



cap. 460. 461.

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MISCELLANIES

BY

JAMES HARRIS

VOL. III.

ADVERTISEMENT.

*M*OST of the Speculations, contained in the following Work, are not the Author's own, but the Speculations of ancient and respectable Philosophers. His employ has been no more, than to exhibit what they taught, which he has endeavoured to do after the best manner he was able. The perusal of old Doctrines may afford perhaps amusement, if it be true (as he has observed in another place *), that, what from it's Antiquity is but little known, has from that very circumstance the recommendation of Novelty.

* See the Preface to *Hermes*.

If he might ask a favour from his Readers, the favour should be this—that, they would not reject his Work upon a cursory inspection, should it appear in some parts too abstruse, and perhaps in others too obvious. He could not well avoid either the one or the other, without impairing an Arrangement, which had been established for Ages.

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PHILOSOPHICAL
ARRANGEMENTS

ADDREST TO THE RIGHT
HONOURABLE THOMAS LORD
HYDE CHANCELLOR OF THE
DUTCHY OF LANCASTER &c. &c.

CHAPTER I.

*Introduction—Scope, or end of the Inquiry
—Begins from the ARRANGEMENT of
simple, or single Terms—Character of
these Terms—Nature and Multitude of
the Objects, which they represent.*

PHILOSOPHY, taking its name Ch. I.
from the *Love of Wisdom*, and hav-
ing for its *End* the Investigation
of Truth, has an equal regard both to
Practice and Speculation, in as much as
Truth of every kind is similar and conge-
B nial.

Ch. I. *nial.* Hence we find that some of the most illustrious *Actors* upon the great Theatre of the World have been engaged at times in Philosophical Speculation. *Pericles*, who governed *Athens*, was the Disciple of *Anaxagoras*; *Epaminondas* spent his youth in the *Pythagorean* School; *Alexander* the Great had *Aristotle* for his Preceptor; and *Scipio* made *Polybius* his Companion and Friend. Why need I mention *Cicero*, or *Cato*, or *Brutus*? The Orations, the Epistles, and the Philosophical Works of the first, shew him sufficiently conversant both in Action and Contemplation. So eager was *Cato* for Knowledge, even when surrounded with Business, that he used to read Philosophy in the Senate house, while the Senate was assembling: and as for the Patriot *Brutus*, though his life was a continual Scene of the most important Action, he found time not only to study, but to compose a *Treatise upon Virtue*.

WHEN

WHEN these were gone, and the worst of times succeeded, *Thrasea Pætus*, and *Helvidius Priscus* were at the same period both Senators, and Philosophers; and appear to have supported the severest trials of *Tyrannic Oppression* by the manly system of the *Stoic Moral* *. The best Emperor, whom the *Romans*, or perhaps any Nation, ever knew, *Marcus Antoninus*, was involved during his whole life in business of the last consequence; sometimes Conspiracies forming, which he was obliged to dissipate; formidable Wars arising at other times, when he was obliged to take the field. Yet during none of these periods did he forsake *Philosophy*, but still persisted in *Meditation* †, and in committing his thoughts to

* See *Arr. Epictet. lib. i. c. 1. and 2.* and the Notes of my late worthy Friend, the learned Editor, *Upton*. See also Mrs. *Carter's* excellent Translation.

† See the Original, particularly in *Gataker's* Edition. See also the learned and accurate Translation of *Meric Casaubon*.

Ch. I. writing, during moments gained by
stealth from the hurry of courts and
campaigns.

IF we descend to later ages, and search *our own Country*, we shall find *Sir Thomas More, Sir Philip Sidney, Sir Walter Raleigh, Lord Herbert of Cherbury, Milton, Algernon Sidney, Sir William Temple*, and many others, to have been all of them eminent in *public Life*, and yet at the same time conspicuous for their *Speculations and Literature*. If we look *abroad*, examples of like character will occur in other Countries. *Grotius*, the Poet, the Critic, the Philosopher, and the Divine, was employed by the court of *Sweden* as *Ambassador to France*: and *De Witt*, that acute but unfortunate Statesman, that Pattern of parcimony and political accomplishments, was an able mathematician, wrote upon the *Elements of Curves*, and applied his Algebra with accuracy to the Trade and Commerce of his Country.

AND so much in DEFENCE OF PHILOSOPHY against those, who may possibly *undervalue* her, because they have *succeeded without* her; those I mean (and it must be confest they are many) who, having spent their whole lives in what *Milton* calls the *busy hum of Men*, have acquired to themselves Habits of amazing efficacy, *unassisted* by the helps of *Science* and *Erudition*. To such the *retired* Student may appear an aukward Being, because they want a just standard to measure his merit. But let them recur to the bright examples before alledged; let them remember that these were eminent in their own way; were men of action and business; men of the world; and yet did they not disdain to cultivate *Philosophy*, nay, were many of them perhaps indebted to her for the splendor of their *active* Character,

THIS reasoning has a farther end. It justifies me in the address of these *Philo-*

Ch: I. *sophical Arrangements*, as your Lordship
 { has been distinguished in *either* character,
 I mean in your *public* one, as well as in
 your *private*. Those, who know the His-
 tory of our *foreign* transactions, know the
 reputation that you acquired both in *Po-*
land and in *Germany** : and those, who
 are honoured with your *nearer* friendship,
 know that you can *speculate* as well as
act, and can employ your pen both with
 Elegance and Instruction.

It may not perhaps be unentertaining
 to your Lordship to see, in what manner
 the *Preceptor of Alexander the Great* ar-
 ranged his *Pupil's* Ideas, *so that they*
might not cause confusion for want of ac-
curate disposition. It may be thought also
 a fact worthy of your notice, that he be-


* The Treaty of *Warsaw*, negotiated and signed by
 Lord *Hyde*, was made in *January*, 1745; that of
Dresden, made under Lord *Hyde's* Mediation, was
 signed the *December* following. By this last Treaty,
 not only the Peace of *Germany* was restored, but the
Austrian Netherlands, and the King of *Sardinia's* Ter-
 ritories were in consequence of it preserved.

came acquainted with this method from Ch. I.
 the venerable *Pythagoras*, who, unless
 he drew it from *remoter* sources, to us
 unknown, was, perhaps, himself its in-
 ventor and original teacher (a).

POETS relate that VENUS was wedded
 to VULCAN, the Goddess of Beauty to
 the God of Deformity. The Tale, as
 some explain it, gives a *double* represen-
 tation of *Art*; *Vulcan* shewing us the
Progressions of Art, and *Venus* the *Comple-*
tions. The *Progressions*, such as the hew-

(a) From *Pythagoras* it past to his Disciples, and
 among others to *Archytas*, who wrote upon the Subject
 in the *Doric* Dialect, the Dialect generally used by *Py-*
thagoras, and his Followers. This Treatise of *Archytas*,
 is in part still extant, tho' but little known, large Quo-
 tations out of it being inserted by *Simplicius* into that
 valuable, but rare Book, his *Commentaries on the Predica-*
ments, from which many of them are transferred into
 the Notes upon the different Chapters of this Work.

Fabricius, in his *Bibliotheca Græca*, T. i. p. 394, men-
 tions a Tract upon this Subject, published at *Venice*
 an. 1571, under the name of *Archytas*, but he informs
 us withal, that its Authenticity is doubted, because the
 above-mentioned Quotations from *Archytas*, made by
Simplicius, are not to be found there. This Tract I
 have never seen.

Ch. I.  ing of Stone, the grinding of Colours, the fusion of Metals, these all of them are laborious, and many times disgustful: the *Completions*, such as the Temple, the Palace, the Picture, the Statue, these all of them are Beauties, and justly call for admiration.

Now if Logic be one of those Arts, which help to improve Human Reason, it must necessarily be an Art of the *progressive* Character; an Art which, not ending with itself, has a view to something *farther*. If then in the following Speculations it should appear dry rather than elegant, severe rather than pleasing, let it plead by way of defence that, tho' its importance may be great, it partakes from its very nature (which cannot be changed) more of the *deformed God*, than of the *beautiful Goddess*.

THE subject commences in the manner following.

THE

THE VULGAR can give reasons to a Ch. I.
 certain degree (*d*), and can examine after }
 a manner, the reasons given them by
 others.—And what is this, but NATURAL
 LOGIC? If therefore these Efforts of
 theirs have an Effect, and nothing hap-
 pen without a Cause, this Effect must of
 necessity be derived from certain Prin-
 ciples.

THE Question then is, *What these Principles are*; for if these can be once investigated, and then knowingly applied, we shall be enabled to do by *Rule*, what others do by *Hazard*; and in what we do, as much to excell the uninstruct-

(*d*) Πάντες γὰρ μέχρι τινὸς καὶ ἐξετάζειν καὶ ὑπέχειν λόγον, καὶ ἀπολογεῖσθαι καὶ κατηγορεῖν ἐγχειροῦσιν. Τῶν μὲν ἔν πολλῶν οἱ μὲν εἰκῇ κ. τ. λ. Omnes enim quadam tenus et exquirere et sustinere rationem, et defendere, et accusare aggrediuntur. At ex imperitâ quidem multitudine alii temerè, &c. *Arist. Rhetor. lib. i. cap. 1.* See also Vol. the first of these Works, *Treatise the third, in the Notes*, p. 286.

Ch. I. ed Reafoner, as a disciplined Boxer fur-
paffes an untaught Ruffic.

Now in the investigation of thefe Principles we are firft taught to obferve, that every *Science* (as Arithmetic, Geometry, Mufic, Aftronomy) may be refolved into it's *Theorems* ; every *Theorem* into it's *Syllogifms* ; every *Syllogifm* into it's *Propofitions* ; and every *Propofition* into certain *fmple*, or *fmgle Terms*.

If this be admitted, it is not difficult to fee, that, in order to know Science, a man muft know firft what makes a Theorem ; in order to know Theorems, he muft know firft what makes a Syllogifm ; in order to know Syllogifms, he muft know firft what makes Propofitions ; and to acquire a general Knowledge of thefe, he muft firft know fmple or fmgle Terms, fmce it is out of thefe that Propofitions are all of them compounded.

AND

AND thus we may perceive, that where Ch. I.
 these several Resolutions *end*, 'tis hence }
 precisely the disquisition is to *begin* (*e*).

It

(*e*) There is an elegant Simile, taken from Architecture, to illustrate this Speculation. The Quotation from the original Author (*Ammonius*) may be found in the first Volume of these Treatises, p. 271. to which a Translation is there subjoined.

Ammonius, after he has produced his Similitude, applies it as follows.

Οὕτως ἔν κ' ὁ φιλόσοφος ποιεῖ· βεβλόμενος γὰρ
 ποιῆσαι ἀπόδειξιν, φησὶ πρὸς ἑαυτὸν, βέλομαι περὶ
 Ἀποδείξεως εἰπεῖν. Ἀλλ' ἐπειδὴ ἡ ἀπόδειξις συλλογισ-
 μός ἐστιν ἐπιστημονικὸς, ἀδύνατον εἰπεῖν περὶ τέττοτον μὴ
 πρότερον εἶποντα, τί ἐστὶ συλλογισμός· τὸν δὲ ἀπλῶς
 συλλογισμὸν ἐκ αὐτῶν μαθοῖμεν, ἢ μαθόντες, τί ἐστὶ πρό-
 τας· λόγοι μὲν γὰρ τινὲς εἰσιν αἱ προτάσεις· τῶν δὲ
 τοιούτων λόγων συλλογὴ ἐστὶν ὁ συλλογισμός· ὥςτε ἄνευ τῆς
 γινῶναι τὰς προτάσεις, ἀδύνατον μαθεῖν τὸν συλλογισ-
 μόν· ἐκ γὰρ τέτων σύγκειται· ἀλλ' ἔδὲ τὴν πρότασιν,
 ἄνευ τῶν ὀνομάτων καὶ τῶν ῥημάτων, ἐξ ὧν συνέστηκε πᾶς
 λόγος. τὰ δὲ ὀνόματα, καὶ ῥήματα ἄνευ τῶν ἀπλῶν
 φωνῶν· ἕκαστον γὰρ τέτων φωνὴ ἐστὶ σημαντική. Δεῖ
 ἔν πρότερον περὶ τῶν ἀπλῶν φωνῶν εἰπεῖν. Ἐνταῦθα
 ἔν ἡ θεωρία κατέληξε, καὶ γίνεσθαι τῆτο τῆς πράξεως
 ἀρχή.

Ch. I. It must begin, where they end, that is to say, from simple Terms; because, if it

ἀρχή. Πρώτερον γὰρ διαλέγεται περὶ τῶν ἀπλῶν Φωνῶν ἐν ταῖς Κατηγορίαις. Εἰθ' ἔτω περὶ ὀνομάτων, καὶ ῥημάτων, καὶ προτάσεως, ἐν τῷ περὶ Ἑρμηνείας· εἴτα περὶ τῶν ἀπλῶς συλλογισμῶν, ἐν τοῖς πρώτοις Ἀναλυτικοῖς· εἰθ' ἔτω περὶ ἀποδείξεως, ἐν τοῖς ὑστέροις Ἀναλυτικοῖς. Ἐνταῦθα ἔν τὸ τέλος τῆς πράξεως, ὅπερ ἦν ἀρχὴ τῆς θεωρίας—*And thus also the Philosopher does: being willing to form a Demonstration, he says to himself, I am willing to speak concerning Demonstration. But, in as much as Demonstration is a Scientific Syllogism, it is impossible to say any thing concerning it, without first saying what is a Syllogism; nor can we learn what is simply a Syllogism, without having first learnt what is a Proposition; for Propositions are certain Sentences; and it is a Collection of such Sentences that forms a Syllogism: so that without knowing Propositions, it is impossible to learn what is a Syllogism, because it is out of these that a Syllogism is compounded. Farther than this, it is impossible to know a Proposition, without knowing Nouns and Verbs, out of which is composed every Species of Sentence; or to know Nouns and Verbs without knowing Sounds articulate, or simple Words, in as much as each of these is a Sound articulate, having a Meaning. It is necessary therefore in the first place to say something concerning simple Words.*

Here then ends the Theory, and it is this, which becomes the Beginning of the Practice, (that is, from this last part the Theory is to be carried into execution.)

First

it were to begin sooner, it would begin Ch. I.
 in the middle; and because if the Reso-
 lutions did not stop somewhere, there
 could be no beginning at all.

Now as to the Subject, whence the Disquisition is to begin (I mean *the Contemplation of Simple Terms*) 'tis obvious it must be widely different from the several Subjects that precede it. The preceding Subjects, such as Theorems, Syllogisms, Propositions, may all of them

First therefore (with a view to the practical Part) he diserts concerning simple articulate Sounds in his PREDICAMENTS: after that, concerning Nouns and Verbs, and Propositions, in his Treatise concerning INTERPRETATION: then, concerning Syllogism, simply so called, in his FIRST ANALYTICS: and finally, concerning Demonstration, in his LATTER ANALYTICS. And here is the End of the Practice, which End (as we have shewn above) was the Beginning of the Theory. Ammon. in Prædic. p. 16. ed. 8vo.

We have made this large Extract from *Ammonius*, not only as it fully explains the Subject of *this* Treatise, but as it gives a concise, and yet an elegant View of that celebrated Work of *Aristotle*, his ORGANON, and of that just and accurate Order in which its several Parts stand arranged.

be

Ch. I. *be resolved, because they are all of them compound: But Terms cannot be resolved, because they are simple or single. The most we can do, as their Multitude is large, is to seek after some Method, by which they may be classed or arranged; and if different Methods of Arrangement occur, then to adopt out of the several that, which appears to be the best.*

It being therefore adjusted, *from what Subject* we are to begin (namely, from *simple or single Terms*) and *after what Manner* we are to begin (namely, by *classing or arranging* them) a farther Question occurs before we proceed, and that is, *What is it, that these Terms represent?*

THERE seem but *three* Classes possible, and these three are either WORDS—or IDEAS—or THINGS, that is to say, *Individuals.*

Now

Now they cannot represent merely *Words*, for then the Treatise would be *Grammatical*—nor yet merely *Ideas*, for then the Treatise would be *Metaphysical*—nor yet merely *Things* or *Individuals*, for then the Treatise would be *Physical*. Ch. I.

How then shall we decide?—Shall we deny that *simple Terms* represent any one of these? Or shall we rather assume the contrary, and say they represent them *all*?—If so, and this be, as it will appear, *the more plausible Hypothesis*, we may affirm of *simple Terms* (the Subject of this Inquiry) that they are *WORDS representing THINGS, through the Medium of our IDEAS (f)*.

THAT

(f) *Ammonius*, in his excellent Commentary upon these Predicaments of *Aristotle*, informs us there were different Sentiments of different Philosophers as to the Subject, concerning which these *Predicaments* were conversant. Some, as *Alexander of Aphrodisæum*, confined them wholly to *Words*: others, as *Eustathius*,

Ch. I. **THAT** *this* in fact is their Character; may appear from the many *Logical*, *Metaphysical*, and *Physical* Theorems, and to these (as *Man* is a Part of Nature) we may add also *Ethical* Speculations; which are occasionally interspersed in the course of this Inquiry (g).

BUT

thus, wholly to *Things*: a third set, of which was *Porphry*, wholly to our *Thoughts* or *Ideas*. *Ammonius* appears to have supposed that they all erred, and that, not so much in the respective Subjects they adopted; as in the restriction or limitation to one Subject only. For this reason he immediately subjoins—

Οἱ δὲ ἀκριβέστερον λέγοντες, ὧν εἷς ἐστὶ καὶ Ἰαμβλῖχῳ, φασὶν ὡς ἕτε περὶ νοημάτων μόνων ἐστὶν αὐτῷ ὁ λόγος; ἕτε περὶ φωνῶν μόνων, ἕτε περὶ πραγμάτων μόνων, ἀλλ' ἐστὶν ὁ σκοπὸς τῶν κατηγοριῶν περὶ φωνῶν σημαίνουσιν πράγματα, διὰ μέσων νοημάτων——But those, who speak more accurately, of which number Iamblichus is one, say that Aristotle discourses not upon Ideas alone, nor upon Words alone, nor upon Things alone; but that the SCOPE or END of his Categories, is, CONCERNING WORDS, SIGNIFYING THINGS, THRO' THE MEDIUM OF OUR THOUGHTS OR IDEAS. *Ammon. in Prædicam. p. 14. 6. ed. 8vo.*

(g) Thus *Boethius*——*Hæc quoque nobis de decem Prædicamentis inspectio, et in Physicâ Aristotelis Doctrinâ,*

BUT to return to our subject, the Ch. I.
Contemplation of Simple Terms.

As they appear to be *Words*, and not only *Words*, but *Words* which represent *Things* through the medium of our *Ideas*, it may not be improper to observe something upon the several Objects

et in Moralis Philosophiæ Cognitione perutilis est; quod per singula currentibus magis liquebit. Boeth. in Cat. p. 113. Edit. fol. Basil.

Ammonius speaks to the same purpose in fuller and more general terms—"Ὅτι δὲ χρήσιμόν ἐστι τὸ βιβλίον εἰς τε τὸ θεωρητικὸν φιλοσοφίας μέρος, καὶ τὸ πρακτικόν, ἐκ τῶν προειρημένων δῆλον, εἴπερ καὶ τὴν ἀπόδειξιν, ἣν ἐδείξαμεν, ἀνευ τῶν ἀπλῶν φωνῶν ἢ ἐκ γινῶναι, καὶ ὅτι περὶ τῶν κοινοτήτων διαλαμβάνει, εἰς ἃ τὰ ὄντα πάντα διαιρεῖται—that the Book is useful both to the speculative Part of Philosophy, and the Practical, is evident from what has been said, if it be true both that Demonstration, as we have shewn, cannot be known without simple Words, and that THE BOOK ALSO TREATS CONCERNING THOSE COMMON CHARACTERS OR ATTRIBUTES, INTO WHICH ALL BEINGS ARE DIVIDED. *Ammon. in Præd. p. 16. Edit. Venet. 8vo.*

C

thus

Ch. I. thus represented, and that with respect
both to their *Nature*, and to their *Multitude*.

As to their Nature (without being too philosophically minute), 'tis enough to observe, that some of them are *sensible* Objects, and some of them are *intelligible*—that *the sensible* are perceived by our several Senses, and make up *the Tribe of external Individuals*—that the *intelligible* are more immediately *our own*, and arise within us, when the Mind, by marking what is *common to many Individuals*, forms to itself a *Species*; or, when by marking *what is common to many Species*, it forms to itself a *Genus*.

NOR are these mental Productions the mere efforts of Art, the ingenious inventions of Human Sagacity, but, under the *original* guidance of pure Nature, even Children in their early days *spontaneously fashion* them, and *spontaneously*

neously refer them to *Individuals*, as they occur, saying of this Individual, 'tis a Horse ; of another, 'tis a Dog ; of a third, 'tis a Sparrow (*h*). Ch. I.

IF from the *Nature* of these Objects (which we have now supposed to be either sensible or intelligible) we pass to their *Multitude*, we shall find the *Genera* to be fewer than the *Species*, and that from this plain reason, because *many* *Species* are included within *one* *Genus*. We shall find also the *Species* to be fewer than the *Individuals*, and that by parity of reason, because *many* *Individuals* are included within *one* *Species*. But as for *Individuals* themselves,

(*h*) See *Hermes*, B. III. c. iv. where the Doctrine of *general* or *universal Ideas* is discuss'd more largely.

See also the *Ἐισαγγελὴ*, or Introduction of *Porphyry*, where the Subject of *Genus* and *Species* is treated in a perspicuous and easy method. This Tract is usually prefixt to *Aristotle's Logic*.

Ch. I. these we shall find to be truly *infinite* ;
and not only infinite, but changing every
moment, as the old are incessantly pe-
rishing, the new incessantly arising.


YET 'tis *these* that compose that *Uni-
verse*, in which we exist ; and without
knowing something of *these*, we may be
considered as living, like the *Cimme-
rians*, in *Homer*,

Ἡέρι καὶ νεφέλῃ κεκαλυμμένοι — — *

Cover'd with mist and cloud.

IF, therefore, *all Science* be something
definite and *steady* (for without this cha-
racter it would not merit the name),
how can it possibly bear relation to *such
a Multitude* as this, a multitude in cha-
racter so truly contrary to it's own, a
multitude every where *fleeting*, every
where *infinite* and *vague* ? How indeed

* Οδυσσ. Α. 15.

should the *fleeting* be known *steadily* ; Ch. I.
 or how should the *vague* and *infinite* (i) 
 be known *definitely* ?

(i) INFINITORUM NULLA COGNITIO EST ; *infinita namque animo comprehendere nequeunt ; quod autem ratione mentis circumdari non potest, nullius Scientiæ fine concluditur : quare INFINITORUM SCIENTIA NULLA EST. Boeth. in Præd. p. 113. Edit. Bas.*

Such was the doctrine of *Boethius*, who, according to the practice of the age, in which he lived, united the *Platonic* and the *Peripatetic* Philosophies. But *Aristotle* himself taught the same doctrine many centuries before.

Εἰ δὲ τὸ μὲν ἄπειρον, ἢ ἄπειρον, ἄγνωστον, τὸ μὲν κατὰ τὸ πλῆθος ἢ μέγεθος ἄπειρον, ἄγνωστον ποσόν τι· τὸ δὲ κατ' εἶδος ἄπειρον, ἄγνωστον ποιόν τι· τῶν δ' ἀρχῶν ἀπείρων ὅσων καὶ κατὰ πλῆθος καὶ κατ' εἶδος, ἀδύνατον εἶδέναι τὰ ἐκ τῶν. ἔτι γὰρ εἶδέναι τὸ σύνθετον ὑπολαμβάνομεν, ὅταν εἰδῶμεν ἐκ τίνων καὶ πόσων εἶναι. *Arist. Phys. l. i. p. . Edit. Sylb. If therefore INFINITE, considered as infinite, be UNKNOWNABLE, then that which is infinite in Multitude or Magnitude is unknowable as to QUANTITY, and that which is infinite in Form is unknowable as to QUALITY. But the Principles being infinite both in Multitude and in Quality, 'tis impossible to know the Beings derived out of them. For then 'tis we conceive that WE KNOW ANY BEING COMPOSITE, when we know out of WHAT Things, and HOW MANY Things it is compounded.*


Ch. I. As this can hardly be supposed, 'tis
 for this reason that LOGIC, which is
 justly called THE ORGAN (*k*), or IN-
 STRUMENT of the Sciences, has for it's
first Employment to reduce Infinitude ;
 and this it does by establishing certain de-
 finitive ARRANGEMENTS, or CLASSES, to

(*k*) The Stoics held Logic to be a Part of Philoso-
 phy ; the Peripatetics held it no more than an OR-
 GAN, or INSTRUMENT ; Plato held it to be both, as
 well a Part as an Organ. His Reasoning, according
 to Ammonius was, as follows. Καθάπερ γάρ Φησιν ὁ
 Ξένης διττός, ὁ μὲν μετρώων, ὁ δὲ μετράμενος, καὶ ὁ
 μὲν μετρώων ὄργανόν ἐστι τῆς μετρήσεως, ὁ δὲ μετράμε-
 νος μέρος τῆς ὅλης ὑγρῆς ὡσαύτως καὶ ἡ Λογικὴ ἀνευ
 μὲν τῶν πραγμάτων ἔσα, ὄργανόν ἐστι τῆς Φιλοσοφίας,
 συμβιβασζομένη δὲ τοῖς πράγμασι, μέρος ἐστι τῆς Φι-
 λосоφίας. As the Quart, says he, is twofold, one that
 which measures, the other that which is measured ; and as
 that, which measures, is the Organ of Mensuration ;
 that, which is measured, the Part of some whole or intire
 fluid : in like Manner also Logic, when taken apart from
 things, is an Organ of Philosophy ; when connected with
 them, is a Part of Philosophy.

Thus Ammonius on the *Categories*, p. 8. where we
 may find also the reasonings both of the Stoics and
 the Peripatetics.

some

some of which *all Particulars may be referred*, however numerous, however diversified, the past, the present, the future, all alike.

Ch. I.



AND thus we return to *Classing* and *Arranging*, the Process already suggested to be the proper one.

IT remains to inquire, whether there are more Methods of Arrangement than one; and, if more, then, from among them, which method we ought to prefer.

BUT this will be the Subject of the following Chapter.

C H A P. II.

A Method of Arrangement proposed—rejected, and why—another Method proposed—adopted, and why—General Remarks—Plan of the Whole.

Ch. II.  ONE Method of Arrangement is as follows.

THE Multitude of *Ideas* treasured up in the human Mind, and which, bearing reference to *Things*, are expressed by *Words*, may be arranged and circumscribed under the following characters. They all denote either SUBSTANCE or ATTRIBUTE—and *Substance* and *Attribute* may be each of them modified under the different characters of UNIVERSAL and PARTICULAR, as best befits the Purposes of Reasoning and Science. Thus *Man is an universal Substance; Alexander,*

ander, a particular One: Valour, an universal Attribute; the Valour of Alexander, a particular One. Ch. II.

AND hence there arises a QUADRUPLE ARRANGEMENT OF TERMS; an Arrangement of them into SUBSTANCE UNIVERSAL, and SUBSTANCE PARTICULAR; into ATTRIBUTE UNIVERSAL, and ATTRIBUTE PARTICULAR, to some one of which FOUR not only our *Words* and our *Ideas*, but the innumerable Tribe of *Individuals* may all of them be reduced (a).

A LARGE

(a) This method may be found in the beginning of *Aristotle's Predicaments*, before he comes to the actual enumeration of the *Predicaments* themselves.

See *Aristot. Prædic.* p. 23. Edit. Sylb. Τῶν ὅντων τὰ μὲν καθ' ὑποκειμένον κ. τ. λ.

The *Stagirite*, in giving this *quadruple* Arrangement, explains himself not by *Names*, but by *Descriptions*. *Substance universal* he describes, as follows—καθ' ὑποκειμένον τινὸς λέγεται, ἐν ὑποκειμένῳ δ' ἔδενί ἐστι—*Attribute particular*, ἐν ὑποκειμένῳ μὲν ἐστὶ, καθ' ὑποκειμένον

Ch. II. A LARGE *Reduction* this, yet a *Reduction* which may possibly lead us into another *Extreme*, by rendering that *Multitude*, which we would confine, *too limited, too abridged*. Suppose, therefore, we were to inquire whether this *Reduction* might not be *enlarged*, and a second and *more perfect Method* than the last be established.

THE World, as we see, is filled with various *SUBSTANCES*. Each of these possesses it's proper *Attributes*, and is at the same time encompassed with certain

κειμένῃ δὲ ὁδῷ λέγεται—*Attribute general*, καθ' ὑποκειμένῃ τε λέγεται, καὶ ἐν ὑποκειμένῳ ἔσιν—*Substances particular*, ἢ ἐν ὑποκειμένῳ ἔσιν, ἢ καθ' ὑποκειμένῃ τινὸς λέγεται.

Those, who would see an explanation of those several *Descriptions*, and why *Aristotle* prefers them to their peculiar *Names*, may consult his *Greek Commentator*, *Ammonius*, and his *Latin one*, *Boethius*, who are both of them copious and accurate upon the subject.

Circum-

Circumstantials. Not to speak of *intelli-* Ch. II.
gible Substances (which belong rather to }
Metaphysics), *natural* Substances appear
all to be *extended*; nor that simply, but
under a certain *external Figure*, and *in-*
ternal Organization. A Lion and an
Oak agree, as they are both *extended*;
yet have they each a Figure, and Orga-
nization *peculiar*. A *living* Lion and a
brazen Lion may have the *same* external
Figure, but *within* there is a wide *Dif-*
ference from the *possession* of *Organization*
on one side, and the *want* of it on the
other. If then we call the Attribute of
Extension QUANTITY, that of *Figure*
and *Organization* QUALITY, we may set
down these two (I mean *Quantity* and
Quality) as the two great *essential Attri-*
butes belonging to every Substance, whe-
ther natural or artificial.


AGAIN, every *Substance*, whether na-
tural or artificial, either from *Will* or
from *Appetite*, or, where these are want-
ing,

Ch. II. ing, from such *lower* Causes as it's *Figure* or mere *Quantity*, has (in an enlarged use of the Words) a *Power to act*. Thus 'tis through *Will*, that Men study ; through *Appetite*, that Brutes eat ; through its *Figure*, that the Clock goes ; and through its *Quantity*, that the Stone descends. Nor are they only thus capable of *acting*, but also of *being acted upon*, and that too each of them, according to its respective Character. The Mind is acted upon by *Truth*, the Appetite by *Pleasure*, the Clock by a *Spring*, and the Stone by *Gravitation*. Thus then, besides *Quantity* and *Quality*, we have found two other Attributes, common to all *Substances*, and these are ACTION and PASSION.

AGAIN, it often happens when Substances are not *present* to us, that we are desirous to know, *when* and *where* they existed. *When*, we ask, lived *Homer* ? *Where*, we ask, stood the antient *Memphis* ?

phis ?—In the answer to these Questions Ch. II. we learn the *Time* and *Place*, which *circumscribed* the existence of these Beings. Now as all sensible Substances are circumscribed after these manners, hence we may consider the *WHEN*, and the *WHERE*, as two *Circumstantials*, that inseparably attend them. And thus have we added two more Attributes to the number already established.

FARTHER still, in contemplating *where* things exist, we are often led to consider their *Position*, and that more especially in *living* Substances possessing the Power of Self-Motion. There is a manifest difference between *reclining* and *sitting*; between *sitting* and *standing*; and there are other Circumstances of *Position*, which extend to all Substances whatever. And thus must *POSITION* or *SITUATION* be subjoined as another different Attribute.

Ch. II.  ADD to this, when *Substances* are *superinduced upon Substances*, we consider them under the character of *Cloathing* or *HABIT*. Thus in the strict sense of the word, the *Glove*, covering our hand, the *Shoe* our foot, the *Coat* our Body, are so many Species of *Habit*. By a more *distant* Analogy the *Corn* may be said to *cloath* the fields, the *Woods* to *cloath* the Mountains ; and by an Analogy still more remote than that, the *Sciences* and *Virtues* to be *Habits*, that *cloath the Mind*.

LAST of all, in the variety of *co-existing* Substances and Attributes, there are many whose very *Existence* infers the *Existence of some other*. Thus in *Substances*, the *Existence of Son* infers that of *Father* ; of *Servant*, that of *Master* : in *Quantity*, the *Existence of greater* infers that of *less* ; in *Position*, *above* infers *below* ; and in the time *When*, *subsequent* has

has a necessary respect to *prior*. 'Tis Ch. II.
 when we view things in these *mutual De-*
pendencies, in these *reciprocal Inferences*,
 that we discover another Attribute, the
Attribute of RELATION.

AND thus instead of confining our-
 selves to the simple Division of SUB-
 STANCE and ATTRIBUTE, we have di-
 vided ATTRIBUTE itself into NINE di-
 stinct sorts ; some of which we have
 considered as *essential*, others as *circum-*
stantial, and thus made upon the whole
 (*by setting Substance at their Head*) TEN
 COMPREHENSIVE AND UNIVERSAL GE-
 NERA, called, with reference to their *Greek*
 name, CATEGORICS ; with reference to
 their *Latin* name, PREDICAMENTS ; and
 styled in the Title of this Work, PHILO-
 SOPHICAL ARRANGEMENTS (*b*). When
 enume-

(*b*) The Antients gave to these ARRANGEMENTS
 different Names, and made also the Number of them
 different. Some, as *Archytas*, called them καθόλου
 λόγοι,

Ch. II. enumerated (*c*), their several Names are
 in order, as they follow: SUBSTANCE,
 QUAE-

λόγοι, *universal Denominations*; others, as *Quintilian*, *Elementa*, *Elements*; others, as *Aristotle*, *ῥήματα κατηγορίας*, *Figures, or Forms of Predication*; *κατηγορίαι*, *Prædicaments*; *γένη γενικώτατα*, *the most general or comprehensive Genera*, *τὰ πρῶτα γένη*, *the primary Genera*. They differed also as to their Number. Some made them *two*, *Subject* and *Accident*, or (which is the same) *Substance* and *Attribute*; others made them *three*, dividing *Accidents* into the *inherent* and *circumstantial*; the *Stoics* held them to be *four*, *ὑποκείμενα*, *πῶτα*, *πῶς ἔχοντα*, *καὶ πρὸς τι πῶς ἔχοντα*, *Subjects, things distinguished by Qualities, distinguished by being peculiarly circumstanced within themselves, distinguished by being so with reference to something else*; *Plato* said they were *five*, *ἁπλῆς*, *ταυτότης*, *ἐτερότης*, *κίνησις*, *καὶ ἡσυχία*, *Substance, Identity, Diversity, Motion, Rest*; others made *seven*; lastly, the *Pythagoreans* and *Peripatetics*, maintained the Number usually adopted, that is to say, those *ten*, which make the Subject of this Treatise.

See *Aristot. Prædic.* p. 24, et *Metaphys.* p. 79, 100, 104, &c. *Edit. Sylburg.* *Quintil.* l. iii. c. 6. *Ammon. in Prædicam.* p. 16, 17, &c. *Edit. Venet.* 8vo. 1545. *Simplic. in Prædicam.* p. 16. *V. Edit. Basil.* Fol. 1551.

As *Words*, by signifying *Things*, through the Medium of our *Ideas*, are essential to *Logic*, and are the
 Mate-

QUALITY, QUANTITY, RELATION, ACTION, PASSION, WHEN, WHERE, POSITION, and HABIT. Ch. II.

As each of these ten Predicaments has it's subordinate distinctions, the Basis of our Knowledge will be now so amply *widened*, that we shall find Space sufficient, on which to build, be our Plan diversified, and extensive, as it may.

WE cannot conclude this Chapter without observing, that the doctrine of these CATEGORIES, these PREDICAMENTS, these PRIMARY GENERA, or

Materials of every Proposition, the present Work may be called *Logical*. But as the Speculations extend to *Physics*, to *Ethics*, and even to the *First Philosophy*, they become for that reason something *more than Logical*, and have been called, with a view to this their *comprehensive* Character, *not Logical*, but PHILOSOPHICAL ARRANGEMENTS.

(c) Τῶν κατὰ μηδεμίαν συμπλοκὴν λεγόμενων, ἕκαστον ἥτοι ἑστίαν σημαίνει, ἢ ποσὸν, ἢ ποιὸν, ἢ πρὸς τι, ἢ πᾶς, ἢ ποτὲ, ἢ κεῖσθαι, ἢ ἔχειν, ἢ ποιεῖν, ἢ πάσχειν, *Aristot. Præd. p. 24. Edit. Sylb.* The passage needs no other translation, than what appears in the Text.

D

PHILO-

Ch. II. PHILOSOPHICAL ARRANGEMENTS, is a valuable, a copious, and a sublime *Theory*; a *Theory*, which, when well understood, leads by *Analogy* from things *sensible* to things *intelligible*; from *Effect* to *Cause*; from that which is *passive*, *unintelligent*, and *subordinate*, to that which is *active*, *intelligent*, and *supreme*; a *Theory*, which prepares us not only to study every thing *else* with advantage, but makes us knowing withal in one respect, where *particular* studies are sure to fail; knowing in the *relative* value of things, when *compared* one to another; and modest, of course, in the estimate of our own accomplishments *.

THIS is in fact the *necessary* consequence of being shewn *to what Portion of Being every Art or Science belongs*, and how *limited that Portion*, when *compared to what remains*. The want of this ge-


* See the last Chapter of this Treatise, p. 462, 463.

neral knowlege leads to an effect the Ch. II.
 very reverse; so that men, who possess
 it not, though profoundly knowing in a
single Art or a single Science, are too of-
 ten carried by such *partial Knowlege* to
 a blameable *Arrogance*, as if *the rest* of
 mankind were busied in *pursuits of no*
value, and *themselves the monopolizers of*
Wisdom and of Truth.—But this by the
 way.

THE *distinct* discussion of each one of
 these *Categories, Predicaments, Arrange-*
ments, or Genera, will become the busi-
 ness of the following Chapters; which
 discussion, joined to what has been *al-*
ready premised, as well as to such *future*
 inquiries, as shall naturally arise in con-
 sequence, will include all we have to of-
 fer upon this *interesting subject (d)*.

As

(d) The *Greek* Logicians divided their specula-
 tions on this subject into three *τμήματα*, or Sec-
 tions, calling the first Section, *τὸ πρὸ τῶν κατηγοριῶν*;

Ch. II.  As for PROPOSITIONS, which have for their materials *the simple Terms*, here enumerated ; and for SYLLOGISMS, which have for their materials *the several Species of Propositions* ; both these naturally make *subsequent and distinct* Parts of LOGIC, and must therefore be consigned to some future Speculation.

IF we go back farther, and recur to *Theorems of Science*, or to *Sciences them-*

the second, τὸ περὶ αὐτῶν κατηγοριῶν ; the third, τὸ μετὰ τὰς κατηγορίας. *Ammon. in Prædic. p. 146.*

The *Latins*, adhering to the same Division, coined new names, *Anti-prædicamenta*, or *Præ-prædicamenta* ; *Prædicamenta* ; and *Post-prædicamenta*. *Sanderfon, p. 22, 51, 55. Edit. Oxon. 1672.*

In the present Work, the first Section begins from Chapter the first ; the second Section, from Chapter the third ; the third Section, from Chapter the fifteenth. Of these Sections, the second (which discusses the Predicaments, or Philosophical Arrangements) makes the *real and essential* part of the Speculation : the first and third Sections are only *subservient* to it ; the first to prepare, the third to explain.


selves,

felves, these will be found *not properly* Ch. II.
Parts of Logic, but works of a *different* }
and *higher* character ; works, where Lo-
gic serves the Philosopher for an *Instru-*
ment or *Organ*, as the Chizzel serves the
Statuary, the Pencil serves the Painter.

AT present we are to proceed to the
Speculation concerning SUBSTANCE.

C H A P. III.

Concerning SUBSTANCE natural—how continued, or carried on—Principles of this Continuation, two—increased to three—reduced again to two—these last two, Form and a Subject, or rather Form and Matter.

Ch. III.


TO explain how natural SUBSTANCES originally began, is a task too arduous for unassisted Philosophy. But to inquire after what manner, when once begun, they have been *continued*, is a work better suited to *Human* abilities; because to a portion of this Continuity we are *personally present*, nay within it we ourselves are all included, as so many *parts*.

Now as to the manner, in which subsists the *Continuity* of natural Substances,

stances, and as to the Causes (*a*) by Ch. III. which that Continuity is maintained ; there is no one, it is probable, who imagines every Birth, every recent Production, that daily happens in the Universe, to be an absolutely fresh Creation ; a realizing of Non-entity ; an Evocation (if it may be so described) of something

(*a*) The Doctrine of *Causes*, and their different Species, is treated at large in the first volume of these Miscellanies, through the whole Treatise upon *Art*, and in the Notes subjoined to the same, particularly page 280.

The Author desires to inform his Readers, that in the subsequent disquisitions he hath not confined himself merely to *Logic*, but has interspersed many Speculations of different kinds ; acting in this view differently from the Model set him by the *Stagirite*. The *Stagirite* left no Part of Philosophy unexplored, and of course had *separate* and *distinct* Treatises for *Logic*, *Physicks*, and the many other Branches of Science, as well the practical, as the speculative. Not so the Author of this Treatise : he by no means pretends to emulate the comprehensive variety of that sublime and acute Genius, whose writings made him for more than two thousand years the admiration of *Grecians*, *Romans*, *Arabians* *Jews*, and *Christians*. Such esteem could not have been the effect either of Fashion, or of Chance.

Ch. III. out of nothing.—What then is it?—

~ 'Tis a *Change* or *Mutation* out of Something, which was *before*. It appears, therefore, that to inquire how natural Substances are *continued*, is to inquire what are the Principles of *Mutation* or *Change*.

FIRST, then, let us observe, what is in fact most obvious, that there can be no Mutation or Change, were every thing to remain precisely *one* and the *same*; hot and cold, precisely as they are, one hot, the other cold; so likewise crooked and strait; black and white, &c. On the contrary, Mutation or Change is from one thing into another (*b*), from

(*b*) Thus *Aristotle*—Πᾶσα μεταβολή ἐστὶν ἐκ τινὸς εἰς τι. He then subjoins the *Etymology* of the word μεταβολή, to confirm his doctrine—δηλοῖ γὰρ καὶ τὸ ὄνομα. MET' ἈΛΛΟ γάρ τι, καὶ τὸ μὲν πρότερον δηλοῖ, τὸ δ' ὕστερον. *Even the Name* (says he) *shows it*; for 'tis SOMETHING AFTER SOMETHING ELSE; and one of these things denotes prior, the other denotes subsequent. *Physic. lib. v. c. i. p. 95. Edit. Sylb.*

hot

hot into cold, or from cold into hot ; Ch.III.
 from strait into crooked, or from crooked }
 into strait ; and so in other instances. It
 follows hence, that the *Principles* of Mu-
 tation or Change are necessarily Two ;
 one, a Principle, OUT OF which ; the
 other, a Principle INTO which.

AGAIN, these two Principles are not
 merely casual and temerarious (c). Hot
 changes not into Crooked, but into
 Cold ; Crooked not into Cold, but into
 Strait ; White not into Moist, but into

(c) Thus the same Author—'Απάντων τῶν ὄντων ἔ-
 δὲν ἔτε ποιεῖν πέφυκεν, ἔτε πάσχειν τὸ τυχὸν ὑπὸ τῆς
 τυχούτης, ὅδ' ἐ γίγνεται ὅτις ἐξ ὅτου ἐν—ἀλλὰ λευ-
 κὸν μὲν γίγνεται ἐξ ἑ λεύκου, καὶ τὰς ἐκ ἐκ παντός,
 ἀλλ' ἐκ μέλανος ἢ τῶν μετὰξὺ, καὶ μουσικὸν κ. τ. λ.
Universally with regard to all Beings whatever, no one
Being is formed by Nature either to act upon any other indif-
ferently, or to be acted upon indifferently ; nor is any thing
produced or generated [indiscriminately] out of any thing
—but white is generated or produced out of something Not
white ; and this, not every thing that may be so called, but
either out of Black, or some of the intermediate Colours.
The same holds as to the production of what is Musical,
&c. Arist. Phys. l. i. c. 5. p. 14. Edit. Sylb.

Black ;

Ch.III. Black ; Moist not into Black, but into
 { Dry. The same holds in other instances
 more (d) complicated. The becoming a
 Statue is a Change from *indefinite* Con-
 figuration into *definite* ; the becoming a
 Palace, a Change from Dispersion into
 Combination, from Disorder into Order.
 Already the Principles, which we in-
 vestigate, have appeared to be *Two* ;
 and now it further appears that they
 must be CONTRARIES (e) or OPPOSITES.

(d) Καὶ τὰ μὴ ἀπλᾶ τῶν ὕτων, ἀλλὰ σύνθετα, κατὰ τὸν αὐτὸν ἔχει λόγον—ἥτε γὰρ οἰκία γίνεται ἐκ τῶ μὴ συνκεῖσθαι, ἀλλὰ διηρῆσθαι ταδὶ ὡδί· καὶ ὁ ἀνδρίας καὶ τῶν ἐχημαλισμένων τι ἐξ ἀρχημοσύνης, καὶ ἑκάστου τέτων τὰ μὲν τάξεις, τὰ δὲ σύνθεσις τίς ἐσιν. *Beings too, which are not simple, but composite, admit the same reasoning—for the House is formed from certain Materials, which are not previously so compounded [as to make a House], but which lie separate ; and the Statue, and every one of those things, which have Figure given them, are formed out of something, which wants that Figure ; and each Production has a different Name, sometimes 'tis ORDER, sometimes 'tis COMPOSITION. Arist. Phys. l. i. c. 5. p. 14, 15.*

(e) See the same Author in the same Treatise, p. 11, 12, &c. See also the Quotation in the Text from


AUTHORITY is not wanting to countenance this last position. The Scripture (f) tells us, that *the Earth* in the beginning *was without form, and void, and darkness was upon the face of the deep.* After this it became *enlightened*, as well as *replenished*; replenished with various *Forms* both Vegetable and Animal; *enlightened* by the sublime Command of, LET THERE BE LIGHT, AND THERE WAS LIGHT. In the whole of this Progress we may remark CONTRARIETY; *Formless* opposed to *Form*; *Void* to *Replenished*; and *Darkness* to *Light*. Ch.III.

AMONG the ancient Philosophers, some held the Principles of things to be hot and cold; others, to be moist and dry; others, to be dense and rare; others, in a

from Scripture, which immediately follows, as well as the subsequent Notes.

(f) *Genesis*, chap. i.

more

Ch. III.  more abstracted way, to be Excess and Defect; Even and Odd; Friendship and Strife. Among the moderns, we know the stress laid on Action and Re-action; Attraction and Repulsion; Expansion and Condensation; Centripetal and Centrifugal: to which may be added those two Principles held by many Ancients as well as Moderns, the Principles of Atoms and a Void (g), which two stand opposed nearly as *Being* and *Non-being*.

WE shall subjoin the following passage from a Treatise of ancient date, because in it the Force of Contraries is exemplified with elegance.

(g) *Democritus*, says *Aristotle*, holds THE SOLID and the VOID, τὸ στερεὸν καὶ κενόν, to be PRINCIPLES, ὧν τὸ μὲν ὡς ὄν, τὸ δ' ὡς ἔκ ὄν εἶναι φησι, of which he says the one is the same as BEING, the other the same as NON-BEING. See *Arist. Phys.* l. i. c. 5. p. 13. See also c. 4. p. 11. where the other Contraries are explained at large.

“ Some

“ Some (says an ancient Author) (h) Ch.III.
 “ have wondered how the World, if it be
 “ composed, as it appears, out of CON-
 “ TRARY PRINCIPLES (*the Dry, the*
 “ *Moist, the Cold, and the Hot*) has not
 “ for ages ago been ruined and destroyed.
 “ As if indeed men should wonder how a
 “ City could subsist, composed (*as it is*) out

(h) See the Treatise *Περὶ κόσμου* — It is given to *Aristotle*, and always makes a part of his Works; but although it be of genuine antiquity, and truly sublime, both in language and sentiment, yet some have thought it of a later period, and not written in the close manner and style of *Aristotle*. A Translation of it is extant, as old as by the Philosopher *Apuleius*, besides other Translations more modern. The Tract itself stands the fifth in the volume of *Aristotle's Physical Pieces*, according to *Sylburgius's* edition, and the passage here translated may be found, cap. 5. page 12. of that edition, beginning at the Words, *Καὶ τοὶ γέ τις ἐθαύμασε πῶς πῶτε εἰ ἐν τῶν ἐναντίων κ. τ. λ.* In *Apuleius* the words are, *Et quibusdam mirum videri solet, quod, cum ex diversis,* &c. p. 731. Edit. in *Usum Delphini*. Quarto.


See *Fabricius's Biblioth. Græc.* T. ii. p. 127, where the learned Author, with his usual labour and accuracy, has collected all the sentiments both of Antients and Moderns on this valuable work.

“ cf

Ch. III. *“ of contrary Tribes (I mean the Poor
 “ and the Opulent, the Young and the
 “ Aged, the Weak and the Strong, the
 “ Good and the Bad), and be ignorant that
 “ this of all things is most admirable in
 “ Political Concord; I mean, that by ad-
 “ mitting every Nature and every Fortune,
 “ it forms out of MANY dispositions ONE
 “ disposition; and out of Dissimilar ones, a
 “ Similar. Perhaps also NATURE herself
 “ has an affection for CONTRARIES, and
 “ chooses out of these to form the Conso-
 “ nant, and not out of things similar; so
 “ that in the same manner as she associated
 “ the Male to the Female, and not each to
 “ it's own Sex, did she establish through
 “ Contraries, and not Similars, the first
 “ and original Concord. ART too, in imi-
 “ tation of Nature, appears to do the same.
 “ Thus Painting, by blending the Natures
 “ of things white and black, pale and red,
 “ produces Representations consonant to
 “ their originals. Thus Music, by mixing
 “ together Sounds that are sharp and flat,
 “ that*

“ that are long and short, out of different Ch. III.
 “ voices produces one Harmony. Thus {
 “ Grammar, by forming a mixture out of
 “ Vowels and Mutes, through these hath
 “ established the whole of it's Art. And
 “ this is what appears to have been the
 “ meaning of that obscure Philosopher He-
 “ raclitus. You are, says he, to connect the
 “ Perfect and the Imperfect, the Agree-
 “ ing and the Disagreeing, the Consonant
 “ and the Dissonant ; and OUT OF ALL
 “ THINGS, ONE ; AND OUT OF ONE,
 “ ALL THINGS.”

THUS far this ingenious Author, with
 regard to whose doctrine, as well as that
 of the many others already mentioned,
 we cannot but remark, that whatever
 may have caused such an *Unanimity* of
 opinion, whether it were that men
 adopted it from one another by a sort of
 Tradition, or were insensibly led to it
 by the latent force of Truth ; *all* Philo-
 sophers, of *all* ages, appear to have fa-
 voured

Ch. III.  voured CONTRARIETY, and given their sanction to the Hypothesis, that PRINCIPLES ARE CONTRARIES (i).

BUT farther still—'Tis impossible for Contraries to co-exist, in the same place, at the same instant. 'Tis impossible, for example, that in the same place and instant should co-exist Cold and Hot; Crooked and Strait; Dispersion and Combination; Disorder and Order. As therefore the Principles of Change are *Contraries*, and Contraries cannot co-exist, it follows that *one Principle* must necessarily depart, as the *other accedes*. Thus in the Mutation out of Disorder into Order, when *the Principle* INTO WHICH,

(i) Πάντες γὰρ τὰ στοιχεῖα καὶ τὰς ὑπ' αὐτῶν καλεμένους ἀρχάς, καίπερ ἄνευ λόγου τιθέντες, ὅμως τὰναντία λέγουσιν, ὥσπερ ὑπ' αὐτῆς τῆς ἀληθείας ἀναγκασθέντες. For ALL Philosophers hold the Elements and those other Causes, which they call PRINCIPLES (though they suppose them without giving a reason) to be CONTRARIES, compelled as it were to do so by Truth itself. *Aristot. Phys. l. i. c. 5. p. 15.*

that

that is *Order*, accedes, *the Principle* OUT Ch.III.
 OF WHICH, that is *Disorder*, departs. }
 The same happens in all other instances.

A QUESTION then arises. If one of them necessarily depart, as soon as the other accedes, how can Nature possibly maintain *the Continuity* of her Productions? To *depart*, is to be no more, a sort of Annihilation, or *Death*; to *accede*, is to *pass into Being*, a sort of Production or *Birth*. They cannot co-exist, because they are absolutely incompatible (*k*); so that upon this Hypothesis
there

(*k*) Τὸ μὴ ποιεῖν δύο μόνον, ἔχει τινὰ λόγον· ἀπορήσειε γὰρ ἂν τις, πῶς ἡ πυκνότης τὴν μαλότηα ποιεῖν πέφυκεν, ἢ αὐτὴ τὴν πυκνότηα· ὁμοίως δὲ καὶ ἄλλη ὁποιαῦν ἐναντιότης. *That we should not make TWO PRINCIPLES only, has some appearance of reason: for a man may well doubt, how Density should be formed by nature to make Rarity, or this last, Density; and so in like manner with respect to any other Contrariety whatever. Arist. Phys. l. i. c. 6. p. 16.*

Simplicius well observes—τὸ μὲν γὰρ ποιεῖν εἰς ὑπομένον τι ποιεῖ· τὸ δὲ ἐναντίον ἔχ' ὑπομένει τὸ ἐναντίον
 E —That

Ch.III. *there can be no Continuity at all, but every new Production must be a realizing of Non-entity, a fresh and genuine Evocation of something out of nothing.*

IF this in the *Continuity* of Beings appear a difficulty, let us try, whether we can remove it by any aid not yet suggested. Crooked, we are told, is changed into Strait, *a Contrary into a Contrary*; one of which necessarily *departs*, and the other *accedes*. We admit it.—But is there not *Something*, which during the Change, *neither departs nor accedes*? Something which REMAINS, and is all along still ONE and the SAME (1).

THE

—That, which acts, acts upon something which remains; but CONTRARY DOES NOT REMAIN and wait for Contrary. *Simpl. in Præd. p. 43. B. Edit. Basil. 1551.*

(1) Καὶ τῆτο ὁρθῶς λέγει Διογένης, ὅτι εἰ μὴ ἦν ἐξ ἐνὸς ἀπαντα, ἐκ αὐτοῦ ἦν τὸ ποιεῖν καὶ πάσχειν ὑπ' ἀλλήλων· οἷον τὸ θερμὸν ψύχεσθαι, καὶ τῆτο θερμαίνεσθαι

THE Stick, for example, changes from Crooked into Strait; and if there was not a *Stick*, or *something analogous*, no

πάλιν· ἡ γὰρ ἡ θερμότης μεταβάλλει καὶ ἡ ψυχρότης εἰς ἀλλήλα, ἀλλὰ δῆλον, ὅτι τὸ ὑποκείμενον ὥσε ἐν οἷς τὸ ποιεῖν εἰς καὶ τὸ πάσχειν, ἀνάγκη τέτων μίαν εἶναι τὴν ὑποκειμένην φύσιν.—And this is rightly said by Diogenes, that if all things were not out of ONE thing, it would not be possible for them to act, or be acted upon by one another; for example, that, what is hot, should become cold; or reciprocally, that this should become hot; for 'tis not the Heat or the Coldness, which change into one another, but 'tis that evidently changes, which is the SUBJECT of these Affections: whence it follows that in those things, where there is acting, and being acted upon, 'tis necessary there should belong to them some ONE Nature, their COMMON SUBJECT. *Arist. de Gener. et Cor.* lib. i. c. 6. p. 20. *Edit. Sylb.*

Aristotle, who gives this quotation, well remarks, that it was too much to affirm this of *all* things, but that it should be confined to such things only as reciprocally act, and are acted upon; and so in his Comment we may perceive he restrains them.

See more of this ONE Being, the *common Subject*, or *Substratum*, in the following Chapter.

The *Diogenes* here mentioned was a contemporary of *Anaxagoras*, and lived many years before the *Cynic* of the same name. See *Diog. Laert.* ix. 57.

Ch. III. *such Change could be effected. Yet is it less a Stick for becoming Strait; or was it more so, when Crooked? Does it not remain (m), considered as a Stick, precisely,*

(m) "Ὅτι δὲ αἰεί τι ὑποκείμενον τὸ γινόμενον, καὶ τὸτο εἰ καὶ ἀριθμῶ ἐστὶν ἓν, ἀλλ' εἶδει γε ἔχ' ἓν. (τὸ γὰρ εἶδει λέγω, καὶ λόγῳ ταύτῳ.) ὃ γὰρ ταύτῳ ἀνθρώπῳ καὶ τῷ ἀμέσῳ εἶναι. καὶ τὸ μὲν ὑπομένει, τὸ δ' ἔχ' ὑπομένει. τὸ μὲν ὑποκείμενον ὑπομένει. (ὃ γὰρ ἀνθρώπῳ ὑπομένει) τὸ δὲ ἀμεσῶν ἔχ' ὑπομένει. 'Tis necessary that in every Production there should be a Subject [or a Substratum], and this, though One numerically, yet not One in Form (I mean, by one in Form, the same as One in Reason, in Detail, or Definition). Thus 'tis not the same thing to be a Man, and to be a Being Immusical, or Void of musical Art. [In the formation of a Musician] the one remains, the other remains not; the Subject or Substratum remains (for Man remains); the being Immusical, or Void of musical Art, remains not [for that is lost, as soon as he becomes an Artist.] *Arist. Phys. l. i. c. 7. p. 18. Edit. Sylb.*

The Production, or Formation here spoken of, means the becoming a Musician by the acquisition of the musical Art. The same reasoning may be applied to any other Art or Science, which Man, as Man, is capable of acquiring.

Again, the same Philosopher—"Ἐτι τὸ μὲν ὑπομένει, τὸ δ' ἐναντίον ἔχ' ὑπομένει. ἔστιν ἄρα τὸ τρίτον παρὰ
ῥα

cifely, in either case, *one and the same*? Ch.III.

As therefore the Stick is to Crooked and Strait, so is the Bar of Iron to Hot and Cold; the Brass of the Statue to Figure and Deformity; the Stones of the Palace to Order and Confusion; and *something, analogous* in other Changes, to other *Contraries, not enumerated.*

IF therefore we were right in what we asserted before, and are so in what we assert now; it should seem that THE PRINCIPLES OF CHANGE OR MUTATION WERE THREE (*n*); ONE, *that which de-*
parts;

παὶ τὰ ἐναντία. *Add to this (says he) there is SOMETHING [in productions of all kinds] WHICH REMAINS; but the Contrary does not remain; there is therefore some THIRD thing over and above the Contraries. Metaph. A. p 196. Edit. Sylb.*

If there appear a difficulty in the first quotation of this note, concerning a Subject being *One numerically*, but not so in *Form*, or *Character*, see Note on the word *Privation*, in the first part of the following Chapter.

(*n*) Διόπερ, εἴ τις τόν τε πρῶτον ἀληθῆ νομίσσειεν εἶναι λόγον, καὶ τῷτον ἀναγκαῖον, εἰ μέλλει διασώσειν


Ch. III. *parts*; ANOTHER, that *which accedes*; and a THIRD, that *which remains*. Take an example or two from Man. *The healthful departs; the morbid accedes; the Body remains. The morbid departs; the healthful accedes; the Body remains.* 'Tis thus we change reciprocally as well to better, as to worse.

ἀμφοτέρως αὐτὰς, ὑποτιθέναι τι τρίτον—*If any one therefore think the former Reasoning, and the present Reasoning, to be each of them true; 'tis necessary, in order to preserve both of them intire and unimpeached, to lay down and establish some THIRD PRINCIPLE.*

He soon after adds—τὸ μὲν ἔν τρία φάναι τὰ στοιχεῖα εἶναι, ἕκ τε τέτων καὶ ἐκ τοιούτων ἄλλων ἐπισκοπῶσι δόξειεν ἂν ἔχειν τινα λόγον. *To say therefore that the ELEMENTS [or Principles of Things] are THREE, may appear to have some foundation to those, who speculate from these and other Reasonings of like sort. Arist. Phys. l. i. c. 6. p. 16, 17. Edit. Sylb.*

And again more explicitly in his *Metaphysics*—Τρία δὲ τὰ αἰτία, καὶ τρεῖς αἱ ἀρχαί· δύο μὲν ἡ ἐναντιώσεις (ἧς τὸ μὲν λόγος καὶ εἶδος, τὸ δὲ σῆψις) τὸ δὲ τρίτον ἡ ὕλη.—*Wherefore the Causes of Things are THREE, and the Principles are THREE; two, the CONTRARIETY (of which Contrariety one part is the DEFINITION and FORM; the other part, the PRIVATION); and the third Principle, the MATTER. Metaph. A. p. 197. Edit. Sylb.*

IT


It may be observed of these *three* Ch.III.
Principles, that *two* of them, being 
Contraries, maintain a perpetual warfare:

*Haud bene conveniunt, nec in unâ sede
morantur——*

the *third*, like a neutral Power, pre-
serves an intercourse with both, and
sometimes associates with one, and
sometimes with the other. It may
be observed also of the two *hostile* or
contrary Principles, that one of them ap-
pertains *for the most part* to the *better*
Co-arrangement (o) of things, and one
to

(o) CO-ARRANGEMENT.—So I here ventured to
translate the word Συνοικήα, or Συνοικήα, for it is
written both ways in *Aristotle*. See *Metaph.* l. i. c. 5.
p. 13. l. iii. c. 2. p. 52. *Edit. Sylb.*

The *Pythagoreans*, observing through the world
a difference in things as to *better* and *worse*, and
that this difference often led to a sort of *Contra-*
riety or *Opposition*, arranged them into two *Classes*,
a *better* Class and a *worse*; and, placing the two
Classes by the side of each other, called them
συνοικήαι, or *Co-arrangements*. In the better Class
E 4 they


Ch. III.  to the *baser*; to the *better* appertains Figure; to the *baser*, Deformity; to the *better*, Order; to the *baser*, Confusion; to the *better*, Health; to the *baser*, Disease. Now if we call those of the better Tribe by the common name of FORM, and those of the other Tribe by the common name of PRIVATION (*p*), distinguish-

they put *Unity, Bound, Friendship, Good, &c.*; in the other they put *Multitude, Boundless, Strife, Evil, &c.* Some of this school limited the Number, others left it indefinite, considering all things *as double, one against another*, according to the Language of *Ecclesiasticus*, chap. xxxiii. v. 14, 15. and chap. xlii. v. 24.

See (besides the quotations mentioned already) *Ethic. Nicom.* l. i. c. 6. p. 15. *Edit. Oxon.* 1716. and *Eustratii Com. in Ethic. Nic.* p. 13. B.

(*p*) Τῶν ἐναντίων ἢ ἑτέρα συστοιχία, εἴρησις—
The OTHER CO-ARRANGEMENT of Contraries is PRIVATION. *Aristot. Metaph.* l. 3. c. 2. p. 52. *Edit. Syll.*

By the word *other*, he means the *baser* and subordinate Class, to which Class he gives the *common* name of PRIVATION, as including all the Genera therein enumerated, *Strife, Evil, &c.* And hence it is,

tinguishing the neutral Principle withal Ch.III,
by the name of SUBJECT, we shall 
then find *the three Principles of Mutation*, or *Change*, to be FORM, PRIVA-
TION, and a SUBJECT.


OF these *three*, if we compare FORM to PRIVATION, we shall find FORM to be *definite* and *simple*; PRIVATION to be *infinite* and *vague*. Thus *there are infinite ways of being diseased*, though but one of being healthy; *infinite ways of being vicious*, though but one of being virtuous (q).

SHOULD it be asked, how PRIVATION is ONE, having this *infinite* and *vague* Character; we may answer, because *as Privation*,

is, that Privation is in this Treatise soon after called *infinite and vague*; for τὸ Ἄπειρον, *Infinite*, made one in this baser Arrangement. See *Blemmidaæ Epitom. Physic.* p. 60. *Philop. in Arist. Phys.* lib. i. *sub fin.*

(q) Ἑσθλοὶ μὲν γὰρ ἀπλῶς, παντοδαπῶς δὲ κακοί.
Theognis.

it

Ch. III.  it is nothing more than the simple *Absence* of that *Form*, to which it is opposed. Thus to be diseased (though the ways are infinite) is nothing more than the *Absence* of *Health*; to be vicious, (though the ways are infinite) nothing more than the *Absence* of *Virtue*.

AND hence, perhaps, it may be possible to reject PRIVATION for a Principle, and supply it's place, when wanted, by it's Opposite, that is to say FORM; not however by the specific *Form* then actually tending to existence, but by every other congenial *Form*, of which this Specific *Form* is the Privation. Thus in the producing of the Sphere, it's Privation may be found in the Presence of the Pyramid, or of any Figure, besides the Sphere, whether regular or irregular. Thus in the producing of that Harmony called the Diapason, it's Privation may be found in the Presence of the Diapente, or of any other Tensions, besides

sides those of the Octave, *be they consonant or dissonant*. 'Tis certain that by such a *reciprocal acceding and receding of all possible Forms*, by such an *Absence and Presence* (r), by such a continued Revolution

Ch.III.

(r) — Ἰκανὸν γὰρ ἔσαι τὸ ἕτερον τῶν ἐναντίων ποι-
εῖν τῇ ἀπυσίᾳ καὶ παρυσίᾳ τὴν μεταβολήν. — *One of*
the two Contraries (that is to say FORM) *will be suf-*
ficiently able, by it's ABSENCE and it's PRESENCE, to
effect Mutation. *Aristot. Phys. l. i. c. 7. p. 20. Edit.*
Sylb.

On this passage, *Themistius* thus comments.—Having inserted the words above quoted, he subjoins—
ὥστε τὸ Εἶδος τὴν χώραν ἀποπληροῖ καὶ τῆς Στερήσεως·
ἡ γὰρ Στέρησις ἐ Φύσις τις καὶ Εἶδος ἐστίν, ἀλλ' ἀπυ-
σία τῷ Εἶδει. *So that the FORM supplies also the place*
of the PRIVATION; for the PRIVATION is itself no
particular Nature or Form, but rather THE ABSENCE
OF THE FORM [which is then passing into exist-
ence]. *Themist. in Arist. Phys. p. 21. B. Edit. Ald.*

Simplicius on this occasion explains himself as fol-
lows—ἐ μέντοι ἠξίωσεν ἐν τοῖς στοιχείοις θεῖναι τὴν
Στέρησιν καὶ τὸ κατ' αὐτὴν μὴ εἶναι, διότι ἀπυσία μόνον
ἐστὶ τῷ πεφυκότῳ, οὐδὲν ἄλλο ἑαυτῇ συνεισάγασα· ἡρ-
κίσθη δὲ τῷ Εἶδει μόνῳ καὶ αὐτὸς, τῇ παρυσίᾳ τῇ ἑαυ-
τῷ καὶ τῇ ἀπυσίᾳ δυναμένῳ τὴν γένεσιν καὶ τὴν φθορὰν
ἀποδιδόναι.—*Aristotle has not designed to place among the*
Elements

Ch.III. lution and periodical Succession, suppos-
ing a proper SUBJECT withal to receive
and

Elements [of Natural Productions] PRIVATION, and that Mode of Non-being, which is consonant to it; because Privation is no more than the Absence of the thing produced, introducing along with itself no other particular Attribute. He himself also has been satisfied with the FORM alone, as being able by it's PRESENCE and it's ABSENCE to effect both Generation and Dissolution. *Simplic. in Aristot. Phys. lib. i. p. 54. Edit. Ald. Fol. 1526.*

Perhaps *Simplicius* alludes to what *Aristotle* says in the following passage.—‘*Ἡ δὲ γε μόρφη καὶ ἡ φύσις διχῶς λέγεται· καὶ γὰρ ἡ εἴρησις εἶδος πως ἐστίν.* The Terms FORM and NATURE have a double meaning: for in one Sense even PRIVATION is FORM. *Physic. Aristot. l. ii. c. i.*

Philoponus gives a pertinent instance to explain, how PRIVATION may be FORM. He tells us—*ἡ γὰρ Λύδιος ἀρμονία γίγνεται ἐκ τῆς ἀναρμονίας τῆς Λυδίας· ἀλλ’ ἡ Λύδιος ἀναρμονία δύναται εἶναι Φρύγιος ἀρμονία, ἢ ἑτέρα τις· δύναται δὲ καὶ ἀπλῶς ἀναρμονία εἶναι τῶν χορδῶν ὅπως ἔχουσιν, καὶ τὸ τοιοῦτίως ἄλλοτε ἄλλως ἐπιτεταμένων μάλλον, ἢ ἀναιμένων.*—The Lydian Mode or Harmony is made out of Lydian Dissonance [that is, before the strings of a Lyre were tuned to that Mode, they were tuned after another manner, which manner he calls properly, Lydian Dissonance]. Now Lydian Dissonance may

and give them up, we may conceive how Ch.III.
Changes may be performed, and *new*
Substances produced, though (as we have
 said already) the Principle of *Priva-*
tion were to be *withdrawn*. No harm
 accrues to the Doctrine from a supposi-
 tion like this; only, if we admit it, we
 again reduce the PRINCIPLES from THREE
 to TWO; not however the *former two*,
 those that exist in CONTRARIETY, for
 now we adopt the more *amicable* ones,
 those of a FORM and a SUBJECT (*t*), or
 (if

*may be the Phrygian Mode or Harmony, or it may be any
 other of the Modes [Doric, Ionic, &c.]; it may also be
 simply the Dissonance of the Strings under any casual
 tension, and that in various and different ways, either
 as they are more stretched, or more relaxed [that is, either
 sharper or flatter.] Philop. in Physic. l. i. p. 45.*

This shews that the *Phrygian Mode* in this exam-
 ple, though clearly a *Form* of *Harmony*, is neverthe-
 less, when referred to the *Lydian Mode*, as much a
Privation, as any *casual* Tension of the Strings, totally
 void of all Concord.

(*t*) This is implied in the words—ὅτι γίγνεται
 ἅπαν ἐκ τε τῆς ὑποκειμένης καὶ τῆς μορφῆς. *That every
 thing*

Ch.III. (if we take *Matter* in it's proper meaning) those of FORM and MATTER.

'Tis in these we behold the *Elements* of those *composite* Beings, NATURAL SUBSTANCES. The Disquisition makes it expedient to consider each of the two apart, and this we shall therefore do by beginning with MATTER.

thing is made or produced out of a SUBJECT and a FIGURE. Arist. Phys. l. i. c. 7. p. 19.

FIGURE, *Μορφή*, means the same with *Εἶδος*, FORM; *ὑποκείμενον*, SUBJECT, means the same with *ὕλη*, MATTER. See the Treatise just quoted, particularly towards the conclusion of the first Book.

C H A P. IV.

Concerning MATTER—An imperfect Description of it—it's Nature, and the Necessity of it's existence, traced out and proved—first by Abstraction—then by Analogy—Illustrations from Mythology.

MATTER is that Elementary Constituent in composite Substances, which appertains in COMMON (a) to them all, without distinguishing them from one another. Ch. IV.

(a) If we compare the beginning of this Chapter with the beginning of the following, it will appear that, though MATTER and FORM are the ELEMENTS, or *inherent Parts* of every *composite Substance*, yet they essentially differ, in as much as *Matter* being COMMON, *Form* PECULIAR, *Form* gives every such Substance it's *Character*, while *Matter* gives it none.

Thus Philoponus—κατ' αὐτὸ γὰρ [τὸ Εἶδος scil.] χαρακτηρίζουσι τὰ πράγματα, κατὰ δὲ τὴν ὕλην ὁρᾶν ἀλλήλων διαφέρειν. —By FORM things are characterised; by MATTER they differ not one from another.

Com.

Ch.IV. *another.*—But 'tis fitting to be more explicit.

EVERY thing generated or made, whether by Nature or Art, is generated or made out of *something else*; and this *something else* is called it's SUBJECT or MATTER. Such is Iron to the Saw; such is Timber to the Boat.

Now this *Subject* or *Matter* of a thing, being *necessarily previous* to that thing's existence, is *necessarily different* from it, and *not the same*. Thus Iron, as Iron, is *not* a Saw; and Timber, as Timber,

Com. in Phys. Arist. p. 55. d.—And soon after—*διότι αὐτὸ χαρακτηριστικὸν ἐστὶ τῆς ἐκάστης οὐσίας ἢ γὰρ "Τλη, κοινή.*—*This* [that is, the FORM] is CHARACTERISTIC of every Being's Essence; for as to the MATTER, it is COMMON [and runs through all.]

Ammonius says expressly—*ἡ μὲν γὰρ "Τλη κοινωίας ἐστὶν αἰτία τοῖς πράγμασι, τὸ δὲ Εἶδος διαφορᾶς.*—MATTER with regard to things is the Cause of their general COMMUNITY, or COMMON NATURE; FORM, the Cause of their peculiar DIFFERENCE. *Ammon. in Cat. p. 25. B.*

is not a Boat. Hence then one character of every *Subject* or *Matter*, that is, the Character of NEGATION or PRIVATION. Ch.IV.

AGAIN, though the *Subject* or *Matter* of a thing be not that thing, yet were it incapable of becoming so, it could not be called it's *Subject* or *Matter*. Thus Iron is the *Subject* or *Matter* of a Saw, because, though *not* a Saw, it may still become a Saw. On the contrary, Timber is *not* the *Subject* or *Matter* of a Saw, because it not only (as Timber) is *no* Saw, but can never be made one, from it's very nature and properties. Hence then, besides *Privation*, another Character of every *Subject* or *Matter*, and that is the Character of APTITUDE or CAPACITY.

AGAIN, when *one* thing is the *Subject*
or *Matter* of *many* things, it implies a
Privation of them *all*, and a *Capacity* to
F them

Ch.IV. them *all* (b). Thus Iron, being the
 { Subject or Matter of the Saw, the Axe,

(b) PRIVATION and CAPACITY are essential to every thing, which bears the name of MATTER; and this is the meaning of the following passage—
 Ἐστὶ δὲ τὸ ὑποκείμενον ἀριθμῷ μὲν ἓν, εἶδει δὲ δύο—
The SUBJECT or MATTER is ONE numerically, but in character it is TWO, that is to say, TWO, as it has a Capacity to become a thing, and yet is under a Privation, till it actually become so. Arist. Physic. l. i. p. 17.—And soon after, he says—ἕτερον γὰρ τὸ ἀνθρώπῳ καὶ τῷ ἀμάσῳ εἶναι, καὶ τῷ ἀρχηματίσῳ καὶ χαλκῷ.
'Tis a different thing to be a Man, and to be Void of the musical Art; 'tis a different thing to be Void of Figure, and to be Brass.—As much as if he had said, that the Man, before he became a musical Artist, had both a Capacity for that character, and a Privation of it; the Brass a similar Capacity and Privation, before it was cast into a Statue.

Thus too Themistius—Καὶ τοι λέγομεν τῆς ὕλης τὸ εἶναι ἐν τῷ δυνάμει· ἡ δὲ δύναμις δηλονότι μετὰ στερήσεως· ὅθεν γὰρ ἔτι δύναμις εἶη, μὴ σὺν αὐτῇ πάντως καὶ τῆς στερήσεως νοημένης—*We say the Essence of MATTER is in CAPACITY; and CAPACITY is evidently connected with PRIVATION; since it would no longer be Capacity, could Privation in no sense be understood, as existing with it. Themist. in Arist. Physic. p. 21. Edit. Ald.*

See before, Note p. 52, and Note p. 71.

and

and the Chissel, implies *Privation* and *Capacity* with respect to *all* three. Ch.IV.

AGAIN, we can change a Saw into a Chissel, but not into a Boat; we can change a Boat into a Box, but not into a Saw. The reason is, there can be no Change or Mutation of one thing into another, where the *two changing* Beings do not participate the *same Matter* (c).

But

(c) This reasoning has reference to what the Ancients called Ὑλη προσεχὴς, THE IMMEDIATE MATTER, in opposition to Ὑλη πρῶτη, THE REMOTE OR PRIMARY MATTER, of which more will be said in the course of this Speculation.

'Tis of the *immediate* Matter we must understand the following Passage—Ἐνδέχεται δὲ, μιᾶς τῆς ὕλης ἕσης, ἕτερα γίγνεσθαι διὰ τὴν κινῆσαν αἰτίαν· οἷον ἐκ ξύλου καὶ κιβωτὸς καὶ κλινή· ἐνίων δὲ ἕτερα ἢ ὕλη ἐξ ἀνάγκης, ἑτέρων ὄντων· οἷον πρίων ἐκ αὐτοῦ γένοιτο ἐκ ξύλου, ὃ ἐπὶ τῇ κινήσει αἰτία τῆτο.—'Tis possible, that, the MATTER being one and the same, different things by the Efficient Cause should be formed out of it; as, for example, that out of Wood should be formed a Box and a Bed. But then with regard to some things, which are different, the Matter is of necessity different also. 'Tis thus, for

Ch.IV. But even here, were the Boat to moulder
 { and turn to Earth, and that Earth by
 natural process to metallize and become
 Iron, through such progression as this,
 we might suppose even the Boat to be-
 come a Saw. Hence therefore it is, that
 ALL CHANGE is by *immediate or mediate*
participation of THE SAME MATTER.

HAVING advanced thus far, we must
 be careful to remember—first, that every
 SUBJECT or MATTER implies, as such,
 PRIVATION and CAPACITY—and next,
 that *all* CHANGE or *Mutation* of Beings
 into one another, is *by means of their*
participating the same common Matter.
 This we have chosen to illustrate from
 Works of Art, as falling more easily un-
 der human cognizance and observation.
 'Tis however no less certain as to the

example, that a Saw cannot be made out of Wood; nor is
this a work in the power of the Efficient Cause. Arist.
Metaph. H. xi. 8. p. 138. Edit. Sylb.

Pro-

Productions of Nature, though the superior Subtlety in these renders examples more difficult. Ch.IV.
}

THE Question then is, whether in the World which we inhabit, it be not admitted from Experience, as well as from the Confession of all Philosophers, that Substances of every kind, whether natural or artificial, either immediately or mediately pass one into another; that we suppose at present no Realizings of Non-entity, but that reciprocal Deaths, Dissolutions, and Digestions, support by turns all Substances out of each other, so that, as *Hamlet* says, from the Idea of this rotation,

*Imperial Cæsar, dead and turn'd to clay,
May stop a hole, to keep the winds away.*

The Question in short is, *whether in this World which we inhabit, there be not an*

Ch. IV. *universal Mutation of all things into all (d).*

If there be, then must there be some ONE

PRI-

(d) The *Peripatetics*, according to the erroneous Astronomy by them adopted, supposed the fixt Stars, the Planets, the Sun, and the Moon, to move all of them round the Earth, attached to different Spheres, which moved and carried them round, the Earth itself being immoveable, and placed in the Centre of the Universe. This Motion, purely and simply *local*, was the only one they allowed to these *Celestial Bodies*, which in *Essence* they held to be perfectly *unchangeable*. Things on the surface of this Earth (such as Plants and Animals), and things between that surface and the Moon (such as Clouds, Meteors, Winds, &c.) these they supposed obnoxious to *Motions of a more various and complicated character*; Motions, which changed them in their *Qualities* and *Quantities*, and which even led to their *Generation* and *Dissolution*, to Life and to Death. Hence the whole Tribe of these mutable and perishable Beings were called *SUBLUNARY*, because the Region of their existence was *beneath the Sphere of the Moon*. 'Twas here existed those Elements, which, as *Milton* tells us,

————— in quaternion run
 Perpetual circle, multiform, and mix
 And nourish all things————— Par. Lost.

'Twas here that *Aristotle* held—*ἑνὶ πάντων ἐν παντὸς γίνεσθαι φύσιν*, that every thing was naturally formed to arise

PRIMARY MATTER, *common to all things*; Ch.IV.

I say, some ONE PRIMARY MATTER, and that COMMON TO ALL THINGS, since, without some *such* Matter, *such* Mutation would be wholly impossible.

BUT if there be some *one Primary Matter*, and that *common to all things*; this *Matter* must imply, not (as particular and subordinate Matters do) a *particular* Privation, and a *particular* Capacity, but, on the contrary, UNIVERSAL
PRI-

arise out of every thing. Lib. de Ortu et Int. p. 39. Edit. Sylb.

Ocellus Lucanus (from whom, and from Archytas, Timæus, and the other Pythagoreans, both Plato and Aristotle borrowed much of their Philosophy) elegantly calls this imaginary Sphere of the Moon's orbit, ἰσθμὸς ἀθανασίας καὶ γενέσεως, the *Isthmus of Immortality and Generation*, that is, the Boundary, which lies between things *immortal*, and things *transitory*. Gale's Opusc. Mythog. p. 516.

The Stoics went farther than this *Isthmus*.—They did not confine these Changes to a *Part* only of the Universe; they supposed them to pass through the
F 4 whole;

Ch.IV. PRIVATION, *and* UNIVERSAL CAPACITY (e).

IF the notion of such a Being appear strange and incomprehensible, we may farther prove the *necessity* of it's existence from the following considerations.

whole; and to continue without ceasing, till all was at length lost in their 'Εκπύρωσις, or general *Conflagration*, after which came a *new World*, and then a *new Conflagration*, and so on periodically. *Diog. Laert.* vii. 135, 141, 142.

(e) Τὸ πρῶτον ὑποκείμενον, δυνάμενον ἀπάσας δεχίσθαι τὰς μορφαίς, ἐν σερήσει μὲν ἔστιν ἀπασῶν—
The PRIMARY SUBJECT or MATTER, having a CAPACITY to admit all Forms, exists in a PRIVATION of them all. Themist. in Arist. Phys. p. 21.

Themistius well distinguishes between two words, expressing the same Being, I mean ὑποκείμενον and ὕλη. *The first* he makes the *Subject* or *Substratum* of *Something ACTUALLY existing*; *the other*, that *Matter* which has a *CAPACITY* of becoming *many* things, before it *actually* becomes any one of them.

This is that *ONE* Being, mentioned by *Diogenes*, whose words we have quoted in the preceding Chapter, p. 51, in the Note.

EITHER

EITHER there is no such general Ch.IV.
 Change, as here spoken of, which is }
 contrary to fact, and would destroy the
 Sympathy and Congeniality of things ;
 or if there be, there must be a *Matter*
 of the character *here* established, be-
 cause without it (as we have said) such
 Change would be *impossible*.

ADD to this, however hard *universal*
 Privation may appear, yet had the *Pri-*
mary Matter in it's proper nature any
 one *particular* Attribute, so as to prevent
 it's *Privation* from being unlimited and
 universal, such *Attribute* would run thro'
all things, and be conspicuous in all. If
 it were white, all things would be white ;
 if circular, they would be circular ; and
 so as to other Attributes, which is con-
 trary to fact (*f*). Add to this, that the
Opposite

(*f*) This Argument is taken from *Plato*.—Speak-
 ing of the *primary Matter*, he says—ὁμοιον γὰρ οὖν τῶν
ἐπει-

Ch.IV. *Opposite* to such Attribute could never have existence, unless it were possible for the *same thing* to be *at once* and in the same instance both white and black, circular and rectilinear, &c. since this *inseparable* Attribute would necessarily be *every where*, because the *Matter*, which implies it, is *itself every where*, at least

ἐπεισιόντων τινὶ, τὰ τῆς ἐναντίας, τὰ τε τῆς παράπαν ἄλλης φύσεως, ὅπότ' ἔλθοι, δεχόμενον, κακῶς ἂν ἀφομοιοῖ, τὴν αὐτῆ παρεμφαινῶν ὄψιν—*Were it like any of those things that enter into it, in such case, when it came to receive things of a nature contrary and totally different from itself, it would exhibit them ill, by shewing IT'S OWN NATURE ALONG WITH THEM at the same time.* Plat. Tim. p. 50.

Thus Chalcidius, in commenting the Passage here quoted—*Si sit aliquid candidum, ut ψιμμήθιον, deinde oporteat hoc transferri in alium colorem, vel diversum, ut ruborem sui pallorem, vel contrarium, ut atrum; tunc candor non patietur introeuntes colores synceros perseverare, sed permixtione sui faciet interpolatos.* Chalcid. in Tim. Com. p. 434.

Hence we see the propriety of those descriptions, which make the primary Matter, to be *void of Body, of Quality, of Bulk, of Figure, &c.* ἀσώμαλον, ἀπριον, ἀμεγέθης, ἀχημάτιστον, ἀμορφον, κ. τ. λ.

may

may be found in all things, that are generated and perishable. Ch.IV.

HERE then we have an Idea (such as it is) of that singular Being, ΤΑΗ ΠΡΩΤΗ, the PRIMARY MATTER; a Being, which those Philosophers, who are immersed in sensible Objects, know not well how to admit, though they cannot well do without it (g); a Being, which flies the Percep-

(g) So strange a Being is it, and so little comprehensible to common Ideas, that the *Greeks* had no name for it in their language, 'till ΤΑΗ came to be adopted as the *proper* word, which was at first only assumed by way of *Metaphor*, from signifying *Timber* or *Wood*, the common materials in many works of Art. Hence it was that *Ocellus*, *Timæus*, and *Plato*, employ various words, and all of them after the same metaphorical manner, when they would express the nature of this mysterious Being. *Ocellus* calls it Πανδεχὴς καὶ Ἐμπαγεῖον τῆς γενέσεως, the universal Recipient, and Impression of things generated, as Wax receives Impressions from various Seals. *Timæus* uses the word ΤΑΑ in the *Doric* Dialect, and explains it (like *Ocellus*) by Ἐμπαγεῖον, to which he adds the Appellations of Ματέρα καὶ Τηθάναν, Mother and Nurse.

Ch.IV. Perception of every *sense*, and which is at best even to the *Intellect* but a *negative* object, no otherwise *comprehensible* than either by ANALOGY or ABSTRACTION.

WE gain a glimpse of it by ABSTRACTION, when we say that *the first Matter* is *not* the Lineaments and Complexion, which make the beautiful Face; *nor yet* the Flesh and Blood, which make those Lineaments, and that Complexion; *nor yet* the liquid and solid Aliments, which

Nurse. Plato calls it first πάσης γενέσεως ὑποδοχὴν, οἷον τιθήνην, *the Receptacle of all Generation, as it's Nurse*—then πάντος αἰσθητῆς μητέρα καὶ ὑποδοχὴν—*the Mother and Receptacle of every sensible Object.* Gale's *Opusc. Mytholog.* p. 516. 544. *Platon. Tim.* p. 47. 51. *Edit. Serr.* See *Hermes*, p. 308, &c.

Aristotle also observes, consistently with one of the above expressions—ἡ μὲν γὰρ ὑπομένουσα, συναιτία τῇ μορφῇ τῶν γινομένων εἶναι, ὥσπερ μήτηρ—that the MATTER, by remaining, is in concurrence with the Form, a Cause of things generated, under the character of a MOTHER. *Phys.* l. i. c. 9. p. 22. *Edit. Sylb.*

make

make that Flesh and Blood ; *nor yet the* Ch.IV.
 simple Bodies of Earth and Water, which
 make those various Aliments ; but *Some-*
thing, which being *below* all these, and
supporting them all, is yet *different* from
 them all, and *essential* to their existence (*h*).

WE obtain a sight of it by ANA-
 LOGY, when we say, that as is the Brass

(*h*) ABSTRACTION appears to have been used by
 Plato—Διὸ τὴν τῆ γεινονότου ὁρατῆ καὶ παντὸς αἰσθητῆ
 μητέρα καὶ ὑποδοχὴν μήτε γῆν, μήτε αἶρα, μήτε πῦρ,
 μήτε ὕδωρ λέγωμεν, μήτε ὅσα ἐκ τῶτων, μήτε ἐξ ὧν
 ταῦτα γέγονεν· ἀλλ' ἀόρατον εἶδος τι καὶ ἄμορφον, παν-
 δεχές· μεταλαμβάνον δὲ ἀπορώτατά τῃ τῆ νοητῆ, καὶ
 δυσαλωτότατον αὐτὸ λέγουσιν, καὶ ψευσόμεθα.—*Let us*
therefore say that THE MOTHER and RECEPTACLE of
every visible, nay of every sensible Production, is neither
Earth, nor Air, nor Fire, nor Water, nor any of the
things which arise out of these, nor out of which these
arise, but a certain INVISIBLE AND FORMLESS BE-
ING, THE UNIVERSAL RECIPIENT ; concerning which
Being, if we say it is in a very dubious way intelligible,
and something most hard to be apprehended, we shall not
speak a falsehood. Plat. Tim. p. 51. Edit. Serr.

Thus Chalcidius—*Sublatis quæ sunt singulis, QUOD*
SOLUM REMANET, IPSUM ESSE, QUOD QUÆRITUR.
In Tim. Com. p. 371.

to


Ch.IV. to the Statue, the Marble to the Pillar; the Timber to the Ship, or any one *secondary Matter* to any one *peculiar Form*; so is the **FIRST and ORIGINAL MATTER** to all *Forms in general* (i).

AND

(i) The Method of reasoning on this Subject by ANALOGY was used by *Aristotle*.—ἡ δ' ὑποκειμένη φύσις ἐπιστητὴ κατὰ ἀναλογίαν· ὡς γὰρ πρὸς ἀνδριάντα χαλκός, ἢ πρὸς κλίνην ξύλον, ἢ πρὸς τῶν ἄλλων τι τῶν ἐχούτων μορφήν ἡ ὕλη καὶ τὸ ἀμορφον ἔχει, πρὶν λαβεῖν τὴν μορφήν· ἔτι πρὸς ἑστίαν ἔχει, καὶ τὸ τόδε τι, καὶ τὸ ὄν. *Phys.* l. i. c. 7. p. 20. *Edit. Sylb.*—*The Subject—Nature*, (that is, the PRIMARY MATTER) is knowable in the way of ANALOGY: for as is the Brass to the Statue; the Timber to the Bed; or the immediate and formless Material to any of those things which have Form, before it assumes that Form; so is THIS [general and primary] MATTER to SUBSTANCE, and to each particular Thing, and to each particular Being.

Not that *Aristotle* rejected the Argument from ABSTRACTION.—Λέγω δ' ὕλην ἢ καθ' αὐτὴν μήτε τι, μήτε ποσόν, μήτε ἄλλο μηδὲν λέγεται οἷς ὄρεται τὸ ὄν· ἔστι γὰρ τι, καθ' ἧ καὶ κατηγορεῖται τέττων ἑκάστου, ὃ τὸ εἶναι ἕτερον, καὶ τῶν κατηγοριῶν ἐκάστη—I mean by MATTER, that which of itself is not denominated either this particular Substance, or that particular Quantity, or any other of those Attributes, by which Being is characterised.

It

AND here, if a Digression may be per- Ch.IV.
mitted, let us reflect for a moment on 
the character of old PROTEUS.

Omnia

It is indeed that, of which each one of these is predicated, and which has an Essence different from every one of the Predicaments. Metaph. Z. p. 106. Edit. Sylb.

And here we may observe, that as ABSTRACTION and ANALOGY are the two Methods, by which this *strange Being* (as it has been called) was investigated by the ancient Philosophers, so for that reason *Timæus* tells us, that it was made known to us λογισμῷ νόθῳ, *by a spurious kind of Reasoning*, p. 545.—*Plato* says the same, only he is more full.—Matter, according to him, was μετ' ἀναισθησίας ἄπτόν, λογισμῷ τῷ νόθῳ μόγῃσι πιστόν—*Something tangible without Sensation, something hard to be believed, and that by means of a spurious kind of reasoning. Tim. Plat. p. 52. Edit. Serr.*

This *spurious Reasoning* is explained by *Timæus*, who says that MATTER is so comprehended τῷ μήκῳ κατ' εὐθυωρίαν νοεῖσθαι, *by it's not being understood in a direct way, but only obliquely, and by implication. Opusc. Myth. Gale, p. 545.*

As to the *being tangible without Sensation*, this means, that though it be an essential to *Body*, which appears to make it tangible, yet the *Abstraction* makes it stand under the same character to the Touch, as *Darkness* stands to the Sight, *Silence* to the Hearing; we cannot be said to see the one, nor to hear the other; and yet without the help of those two Senses we could have no

Compre-

Ch.IV. *Omnia transformat sese in miracula rerum,
 Ignemque, horribilemque feram, fluvium-
 que liquentem.* Georg. IV.

Thus VIRGIL — thus, before him,
 HOMER :

Πάντα δὲ γιγνόμενος πειρήσεται, ὅσσ' ἐπὶ γαῖαν
 Ἔρπετ' ἀγίνουσαι, καὶ ὕδωρ, καὶ θεισπιδάες πῦρ.

Οδυσ. Δ. 417.

*Made into all things, all he'll try ; become
 Each living thing, that creeps on earth ;
 will glide
 A liquid Stream, or blaze a flaming Fire (k).*

Comprehension of those two Negations, or perhaps more properly, those two sensible Privations.

Both *Timæus* and *Plato* drop expressions, as if they considered MATTER to be PLACE. *Timæus* calls it τόπος and χώρα ; *Plato* calls it χώρα and ἴδρα. *Opusc. Myth.* p. 544. *Plat. Tim.* p. 52.

Chalcidius elegantly shews, how in this negative manner it attends all the Predicaments, and serves for a support to each. *Essentia est, ut opinor, cum eam Species, &c.* See *Com. in Tim.* p. 438.

(k) To the Poets here quoted may be added *Horace Sat. lib. ii. S. 3. v. 73.* *Ovid. Metam. viii. 730.*

WHAT

WHAT wonder, if this *singular Deity* Ch.IV.
 suggest to us that *singular Being*, which 
 we have been just attempting to describe?
 The Allegory was too obvious to escape
 the Writers of any age, and there are
 many, we find, by whom it has been
 adopted (1).

That great Parent of *Mythology* as well as *Poetry*,
Homer, not only informs us concerning PROTEUS,
 but concerning his daughter EIDOTHEA, who disco-
 vered her father's abode.

We shall perceive in the Explanations which fol-
 low, how this Fable applies itself to the Subject of the
 present Chapter.

(1) Some, says *Eustathius*, when he comments the
 passage above cited from *Homer*, hold "PROTEUS to
 "be that original MATTER, which is the Receptacle of
 "Forms; that, which being IN ACTUALITY NO ONE
 "of these Forms, is yet IN CAPACITY all of them—
 "WHICH PROTEUS (they add) EIDOTHEA his
 "Daughter is elegantly said to discover, by leading him
 "forth out of Capacity into Actuality; that is, she is that
 "PRINCIPLE OF MOTION, which contrives to make
 "him RUSH INTO FORM, and be moved and actuated.

Heraclides Ponticus having adopted the same Me-
 thod of explaining, subjoins—"that hence it was with
 "good reason, that the FORMLESS MATTER was called
 "PROTEUS; and that PROVIDENCE, which modified

Ch.IV. *"each Being with it's peculiar Form and Character, was called EIDOTHEA."*

The words of EUSTATHIUS in the original are—
 ΠΡΩΤΕΑ τὴν πρωτόγονον εἶναι ὕλην, τὴν τῶν εἰδῶν
 δεχάδα, τὴν ἐνεργείᾳ μὲν ἔσαν μηδὲν τῶν εἰδῶν, δυνάμει
 δὲ τὰ πάντα—ὅν δὴ Πρωτέα καλῶς λέγεται ἢ ΕΙ-
 ΔΟΘΕΑ ἐκφαίνειν, διὰ τῆς ἐκ τῆς δυνάμει εἰς τὴν ἐνέρ-
 γειαν προαγωγῆς· ἦγαν ἢ κίνησις, ἢ Εἰς Εἶδος
 ΘΕΕΙΝ αὐτόν, καὶ κινεῖσθαι μηχανωμένη. *Eustath. in*
Hcm. Odyss. p. 177. Edit. Basil.

We shall only remark, as we proceed, that the Etymology here given of EIDOTHEA, εἰς εἶδος θεῖν, *to rush into Form*, is invented, like many other ancient Etymologies, more to explain the word *philosophically*, than to give us it's *real* origin. 'Tis perhaps more profitable, though not equally critical, to etymologize after this manner; and such appears to have been the common practice of *Plato, Aristotle*, and the *Stoics*.

The words of *Heraclides* are—ὥς εὐλοῖον, τὴν μὲν ἄμορφον ὕλην ΠΡΩΤΕΑ καλεῖσθαι, τὴν δ' εἰδωλοπλασθήσασαν ἕκαστα Πρόνοιαν ΕΙΔΟΘΕΑΝ. *Heraclid. Pontic. p. 490. Gale's Opusc. Mythog. 8vo.*

To these *Greeks* may be subjoined a respectable Countryman of our own.

Lord *Verulam* tells us of PROTEUS, that he had his Herd of Seals, or Sea-calves; that these 'twas his Custom every day to tell over, and then to retire into a Cavern, and repose himself. Of this we read the following Explanation—"that under the Person of PROTEUS
 " is signified MATTER, the most ancient of all Things,
 " next

“ next to the Deity—that the Herd of Proteus was no-
 “ thing else, than the ordinary SPECIES of Animals,
 “ Plants, and Metals, into which MATTER appears to
 “ diffuse, and as it were to consume itself; so that after
 “ it has formed and finished those several Species (it’s task
 “ being in a manner complete) it appears to sleep and be
 “ at rest, nor to labour at, attempt, or prepare any Spe-
 “ cies farther.” *De Sapientiâ Vet. c. 13.*

Ch.IV.

The Author’s own words are—*sub PROTEI enim personâ MATERIA significatur, omnium rerum post Deum antiquissima. —PECUS autem, sive GREX Protei non aliud videtur esse, quam SPECIES ordinariæ Animalium, Plantarum, Metallorum, in quibus Materia videtur se diffundere, et quasi consumere; adeo ut, postquam istas Species effinxerit, et absolverit, (tanquam pensò completo) dormire et quiescere videatur, nec alias amplius Species moliri, tentare, aut parare.*

C H A P. V.

Concerning FORM—An imperfect Description of it—Primary Forms, united with Matter, make Body—Body Mathematical—Body Physical—how they differ—Essential Forms—Transition to Forms of a Character superior to the passive and elementary.

Ch. V. **F**ORM is that elementary Constituent in every composite Substance, by which it is DISTINGUISHED and CHARACTERIZED, and known from every other (a). But to be more explicit.

THE *first* and most simple of all *Extensions* is a *Line*. This, when it exists united with a *second* Extension, makes a *Superficies*; and these two, existing to-

(a) See the first Note in the preceding Chapter, and page 91.

gether

gether with a *third*, make a *Solid*. Now Ch. V.
 this *last* and *complete* EXTENSION we call
 the *first* and *simplest* FORM; and when
 this *first* and *simplest* Form accedes to
 the *first* and *simplest* Matter, the Union
 of the two produces BODY, which is
 for that reason defined to be *Matter triply*
extended. And thus we behold the rise
 of *pure* and original BODY (*b*).


IT

(*b*) Original Body, when we look *downwards*, has reference to the *primary Matter*, it's Substratum; when we look *upwards*, becomes itself a ὕλη, or *Matter to other things*; to the *Elements* as commonly called, Air, Earth, Water, &c. and in consequence, to all the variety of *natural Productions*.

Hence it is, that *Ammonius*, speaking of the first Matter, says—αὕτη ἔν, ἐξοικωθεῖσα κατὰ τὰς τρεῖς διαστάσεις, ποιεῖ τὸ δεύτερον ἀποιον σῶμα—*This* [that is, THE FIRST MATTER] *being embulked with three extensions, makes THE SECOND MATTER OR SUBJECT*, that is to say, BODY VOID OF QUALITY.

After having shewn how *natural Qualities* and *Attributes* stood in need of such a Subject for their existence, he adds (which is worth remarking)—ἐχ' ὅτι ἥν ποτε ἐνεργεῖα ἡ ὕλη ἀσώματ', ἡ σῶμα ἀποιον, ἀλλὰ τὴν εὐτακτον τῶν ὄντων γένεσιν θεωρεῖντες φαιμέν,

Ch. V.




It must be remembered however, that *Body* under this character is something *indefinite* and *vague*, and scarcely to be made an *Object of scientific Contemplation*. 'Tis necessary to this end, that it's *Extension* should be *bounded*; for as yet we have treated it without such regard. Now the *Bound* or *Limit* of *Simple Body* is *Figure*; and thus it is that *FIGURE*, with regard to *Body*, becomes the next *Form* after *Extension*.

IN *Body* thus bounded by *Figure*, every other of it's *Attributes* being *abstracted* and *withdrawn*, we behold that Species of *Body*, called *BODY MATHEMATICAL*; a name so given it, because the *Mathematician*, as such, considers no other *At-*

τῇ ἐπινοίᾳ διαίρωντες ταῦτα, τὰ τῇ φύσει ἀχώριστα—
not that there ever was IN ACTUALITY either *Matter* without *Body*, or *Body* without *Quality*; but we say so, as we contemplate the well ordered *Generation* of things, dividing these things in *Imagination*, which are by *Nature* inseparable. *Armon. in Præd.* p. 62. See below, p. 90, 91.

tributes

tributes of Body, except it be these two Ch. V.
Primary, it's *Extension* and it's *Figure* (c). 

BUT though the *bounding* of Body by *Figure* is one step towards rendering it more *definite* and *knowable*, yet is not this sufficient for the purposes of *Nature*. 'Tis necessary *here*, that not only it's *External* should be duly bounded, but that a suitable regard should be likewise had to it's *Internal*. This *internal Adjustment, Disposition, or Arrangement*

(c) In *Body Mathematical* all Qualities being abstracted but *Figure* and *Extension*, we may hence perceive the reason why the Contemplation of *such* Body (*which Contemplation makes so large a part of the Mathematical Sciences*) is more accurate and certain, than that of any *other* Body. It is, because of all Bodies, *Mathematical* Body has the *fewest*, the *most obvious*, and the *most precise* Attributes.

Hence too we may perceive the difference between a *Mathematician*, and a *natural Philosopher*. They differ, as their Subjects differ; as the Subject of the first is simple; of the last is complicated; as the Attributes of *Mathematical* Body are *few* and *known*; of *Physical* Body are *unknown* and *infinite*. *Vid. Arist. Phys. l. ii. c. 2.*

Ch. V. (denominate it as you please) is called
 ORGANIZATION, and may be considered
 as the *third* Form, which appertains to
 Body. By it's accession we behold the
 rise of BODY PHYSICAL or NATURAL,
 for every *such* Body is some way or other
organized.

AND thus may we affirm that these
three, that is to say, EXTENSION, FI-
 GURE, and ORGANIZATION, are the
 three ORIGINAL FORMS to BODY PHY-
 SICAL or NATURAL, *Figure* having re-
 spect to it's *External*; *Organization* to
 it's *Internal*; and *Extension* being common
 both to one and to the other. 'Tis
 more than probable that from the Va-
 riation in these *universal*, and, as I may
 say, *Primary Forms*, arise most of those
secondary Forms usually called QUALI-
 TIES SENSIBLE, because they are the
proper Objects of our several Sensations.
 Such are Roughness and Smoothness,
 Hardness and Softness, the tribes of Co-
 lours,

lours, Savours and Odours, not to mention those Powers of Character more *subtle*, the Powers Electric, Magnetic, Medicinal, &c. Ch. V.

HERE therefore we may answer the Question, how *natural* Bodies are distinguished. Not a single one among them consists of *Materials in Chaos*, but of Materials wrought up after the most exquisite manner, and that conspicuous in their *Organization* (*d*), or in their *Figure*, or in *both*.

As therefore every *natural Body* is distinguished by the *Differences* just described; and as these *Differences* have nothing to do with the *original Matter*, which being every where similar, can afford no distinctions at all: may we not

(*d*) No where perhaps is the force of *Organization* more conspicuous, than when we perceive different Grafts, upon the same Tree, to produce different Species of Fruit.

hence

Ch. V. hence infer the expediency of ESSENTIAL FORMS, that *every natural Substance may be essentially characterized?* 'Tis with deference to my Contemporaries, that I surmise this assertion. I speak perhaps of Spectres, as shocking to some Philosophers, as those were to *Eneas*, which he met in his way to Hell:

Terribiles visu Formæ.

Yet we hope to make our peace, by declaring it our opinion, that we by no means think these *Forms* SELF-EXISTENT; things, *which Matter may slip off*, and fairly leave to themselves,

Ut veteres ponunt tunicas æstate cicadæ (e.)

They rather mean something, which, though differing from Matter, can yet *never subsist without it (f)*; something,

(e) *Lucr.* iv. 56.

(f) See Note the second of this Chapter. 'Tis a uniform Position in the Physics of the old Peripatetics,


which, *united* with it, helps to produce Ch. V.
 every *composite* Being, that is to say in {
 other words, every *natural Substance* in
 the visible world.

IT must be remembered however (as we have said before) that it is the FORM in this Union, which is the *Source of all Distinction* *. 'Tis by *this*, that the Ox is distinguished from the Horse, not by that Grass, on which they subsist, *the common Matter* to both. To which also may be added, that as Figures and sensible Qualities are *the only objects of our Sensations*, and these all are *Parts of natural Form*; so therefore (contrary to the

tetics, ὅτι ἀχώριστα τὰ πάθη, that *the Affections* [of Body] are *inseparable from it*. See *Arist. Phys.* l. i. 'Tis *one* thing to be a Cube, *another* thing to be Iron, or Silver, or Wood, or Ivory. The Cube is most evidently and certainly *no one* of these, yet is it absurd and impossible to suppose the Cube should ever exist without one of these, or something similar to support it. See before, pages 77, 78.

* P. 63. 84.

sentiment

Ch. V.  sentiment of the Vulgar, who dream of nothing but of *Matter*) 'tis *Form* which is in truth the whole, that we either hear, see, or feel; nor is mere *Matter* any thing better, than an *obscure imperfect Being*, knowable only to the *reasoning Faculty* by the two methods already explained, I mean that of *Analogy*, and that of *Abstraction* (g).

HERE therefore we conclude with respect to SENSIBLE FORMS, that is to say, FORMS IMMERGED in *Matter*, and ever inseparable from it. In these and *Matter* we place THE ELEMENTS OF (h) NATURAL

(g) See before p. 76, 77, 78.

(h) ELEMENTS are τὰ ἐνυπάρχοντα αἴτια, the *inherent*, or (if I may use the expression) the *in-existing Causes*, such as MATTER and FORM, of which we have been treating. There are other Causes, such as the Tribe of EFFICIENT CAUSES, which cannot be called Elements, because they make no part of the Substances, which they generate, or produce. Thus the Statuary is no part of his Statue; the Painter, of his Picture.

TURAL SUBSTANCE, and thus finish the Ch. V.
first part of the Inquiry we proposed. }

WE are now to engage in Speculations of another kind, and from the *Elements* of Natural Substance to inquire after it's EFFICIENT CAUSE (*i*), that is to say, that

Picture. Hence it appears that ALL ELEMENTS are Causes; but not ALL CAUSES, *Elements*.

(*i*) *Aristotle* having reduced his three Principles of natural Productions to *two*, which two we have treated in this, and the preceding Chapter, adheres not so strictly to this Reduction, but that he still admits the *Three*.—Thus in his *Metaphysics*, he tells us—ὅτι ἀρχαί εἰσι τρεῖς, τὸ εἶδος, καὶ ἡ στέρησις καὶ ἡ ὕλη—that the *Form*, the *Privation*, and the *Matter*, are three PRINCIPLES. He calls them ELEMENTS, because they have no Existence, but in the Substance to which they belong. To these he adds the EFFICIENT CAUSE, which as it exists *externally*, that is, *without* the Subject, he will not for that reason allow to be an *Element*.—Hence he observes, ὥστε Στοιχεῖα μὲν τρία, αἰτίαι δὲ καὶ ἀρχαὶ τέσσαρες—that the ELEMENTS were THREE; the CAUSES and PRINCIPLES were FOUR. His instances are—Health, the *Form*; Disease, the *Privation*; the human Body, the *Subject*. In these *three Causes* we have the ELEMENTS: Add to these Causes the *fourth*,
that

Ch. V. that Cause, which *associates* those Elements, and which *employs* them, when associated, according to their various and peculiar Characters.

that is, *the Efficient*, the Art of Medicine; and then we have THE FOUR CAUSES required.—Again—call the Plan of the House, the *Form*; the previous want of Order, the *Privation*; the Bricks, the *Materials*; add to these the *fourth Cause*, the Architect's *Art*, and again we have THE FOUR CAUSES required. *Metaph. A. p. 198, 199. Edit. Sylb.*

'Tis this *Efficient Cause*, that will make the Subject of the following Chapter.

C H A P.

C H A P. VI.

Concerning FORM, considered as an EFFICIENT ANIMATING PRINCIPLE—Harmony in Nature between the living and the lifeless—Ovid, a philosophical Poet—Farther Description of the animating Principle from it's Operations, Energies, and Effects—Virgil—The Active and the Passive Principle run thro' the Universe—Mind, Region of Forms—Corporeal Connections, where necessary, where obstructive—Means and Ends—their different Precedence according to different Systems—Empedocles, Lucretius, Prior, Galen, Cicero, Aristotle, &c.—Providence.

LET us suppose an artificial Sub-
 stance, for example a musical Pipe,
 and let us suppose to this Pipe *the Art*
 of the Piper to be united, not separated
 as

Ch.VI.

Ch.VI. as now, but *vitally* united, so that the
 { Pipe by it's *own* Election might play,
 whenever it pleased.—Would not this
 Union render it a kind of *living* Being,
 where the Art would be an *active* Prin-
 ciple, the Pipe a *passive*, both *recipro-*
cally fitted for the purposes of each other ?
 —And what, if instead of the Piper's
 Art, we were to substitute that of the
 Harper ?—Would this *new* Union also
 be *natural* like the former ? Or would
 not rather the *Inaptitude* of the Consti-
 tuents prevent any *Union* at all ? It cer-
 tainly would prevent it, and all *Melody*
 consequent ; so that we could now by no
 analogy consider the Pipe as *animated*.

'Tis in these and other Arts, confi-
 dered as *efficient* Habits, we gain a
 glimpse of those Forms, which charac-
 terise not by *visible* Qualities, but by their
 respective *Powers*, their Operations and
 their Energies. As is the Piper's *Art*
 to the Pipe, the Harper's to the Harp,
 so

so is the *Soul* of the Lion to the *Body* Ch.VI.
 Leonine, the *Soul* of Man to the *Body* }
 Human ; because in neither case 'tis possible to commute or make an exchange, without subverting the very End and Constitution of the Animal (*a*).

AND thus are we arrived at a *new order of Forms*, the tribe of animating Principles (*b*) ; for there is nothing which
distin-

(*a*) See *Arist. de An.* l. i. c. 3. p. 13. *Edit. Sylb.*

The *Stagirite* uses upon this occasion the following Similitude—*παρὰ πλῆσιον γὰρ λέγουσιν, ὥσπερ εἴ τις φαίη τὴν τεκτονικὴν εἰς αὐλὰς ἐνδύεσθαι· δεῖ γὰρ τὴν μὲν τεχνὴν χρῆσθαι τοῖς ὀργάνοις, τὴν δὲ ψυχὴν τῷ σώματι*—*They* [who adopt the Notion of placing any Soul in any Body] *talk the same, as if a Person was to say the Carpenter's Art might enter into a Musician's Pipe : now 'tis necessary that every Art should use it's proper Instruments, and every Soul it's proper Body.*

(*b*) *Alexander Aphrodisiensis* has an express Dissertation to prove, ὅτι εἶδος ἡ ψυχὴ, *that the Soul is a Form.* *Alex.* p. 124. *B. Edit. Ald. Ven.* 1534. It was so called, not with the least view to it's having a

H

Figure,

Ch.VI. *distinguishes* so eminently as these; and
 'tis on the power of *Distinction*, that we
 rest the very *Essence* of FORM.

'Tis here we view *Form* in a higher and nobler light, than in that of a *passive elementary* Constituent, a mere inactive and sensible Attribute. 'Tis here it assumes the dignity of a *living motive Power*, of a Power destined by it's nature to use, and not be used. 'Tis to the Diversity of *Powers* in these animating *Forms*, that the *Diversity* of the *Organizations* in the corporeal World has reference. That strong and nervous Leg, so well armed with tearing

Figure, as if, for example, it were a Spherical Body, but because it was able not only by it's *perceptive Powers* to *secrete* Forms, but by it's *productive Powers* to *impart* them; whence, being considered as full of them, it was elegantly described to be τόπος ἑίδων, *the Region of Forms*. *Arist. de Anim.* l. iii. c. 4.
 — See also l. ii. c. 1.

See *Hermes*, p. 310, 311, 312, &c.

Fangs,

Fangs, how perfectly is it correspondent Ch.VI.
to the fierce Instincts of the Lion? Had {
it been adorned, like the Human Arm,
with Fingers instead of Fangs, *the na-*
tural Energies of a Lion had been all of
them defeated. That more delicate struc-
ture of an Arm, terminating in *Fingers*
so nicely diversified, how perfectly does
it correspond to the pregnant Invention
of the *human* Soul? Had these Fingers
been Fangs, what had become of poor
Art, that by her Operations procures
us so many Elegancies and Utilities?
'Tis here we behold the *Harmony* be-
tween the Visible World and the Invi-
sible; between the Passive and the Ac-
tive; between the Lifeless and the Liv-
ing. The whole Variety in *Bodies* as
well natural as artificial, is solely refer-
able to the *previous* Variety in these their
animating Forms. 'Tis for the sake of
these they *exist*; 'tis by these they are
employed; and without them they would

Ch.VI. be as useless, as the Shoe without the
 { Foot.

'TWAS perhaps owing to this use of the word FORM, in order to denote *an animating Principle*, that the Poet OVID (who appears by his works not unacquainted with Philosophy) opens his *Metamorphosis* with those lines, so perplexing to his Commentators.

*In NOVA fert ANIMUS mutatas dicere
 FORMAS
 CORPORA—*

“ *My Mind* (says he) *carries me to tell of*
 “ *FORMS changed into NEW BODIES;*”
 not of *Bodies* changed into *new Forms*,
 but of *Forms*, that is to say, SOULS,
 transferred into NEW BODIES. The *Bodies* it seems were new, but the *Souls* or *Forms* remained *the same*, of which throughout his Work we have perpetual testimony. Thus, when he speaks of *Callisto*,

MENS ANTIQUA *tamen factâ quoque man-*
fit in urſâ. Metam. ii. 485.

Ch. IV.

Of *Arachne*,

— ANTIQUAS exercet *Aranea* TELAS.
 Ibid. vi. 145.

Of the *Ants*, that became *Men*,

— MORES, QUOS ANTE GEREBANT,
 NUNC quoque habent; *parcumque genus, pa-*
tientsque laborum. Ibid. vii. 656.

And so in many other places (*c*), which
 those who favour this Conjecture, may
 easily discover.

(*c*) *Ovid* appears by these quotations to have used
 the word *FORMA*, when he opens his Poem, in
 a sense *truly* Philosophical. His Doctrine, that this
Form or *Soul* might be *transferred from one Body into*
another was PYTHAGOREAN, but which the PERI-
 PATETICS rejected from the reasons above alleged,
 in the first Note of this Chapter.

Ch. VI.

As nothing can become known by that, which it has not, so it would be absurd to attempt describing these animating Forms by any *visible* or other Qualities, *the proper Objects of our Sensations*. The Sculptor's *Art* is *not Figure*, but 'tis that, through which Figure is imparted to *something else*. The Harper's *Art* is *not Sound*, but 'tis that, through which Sounds are called forth from *something else*. They are of themselves no objects either of the Ear or of the Eye; but their nature or character is understood in this, that were they never to exert their *proper Energies* on their *proper Subjects*, the Marble would remain for ever shapeless, the Harp would remain for ever silent (*d*).

'Tis

(*d*) See *Maximus Tyrius*, Diff. I. who eloquently applies this Reasoning to the SUPREME BEING, the Divine Artist of the Universe—Εἰ δὲ καὶ νῦν ἤδη μαθεῖν ἐρᾷς τὴν ἐκείνου Φύσιν, πῶς τις αὐτὴν διηγήσεται; καλὸν μὲν γὰρ εἶναι τὸν Θεόν, καὶ τῶν καλῶν τὸ φανώτατον.


'Tis the same in *natural* Beings (*e*). Ch.VI.
 The ANIMATING FORM of a *natural*
Body is neither it's Organization, nor it's
 Figure, nor any other of those inferior
Forms, which make up the System of

τατον· ἀλλ' ὃ σῶμα καλόν, ἀλλ' ὅθεν καὶ τῷ σώματι
 ἐπὶ ῥεῖ τὸ κάλλος· ὅθεν λειμῶν καλός, ἀλλ' ὅθεν καὶ ὁ
 λειμῶν καλός· καὶ ποταμὸς κάλλος, καὶ θαλάττης, καὶ
 ἔρανος, καὶ τῶν ἐν ἔρανῳ θεῶν, πᾶν τὸ κάλλος τῆτο ἐ-
 κεῖθεν ῥεῖ, οἷον ἐκ πηγῆς ἀενάου, καὶ ἀκηράτου· καθόσον
 αὐτὸς μετέχεν ἕκαστα, καλὰ, καὶ ἐδραῖα, καὶ σωζόμενα·
 καὶ καθόσον αὐτὸς ἀπολείπεται, αἰχρὰ, καὶ διαλυόμενα,
 καὶ φθειρόμενα.—But if even now you wish to learn the
 nature of this SOVEREIGN BEING, after what manner
 shall any one be able to explain it? DIVINITY itself is
 surely beauteous, and of all Beauties, &c. &c.

Those, who chuse to see the remaining part
 of this elegant original, elegantly translated, may
 find it in the second Volume of Lord Shaftesbury's *Cha-
 racteristics*, p. 295.

(*e*) Here an attempt is made to explain the *three*
 great Principles of the SOUL, anciently called τὸ
 νοητικόν, τὸ αἰσθητικόν, τὸ θρεπτικόν, the *Intellective*,
 the *Sensitive*, and the *Nutritive*. The *Nutritive* is
 treated first, then the *Sensitive*, then the *Intellective*.

See below, note on the word *Intellective*, p. 106.

Ch. VI.  it's visible Qualities; but 'tis the Power, which, *not being* that Organization, nor that Figure, nor those Qualities, *is yet able* to produce, to preserve, and to employ them. 'Tis therefore *the Power*, which *first* moves, and then conducts that latent Process, by which the Acorn becomes an Oak, the Embryo becomes a Man. 'Tis *the Power*, by which the Aliment of Plants and Animals is *digested*, and by such digestion *transformed* into a part of themselves. 'Tis *the Power*, as oft as the Body is either mutilated or sick, that co-operates with the Medicine in effecting the Cure. 'Tis *the Power*, which departing, the Body *ceases to live*, and the Members soon pass into putrefaction and decay.

FARTHER still, as putrefaction and decay will *necessarily* come, and Nature would be at an end, were she not maintained by a supply; it is therefore *the Power*, that enables every Being to *produce*

duce another like itself, the Lion to produce a Lion, the Oak to produce an Oak; so that, while Individuals perish, the Species still remains, and THE CORRUPTIBLE, *as far as may be*, PARTAKES OF THE ETERNAL AND DIVINE (f). Ch. VI.

IN

(f) This ETERNAL and DIVINE is what, as Aristotle says, all Beings desire, and for the sake of which they act whatever they act agreeably to Nature. Πάντα γὰρ ἐκείνους (scil. τῷ αἰεὶ καὶ τῷ θεῷ) ὀρέγναι, καὶ ἐκείνους ἐνεκα πράττει ὅσα κατὰ φύσιν πράττει. *De Anim.* l. ii. c. 4. p. 28. Edit. Sylb.

Immediately afterwards he subjoins the following remarkable passage, by which he appears to refer the whole System of natural Production or Generation to that one great Principle.—ἐπεὶ ἔν κοινῶν εἶν ἀδυνατεῖ τῷ αἰεὶ καὶ τῷ θεῷ τῇ συνεχείᾳ, διὰ τὸ μηδὲν ἐνδέχεσθαι τῶν φθαρτῶν τὸ αὐτὸ καὶ ἐν ἀριθμῷ διαμένειν, ἢ μετέχειν δύνάται ἕκαστον, ταύτῃ κοινῶν, τὸ μὲν μᾶλλον, τὸ δὲ ἥττον· καὶ διαμένει ἐκ αὐτοῦ, ἀλλ' οἷον αὐτό· ἀριθμῷ μὲν ἔχ' ἐν, εἶδει δὲ ἐν.—*In as much therefore as these Beings* (meaning the subordinate and inferior) *cannot participate of the ETERNAL and the DIVINE in uninterrupted Continuity, from it's being impossible that any thing perishable and transient should remain the same and one numerically; hence it follows that as far as each is capable of sharing it, so far it participates, one thing*
in

Ch.VI. IN *all the Energies here enumerated* it extends through *Vegetables* as well as *Animals*. But with *Animals*, taken apart, it is that *higher Active Faculty*, which, by employing the *Organs of Sense*, peculiar to them as *Animals*, distinguishes them as *Beings sensitive* from *Vegetables* and *Plants*. Farther than this, with *Man* alone above the rest it is that still superior and more noble FACULTY, which by its own divine Vigour, unassisted perhaps with *Organs*, makes and denominates him a BEING INTELLECTIVE and RATIONAL (g).

AND

in a greater degree, and another in a less; and that each thing remains not precisely the same, but as it were the same, not NUMERICALLY ONE, but ONE IN SPECIES.

To this *Virgil* alludes,

At GENUS IMMORTALE manet—

Georg. iv.

See *Plat. Conviv.* p. 1197. C. *Ed. Fic.*

(g) Τῶν δὲ δυνάμεων τῆς ψυχῆς αἱ λεχθεῖσαι τοῖς μὲν ἐνυπάρχουσιν ὡσαύτως, καθάπερ εἵπομεν, τοῖς δὲ τι-
νές

AND so much for the description of Ch.VI.
those Forms, which, being *purely invi-*

νὲς αὐτῶν, ἐνίοις δὲ μία μόνη.—As to the Powers of the Soul here described, they exist ALL of them in some Beings; SOME of them only in other Beings; and in some Beings ONLY ONE of them. *Arist. de An.* l. ii. c. 3. p. 26. *Edit. Sylb.* That is to say, Man possesses all; Brutes possess some; Plants, one only—Man has the Vegetative, the Sensitive, and the Intellectual Faculty; Brutes only the Vegetative and the Sensitive; Plants, the Vegetative alone.

See soon after, p. 28—ἀνευ μὲν γὰρ τῆς θρεπτικῆς
κ. τ. λ.

Ideoque ob consortium corporis est inter homines, bestiasque, et cetera vitâ carentia, Societas communioque corporum proventuum. Siquidem NASCI, NUTRIRI, CRESCERE commune est hominibus cum cæteris; SENTIRE vero ET APPETERE, commune demum hominibus et mutis tantum, et ratione carentibus animalibus. CUPIDITAS porro atque IRACUNDIA vel agrestium vel mansuetorum, APPETITUS IRRATIONABILIS est: Hominis vero, cujus est proprium rationi mentem applicare, RATIONABILIS: RATIOCINANDI enim atque INTELLIGENDI, SCIENDIQUE VERUM APPETITUS proprius est Hominis, quia a cupiditate atque iracundia plurimum distat. Illa quippe etiam in mutis animalibus, et multo quidem acriora, cernuntur: RATIONIS autem PERFECTIO et INTELLECTUS, propria DEI et HOMINIS tantum. Chalcid. in Plat. Tim. p. 345. Edit. Fabric.

sible,

Ch. VI. *sible*, and (it may be said) *totally insensible*, are no otherwise to be known, *Consciousness* alone excepted, than by *sensible Operations* and *Energies* (h), *perceived in things corporeal*. As

(h) See the Passage just before quoted from *Maximus Tyrius*. Nothing can be of greater importance, than a due attention to this Distinction; I mean *the Distinction between Effects and Causes*; between *Effects* which are visible, and *Causes* which are invisible; between *Effects*, the natural Objects of *all* our Sensations; and *Causes*, which are Objects of *no* Sensation at all.

'Tis with reference to this Distinction that *Cyrus* is made to reason in his last moments by *Xenophon*, his philosophical Historian, who thus describes him addressing his Children.

Οὐ γὰρ δὴ πῦρ τὸ τό γε σαφῶς δοκεῖτε εἶδέναι, ὥς ἔ-
δεν ἔσομαι ἐγὼ ἔτι, ἐπειδὴν τῇ ἀνθρωπίνῃ βίῃ τελευτήσω·
ἐδὲ γὰρ νῦν τοι τὴν γ' ἐμὴν ψυχὴν ἐωρᾶτε, ἀλλ' οἷς
διεπράττετο, τέτοις αὐτὴν ὥς ἔσαν κατεφωρᾶτε—
Thus excellently translated by my honourable Relation, Mr. *Ashley*.—You ought not to imagine you certainly know, that, after I have closed the period of Human Life, I shall no longer exist. For neither do you NOW see my Soul; but you conclude FROM IT'S OPERATIONS, that it DOES EXIST. *Cyropædia*, l. viii.

Cicero has translated the same passage with great elegance, but in a manner less strict, less confined to the original.

As in their very Essence they imply Ch.VI.
Activity, as much as *Matter*, upon which
 they operate, implies *Passivity*; hence in
 every natural Composite, we may dis-
 cern the influence of *two such Principles*, while, under different Proportions,
 and in different Degrees, THE ACTIVE
enlivens the Passive, and THE PASSIVE
depresses the Active.

'Tis to this that VIRGIL nobly alludes,
 when he tells us, that to every *enlivened*
 substance, every *animated* Being, there
 was something appertaining of *etherial*

*Nolite arbitrari O! mihi carissimi filii, me, cum a vo-
 bis discessero, nusquam aut nullum fere; nec enim, dum
 eram vobiscum, animum meum videbatis, sed cum esset in
 hoc corpore, EX IIS REBUS, QUAS GEREBAM, intelli-
 gebatis: eundem igitur esse creditote, etiamsi nullum vi-
 debitis. De Senect. c. 22.*

Nothing is more certain than that many things,
 which have *no sensible* Qualities, may be described ac-
 curately, and comprehended adequately, by *their*
Energies and Operations upon sensible Objects.

Vigour,

Ch.VI. Vigour, and *heavenly* Origin, as far forth
 as not retarded by it's *mortal* and *earthly*
 Members.

IGNEUS *est* ollis VIGOR, *et* CÆLESTIS
 ORIGO

Seminibus, quantum nox NOXIA CORPORA
 TARDANT,

TERRENIQUE *hebetant* ARTUS, *moribun-*
daque membra. Æn. VI.

COULD we penetrate that Mist, which
 hides so much from human Eyes, and
 follow these *Composites* to their different
 and original Principles, we might gain
 perhaps a glimpse of *two* objects worth
 contemplating; of that which is FIRST,
 and that which is LAST, in the general
 Order of Being; of *pure Energy* in the
 SUPREME MIND, the *first* Mover of all
 Efficients; of *pure Passivity* in the
 LOWEST MATTER, the *ultimate* Basis of
 all subjects (i).

(i) Thus the *Stoics*—δοκεῖ δ' αὐτοῖς ἀρχὰς εἶναι
 τῶν ὅλων δύο, τὸ ποιεῖν καὶ τὸ πάχον. τὸ μὲν ἐν πά-
 χον

BUT lest these should be esteemed Ch. VI.
 Speculations rather foreign, 'tis sufficient
 to

χον εἶναι τὴν ἄποιον ὑσίαν, τὴν ὕλην, τὸ δὲ ποιῆν, τὸν
 ἐν αὐτῇ λόγον, τὸν Θεόν.—*Their opinion is, that the*
Principles of all things are two, THE ACTIVE Prin-
ciple and THE PASSIVE; that the Passive Principle is
that Substance void of all Quality, MATTER; the Ac-
tive Principle, that Reason, which exists within it, GOD.
Diog. Laert. vii. 134.

The following Passage from *Ammonius* is remark-
 able, and well applies to the present Subject.—
 Διὸ φασὶ τὴν ὕλην τῷ Θεῷ ἀνομοίως ὡμοῖσθαι· ὡ-
 μοῖσθαι μὲν, ὅτι δι' ἀποφάσεως τῶν ἄλλων σημαίνε-
 ται ἐκάτερον, ἀνομοίως δὲ, ὅτι τῷ μὲν, κρείττονος ὄν-
 τος, ἢ κατὰ πάντα τὰ ὄντα, ἀποφάσκομεν πάντα,
 τῆς δὲ ὕλης, χείρονος ὄντος ἢ κατὰ πάντα, ταῦτα ἀ-
 ποφάσκομεν.—*For this reason they say that MATTER is*
DISSIMILARLY SIMILAR to the DIVINITY; is SIMI-
LAR, because each of them is explained by a Negation of
all other things; DISSIMILARLY so, in as much as we
deny all things of the Divinity, by it's being better than
all things; we deny them of Matter, by it's being worse.
Ammon. in Prædic. p. 50. B.

Archytas thus expresses himself in his *Doric Dia-*
lect.

Τὸ μὲν ἐντὶ ποιέον, τὸ δὲ πάχον· οἷον ἐν τοῖς φυ-
 σικοῖς ποιέον μὲν ὁ Θεός, πάχον δὲ ἡ ὕλη, καὶ ποιέον
 καὶ

Ch. VI. to mark the *Analogy* between things *Natural* and *Artificial*; how, that as there are no *FORMS* of *Art*, which did not *pre-exist* in the *Mind* of *Man*, so are there no *FORMS* of *Nature*, which did not *pre-exist* in the *Mind* of *GOD*. 'Tis through this we comprehend, how *MIND* or *INTELLECT* IS THE *REGION* OF

καὶ πάχον, τὰ σοιχεῖα.—*There is something, which is AGENT; and something, which is PATIENT; thus among natural Beings GOD is the AGENT; MATTER the PATIENT; but the ELEMENTS are both Agent and Patient united.*

Upon this *Simplicius* observes—Σαφές δὲ οὐτὸ τῷ λεγόμενῳ, παραδείγματα ἀρχητικώτατα παρέθετο, ποιεῖν μὲν τὸν θεὸν εἰπὼν, ὃ καὶ τὰ ἄλλα τὰ ποιητικὰ αἰτία συνέπεται, πάχειν δὲ τὴν ὑλὴν, δι' ἣν καὶ τὰ ἄλλα μετέχει τῷ πάχειν, καὶ ποιεῖν δὲ καὶ πάχειν τὰ σοιχεῖα, ὥσπερ δὴ μετέχοντα καὶ ὕλης καὶ εἶδους.—*Tho' what has been said is evident, he has adduced (to explain himself) the two highest and most leading Instances, saying, that GOD is AGENT, whom all other Active Causes follow; and MATTER PATIENT, thro' which other Beings partake of Passion; and that the ELEMENTS are both AGENTS and PATIENTS, in as much as they participate both of Matter and of Form. Simpl. in Præd. p. 84. Edit. Basil. 1551.*

FORMS,

FORMS (*k*), in a far more noble and ex-
 alted sense, than by being their *passive*
 Receptacle through Impressions from
 Objects without. It is their *Region*, not
 by being the Spot into which they mi-
 grate as *strangers*, but in which they
 dwell as αὐτοχθόνες, the *original Natives*
 of the Country. 'Tis in *Mind* they
 first exist, before *Matter* can receive

Ch. VI.

(*k*) See *Aristotle* already quoted; p. 98, in his
 Tract *De Animâ* iii. 4. p. 57. *Edit. Sylb.* In the
 eighth Chapter of the same Book, p. 62, he calls
 the Soul Εἶδος Εἰδῶν, THE FORM OF FORMS,
 and that not only from it's being that *supreme charac-*
terising Power, which gives to subordinate Beings their
peculiar Form or Character, but as it *uses* them, when
 made, agreeably to their respective Natures. In
 this last acceptation it is the *Form of Forms*, as the
Hand appears to be the *Organ of Organs*; to be that
 superior Instrument, which *uses* the rest, the Chissel,
 the Pencil, the Lyre, &c. all which inferior Organs
 or Instruments, *without this previous and superior one*
to employ them, would be inefficacious, and dead, and
 incapable of producing any single Effect.—ἡ ψυχὴ
 ὥσπερ ἡ χεὶρ ἐστὶ καὶ γὰρ ἡ χεὶρ ὄργανόν ἐστιν ὀργάνων.
Arist. in loc.

I

them;

Ch. VI. them (l) ; 'tis *from Mind*, when they
 { adorn *Matter*, that they *primarily* proceed : so that, whether we contemplate the works of Art, or the more excellent Works of Nature, all that we look at, as *beautiful*, or listen to, as *harmonious*, is the genuine EFFLUENCE OR EMANATION OF MIND (m).

AND

(l) In the *Scriptural* account of Creation, *Light*, previously to it's existence, is commanded to exist.—*And God said, LET THERE BE LIGHT, AND THERE WAS LIGHT.* So also *Vegetables* and *Animals*, *previously* to their existing, are *commanded* to exist. Now, whether by these Commands we suppose certain *verbal Orders*, or (what seems far more probable) only a *Divine Volition*, respect must needs have been had to certain PRE-EXISTING FORMS, else *such Words* or *such Volitions* must have been *devoid of all Meaning*.

(m) A proof, that these transcendent Objects are of an Origin truly *mental*, is, that nothing but MIND or INTELLECT *can recognize or comprehend them*. And hence it follows that, if this *intellective* Faculty be wanting, as it is to inferior Animals, or be unhappily debased, as too often happens to our own Species ; tho' their *sensitive* Organs may be *exquisite* to a degree, yet are such Beings to such Objects, as if they had no Organs at all. *Eyes have they, and see not, &c.*

And

AND now to recapitulate what we Ch.VI.
 have said concerning FORM. We have }
 traced it's Variety from the *Lifeless* and
Inanimate up to the *Living* and *Ani-*
minating; from Figures, Colours, and sen-
 sible Qualities, up to the *Powers only*
knowable through their Energies and Ope-
rations; in other words, from those
Forms, which are but *passive Elements*,
 up to those, which are *Efficient Causes*.

EVEN in these active, animating, and
 efficient *Forms*, besides the Differences
 which we have remarked, there is still
 another worth regarding. Some of them

And hence the meaning of that fine Trochaic Verse
 in the *Sicilian* Poet and Philosopher, *Epicharmus*;

Νῆς ὄρεῖ καὶ νῆς ἀκούει· τ' ἄλλα κωφὰ καὶ τυφλά.

'Tis MIND ALONE, that sees, that hears; all things
 beside are deaf and blind.


Clem. Alex. t. i. p. 442. Edit. Pott. Max. Tyr.
Edit. 8vo p. 12. Edit. 4to. p. 203.

Ch.VI. cannot act without *corporeal* Connections, while to others such Connections appear to be no way requisite. What for example is the *vegetative* Power in Plants, without a *natural Body* for it to nourish and enliven? What the *sensitive* Powers of hearing or of seeing, without the corporeal Organs of an Ear, or an Eye? These are *animating Forms*, which though themselves not Body, are yet so far inseparable from it, that were their Connection dissolved, they would be as unable to exert themselves, as the Painter, deprived of his Pencil, or the Harper of his Harp. 'Tis not so with that *perceptive Power*, UNMIXED AND PURE INTELLIGENCE, the Objects of which being purely intelligible, are all congenial with itself. *Corporeal* Connections appear so little wanted here, that perhaps 'tis then in it's *highest* Vigour, when it is wholly *separated* and *detached*. 'Tis in *this* part of our animating Form, that we must look for THE IMMORTAL AND DIVINE ;

VINE (*n*) ; 'tis *this* indeed is all of it, Ch. VI.
 that a rational Man would wish to pre-
 serve,

(*n*) 'Ο δὲ Νῆς ἔοικεν ἐγείνεσθαι, ὥςτις τις ἔσται, καὶ ἐφθείρεσθαι—MIND *seems to be implanted* [into the Body] *being* A PECULIAR SUBSTANCE OF ITSELF, *and not to be corrupted or to perish* (as the Body does). *Arist. de An.* l. i. c. 4. p. 15—And soon after, when he has told us that the *Passions* perish with *the Body*, to which they are inseparably united, he adds—'Ο δὲ Νῆς ἴσως θειότερόν τι καὶ ἀπαθές. *But the MIND perhaps is something MORE DIVINE, and free from Passion, or being acted upon.*

In another part of the same Work he distinguishes between the original *Capacity* of the *sensitive* Part, and that of the *Intellective* Part: *Sensation* (he tells us) is *impaired* by the *Violence of sensible Objects*: Excessive Sounds, excessive Light, excessive Smells, prevent us from hearing, from seeing, or from smelling.—*Αλλ' ὁ Νῆς, ὅταν τι νοήσῃ σφόδρα νοητὸν, ἐκ ἧττον νοεῖ τὰ ὑποδεέστερα, ἀλλὰ καὶ μᾶλλον· τὸ μὲν γὰρ αἰσθητικὸν ἐκ ἄνευ σώματος, ὁ δὲ Νῆς χωριστός.*—*But MIND, when it contemplates any thing clearly and strongly intelligible, does not for that reason LESS comprehend inferior Objects of Intellection, but even MORE; the Cause is, the SENSITIVE Principle exists not WITHOUT A BODY* (it's Organs being all Bodily); *but MIND on the contrary is SEPARABLE AND DETACHED.* *Ibid.* l. iii. c. 4.

Ch. VI.  serve, when he would be rather thankful to find his Passions and his Appetites extinct.


AND

Cyrus, in the Speech attributed to him by *Xenophon*, and quoted before, p. 108, speaks as follows.

Οὗτοι ἔγωγε, ὦ παῖδες, εἰδὲ τῆτο πόπολε ἐπείσθην, ὥς ἡ ψυχὴ, ἕω μὲν ἂν ἐν θνητῷ σώματι ᾖ, ζῇ· ὅταν δὲ τέττε ἀπαλλαγῇ, τέθνηκεν. Ὅρῳ γὰρ, ὅτι καὶ τὰ θνητὰ σώματα, ὅσον ἂν ἐν αὐτοῖς χρόνον ἢ ἡ ψυχὴ, ζῶσα παρέχεται. Οὐδέ γε, ὅπως ἄφρων ἔσαι ἡ ψυχὴ, ἐπειδὴ τῷ ἄφρονι σώματι δίχα γένηται, εἰδὲ τῆτο πέπεισμαι· ἀλλ' ὅταν ἀκραίῳ καὶ καθαρὸς ὁ νῦς ἐκκριθῇ, τότε καὶ φρονιμώτατον εἶδος αὐτὸν εἶναι. Διαλυομένη δὲ ἀνθρώπων, δῆλὰ ἐστὶν ἕκαστα ἀπίοντα πρὸς τὸ ὁμοφύλον, πλὴν τῆς ψυχῆς· αὕτη δὲ μόνη ἔτε παρῶσα ἔτε ἀπίοντα ὁρᾶται. *Ξενοφ. Κύρου Παιδ. H. p. 655. Edit. Hutchinson. 4to. Oxon. 1727.*

Thus translated by the abovementioned excellent Translator.


No ! Children ! I can never be persuaded, that the Soul lives no longer than it dwells in this mortal Body, and that it dies on Separation. For I see that the Soul communicates Vigour and Motion to mortal Bodies, during it's continuance in them. Neither can I be persuaded, that the Soul is divested of Intelligence, on it's Separation from this gross senseless Body ; but it is probable, that WHEN THE SOUL IS SEPARATED, it becomes pure and intire,

AND thus having traced the various Ch.VI.
order of FORMS from the lowest and 
baseſt

intire, and is then MORE INTELLIGENT. It is evident, that, on Man's dissolution, every part of him returns to what is of the same nature with itself, except the Soul: THAT ALONE IS INVISIBLE, BOTH DURING IT'S PRESENCE HERE, AND AT IT'S DEPARTURE. *Cyropæd.* p. 326, 327.

Thus translated by Cicero—*Mibi quidem nunquam persuaderi potest animas, dum in corporibus essent mortalibus, vivere; cum exissent ex iis, emori: nec vero tum animum esse insipientem, cum ex insipienti corpore evasisset; sed, cum, OMNI ADMIXTIONE CORPORIS LIBERATUS, purus et integer esse cœpiſſet, tum esse SAPIENTEM. Atque etiam, cum hominis natura morte diſſolvitur, cæterarum rerum perſpicuum eſt quo quæque diſcedant; abeunt enim illuc omnia, unde orta ſunt: ANIMUS AUTEM SOLUS, NEC CUM ADEST, NEC CUM DISCEDIT, APPARET.* *De Senectute*, cap. 22.

These Speculations of *Cyrus* may more properly be called the Speculations of *Xenophon*, who derived them without doubt (as he did the rest of his Philosophy) from his great Master, *Socrates*. They passed also into other Systems of Philosophy, derived from the same Original; such for example as the Philosophy of *Aristotle*, who was a hearer and a disciple as well of *Socrates* as of *Plato*.

Ch.VI.  basest up to the highest and best, and considered how, though differing, they all agree in this, that *they give to every Being it's peculiar and distinctive Character*, we shall here conclude our Speculations concerning FORM, the second Species of Substance, and which appears in

Besides what has been offered in the beginning of this Note, the following Remark and Quotation may perhaps inform us farther in the Sentiments of the *Stagirite*, and his School.

The HUMAN INTELLECT was supposed by the *Peripatetics* to be *pure and absolute CAPACITY*; to be *no particular thing*, till it began *to comprehend things*; nor to be *blended with Body*, because, if it were, it would have *some Quality of Body* adhere to it (such as hot, cold, and the like), which *Quality* would of course obstruct it's operations. On the contrary they held it to receive it's impressions, ὥπερ ἐν γραμματεῖῳ, ὃ μὴδὲν ὑπάρχει ἐντελεχείᾳ γεγραμμένον, *as impressions are made in a WRITING TABLET, WHERE NOTHING AS YET IS IN ACTUALITY WRITTEN.* *Aristot. de Animâ, lib. iii. c. 4. p. 58. Edit. Sylb.*

But this in the way of digression—'Tis only the short Specimen of an ancient Speculation, which gives us reasons, why the *human Intellect* can have *no Innate Ideas.*

part

part to be an ELEMENT, *in part* an EFFICIENT CAUSE (o). Ch.VI.

AND yet we cannot quit these Speculations, the latter part of them at least, without a few observations on their dignity and importance.

THEIR principal object has been to shew, that in the great *intellectual* System of the Universe, MEANS do not lead to ENDS, but ENDS lead to MEANS; that it was not the Organization of the Sheep's Body, which produced the *gentle* instincts of the Sheep; nor that of the Lion's Body, which produced the *ferocious* Instincts of the Lion (p); but, because in the Divine Oeconomy of the whole, such respective *animating* and *active Principles* were wanting, it was

(o) See the two last Notes of the preceding Chapter.

(p) See before, in the beginning of this Chapter, page 99.

therefore

Ch.VI. therefore necessary that they should be furnished with such peculiarly *organized Bodies*, that they *might* be enabled to *act*, and to perform their part, agreeably to their respective natures, and their proper business in the World.

THE ancient System of Atheism supposed the Organs to come *first* * before any thing *farther* was thought of; which Organs, being all of them formed *fortuitously*, some of them *luckily* answered an end, and others answered none: those that answered, *for a while subsisted*; those that failed, *immediately perished*.

EMPEDOCLES (which is somewhat surprising, if we consider some of his better and more rational Doctrines) appears to have favoured this opinion: καὶ τὰ μέρη τῶν ζώων ἀπὸ τύχης γενέσθαι τὰ πλεῖστα φησίν. *He says, (as Aristotle tells us) that the Limbs of Animals were the*

* See *Hermes*, p. 392.

greater

greater part of them MADE BY CHANCE. Ch.VI.

Soon after this *Aristotle* proceeds in explaining this strange System—ὅπερ μὲν ἐν ἀπαντα συνέβη, ὥσπερ καὶ εἰ ἕνεκά τῃ ἐγίγνετο, ταῦτα μὲν ἐσώθη, ἀπὸ τῆς αὐτομάτης συζάντα ἐπιτηδείως· ὅσα δὲ μὴ ἔτῳς, ἀπώλετο καὶ ἀπόλλυται, καθάπερ Ἐμπεδοκλῆς λέγει τὰ βεγενῆ καὶ ἀνδρόπρωρα—*When therefore these Limbs all co-incided, as if they had been made for the purpose, they were then saved and preserved, having been thus aptly put together by the Operation of CHANCE; but such as co-incided not, these were lost, and still [as fast as they arise] are lost; according to what Empedocles says concerning [those monstrous Productions] the Bull Species with Human Heads. Arist. Physic. 1. ii. c. 4. 8.*

LUCRETIVS advances the same Doctrine, which was indeed suitable to his Ideas of the World's production. *The Earth*, he tells us in his account of Creation, aimed at the time to create
many

Ch. VI. *many portentous Beings, some with strange Faces and Members ; others deficient, without either Feet or Hands ; but the endeavours were fruitless, for Nature could not support, and carry them on to Maturity.*

*Multaque tum Tellus etiam portenta
creare*

*Conata est, mirâ facie, membrisque coorta ;
Orba pedum partim, manuum viduata vicissim :*

— — — — —

*Nequicquam, quoniam Natura absterruit
auctum,*

*Nec potuere cupitum ætatis tangere florem,
Nec reperire cibum, &c.*

LUCRET. V. 835, &c.

'Tis more expressly in contradiction to the Doctrines inculcated through this whole Tract, *that he denies FINAL CAUSES ; that he holds Eyes were not made for seeing, nor Feet for walking, &c.*

&c. that he calls such explanations a Ch.VI.
preposterous and inverted order, the ex-
 istence of the USE (according to him)
 not leading to the production of the
 THING, but the CASUAL PRODUCTION
 of the THING leading to the existence
 of the USE.

LUMINA ne facias oculorum clara
 creata,

*Prospicere ut possimus, et, ut proferre viam
 Proceros passus, ideo, &c.*

*Cætera de genere hoc inter quæcunque pre-
 tantur,*

*Omnia perversâ PRÆPOSTERA sunt ra-
 tione :*

*Nil adeo quoniam natum'st in Corpore,
 UT UTI*

*Possimus ; sed quod NATUM'ST, ID pro-
 creat USUS.*

LUCRET. IV. 822, 30.

AN elegant Poet of our own states this
 doctrine with his usual humour.

Note


Ch. VI.

*Note here, Lucretius dares to teach
 (As all our Youth may learn from CREECH)
 That Eyes were made, but could not view,
 Nor Hands embrace, nor Feet pursue ;
 But HEEDLESS Nature did produce
 The Members FIRST, and THEN the use :
 What each must act, was yet unknown,
 Till all was moved by CHANCE alone.*


*A Man first builds a Country seat,
 Then finds the Walls not fit to eat ;
 Another plants, and wond'ring sees
 Nor Books, nor Medals on his Trees.
 Yet Poet and Philosopher
 Was He, who durst such whims aver.
 Blest, for his Sake, be Human Reason,
 Which came at last, tho' late, in season.*

PRIOR'S *Alma*, Canto I.

THE Poet had cause to be thankful,
 that a time came, when Men of Sense
 opposed Reason to such Sophistry ; but
 the Opposition was not so late, nor so
 long

long in coming, as he imagined. *Galen*, Ch.VI. 
many Centuries ago, in his excellent
Treatise *De Ufu Partium*; *Cicero*, in the
best and most conclusive part of his
Treatise *De Naturâ Deorum*; and before
them both, as well as before *Lucretius*,
Aristotle, through every part of his
Works, and above all in those respect-
ing the History of the *Members*, and the
Progression of *Animals*, had inculcated
with irresistible strength of Argument
the great Doctrine of FINAL CAUSES;
which if we allow with regard to *our-*
selves, but deny to *Nature*, we totally
annihilate through the Universe any DI-
VINE OR INTELLIGENT PRINCIPLE. For
nothing can be *Divine*, which is not *In-*
telligent; nor any thing *Intelligent*, which
has not a *Meaning*; nor any Being have
a *Meaning*, which has no *Scope*, or *Final*
Cause, to govern and direct it's Energies
and Operations.


A PAINTER

Ch. VI.  A PAINTER, painting a hundred Portraits, succeeds in ninety-nine, and fails in one. We may possibly impute *the single Failure* to CHANCE; but can we possibly impute to CHANCE his success in the *ninety-nine*? How then can we dream of CHANCE in the Operations of NATURE; Operations so much more *accurate*, tho' withal so much *greater*, and more *numerous*, than those of the Painter? CHANCE is never thought of in that which happens *always*; nor in that which happens *for the most part*; but, if any where, in that which happens *unexpectedly* and *rarely* (q).

AND

(q) See Vol. i. p. 267, 8, 9, where the Doctrine of CHANCE and FORTUNE is discussed at large upon the *Peripatetic Principles*, and where an attempt is made to explain that most subtle and ingenious Argument of the *Stagirite*, by which he proves that CHANCE and FORTUNE are so far from supplanting MIND, or AN INTELLIGENT PRINCIPLE, that the Existence of *the two former* necessarily infers the Existence of *the latter*.

'T was

AND so much for those Philosophers, Ch.VI.
recorded for having hardily *denied* a Pro-
vidence. 

THERE are others, who, tho' they
have not denied one, have yet made *Sys-*
tems, that would do without one ; seeming
to think concerning the trouble of go-
verning a World, as Queen *Dido* did of
old,

*Scilicet is superis labor est ; ea cura quietos
Sollicitat ?—— (r).*

A THIRD fort, with more decency,
have neither denied a Providence, nor

'Twas consonant to the Reasoning there held, that
PLATO, long before, is said to have called FORTUNE
σύμπτωμα φύσεως ἢ προαιρέσεως, a SYMPTOM, or
THING CO-INCIDENT *either with Nature, or the Hu-*
man Will. See *Suidas* in the Word, Εἰμαρμένον.
Plato's Account will be better understood perhaps, by
recurring to the Quotation in the former part of this
note.

(r) *Virg. Æn. iv.*

K

omitted

Ch. VI. omitted one; yet have seldom recurred
 { to it, but upon pressing occasions, when
 difficulties arose, which they either hap-
 pened to find, or had happened to make.
 They appear to have conducted them-
 selves by *Horace's* advice;

*Nec Deus interfit, nisi dignus vindice
 nodus (s).*

A FOURTH Philosopher remains, and
 a respectable one he is, who supposes
*Providential Wisdom never to cease for a
 single moment*, and who says to it with re-
 verence, what *Ulysses* did to *Minerva*,

——— εἰς σε λήθω

Κινύμεν. (t)


(s) *Hor. Art. Poet.*

(t) *Hom. Iliad.* 10. v. 279. See *Arrian's Epictetus*, lib. i. c. 12, both in the *Original*, and in *Mrs. Carter's* excellent Translation. See also the Comment of my worthy and learned Friend *Upton*, on this Chapter, in his valuable Edition of that Author, tom. ii. p. 40, 41. See also *Psalms* cxxxix.

—Nor

—*Nor can I move, and 'scape
Thy Notice—*

Ch.VI.



But to quit Philosophers and Poets,
and return from a Digression, to which
we have been led insensibly by the la-
tent connection of many different ideas.

THERE remains nothing further, in the
treating of SUBSTANCE, than to say some-
thing of those characters, which are
usually ascribed to it by *Aristotle* and his
followers, when they consider it not in a
physical, but in a *logical* view.

C H A P. VII.

Concerning the Properties of Substance, attributed to it in the Peripatetic Logic.

C.VII. **T**HE ancient Logicians, or rather ARISTOTLE and his School, have given us of SUBSTANCE the following Characters.

They inform us that, as SUBSTANCE, *it is not susceptible of more and less (a)*. Thus a Lion is not more or less a Lion, by being more or less bulky ; a Triangle is not more or less a Triangle, by being more or less acute-angled. The Intentions and Remissions are to be found in their *Accidents* ; the *Essences* remain *simply* and immutably the same, and either absolutely *are*, or absolutely *are not*.

(a) Δοκεῖ δὲ ἡ οὐσία μὴ ἐπιδέχασθαι τὸ μᾶλλον καὶ τὸ ἧττον.—*Arist. Præd.* p. 28. *Edit. Sylb.* See *Hermes*, p. 201.

AGAIN,

AGAIN, SUBSTANCE, they tell us, C. VII.
admits of no Contraries (b). 'Tis to this
 that *Milton* alludes, when, after having
 personified *Substance*, he tells us,

TO FIND A FOE IT SHALL NOT BE
 HIS HAP,
*And Peace shall lull him in her flow'ry
 lap* (c).

THE Affertion is evident in *compound*
Beings, that is to say, in substances *na-*
tural; for what is there contrary to Man
 considered as Man, or to Lion considered
 as Lion? This is true also in the Rela-
 tion borne by MATTER to FORM; for
 while Contraries by their co-incidence
 destroy each other, these two, *Matter*

(b) Ὑπάρχει δὲ ταῖς ἐξίσαις καὶ τὸ μὴδὲν αὐταῖς ἐναν-
 τίου εἶναι. *Arist. Præd.* p. 28. *Edit. Sylb.*

(c) *Milt. Poems*, No. II.

C.VII. and *Form*, coalesce so kindly, that no
 ~~~~~ Change to either arises from their Union.  
 Thus the Marble, when adorned with  
 the *Form* of a Statue, is as precisely  
 Marble, as it was before; and the Oak,  
 when fashioned into the *Form* of a Ship,  
 is as truly Oak; as when it flourished in  
 the Forest. If there be any Contrariety  
 in Substance it is that of FORM to PRI-  
 VATION, where *Privation* nevertheless is  
 nearly allied to *Non-entity*.

LASTLY, SUBSTANCE they tell us is  
 Something, which, though it have no  
 Contrary, yet *is by nature susceptible of*  
*all Contraries, itself still remaining one and*  
*the same (d).*

WE cannot forget that description,  
 given by VIRGIL, of the *Cumean Pro-*  
*phets.*

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(d) Μάλιστα δὲ ἴδιον τῆς ἁπλῆς δοκεῖ εἶναι τὸ ταυ-  
 τὸν καὶ ἐν ἀριθμῷ οὐ τῶν ἐναντίων εἶναι δεκτικόν. *Arist.*  
*Præd.* p. 29. *Edit. Sylb.*

— *Subito non vultus, non color unus, C. VII.*  
*Non comptæ mansere comæ; sed pectus*   
*anhelum,*  
*Et rabie fera corda tument (e).*

Here we see her countenance and complexion perpetually *changing*, her hair dishevelled, her breast panting, and a transition too in her manners from *sobriety* to *distraction*. How different is all this from the appearance of that *Sibyl*, who first so courteously received *Eneas* at *Cumæ*, and afterwards so prudently attended him to the Shades? Yet, *amidst all these Contrarieties*, was she still the same *Sibyl*; she was susceptible of them all, without becoming another woman.

THIS last Character of Substance appears to be the most *essential*: for what is the *Support of Contraries*, or indeed of every Attribute, but *Substance*? Motion

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(e) *Æn.* VI.



C.VII. and Rest, Heat and Cold, Health and Sicknefs, Vigour and Decay, are all to be found at times in each Individual of the human race. Most of the same Contraries are to be found among Brutes, and some of them descend even to the race of Vegetables.

IF we descend from these minuter *Substances* to our terraqueous Globe, here Tempest and Calm, Frost and Thaw, Rain and Drought, Light and Darknefs, have each their turn; yet leave it, when they depart, after all their seeming Contest, *the same* individual Globe, and not another. Thus the *Poet*, we have already quoted, still considering *Substance*, as a *Person*—

*Yet he shall live in strife, and at his door  
Devouring War shall never cease to roar :  
Yea, it shall be his nat'ral property,*


TO HARBOUR THOSE THAT ARE AT  
ENMITY (f).

IF we extend our views beyond the C. VII.  
 Spot which we inhabit, what is the {  
 whole visible Universe, but the comprehensive Receptacle of every Contrary conceivable? Within this immense Whole they all distributively exist, while each of them by succession fulfils it's allotted period, without disturbing the general Order, or impairing the general Beauty.

BUT if we ascend from *passive* and *material Substances* up to such as are *active* and *immaterial*, here we shall find no Distribution, no succession of Contraries; but Motion and Rest, Equality and Inequality, Similarity and Dissimilarity, Identity and Diversity, will appear, each pair co-existing within *the same* Being in *the same* instant, and that by an amazing Connection of both together under One.

'Tis by virtue only of this combining,  
 this *unifying* Comprehension (and which  
for



C.VII.  for that reason can only belong to a Being *unextended* and *indivisible*) that the Mind or Intellect pronounces that A is not B, that C is unequal to D, that E is unlike to F. Were such Propositions, instead of being comprehended *at once* by something *Indivisible* and *One*, to be comprehended in portions by the different parts of something *Divisible*; or were they to be comprehended by a Power indivisible, yet *not at once*, but *in a Succession*; 'twould be as impossible either way to comprehend the real Propositions, as it would, if they were to be recognized in part by a Man in *England*, in part by one in *China*; or else in part by a Man in the *present* Century, in part by one of the *succeeding*. It may be asked in such instances, *who is it that comprehends THE WHOLE* (g) ?

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(g) See *Hermes*, l. iii. c. 4. Note (f). See also *Aristot. de Animâ*, l. iii. c. 2. p. 52. Edit. Sylb. *Themist. Paraph.* p. 85. a. b.

LASTLY,

LASTLY, much more in the SUPREME MIND may we find such *Coincidence*, since here not only Contraries, but all things whatever *co-exist*, and that too after a manner peculiarly transcendent; not by a Knowledge which is partial, but by one which is universal; not with *occasional* remissions, but in one uniform unremitting Energy (*h*); not by subsequent Impressions from things already *pre-existing*, but by that *original Causality*, through which it makes all things to exist. C. VII.

A NOBLE field for speculating opens upon this occasion; which, tho' arising out of our Subject, yet naturally leading us beyond it, we shall omit, and return to our *Logical* Inquiries, concluding here what we have to ad-

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(*h*) See the Chapter on *Quality*, where the Verses of *Empedocles* are quoted.



C. VII. vance in our Theory concerning SUB-  
STANCE (i).

WE are now to consider the remaining GENERA, PREDICAMENTS, or ARRANGEMENTS, that is to say *Quality*, *Quantity*, *Relation*, *Site*, &c.

SOME of these are *at all times* no higher than *Accidents* ; such for example as *Site* or *Position*, the Time *When*, and the Place *Where*. Others upon occasion *characterize*, and *essentiate* ; such for example as *Magnitude*, *Figure*, *Colour*, and many *Qualities*. Thus a *triply extended Magnitude* is *essential* to Body ; *Angu-*

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(i) The Author, in the representing of ancient Opinions, has endeavoured, as far as he was able, to make all his Treatises *consistent*, and *explanatory* one of another. Those, who would see what he has already written on the *two great Elements of Substance*, discussed in this and the three preceding Chapters, may search the Index of *Hermes* for the Words, MATTER and FORM ; and the Index of his first Volume, for the Word CAUSE.

*larity*

## ARRANGEMENTS.

141

larity to a Cube ; *Heat* to *Fire* ; and *Co-* C. VII.  
*lour* to every Superficies not transpa-  
 rent. In all such Instances, they make  
 a part of the *Characteristic Form*, and  
 in that Sense are to be considered rather  
 as *Substances* than as *Accidents*. How-  
 ever as this holds not always, and that  
 they are *sometimes* as merely and as  
 strictly *Accidents*, as any of those which  
 are so *always*, we choose under that *com-*  
*mon* Denomination to speculate upon  
 them all, beginning according to Or-  
 der first from the first.

C H A P.



## C H A P. VIII.

*Concerning QUALITIES—corporeal and incorporeal—natural and acquired—of Capacity, and Completion—Transitions immediate, and through a medium—Dispositions, Habits—Genius—Primary and imperfect Capacity—Secondary and perfect—where it is, that no Capacities exist—Qualities, penetrating, and superficial—Essential Form—Figure, an important Quality—Figures intellectual, natural, artificial, phantastic—Colour, Roughness, Smoothness, &c.—Persons of Quality—Properties of Quality—Some rejected, one admitted, and why.*

C.VIII. **A**S SUBSTANCE justly holds the *first* rank among these *Predicaments*, or *universal Arrangements*, by being the single one among them that exists *of itself*,

*self*, so the next in order, as some have C.VIII.  
 asserted (a), is QUALITY, because Qua-  
 lity is said to be an Attribute, from  
 which no Substance is exempt.

THERE may be *Substances*, they tell us, *devoid of Quantity*; such, for example, if we admit them, as the *intellective*, or *immaterial*. But that there should be *Substances devoid of Quality*, is a

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(a) This was the Opinion of Archytas—Πρώτα μὲν τέτακται ὕσῳ—δευτέρα δὲ αἱ ποιότητες—the first in Order is SUBSTANCE; the second, QUALITY. *Simplic. in Præd. Quantitat.* p. 31. *Edit. Basil.* *Simplicius* adds—ὥσπερ ἡ Οὐσία τῷ Ποσὶ προπάρχει, διότι τὸ εἶναι τῷ ποσὶ ἀπὸ τῆς ὕσῳ ἐνδίδεται ἕτως καὶ μετὰ τὸ Ποιοῦν ἂν εἴη τὸ Ποσόν, ἐπειδὴ τὸν χαρακτῆρα αὐτὸν, καὶ τὴν ιδιότητα ἀπὸ τῆς ποιότητος ἔχει—As SUBSTANCE PRECEDES Quantity, because Being is imparted to Quantity from Substance, so also must Quantity succeed and COME AFTER QUALITY, in as much as it derives from Quality its very Character, and distinctive Peculiarity.—*Ibid.*—Τὸ ποιοῦν λέγεται ἡ διαφορὰ τῆς ὕσῳ—The DIFFERENCE, which attends each Substance, is called QUALITY. *Arist. Metaph.* Δ. c. 14. He explains it immediately—*Man is a Biped Animal; Horse, a Quadruped.*

thing



C.VIII. thing hardly credible, because they could  
 not *then* be *characterized*, and distinguished one from another.

ON this reasoning it is maintained, that, altho' we have no Idea of *Quantity* suggested to us in that *animating* Principle, THE SOUL, yet can we discern that this Principle has many different *Qualities*, and that Animals from these *Qualities* derive their distinct and specific Characters. There is for example a *social* Sympathy in the Soul of Man, which prompts the individuals of our Species to congregate, and form themselves into Tribes.

*Homo sum, humani nihil a me alienum puto (b).*

WE can trace the same congregating Quality in the Bee, in the Beaver, and

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(b) *Terent. Heauton. Act. I.*

even in the ferocious Wolf. It is C.VIII.  
 however less frequent in those of fero-  
 cious character; the greater part of  
 whom, if we except those seasons while  
 they breed and nurture their young, seem  
 to feel no other instincts, but such as  
 lead them to be *solitary*. 'Twas under  
 this unfeeling and gloomy character that  
*Homer* describes *Polypheme*, and his giant-  
 brethren—

——— ΘΕΜΙΣΕΥΕΙ ΔΕ ἕκαστος

Παίδων, ἢ δ' ἀλόχων· ἕδ' ἀλλήλων ἀλέγῃσι.

——— *Each lords it o'er*

*His children and his wives* ; NOR CARE

THEY OUGHT

ONE FOR ANOTHER (c).

IT is no less obvious on the other  
 hand, that there are QUALITIES which  
 may be considered as peculiar to BODY.

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(c) *Odyf.* l. ix. v. 114.

L

IF



C.VIII. If we admit Figures, Colours, and  
 ~~~~~ Odours for *Qualities*, and such undoubtedly they are ; we must admit of course, that among *Animal Bodies* there is one Figure to the Serpent, another to the Horse ; one Colour to the Swan, another to the Parrot. Even in the *vegetable* Race, the Rose has one Odour, the Jessamine another ; there is one Figure to the Orange, another to the Fig.

It follows, therefore, that as *QUALITIES* help to *distinguish* not only one *Soul* from another *Soul*, and one *Body* from another *Body*, but (in a more general view) every *Soul* from every *Body* ; it follows (I say) that *QUALITIES*, by having this common reference to *both*, are naturally divided into *CORPOREAL* and *INCORPOREAL*.

'Twas the judgment of *Shakespear* to unite them in the character of *Richard* the third, when he makes *Buckingham*

ham relate, in what manner he recommended him to the Citizens of London : C.VIII.

*Withal I did infer your lineaments,
Being the right Idea of your Father,
Both in your FORM, and NOBLENESSE OF
MIND (d).*

Virgil does the same with respect to Eneas, when he makes his *heroic Virtue* and his *graceful Person* have so powerful an effect upon the unfortunate Dido.

*Quis novus hic nostris successit sedibus
hospes ?*

*Quàm sese ORE ferens, quàm FORTI PEC-
TORE et armis ? (e)*

THE *Qualities* abovementioned admit of another division, and that is into NATURAL and ACQUIRED. Thus in the

(d) *Shakesf. Rich. III.*

(e) *Æn. iv. 10, 11.*

C.VIII. *Mind, Docility* may be called a *natural Quality*; *Science*, an *acquired* one: in the human *Body*, *Beauty* may be called a *natural Quality*; *Gentility*, an *acquired* one. This distinction descends even to Bodies *inanimate*. To transmit Objects of Vision is a *Quality natural* to Crystal; but to enlarge them, while transmitted, is a character *adventitious*. Even the *same Quality* may be *natural* in one Substance, as Attraction in the Magnet; and *acquired* in another, as the same Attraction in the Magnetic Bar.

ALL the above *Qualities* have not only their *Completion*, but their *Capacity* (*f*). Thus not only the Grape, when com-

(*f*) Thus we translate the Words 'Εντελέχεια and Δύναμις. Sometimes we read τὰ μὲν Δυνάμει, τὰ δὲ 'Ενεργείᾳ. Δύναμις, POWER, is seen in Ὑλη, MATTER; 'Εντελέχεια, COMPLETION, in Εἶδος, FORM.

The Division abovementioned into *Corporeal* and *Incorporeal*, is taken from *Plotinus*, as we learn from *Simplicius in Præd.* p. 69. B.

plete

plete (that is to say, when mature) possesses a delicious Flavour; but there is a *Capacity* also to produce it, residing in a simple Grape-stone. Even in *artificial* Substances, there are in like manner *Capacities*. A Grain of Gun-powder has the *Capacity* of explosion; a musical Instrument, that of rendering Harmony. If, leaving these *artificial* and *vegetative* Substances, we go still higher; we shall in *Animals* find *Capacities*, commonly known by the name of *Instincts*, to which the frame of every Species is peculiarly accommodated, and which Frame such *Instincts* internally actuate.

Dente lupus, cornu taurus petit; unde nisi

INTUS

Monstratum?—(g)

IN MAN there is a *Capacity to Science and Virtue*; and well would it be for

(g) *Horat. Sat. ii. 1. 52.*

C.VIII. him, if not also to their *Contraries*. Yet
 { such is our Nature, such the peculiar
 character of the *Reasoning* Faculty, be-
 longing to us as *Men*; it is capable of
either Direction (*h*), and may be em-
 ployed, like the same Weapon, as well
 to Evil as to Good.

NOR are there such *Qualities* only as
Capacities, but there is a *contrary* and ne-

(*h*) Ἐπαμφοτερίζει πᾶσα ἡ λογιστικὴ [δύναμις]—
Every POWER of the RATIONAL kind has a Capacity
either way, that is, a double Capacity. Ammon. in *Præd.*
 p. 127. Αἱ μὲν ἔν μετὰ λόγον δυνάμεις, αἱ αὐτὰς
 πλειόνων καὶ τῶν ἐναντίων—*The POWERS, that are con-*
nected with the REASONING Faculty, are THE SAME
with respect to various and CONTRARY Operations.
Arist. de Interpr. p. 75. Edit. Sylb.

'Tis thus Medicine, as an Art, can cause Sickness,
 as well as Health; Music, as an Art, can cause Discord,
 as well as Harmony.—And why this?—Because they
 are both founded in *Reason*; and 'tis the same *Reason*,
 in all instances, which shews us *the Thing*, and shews
 us also its *Privation*.—Ὁ δὲ λόγος ὁ αὐτὸς δηλοῖ τὸ
 πρᾶγμα, καὶ τὴν εἰρησιν. *Arist. Metaph. ix. 2. p.*
143. Edit. Sylb. See also pages 147, 153, of the
 same Work.

gative

gative Sort, which may be called INCAPACITIES (i); and these also of different Kinds, some for *better*, some for *worse*; so that where the *Capacities* do honour, there the *Incapacities* debase; where the *Capacities* debase, there their Opposites do honour. Thus to the Power of being taught, an *honourable* Capacity, is opposed the Incapacity of being taught, a *debasing* one; and hence is *Man* distinguished from an Insect, and the one called *docil*, the other *indocil*. Again, to the Power of *dying*, a *debasing* Capacity, is opposed the *Inability* of dying, a *superior* one; and thus are superior Beings called *immortal* (k) in the way of excellence,

(i) Δυνάμεις, Ἀδυναμίας. *Arist. Præd.* p. 41. *Edit. Sylb.*

(k) *Sappho*, the celebrated Poetess, has a singular Sentiment upon this Subject.—Τὸ ἀποθνήσκειν κακόν· οἱ θεοὶ γὰρ ἔτω κερύκασιν· ἀπεθνήσκειν γὰρ ἄν — *To die, is an Evil; the Gods have so determined it, or else they would die themselves.* *Arist. Rhet.* l. ii. c. 22. S. 27.

C.VIII. whilst Man is called *mortal*, with a view
 to subordination.

THE Transition from *Qualities* of Capacity to those of *Completion*, is sometimes *immediate*, sometimes *through a Medium*. Thus in a Grain of Gunpowder, the Transition from the *power* of exploding, to *actual* explosion, is *immediate*; so from the *power* of hearing, to *actual* hearing; from the *power* of seeing, to *actual* sight; and the same in the other *Senses* (1), *all which we seem to possess*

(1) The *Peripatetics* made two *Sorts of Capacity*, both of which have a foundation in Nature, and yet are evidently distinguished the one from the other. Man, as a rational Being, is capable of Geometry.—This is the *first Capacity*.—After he has acquired the Science of Geometry, he possesses it, even when he *does not* geometrize.—This is the *second Capacity*; a Capacity acquired indeed by Labour, but when once acquired, *called forth in an instant*; a Capacity founded on the *original* one, but yet in every view of it far *superior* and more valuable.

All this holds with regard to the INTELLECT or MIND, but by no means with regard to the SENSES,
 for

possess in a sort of perfection from the beginning. But there are other Capacities, and those none of the meanest, where

C.VIII.

for these are perfect, or nearly so, from the beginning, and require neither Time, nor Teaching, for their Maturity.

Ὅταν δὲ γεννηθῇ, ἔχει ἤδη ὥσπερ ἐπισήμην καὶ τὸ αἰσθάνεσθαι, καὶ τὸ κατ' ἐνέργειαν ὁμοίως λέγεσθαι τῷ θεωρεῖν—As soon as any one is born, he immediately possesses Sense, as he would actual Science; and the Energy of Sensation has a similar meaning with that of actual scientific Speculating. *Arist. de An.* ii. 5. He means by this, that every Man originally sees with the same ease, as an able Geometrician goes thro' a Theorem. There is none of the fatigue and labour and delay of a Learner: Seeing and Hearing have no need to be taught us.

Animum autem reliquis rebus ita perfecit, ut Corpus: Sensibus enim ornavit ad res percipiendas idoneis, ut nihil aut non multum adjumento ullo ad suam conformationem indigeret. Quod autem in homine præstantissimum et optimum est, id, &c. Cic. de Fin. l. v. c. 21.

And here, by the way, we may perceive a capital Distinction between those two Powers or Faculties of the Soul, SENSE and INTELLECT, which Faculties in vulgar Speculations are too often confounded. In INTELLECT there is an Advance to better and more complete; a Progression wholly unknown to the Powers of SENSE, which is complete from the very beginning, through all it's Operations.

the

C.VIII. the Transition to Completion is necessarily *through a Medium*.

*Qui studet optatam cursu contingere metam,
Multa tulit, fecitque puer—— (m)*

IF an *Art* be our End, there are many Energies to be practised ; if a *Science*, many Theorems to be understood ; if *Moral Virtue*, many Appetites to be curbed, many Opinions to be eradicated, before we can attain the wished for Goal. The *Qualities*, which distinguish any Being, during this *changeable* period, may be called TENDENCIES, DISPOSITIONS, or PROGRESSIVE QUALITIES. They are too, as well as *Capacities*, of a different colour, some *good*, some *bad*. There is a kind of laudable Progression, before we arrive at perfect Virtue ; as there is a kind of degenerating Interval, before we sink into perfect Vice.

(m) *Hor. Art. Poet.* v. 412.

OUR

OUR *Tendencies* during these intervals C.VIII.
 are easy to be *interrupted*. As the Wiles
 of Pleasure, and an ill-directed Shame,
 are often fatal Checks to a young Profi-
 cient in Virtue; so are Conscience and
 a better Shame to young Beginners in
 Vice. And hence we may perceive the
true character of these Tendencies; which
 is, that of all *Qualities* they are the *least*
steady and *permanent*. Horace well de-
 scribes this state of fluctuation:

————— *Si toga diffidet impar,*
Rides : Quid, mea cùm pugnat sententia
secum ;
Quod petiit, spernit ; repetit, quod nuper
omisit ;
 ÆSTUAT, ET VITÆ DISCONVENIT OR-
 DINE TOTO (n).

'Tis to the same *mutable* Condition that
Epicætetus alludes, where, having *spoken*

(n) Horat. *Epist.* l. i. 96.

C.VIII. upon Proficiency, he subjoins the following advice—" That after a certain time
 " his young Philosopher should exhibit
 " himself, to see how far the Fancies
 " overpowered him, as they did before ;
 " and how far he was now able to resist
 " their influence. He advises him, how-
 " ever, to fly at first such Conflicts, as
 " would put his Virtue to a trial too
 " severe ; and quotes the proverb on the
 " occasion, that the Metal Pot and the
 " Stone Pot do not with safety ac-
 " cord (o)".

SUCH *therefore* is the character of these *Tendencies*, or *Dispositions* (p). But different is the case, when their course is finished, and when they may be said to have attained their *Maturity* and *Completion*. The Man *completely virtuous*

(o) *Arrian. Epietet.* l. iii. c. 12.

(p) *Διάθεσις*, *Disposition* ; *Ἔξις*, *Habit.* *Arist. Cat.* p. 40. *Edit. Sylb.*

dreads no allurements; the Man *com-* C.VIII.
pletely vicious feels no compunctions. }
 Like sturdy Oaks, they defy that force,
 which could easily have bent them, while
 they were but saplings.

AND hence, as we are not said to *have*
 an Estate, because we are walking upon
 it, or to *have* a Picture, because we are
 holding it; but to *have* them, implies a
 superior, a more *permanent possession*, such
 as either cannot be defeated, or at least
 not easily; hence I say these *Completions*,
 whether virtuous or vicious, are called,
 from their *steadiness* and *permanence*, HA-
 BITS (q). They are *Possessions*, which
 their

(q) Διαφέρει Ἐξίς Διαθέσεως τῷ τὴν μὲν εὐκίνητον
 εἶναι, τὴν δὲ πολυχρονιώτερον, καὶ δυσκίνητότερον.
 HABIT differs from DISPOSITION, as the latter is ea-
 sily moveable, the former is of longer duration, and more
 difficult to be moved. *Arist. Præd. p. 40. Edit. Syb.*

And just after, having spoken of Warmth and Cold,
 of Health and Sickness, and shewn how far these,
 when

C.VIII. their owner may properly be said to HAVE, and by which we call him *habitually good*, or *habitually bad*. The Professors of Medicine find this Distinction in human Bodies. 'Tis not *any* Health, (such as health just recovered, or with difficulty preserved) but 'tis *confirmed* and *steady* Health, which they call a GOOD HABIT OF BODY. They have reference in Diseases to the same *Permanence*, when they talk of HECTIC Coughs, and HECTIC Fevers, Complaints not casual, but which *make a part* (as it were) of the Constitution.

when they are *mutable* and shift easily, may be called *Dispositions*, he subjoins, that so it is—ἢν μή τις κ' αὐτῶν τέτων τυγχάνει διὰ χρόνου πλῆθος ἤδη συμπεφυσιωμένη κ' ἀνιάτῃ (legitur ἀκίνητῃ), ἢ πάνυ δυσκίνητῃ ἴσα, ἢν αὐτὶς ἴσως ΕΙΝ ἤδη προσαφορεύοι—*Unless any one of these very affections should by length of time become naturalized, and grow either immoveable, or only to be removed with difficulty; which perfection then perhaps we may call a HABIT. Arist. Præd. p. 41. Edit. Syll.*

AND

AND thus besides the Distinctions of C.VIII.
CORPOREAL and INCORPOREAL, of NATURAL and ACQUIRED, may all QUALITIES be considered as CAPACITIES, as TENDENCIES, and as HABITS; as *Capacities* only and *Habits*, where the *transition* is *immediate*; as *all three successively*, where the transition is *through a Medium*.

IT is worth while to observe in the human Mind the *successive* appearance of *these Qualities*, where during the Transition there exists a *Medium* or *Interval*. The *original* Power, which the Mind possesses of being taught, we call NATURAL CAPACITY; and this in some degree is common to *all* Men. The *superior Facility* of being taught, which *some* possess above the rest, we call GENIUS. The *first* transitions or advances from *natural* Power, we call PROFICIENCY; and the

C.VIII. the End or *Completion* of *Proficiency* we
 call HABIT.

IF such *Habit* be conversant about Matter purely *Speculative*, it is then called *Science*; if it descend from Speculation to *Practice*, it is then called *Art*; and if such *Practice* be conversant in regulating the *Passions* and *Affections*, it is then called *Moral Virtue*.

EVEN all these *Habits*, after having been thus acquired, can *return at times* into Capacity, and there lie dormant and for a time unperceived.

———— *Alfenus vafer, omni*
Abjecto instrumento artis, clausâque tabernâ,
Sutor erat———— (r)

WIDE however is the difference between this *habitual, secondary* Capa-

(r) *Horat. Sat. i. 3. 130.*

city (s), and that which is *natural* and *original*. The *habitual* can pass AT ONCE, when it pleases, into *perfect Energy*; the *natural*, only thro' the Medium of *Institution* and REPEATED PRACTICE: C.VIII.

THE several *Qualities* thus variously distinguished are to be found only in Beings of *subordinate* Nature. But if there be a BEING, whose Existence is *all-perfect* and *complete*, and such must that Being *necessarily* be, the Source of Perfection to all others; with the nature of such Being *this Variety* will be incompatible. In Him are no *Powers* or *dormant Capacities*, no *Proficiencies* or *Transitions* from worse to better, and still

(s) See before Note, p. 152—ἐχ' ἀπλῶς οὐτὸ τῆς δυνάμει λεγόμενον, ἀλλὰ τῆς μὲν ὥσπερ οὐ εἶπομεν τὸν παῖδα δύνασθαι στρατηγεῖν, τῆς δὲ ὡς τὸν ἐν ἡλικίᾳ ὄντα—CAPACITY or POWER is not a simple Term of one Meaning only, but there is one Sort, when we say of a Child, he has a Capacity to be a military Leader; another, when we say so of a Man, who is in complete Maturity. *Arist. de An.* 1. ii. c. 5. p. 33. Edit. Sylb.

C.VIII. much less from better to worse; *but a*
 { *full and immutable Energie thro' every part*
of Space. 'Twas concerning this divine
Principle that Empedocles sung of old.

Οὔτε γὰρ ἀνδρομέη κεφαλῇ κατὰ γυῖα κίκασαι,
 Οὐ μὲν ἀπαὶ νάτων γε δύο κλάδοι αἴσσειν,
 Οὐ πόδες, ἔθόα γῆνα, ἔμῃδεα λαχυνέυια,
 Ἀλλὰ φρὴν ἱερὴν, καὶ ἀθέσφατον ἔπλετο μένον,
 Φρουτίσι κόσμου ἀπαῖα καταΐσσεια δοῆσι.

No Limbs hath he, with human head a-
dorned ;
Nor from his Shoulders branch two sprout-
ing Arms ;
To him belong nor feet, nor pliant knees ;
But MIND ALONE he was ; ineffable,
And HOLY MIND ; that rapidly pervades
With providential cares the mighty
World (t).

(t) See Ammon. in Lib. de Interpret. p. 199. B.
 and Poes. Philosoph. Hen. Step. p. 30, where, instead of
 ἔτε γὰρ ἀνδρομέη, we read ἔμῃ γὰρ βροτέη.

And here it may be observed by way of digression,
 that in this part of Ammonius, a part truly valuable,
 and

THE Speculations of this *Genus*, or C.VIII.
Arrangement, having now carried us to
 the sublimest of all Objects, ought here
 to end. But as there still remain a few
 observations, and besides these a disqui-
 sition into the *Properties of the Genus*,

and deeply philosophical, we meet in the printed text two Chasms, which much impair the meaning. The first occurs p. 199. *B.* line 19, between the words τῶν—καὶ τῶν. Here a MS. Collation supplies the word ἀφανῶν. The second occurs p. 200, line 2, after the word συνιέντων. Here the same MS. supplies the following valuable Reading, which lies far beyond the reach of the most acute Conjecture. The words are—ὁ συνιέντων [ὅτι περι-
 πετάσματα τῆς ἀληθείας εἰσι.]


There is a third Reading from the same Authority, in the fourth line of the same page, which is ἀπ' ἐκείνων, instead of ἐπ' ἐκείνων, a Reading manifestly better, though not so important as the former.

The Edition of *Ammonius*, here referred to, is that of *Venice*, in 12mo. in the year 1545. The same places may be found in the Edition of *Aldus* at *Venice*, in 12mo. in the year 1546, page 172, *B.* p. 173, and in the *Fol. Edition* of the same *Aldus*, in the year 1503, where the pages are not marked, but where the above Chasms easily shew themselves to the Reader's eye.

C.VIII. and that the apparent, as well as the real; we cannot quit the subject, till these inquiries have been first satisfied. Thus then the Treatise proceeds.

WITH respect to QUALITIES PURELY CORPOREAL, they may be considered either as *penetrating* Body, such as Gravitation, Heat, Flavour, and the like; or else as *confined to the Surface*, such as Figure, Colour, Smoothness, Roughness, &c. Those *internal Qualities* which pervade the *whole*, (whether they arise merely from Organization, or include that, and something more) constitute what we call *essential Form* or *natural Essence*. And hence the just Idea of *natural Essence*, or *essential Form* (*u*), which consists in *giving a Character* to the subject, which it pervades. 'Tis thro' this *internally pervading Character*, that Substances are what they are; that they become not

(u) See before, p. 89, 90, 91.

only distinguished from one *another*, but C.VIII.
from the nicest Mimicries of *Art*; the 
real Orange from the Orange of Wax,
the *living* Lion from the Lion painted.

INDEED one of the capital Distinctions between Operations *Natural* and *Artificial*, is, that *Nature penetrates*, while *Art stops at the surface*. 'Tis the Surface of the Canvas, which the Painter covers; the Surface of the Gem, which the Jeweller polishes; the Surface of the Steel, to which the Smith gives a Figure; and the Surface of the String, to which the Musician applies his Bow. There is hardly *any* deviation from this rule with respect to *Arts*, if we except *those only*, (such as Cookery and Medicine) the business of which consists principally in *compounding* natural Materials. Here indeed the Proportions pass *thro' the whole* Composition, and the more accurate these Proportions, the greater of course the merit of each Artist.

C.VIII. It must be remembered however, that tho' *artificial Qualities* are mostly *superficial*, yet are not *all natural Qualities* to be considered as *internal*. The FORM or ESSENCE of every *natural Substance* (that is to say, in other words, *it's System of internal Qualities*) extends itself *outwardly* (x) every way from *within*; and, as it must necessarily *stop somewhere*, (every individual being finite) so according to the *different points*, at which it stops in it's *Evolution*, it communicates to each Substance a *different and peculiar Figure*. And hence the

(x) Ὡς περ δὲ τῆς διαστάσεως τὸ τέλος ἐστὶ τὸ σχῆμα, ἔτις ἢ τῶν ὅλων εἶδες ἀποτελεύτησις ἄχρι τῆς ἐπιφανείας τὴν μορφήν ἀπεγύνησεν, ἔσαν αὐτὴν τὸ φαίνόμενον ἔχον τὰ εἶδες, καὶ τελευταίαν ἔκτασιν τῆς τῶ λόγῳ ἐπὶ τὰ ἐκτὸς προοίον—*Simplic. in Præd. p. 69. B. Edit. Basil.*—For as the End or Extremity of any Extension is the FIGURE, so the Ending of a complete Form, at it's Surface, produces SHAPE; Shape being itself the apparent Vestige of that Form, and the ultimate Extent of that Progression, which the internal Ratio makes outwards.

true

true character of every NATURAL and SPECIFIC FIGURE, which ought not to be considered merely as a *Surface*, but as a *Bound*; the Bound, *to which* the *internal* Effence or Form every way *extends* itself, and *at which*, when it is arrived, it finally *terminates*. C.VIII.


FOR this reason it is, that of all *the external Qualities* there is none so capital, so characteristic, as FIGURE. 'Tis a kind of *universal* Signature, by which Nature makes known to us the several Species of her Productions; the primary and obvious test, by which we pronounce this a Vegetable, and that an Animal; this an Oak, and that a Lion: so that if we neither suspect fraud, nor the fallibility of our own Organs, we commonly rest here, and inquire no farther.

IF we pass from these *natural* Subjects to contemplate FIGURE in works of *Art*, we shall discover it to be *almost* all, that

C.VIII. *Art* is able to communicate. 'Tis to this that the Painter arrives by *Addition*; the Sculptor by *Detraction*; the Founder by *Fusion*; and the Stucco-Artist by *Moulding*. Even when we contemplate the Tools of Art, it will appear that as 'tis by virtue of their *Figure* alone the Saw divides, the Hammer drives, and the Pincers extract; so is it from these several *Figures*, that they derive their Character and their Name, not from their *Matter*, which Matter is often the *same*, when the Tools are totally different, and distinct one from another *.

NOR are these *artificial* the only *Figures*, with which Man is found conversant. Among the various *possibilities*, which the Mind suggests, there is a *more accurate* tribe of *Figures*, which it recognizes and defines, and *which*, it may be justly questioned, *whether Matter*

* See before, Chap. IV.

ever possessed; for example, the *perfect* C.VIII, Triangle, the *perfect* Circle, the *perfect*  Pyramid, the *perfect* Sphere, with the rest of those FIGURES commonly called MATHEMATICAL *. These are not sought out by *Experiments*, nor are the *Truths* dependent on them derived from *Experiments*, being in fact the result of a *more authentic* Knowledge, that is to say in other words, of the purest *Demonstration*. On these Figures, and their dependent *Truths*, rests the whole of *Mechanics*, so highly useful to human life; rest *Astronomy* and *Optics*, and a large part of *Physics*, some of the noblest subjects among the *corporeal* for contemplation.

THE industry of Man stops not even here, but prompts him to search for *Figures*, not only in his *Intellect*, but in a *lower* faculty.

* See the third Treatise of Vol. first, p. 220, 370, 371.

C.VIII. *The Poet's Eye in a fine Phrenzy rolling*
 } *Doth glance from Heav'n to Earth, from*
 Earth to Heav'n,
And as IMAGINATION bodies forth
 THE FORMS OF THINGS UNKNOWN, *the*
 Poet's Pen
Turns them to Shape, and gives to airy
 nothings
A local Habitation and a Name (z).

And hence that tribe of FIGURES, which are neither *natural*, nor *artificial*, nor *intellectual*, but which make a *fourth* sort, that may be called PHANTASTIC, or IMAGINARY; such as Centaurs, Satyrs, Sphinxes, Hydras, &c.

AND so much for FIGURE, that most *capital Quality* of all the *superficial*.

THE next *Quality* of this sort after *Figure* is COLOUR, the Source, like *Fi-*

(z) *Shakesf. Midf. Night's Dream, Act V. Sc. I.*

gure, of many Varieties and Distinctions. C.VIII.
 Yet that it is inferior to *Figure*, is obvious from this: in the Sketches of a Painter, we know things by their *Figures alone*, without their Colours; but not by their *Colours alone*, when divested of their Figures.

As for Roughness, Smoothness, Hardness, Softness, tho' they may be said perhaps to penetrate farther than the Surface, yet are they, to *Man's* Sensation at least, so many *Qualities superficial*.

AND now with respect to *all* kinds of QUALITIES whether corporeal or incorporeal, there is one thing to be observed, that *some* degree of *Permanence* is always requisite; else they are not so properly *Qualities*, as *incidental Affections* (a). Thus

(a) These *Aristotle* calls Πάθη.—Οὔτε γὰρ ὁ ἐρυθρίων διὰ τὰ αἰχύνεσθαι, ἐρυθρίας λέγεται, ἔτε ὁ ὠχρίων διὰ τὸ φοβεῖσθαι, ὠχρίας· ἀλλὰ μᾶλλον πεπονθέναι τι· ὥςτε πάθη μὲν τὰ τοιαῦτα λέγεται, ποιότητες δὲ ἔσθαι.

—Neither

C.VIII. we call not a man *passionate*, because he has occasionally been angered, but because he is *prone to frequent anger*; nor do we say a man is of a *pallid* or a *ruddy* Complexion, because he is *red* by immediate *exercise*, or *pale* by sudden *fear*, but when that Paleness or Redness may be called *constitutional*.

WE have said already, that it was *the Essence of all Qualities to CHARACTERIZE and DISTINGUISH*. And hence the Origin of that Phrase, *a Person of Quality*; that is to say a Person *distinguished from the Vulgar* by his Valour, his Wisdom, or some other *capital Accomplishment*, As these were the *primary Sources* of those *external Honours*, paid to eminent

—Neither is the Man, who blushes from being ashamed, called of a *Reddish Complexion*; nor is he, who turns pale from being frightened, called of a *Palish Complexion*, but they are rather said to have been particularly affected; for which reason such Events are called *incidental AFFECTIONS*, and not *QUALITIES*. *Aristot. Præd. p. 43. Edit. Sylb.*

Men

Men in Precedencies, Titles, and various other Privileges; it followed that these *Honours* by degrees grew to represent the *things honoured*; so that as *Virtue* led originally to *Rank*, *Rank* in after days came to *infer Virtue*; particular Ranks, particular Virtues; that of a Prince, *Serenity*; of an Ambassador, *Excellence*; of a Duke, *Grace*; of a Pope, *Holiness*; of a Justice or Mayor, *Worship*, &c. &c. C.VIII.

AS to the GENERAL PROPERTIES of QUALITY, they may be found among the following.

CONTRARIETY appertains to it (b). Thus in the *corporeal Qualities*, Hot is contrary to Cold, and Black to White. So too in *mental Qualities*, Wisdom is contrary to Folly, and Virtue to Vice: subordinate Virtues to subordinate Vices; Liberality to Avarice, Courage to Cowardice. Even *Vices* themselves are con-

(b) Ὑπάρχει δὲ Ἐναντιότης κατὰ τὸ ποιεῖν, κ. τ. λ.
Arist. Præd. p. 44. Edit. Sylb.

trary

C.VIII. *trary one to another*; Cowardice to Temerity; Avarice to Profusion. It may be doubted, however, whether this character of Quality be *universal*; for what among *Figures* is there *Contrary* in one *Figure* to another, either in the Square to the Circle, or in the Circle to the Square?

ANOTHER *Property* of *Qualities* is TO ADMIT OF INTENSION AND REMISSION (c). Thus of *two* Persons handsome, there may be one *the handsomer*; and among *many* handsome, one the *handsomest*.

Πασάων δ' ὕπερ ἦγε κόρη ἔχει, ἥδ' ἐ μέτωπα,
 'Ρεῖα δ' ἀριγνώτη πέλεται, καλαὶ δέ τε πόσται (d).

*Far above all she bears her tow'ring head,
 With ease distinguish'd, tho' they all are fair.*

So Sir *John Falstaff*, speaking to his Companion, the young Prince—I am

(c) Ἐπιδέχεται δὲ τὸ μᾶλλον καὶ τὸ ἥττον τὰ ποιά.
 κ. τ. λ. *Arist. Præd.* p. 45. *Edit. Sylb.*

(d) *Hom. Odyss.* ζ. 107.

not John a Gaunt, your Grandfather; and yet I am no Coward (e). C.VIII.

It appears, however, that the above-mentioned Species of *Quality* called *Figure* no more admits this Property, than it did *Contrariety*. The Figures, which are Triangles, are not *more so* one than another; no more are the Circles, Circles; the Squares, Squares, &c. which seems indeed to arise from their *definitude* and *precision* *.

BUT there is a *Property* to be found, which may justly deserve the name, by being *common at least to the whole Genus*, if not *peculiar to that only*: and this Property is, that BY VIRTUE OF THEIR QUALITIES THINGS ARE DENOMINATED LIKE and UNLIKE (f). 'Tis thus that

(e) *Shakesf. Hen. IV.*

* See *Hermes*, p. 200.

(f) Ὅμοια δὲ ἢ ἀνόμοια κατὰ μόνας τὰς ποιότη-
τας λέγεται· ὁμοίου γὰρ ἑτέρου ἐτέρῳ ἕκ ἐστὶ κατ' ἄλλο
ἕδεν, ἢ καθ' ὃ ποιόν ἐστιν. *Arist. Præd.* p. 45. *Edit.*
Sylb.

C.VIII. the Swan by his *Quality* of Whiteness *resembles* the Snow; that *Achilles* by his *Quality* of fierceness *resembles* a Mastiff; and that the *Earth* by her *Quality* of Figure is *like* to a Bowl.

FROM *this Property* we see the reason, why there is no *Arrangement*, to which *the Poets* are so much indebted, as to *this*; since hence they derive those innumerable Images, which so strongly distinguish Poetry from every other Species of Writing. For example: let us suppose a young Hero just slain; let us suppose him lying, with a drooping head, a face divested of life and bloom, yet still retaining traces both of beauty and of youth. The Poet would illustrate this pathetic Image by finding something that *resembles* it. And where is he to search, but where he can discover *similar Qualities*? He finds at length an *assemblage* of them in a flower just gathered: the same drooping head, the same lifeless
fade,

fade, the same relicts of a form that was C.VIII.
once fair and flourishing. {

THUS then *Virgil*, speaking of young *Pallas*—

*Qualem virgineo demessum pollice florem
 Seu mollis violæ, seu languentis hyacinthi,
 Cui neque fulgor adhuc, necdum sua formæ
 recessit ;
 Non jam mater alit tellus, viresque mini-
 strat (g).*

AGAIN, what would *Milton* have us conceive, when he describes the tremendous *Shield of Satan*?—Those conspicuous Characters of *Brightness, Vastness, and Rotundity*. To what subject then ought he to refer, that we may comprehend what he would describe? It must be to one, that eminently possesses an *asssemblage of the same Qualities*. Let the Poet in his own Words inform us *what this Subject is* :

(g) *Æn.* xi. 68.

C.VIII. ———— *The broad Circumference*

Hung on his Shoulders, LIKE THE MOON (h).

THE reason of this *Property* may be perhaps as follows. *To be like* is something *less* than to be perfectly *the same*, and something *more* than to be perfectly *different*. And hence it is, that when two things are called *like*, there is implied in their nature something of *Sameness*, and something of *Diversity*. If it be asked what the *Sameness* is, we answer, it must be something *more definitive* than those *transcendental Samenesses*, which run thro' all things. We say not that a piece of Ebony is *like* a Swan, because they both *are*; or that a Crow *resembles* a Snow-ball, because each of them is *One*, and not two. The *Identity* must be sought from among the number of those *Qualities*, the nature of which is less

(b) *Par. Left*, l. i. 286.

extensive, and *more* confined to particular Species. Let Blackness, for example, be a *Quality* of *this character* in that union of *Qualities*, which constitutes Ebony; and let *the same Quality* be one also in *that union*, which constitutes a Crow. So far then the Ebony and the Crow are the same; thro' every other *Quality* perhaps they are different; and thro' *Sameness*, thus temper'd by *Diversity*, they become, and are called LIKE (i). C.VIII.

THE same happens to the Earth and a Bowl, from their *common Rotundity*; to the Hero and the Mastiff, from their *common Ferocity*.

AND so much for the *second universal Genus, Arrangement, or Predicament*, the Genus of QUALITY, it's various SPECIES, and it's different PROPERTIES.

(i) See Note, p. 90. and Note, p. 190.

C H A P. IX.

*Concerning QUANTITY—its two Species—
—their characters—Time, and Place—
their characters—PROPERTY of Quantity,
what—Quantities relative—Figure and
Number, their Effect upon Quantity—
Importance of this Effect—Sciences Ma-
thematical appertain to it—their use,
according to Plato—how other Beings
partake of Quantity—Analogy, found in
Mind—Common Sense and Genius, how
distinguished—Amazing Efficacy of this
Genus in and thro' the World—Illus-
trations.*

Ch. IX. **T**HE Attribute of *Substance*, stand-
ing in Arrangement next to *Qual-
ity*, is QUANTITY; the former having
precedence, as being supposed *more uni-
versal*; while the latter, at least in ap-
pearance,

pearance, seems not to extend beyond Ch. IX.
Body.

OUT of *natural Bodies* is the visible *World* composed, and we may contemplate them in different manners; either *one Body* taken by *itself* and *alone*; or *many Bodies* taken *collectively*, and at once. When *Virgil* says of the Oak,

——— QUANTUM *vertice ad auras*
Ætherias, TANTUM *radice ad Tartara*
tendit——— (a)

or when *Milton* informs us, that

Behemoth, biggest born of Earth, upheaved
 HIS VASTNESS——— (b).

in these instances we have *only one Body*, taken by *itself* and *alone*, and this naturally suggests the Idea of MAGNITUDE. But when in *Virgil* we read,

(a) *Geor.* ii. 291.

(b) *Par. Lost.* vii. 471.

Ch.IX. Quàm MULTA in sylvis autumni frigore
 primo
 Lapsa cadunt folia—— (c).

or when in Milton,

THICK as autumnal leaves, that strew the
 brooks
 In Vallombrosa—— (d).

in these instances we have *many Bodies taken collectively* and *at once*, and this naturally suggests the Idea of MULTITUDE.

HORACE gives the two Species together in his fine address to *Augustus* :


Cum TOT sustineas et TANTA negotia——(e).

Now in MAGNITUDE and MULTITUDE we behold these two primary,

(c) *Æn.* vi. 309.

(d) *Par. Lost*, i. 302.

(e) *Horat. Epist.* l. ii. 1.

these *two* grand and comprehensive *Species*, into which the *Genus of Quantity* is divided; MAGNITUDE, from it's Union, being called QUANTITY CONTINUOUS; MULTITUDE, from it's Separation, QUANTITY DISCRETE (*f*). Ch.IX. 

OF the *Continuous* kind is every *Solid*; also the *bound* of every *Solid*, that is, a *Superficies*; and the bound of every *Superficies*, that is, a *Line*; to which may be added those two *concomitants* of every *Body*, namely *Time* and *Place*. Of the *Discrete* kind are *Fleets*, *Armies*, *Herds*, *Flocks*, the *Syllables of Sounds articulate*, &c.

WE have mentioned formerly (*g*), when we treated of *Time*, that every *Now*

(*f*) Τῆ δὲ Ποσὲ τὸ μὲν ἐστὶ διωρισμένον, τὸ δὲ συνεχές. *Aristot. Præd.* p. 30. *Edit. Sylb.*

(*g*) See *Hermes*, lib. i. c. 7. p. 103, 104.

Ch.IX. or present Instant was a Boundary or
 { Term, at which the Past ended, and the
 Future began; and that 'twas in the *Perpetuity of this Connection, that Time became continuous*. In like manner *within every Line* may be assumed infinite *such Connectives*, under the character of *Points*; and within every *Superficies*, under the character of *Lines*; and within every *Solid*, under the character of *Superficies*; to which *Connectives* these *Quantities* owe their *Continuity*. And hence a *Specific Distinction, attending all Quantities continuous*, that their several *Parts* *everywhere coincide in a common Boundary or Connective* (h).


It is not so with *Quantities discrete*: for *here such Co-incidence is plainly impossible*. Let us suppose, for example, a

(h) See *Arist. Prædic.* p. 31. *Edit. Sylb.*—ἡ δὲ γραμμὴ συνεχὴς ἐστίν, κ. τ. λ. This Character is described to be—πρὸς τινὰ κοινὸν ὅρου συνάπτειν.—*Ibid.*

Multitude of Squares; x, y, z , &c: C.VIII.



Here if the Line AB, where the Square x ends, were the same with the Line CD, where the Square y begins, and EF in like manner the same with GH; they would no longer be a *Multitude* of Squares, but one continuous Parallelogram, such

as  the figure KMNL.

ANOTHER *Specific* Character belonging to the Solid Body, the Superficies, and the Line, (*all of which are Quantities Continuous*) is, that *their Parts have a definite Position within some definite Whole* (i); while in *Quantities discrete*,

(i) Ἐτι, τὰ μὲν ἐκ θέσιν ἔχοντων πρὸς ἀλλήλα τῶν ἐν αὐτοῖς μορίων συνέστηκε· οἷον τὰ μὲν τῆς γραμμῆς μόρια θέσιν ἔχει πρὸς ἀλλήλα, κ. τ. λ. *Arist. Præd. p. 31. Edit. Sylb.*

that

Ch.IX. that is in *Multitudes*, such Position is *no* way requisite. In the most *perfect continuous Quantities*, such as Beams of Timber, Blocks of Marble, &c. 'tis with difficulty the Parts *can change Position*, without destruction to the *Quantity*, taken as *continuous*. But a herd of Cattle, or an Army of Soldiers, *may change Position* as often as they please, and no damage arise to the *Multitude*, considered as a *Multitude*.

It must be remembered however, that *this Character of Position extends not to TIME*, tho' *Time* be a *Continuous Subject*. How indeed should the Parts of *Time* have *Position*, which are so far from being *permanent*, that *they fly* as fast as they arrive? Here therefore we are rather to look for a *Sequel in just Order* (k); for a

(k) "Ο δὲ μή ἐστιν ὑπομένον, πῶς ἂν τῆτο θείσιν τινὰ ἔχοι; ἀλλὰ μᾶλλον τάξιν τινὰ εἴποις αὐ ἔχειν, τῷ τὸ μὲν πρότερον εἶναι τῷ χρόνῳ, τὸ δὲ ὕστερον. *Arist. Præd.* p. 32. *Edit. Sylb.*

Continuity not by *Position*, as in the Ch.IX. Limbs of an Animal, but *for a Continuity by Succession* ;

—— *velut unda supervenit undam* (1).

AND thus are the two Species of *Quantity*, THE CONTINUOUS and THE DISCRETE distinguished from each other.


BESIDES this, among the *Continuous themselves* there is a farther *Distinction*. BODY and it's Attributes, the Surfaces and the Line, are continuous Quantities, capable all of them of being divided ; and by being divided, of becoming a *Multitude* ; and by becoming a *Multitude*, of passing into *Quantity Discrete*. But those *continuous* Quantities, TIME and PLACE, admit not, like the others, even the *possibility* of being divided. For grant *Place* to be divided,

(1) *Horat. Epist. ii. 2. 176.*

Ch.IX. as *Germany* is divided from *Spain* : what *interval* can we suppose, except it be *other Place* ?—Again, suppose *Time* to be divided, as the Age of *Sophocles* from that of *Shakespeare* : what *Interval* are we to substitute, except it be *other Time* ? PLACE therefore and TIME, tho' *continuous* like the rest, are incapable of being divided, *because they admit not*, like the rest, *to have their Continuity broken* (m).

(m) They cannot be divided ACTUALLY, from the reasons here given ;—but they may be divided IN POWER, else they could not be CONTINUOUS ; nor could there exist such Terms, as a Month, a Year, a Cubit, a Furlong, &c.

In this Sense of *potential* Division, they may be divided *infinitely*, as appears from the following Theorem.



Let A and B be two Spheres, that are moving, and let A be the *quicker* moving Sphere ; B, the *slower* ;
and

BUT to proceed. Let us imagine, as Ch.IX.
 we are walking, that at a distance we
 view a Mountain, and at our feet a
 Mole-hill. The Mountain we call *Great*,
 the Mole-hill *Little*; and thus we have
 two *opposite* Attributes in *Quantity Con-*

and let the flower have moved thro' the Space $\gamma\delta$ in the Time $\zeta\eta$. 'Tis evident that the quicker will have moved thro' the same Space in a less Time. Let it have moved thro' it in the Time $\zeta\theta$. 'Tis thus *the Sphere A divides the Time*. Again, in as much as the quicker A has in the Time $\zeta\theta$ past thro' the whole Space $\gamma\delta$, the slower B in the same Time will have past thro' a smaller Space. Let this be $\gamma\kappa$. 'Tis thus *the Sphere B divides the Space*. Again, in as much as the slower Sphere B in the Time $\zeta\theta$ has past thro' the Space $\gamma\kappa$, the quicker Sphere A will have past thro' it in a less Time; so that the Time $\zeta\theta$ will be again divided by the quicker Body. But this being so divided, the Space $\gamma\kappa$ will be divided also by the slower Body, according to the same Ratio. And thus it will always be, as often as we repeat successively what has been already demonstrated: for the *quicker Body* will after this manner divide *the Time*; and the *slower Body* will divide *the Space*; and that, in either case, to *Infinite*, because their *Continuity is infinitely divisible in power*. See the Original of this Theorem in *Aristotle's Physics*, lib. vi. cap. 2. p. 111. Edit. Sylb. "Ἐστω τὸ μὲν ἐφ' ᾧ α, κ. τ. λ.

tinuous.

Ch.IX. *tinuous.* Again, in a meadow we view a Herd of Oxen grazing ; in a field, we see a Yoke of them ploughing the land. The Herd we call *Many*, the Yoke we call *Few* ; and thus have we two *similar Opposites* in *Quantity Discrete*.

OF these four Attributes, *Great* and *Many* fall under the common name of *Excess* ; *Little* and *Few* under the common name of *Defect*. Again, *Excess* and *Defect*, tho' they include these four, are themselves included under the common name of *Inequality*. Farther still, even *Inequality* itself is but a Species of *Diversity* ; as it's *Opposite*, *Equality*, is but a Species of *Identity*. They are subordinate Species confined always to *Quantity*, while *IDENTITY* AND *DIVERSITY* (their *Genera*) may be found to *pass thro'* *all things* (n).

Now

(n) The following *Characters* of the *three first* great *Arrangements*, or *universal Genera*, are thus described by

Now 'tis here, namely in these two, Ch.IX.
Equality and *Inequality*, that we are to
 look for that PROPERTY, by which *this*
Genus is distinguished. It is from QUAN-
 TITY ONLY that things are denominated
 EQUAL or UNEQUAL (o).

FARTHER still—Whatever is *Equal*, is
 equal to *something else* ; and thus is *Equa-*
lity a RELATIVE Term. Again, if we
 resolve *Inequality* into it's several *Excesses*
 and *Defects*, it will be apparent that each
 of these is a *Relative* Term also. 'Tis
 with reference to *Little* that *Great* is
 called *Great* ; with reference to *Few*, that

by *Aristotle*.—Ταυτὰ μὲν γὰρ, ὧν μία ἡ οὐσία· ὅμοια
 δ', ὧν ἡ ποιότης μία· ἴσα δὲ, ὧν τὸ ποσὸν ἓν.—
Things are the SAME, of which the SUBSTANCE is one ;
SIMILAR, of which the QUALITY is one ; EQUAL, of
which the QUANTITY is one. *Metaph. Δ. κεΦ. ιε'.*
p. 88. Edit. Sylb.

(o) — ἰδίου δὲ μάλιστα τῷ ποσῷ, τὸ ἴσον τε καὶ ἀνι-
 σον λέγεσθαι—*Arist. Præd. p. 34.*

Many

Ch.IX. *Many* are called *Many* ; and 'tis by the same habitudes inverted exist *Little* and *Few*. And thus is it that, thro' the Property here mentioned, the Attribute of QUANTITY passes insensibly into that of RELATION (*p*) ; a fact not unusual in other Attributes as well as these, from the universal Sympathy and Congeniality of Nature.

NAY so merely *relative* are many of these Excesses and Defects, that the *same* subject, from it's different *Relations*, may be found susceptible of *both at once*. The Mountain, which by it's Relation to the Mole-hill, was *great* ; by it's Relation to the Earth, is *little* : and the Herd, which were *many* by their Relation to

(*p*) *Aristotle* says expressly of the Things here mentioned, that no one of them is *Quantity*, but exists rather among the Tribe of *Relatives*, in as much as nothing is *Great* or *Little* of *itself*, but merely *with reference* to something else.—Τέτων δὲ ἕδεν ἐστὶ ποσὸν, ἀλλὰ μᾶλλον τῶν πρὸς τι, ἕδεν γὰρ αὐτὸ καθ' αὐτό· κ. τ. λ. *Arist. Præd.* p. 33. *Edit. Sylb.*

the

the single Yoke, are *few* by their Relation to the Sands of the Sea-shoar (q). Ch.IX.


And hence it appears that the Excesses and Defects, which belong to *Quantity*, are not of a *relative* Nature only, but of an *indefinite* one likewise. The truth of this will become still more evident, when it is remembered, that every Magnitude is *infinitely divisible*; and that every Multitude is *infinitely augmentable*.

WHAT then is to be done? How is it possible that *such* Attributes should become the Objects of *Science*? 'Tis then only we are said to *know*, when our Per-

(q) *Aristotle's* Instance goes farther, and shews how a *smaller* Number may be called *Many*; a *larger* Number be called *Few*.—ἐν μὲν τῇ κώμῃ πολλὰς ἀνθρώπους φαμὲν εἶναι, ἐν Ἀθήναις δὲ ὀλίγας, πολλαπλασίους αὐτῶν ὕτας· καὶ ἐν μὲν τῇ οἰκίᾳ πολλὰς, ἐν δὲ τῷ θεάτρῳ ὀλίγας, πολλῶν πλείους αὐτῶν ὕτας—*We say there are MANY Men in a Village; and but FEW in Athens, tho' the Number in this last be many times larger; so too we say there are MANY Persons in a House, and but FEW in the Theatre, tho' the Number in this last may be many times more. Ibid.*

O

ception

Ch.IX.  ception is *definite* (r) ; since whatever falls short of this, is not *Knowledge*, but *Opinion*. Can then the Knowledge be *definite*, when it's Object is *indefinite* ? Is not this the same, as if we were to behold an Object as strait, which was in itself crooked ; or an Object as quiescent, which was in itself moving ? We may repeat therefore the question, and demand, what is to be done ?—It may be answered as follows : *Quantity Continuous* is circumscribed by FIGURE, which, being the natural boundary both of the Superficies and the Solid, gives them the distinguishing Names of Triangle, Square, or Circle ; of Pyramid, Cube, or Sphere, &c. By these FIGURES not only the *Infinity* of *Magnitude* is limited, but the means also are furnished for its most exact Mensuration. Again, *the Infinity of Quantity Discrete* is ascertained by NUMBER, the very Definition of which is Πλῆ-

(r) See before, page 19, 20, 21, and *Hermes*, p. 368, 369.

ὅς ὡρισμένον, that is, *Multitude circum-* Ch.IX.
scribed or defined. Thus, if, in describ-
 ing a Battle, we are told that *many* of
 the Enemy were slain, and but *few*
 saved; our Knowledge (if it deserve the
 name) is perfectly vague and *indefinite*.
 But if these indefinite *Multitudes* are
defined by Number, and we are told that
 the slain were a *thousand*, the saved a
hundred; in such Case our Knowledge be-
 comes adequate and *complete*.

'Tis in the contemplation of these two
Quantities thus defined, the Continuous
 by *Figure*, the Discrete by *Number*, that
 we behold them rendered subjects for the
 two *noblest* of Sciences, the first of them
 for GEOMETRY, the second for ARITH-
 METIC (s); from which two (and not
 from mere Experiments, as some have
 hastily asserted) both the Knowledge of

(s) See *Hermes*, page 351, 352. 367.

Ch.IX. Nature, and the Utilities of common
Life, are in the greatest part derived.

'Tis here we see the rise of those *Mathematical* Sciences, Arithmetic, Geometry, Music, &c. which the Ancients esteemed so essential to a liberal Education. Nor can we believe there is any one now, but must acknowledge, that a Mind properly tinged with such noble Speculations (supposing there be no want of Genius, or of Courage) is qualified to excel in every superior Scene of Life. Far more honourable they surely are, than the Arts of riding a Horse, or of wielding a Sword, those Accomplishments usually assigned to our Youth of Distinction, and for the sake of which alone they are often sent into distant Countries, as if there were nothing to be taught them *at home*, nor any thing in a Gentleman worth cultivating, but his Body. We would not undervalue these *bodily* Accom-

complishments (for Perfection of every Ch.IX.
 fort is certainly worth aiming at); but
 we would wish them to be rated as
 much below the *mental*, as the *Body* it-
 self is inferior to the *Mind*.

THERE is an elegant account of the Sciences abovementioned in the Republic of *Plato*. *Glaucus* (one of the Persons in the Dialogue) takes pains to recommend them from their Usefulness in human life: Arithmetic for accounts and distributions; Geometry for incampments and mensurations; Music for solemn festivals in honour of the Gods; and Astronomy for agriculture, for navigation, and the like. *Socrates*, on his part, denies not the truth of all this, but still insinuates, that they were capable of answering an end more sublime. “ You
 “ are pleasant, says he, in your seeming to
 “ fear the multitude, lest you should be
 “ thought to enjoin certain Sciences, that
 “ are useless. ’Tis indeed no contemptible

Ch.IX. *“ matter, tho’ a difficult one, to believe, that
 “ thro’ these particular Sciences the Soul
 “ has an Organ purified and enlightened,
 “ which is destroyed and blinded by Studies
 “ of other kind; an Organ better worth
 “ saving than a thousand Eyes; in as much
 “ as TRUTH becomes visible thro’ THIS
 “ ALONE (t).*

THESE, that we have here mentioned, appear to be the *only* Species of *Quantity*; in as much as other things are called *Quantities*, not from *themselves*, but with reference to *these*. Thus we say that there is *much* White, because the Superficies,

(t) The above is an attempt to translate the following elegant Passage of *Plato*.—Ἡδὺς εἶ, ὅτι ἔοικας δειδιότι τὰς πολλὰς, μὴ δοκῆς ἄχρηστα μαθήματα προσάτειν. Τὸ δ’ ἐστὶν ὁ πᾶν Φαῦλον, ἀλλὰ χαλεπὸν πειθεῖσθαι, ὅτι ἐν τέτοις τοῖς μαθήμασιν ἑκαστοῖς ὄργανόν τι ψυχῆς ἐκκαθαίρεται, καὶ ἀναζωπυρεῖται, ἀπολλύμενον καὶ τυφλόμενον ὑπὸ τῶν ἄλλων ἐπιτηδεύμάτων, κρείττον δὲ σωθῆναι μυρίων ὁμμάτων· μόνῳ γὰρ αὐτῷ Ἀλήθεια ὁράται. *Plat. de Repub. lib. vii. p. 527. Edit. Serran. Hermes, 294, 5.*

which

which it covers, is *much*; and that an Ch.IX.
 Action was *long*, because *the Time* was
 long, during which it was transacted.
 And hence it is, that, if any one is to
 explain the *Quantity of an Action*, as for
 example the length of the *Trojan War*,
 he explains it by the *Time*, saying it
 was a War of ten *Years*. So when we
 give the *Quantity* of any thing *White*,
 we define it by the *Superficies*, because,
 as that is in *Quantity*, so also is the
White (u).

WE farther observe that *Quantity Con-*
tinuous and *Discrete* may be said to *blend*
 themselves with all things. Thus in
Substances, let Mount *Athos* represent the
 former; the Army of *Xerxes*, the latter.

(u) Κυρίως δὲ Ποσὰ ταῦτα λέγεται μόνον τὰ εἰρημένα,
 τὰ δὲ ἄλλα πάντα κατὰ συμβεβηκός· εἰς ταῦτα γὰρ
 ἀποβλέπουσιν, καὶ τὰ ἄλλα Ποσὰ λέγομεν· οἷον πολὺ
 τὸ λεῦκον λέγεται, τῷ γε τὴν ἐπιφάνειαν πολλὴν εἶναι·
 καὶ ἡ πρᾶξις μακρὰ, τῷ γε τὸν χρόνον, κ. τ. λ.
Aristot. Præd. p. 32. Edit. Sylb.

Ch.IX. In *Colours*, let us view the former in the uniform Blueness of a clear sky; the latter, in the many and diversified Tints of a Rainbow. In *Sounds* we find *Quantity Discrete* belonging to *Speech* or *Language*, it being the Essence of Articulation, that every Syllable should be distinct. *The Continuous*, on the contrary, naturally suggests itself to our Ears, when we hear Yellings, Howlings, and heavy Psalmody. In *Motions*, when a Grasshopper moves *by leaps*, we behold *Quantity discrete*; when a Ship sails *smoothly*, we behold *Quantity Continuous*. The motion of all Animals, that have feet, (whether they leap or not) by being *alternate*, is of the *discrete* kind: but 'tis fabled of the Gods, that, when they moved as Gods, 'twas under *one continued progression* of their whole frame together; to which *Virgil* they say alludes in speaking of *Venus*,

Et vera INCESSU patuit DEA— (x) Ch.IX.

THE MIND, tho' devoid of *Corporeal* Extension, admits what is *analogous* to these two Species of *Quantity*, and recognizes their force even within the sacred recesses of itself. For what can be more truly united in *perfect Continuity*, than the Terms which compose a *Self-evident Truth*? And how is this *Continuity* still *farther* extended, when by the Union of two such Truths there is produced a third, under the indissoluble Connection of a *Demonstrative Syllogism*? If there was not this *Syllogistic Continuity*, there might indeed be other Continuities, but it would never be in our power to prove any thing concerning them. Again, when we consider either *many Propositions*, without reference to a *Syllogism*; or *many independent Terms*,

(*) *Æn.* I. 411.

without

Ch.IX. without reference to a *Proposition* ; what
 { have we then but *Quantity discrete* ? PHI-
 LOSOPHICAL ARRANGEMENTS ? Treas-
 ures, as capable of being *number'd*, esti-
 mated, and recorded, as those which the
 Miser commits to his coffers.

'Tis indeed by the help of an *innate*
 power of *Distinction*, that we recognize
 the *Differences* of things, as 'tis by a
contrary power of *Composition*, that we
 recognize their *Identities* (y). These
 powers, in some degree, are *common to*
all Minds ; and as they are the Basis of
 our whole Knowledge (which is of neces-
 sity either *affirmative* or *negative*) they
 may be said to constitute what we call
 COMMON SENSE (z). On the contrary,
 to possess these Powers in a *more emi-*
nent degree, so as to be able to perceive

(y) See *Hermes*, p. 362, Note (f).

(z) See Vol. I. *Treatise the third, in the Notes*, p.
 287.

Identity in things *widely* different, and *Diversity* in things *nearly* the same ; this 'tis that constitutes what we call GENIUS, that Power divine, which thro' every sort of discipline renders the difference so conspicuous between one learner and another. Ch.IX.

It was from Speculations of this kind, that some of the Ancients were induced to consider QUANTITY in a far higher rank than is usual in common Speculations. “ They considered *both* Species “ under *the common* character of a BOUND “ or MEASURE, and as such to be conspicuous throughout the whole Universe ; the nature of the *Continuous*, “ called MAGNITUDE, being seen in “ UNION and CONNECTION ; that of the “ *Discrete*, called MULTITUDE, in ACCUMULATION and JUXTAPOSITION ;— “ that by virtue of *Magnitude* the WORLD “ or Universe was ONE ; was extended “ and connected every where thro' its “ most


Ch.IX. “ most *distant* Parts ;—that by virtue of
 “ *Multitude* it was DIVERSIFIED WITH
 “ THAT ORDER AND FAIR ARRANGE-
 “ MENT, seen in the amazing variety of
 “ Stars, of Elements, of Plants, of Ani-
 “ mals ; of *Contrarities* on one side, and
 “ of *Similarities* on the other ;—that if
 “ these *Quantities* were thus distinguish-
 “ able in the *Copy* or *Image*, (for such
 “ was this *World*, when compared to it’s
 “ *Archetype*) much more so were they in
 “ those PURE and IMMATERIAL FORMS,
 “ the invariable and immediate Objects
 “ of the SUPREME INTELLECT. The
 “ whole Production of *Quantity* (as of
 “ every thing else) they referred with
 “ reason to this *Primary Intelligent Cause* ;
 “ —whose *virtual* Efficacy, as far as it
 “ passes thro’ all things *without dividing*
 “ itself or stopping, they supposed to
 “ generate CONTINUITY and UNION ;—
 “ as far as it *stops in it’s progress* at every
 “ particular, and communicates to each
 “ a peculiar Form of its own, they held
 “ to

“ to generate DISTINCTION and MUL- Ch.IX.
 “ TITUDE ;—and as far as it perpetually
 “ exerts *at once* these two *distinct* and
 “ *opposite Energies, they considered as for*
 “ *ever rendering* THE UNIVERSE *both*
 “ MANY and ONE ; MANY, thro’ it’s
 “ Order and fair Variety ; One, thro’ it’s
 “ Connection and general Sympathy.” (a)

AND

(a) The Authors, from whom the preceding Sentiments are taken, are *Plotinus* and *Jamblichus*, in the Commentary of *Simplicius* upon this Predicament of *Quantity*.

Ἔτι δὲ ὁ Πλωτῖνός—ἰδίᾳ γὰρ καὶ φύσις ἐκάσῳ, ὡς
 καὶ ἐν τῷ παυτὶ κόσμῳ θεωρεῖται, τῷ μὲν συνεχῆς ἡ φύ-
 σις, ἣτις καλεῖται μέγεθος, κατὰ ἕνωσιν καὶ ἀλληλε-
 χίαν· τῷ δὲ διωρισμένῳ, ἣτις καλεῖται πλῆθος, κατὰ
 σῶρειαν καὶ παράθεσιν· καὶ γὰρ κατὰ μὲν τὴν τῷ μεγέ-
 θος ἑσῖαν, εἰς ὁ κόσμος ἐστὶ τε καὶ νοεῖται, σφαιρικός καὶ
 συμπεφυκὼς ἑαυτῷ, διατεταμένῳ τε καὶ ἀλληλεχόμε-
 νῳ· κατὰ δὲ τὸ πλῆθος, ἥτε σύνταξις καὶ ἡ διακόσ-
 μησις, ἡ ἐκ τούτωνδε φέρεται εἰπεῖν στοιχείων, καὶ ζώων ἢ
 φυτῶν θεωρεῖται, καὶ ἐναντιωτήτων ἢ ὁμοιοτήτων τούτων
 καὶ τούτων· εἰ ἔν ἐν ταῖς εἰκόσιν ἔτω ταῦτα κεχώρισται,
 πολὺ πρότερον ἐν τοῖς νοημένοις γένεσι καὶ πρὸ τούτων,
 ἐν

Ch.IX.  AND so much for the *third* UNIVERSAL GENUS, or PREDICAMENT, that of QUANTITY, it's various *Species*, and it's peculiar *Properties* (b).


ἐν τοῖς καθ' αὐτὰ ἀύλοις εἶδεσι διέσκηκε, κοινὸν ἔχουσα, ὡς εἶρηται, τὸ μέτρον καὶ τὸ πῆρας. *Simplic. in Præd.* p. 32. B. *Edit. Basil.* 1551.

Ὁ δὲ θεῖος Ἰάμβελιχος ——— ἐπειδὴ γὰρ ἡ τῆ ἐνὸς δύναμις, ἀφ' ἧς πᾶν τὸ ποσὸν ἀπογεννᾶται, διατείνεται δι' ὅλων ἢ αὐτῇ, καὶ ὁρίζει ἕκαστον προῖστα ἀφ' ἑαυτῆς, ἢ μὲν δι' ὅλων διήκει παντάπασιν ἀδιαίρετως, τὸ συνεχὲς ὑφίστησι, καὶ ἡ τὴν πρόσοδον ποιεῖται μία, καὶ ἀδιαίρετον καὶ ἄνευ διωρισμῶ· ἢ καὶ προῖστα ἴσεται καθ' ἕκαστον τῶν εἰδῶν, καὶ ἡ ὁρίζει ἕκαστον, καὶ ἕκαστον ἐν ποιεῖ, ταυτὴ τὸ διωρισμένον παράγει. ——— ἐπεὶ δὲ ἅμα καὶ μένει καὶ πρόεισι, τὰ δύο ἀπογεννᾶ. περιέχει γὰρ ἡ τῶν νοητῶν μέτρων δύναμις ἅμα ἀμφοτέρω τὰ μένοντα καὶ προϊόντα ἐν ἐνὶ τῷ αὐτῷ. *Simplic. in Præd.* p. 34. *Edit. Basil.* 1551.

As the above Sentiments are expressed in the Text, a verbal Translation of them is omitted. It may however be acceptable to the curious to see them in their Originals, and for that reason they have been subjoined.

(b) See before Note (c) of this Chapter, p. 190.

W E

WE cannot however quit this and the preceding *Predicament* (I mean the *Predicaments* of *Quality* and *Quantity*) without observing that, as they are diffused in a conspicuous manner throughout the Universe, so Writers both sacred and profane, both poetic and prosaic, appear to have expressed their force, and that often *at the same time*, as the *Predicaments* themselves often exist *so in nature*. Ch.IX. 

O ! Lord, how MANIFOLD are thy Works ? IN WISDOM hast thou made them all (c).

HERE [*manifold*] denotes the *Quantity* of the Divine Works ; [*made in Wisdom*] denotes their *Quality*.

Quintilian——*Nam et QUALIS in cuiusque rei naturâ, et quæ forma, quæritur :*

(c) *Pfalm* civ. v. 24.

Ch.IX. *an immortalis anima, an humanâ Specie*
 Deus : et de MAGNITUDE et NUMERO :
quantus, Sol ; an unus, Mundus (d).

WHERE the Critic not only delineates the two great *Predicaments* here mentioned, but divides also *Quantity* into it's two capital Species, I mean *Magnitude* and *Number*.

CICERO goes farther in his *Tusculan Disputations*, not only producing QUALITY and QUANTITY, but SUBSTANCE also, their support ; which he places first, according to it's proper order. *Si QUID sit hoc, non vides ; at QUALE sit, vides : si ne id quidem ; at QUANTUM sit, profectò vides (e).*

EVEN comic writers have expressed the force of *these two Predicaments*.

(d) *Instit. Orat.* l. vii. c. 4.

(e) *Tusc. Disp.* l. i. 25.

QUANTAM *et* quam VERAM laudem capiet Ch. IX.
Parmeno (f) ?

HOW GREAT, and HOW TRUE *praise* will
Parmeno acquire ?

Great indicates QUANTITY ; *True* indicates QUALITY ; for what QUALITY in *praise* is more valuable, than *Truth* ?

THE Poets, who dealt in Subjects more exalted than Comedy, appear many of them to have employed the same Language.

THUS *Tibullus*, speaking of *Bacchus*—

—QUALIS QUANTUSQUE *minetur* (g).

OVID, of *Jupiter*—

(f) *Terent. Eunuch.* v. 4. 3.

(g) *Tibul.* l. iii. *Eleg.* vi. v. 23.

Ch.IX. —QUANTUSQUE *et* QUALIS *ab altâ*
 Junone excipitur—— (h)

VIRGIL, of *Venus*——

—— QUALISQUE *videri*
Cælicolis, et QUANTA *solet*—— (i)

THE same, of POLYPHEME——

— QUALIS, QUANTUSQUE *cavo Polyphē-*
mus in antro (k).

HOMER (whom 'tis probable the rest
 all copied) speaking of *Achilles*——

Ἦτοι Δαρδανίδης Πρίαμος θάυμαζ' Ἀχιλλῆα,
 ὅσσος ἔην, οἷός τε θεοῖσι γὰρ ἄλλα ἑώκει (l).

Nor less the royal Guest the Hero eyes,
His godlike aspect, and majestic size (m).


(h) *Metam.* iii. 204.

(i) *Æn.* ii. 589.

(k) *Æn.* v. 641.

(l) *Iliad.* xxiv. 629.

(m) *Pope's Homer*, B. xxiv. v. 798. The Transla-
 tion we see renders the words ὅσσος and οἷός by a
Peri-

THESE Attributes, given by Poets to Gods and Heroes, have been found by *Euclid* in Figures Geometrical. He has a Problem, to teach us *how to describe a rectilineal Figure, which to one given rectilineal Figure shall be SIMILAR, to another shall be EQUAL* (n). Ch.IX. 

SIMILAR is a Property of QUALITY ;
EQUAL, of QUANTITY (o).

BUT 'tis time to finish, and proceed to the Arrangement next in order.

Periphrasis, and it should seem with some propriety, as the God-like aspect of *Achilles* is clearly among his Qualities, and his Majestic Size evidently respects his Magnitude, that is to say, his Quantity. It must be confessed however, that much of the force of the Original will necessarily be lost in the Translation, where single words in one Language cannot be found corresponding to single words in the other.

(n) *Euclid* vi. 25.

(o) See before page 175, and page 191.

C H A P. X.

*Concerning RELATIVES (a) —their Source
—Relatives apparent—real—their Properties, reciprocal—Inference, and Co-existence—Force of Relation in Ethics—
—in matters Dramatic—in Nature, and the Order of Being—Relations, amicable and hostile—Evil—Want—Friendship—Strife—Relation of all to the Supreme Cause—extent and use of this Predicament, or Arrangement.*

Ch. X. **T**HRO' the *three universal Genera, Predicaments, or Arrangements* already described, subordinate Beings may be said to attain their *Completion* ; thro' *Substance*

(a) The Title of this ARRANGEMENT is expressed by a *Plural*, and not a singular (like *Quality* and *Quantity*) because *all Relation is necessarily between Two.*

Substance they exist; thro' *Quality* they are distinguished; and thro' *Quantity* they acquire a *Magnitude*, and become a certain *Multitude*. Ch. X.

YET when Beings are thus produced, we must not imagine them to exist, like Pebbles upon the Shoar, dispersed and scattered, without *Dependence* or mutual *Sympathy*. 'Twould be difficult out of such to compose a Universe or perfect *Whole*, because every perfect *Whole* has a respect to it's Parts, as well as the Parts a respect both to such *Whole*, and to each other. Hence then the rise of that *Genus* called *RELATION*, a *Genus* which runs thro' all things, holding all of

TWO.—ἡ δὲ Σχέσις τοῦλάχισον ἐν δυσὶ πράγμασι θεωρεῖται. Ammon. in Cat. p. 94. B.—ἴδιον γὰρ τῆς σχέσεως μόνης, τὸ ἐν πολλοῖς ὑφεῖναι μόνως, ὅπερ ἕδεμιξ̃ πρόσεσι τῶν ἄλλων κατηγοριῶν.—'Tis a Peculiarity of Relation only, to have it's existence in MANY, which is the case with no one else of the Predicaments. Simpl. in Præd. p. 41. B. Edit. Basil. 1551.

Ch. X. *them together*, in as much as there is no
 { Member of the Universe either so great
 or so minute, that it can be called *inde-*
pendent, and *detached* from the rest.

Now in all RELATION there must be
 a Subject *whence* it commences, for ex-
 ample Snow ; another, *where* it termi-
 nates, for example a Swan ; the *Relation*
itself, for example Similitude ; and lastly
the Source of that Relation, for example
 Whiteness (*b*) ; *the Swan* is related to
Snow, by being both of them *White*.

THE

(*b*) This Source may be sought for among the Dif-
 ferential Characters of Being, in whatever *Predica-*
ment or *Arrangement* they happen to exist, be it in
Quality, as the Character of *Whiter* ; in *Quantity*, as
 that of *Greater*, that of *more Numerous* ; in *Time*, as
 that of *Older* ; in *Place*, as that of *Upper*, &c.

This is what *Simplicius* means, when he says—
 ἀνάγκη αὐτὴν (*scil.* τὴν χεῖρον) ἐν τῷ κατὰ διαφορὰν
 χαρακτῆρι εὐπαρέχειν. *Simpl. in Cat.*

Hence too we may see why RELATION stands next
 to *Quantity* ; for in strictness the *Predicaments* which
 follow are but different *Modes of Relation*, marked by
 some

THE Requisites to *Relation* being in Ch. X.
 this manner explained, it will appear
 that *those only* are the *true Relatives*,
 which express in their very *Structure* the
relative Source, and *whose very Essence* may
 be found in this their *reciprocal Habi-*
tude (c). But this perhaps will be bet-
 ter understood by a few examples.

THE

some *peculiar* Character of their own, over and
 above the *relative* Character, which is *common* to
 them all.

Even in the two *Predicaments* that precede this of
 Relatives, I mean *QUALITY* and *QUANTITY*, tho'
 they have an existence *void of Relation*, we cannot
 say so of their *characteristic Peculiarities*; for *LIKE* is
 a *Relative* Term, and so is *EQUAL*. Hence *Simpli-*
cus—ἄλλο γὰρ τὸ ἴσον παρὰ τὸ ποσὸν, καὶ ἄλλο τὸ
 ὅμοιον παρὰ τὸ ποιοῦν—*EQUAL* is *something else beside*
QUANTITY; *LIKE*, *something else beside QUALITY*.
Simpl. in Præd. By something else he means they
 are *Relatives*.

(c) Πρὸς τι καὶ τοιαῦτα λέγεται, ὅσα, αὐτὰ ἅπερ
 εἰν, ἐτέρων εἶναι λέγεται· ἢ ὅπως ἄλλως πρὸς ἕτερον.
 —Such things as these are said to be RELATIVES,
 namely as many as are said TO BE, WHAT THEY ARE,

Ch. X. THE Swan ('twas said before) was in
 Whiteness *like* Snow. Here the Swan
 and the Snow were produced, as *Rela-*
tives. We produce others of like kind,
 when we assert that *London* is larger than
York, a Lemon equal to an Orange, &c.

BUT the truth is, these Subjects are
 none of them *properly Relatives of them-*
selves, but then *only* become such (as
 indeed may every thing else) when a
Relation is raised between them through
 the Medium of a *Relative Attribute*,
London, we say, is larger than *York*.
 The Relation subsists in *Larger*, which
 being attributed to *London*, makes it a
 Relative to *York*, which is in fact some-
 thing *less*. The same holds in the Le-
 mon and Orange, and in all possible in-
 stances. To whatever Subject we affo-

by being THINGS BELONGING TO OTHER THINGS,
 or which in any other sense have reference to something
 else. *Arist. Præd. p. 34. Edit. Sylb.*

ciate

ciate any of the *Relative* Attributes, we immediately render the Subject by such *Association* a *Relative*. Such a Subject therefore is only a *Relative incidentally*. Ch. X.

BUT the *true* and *real* Relatives are those Attributes *themselves*, the Terms *Larger, Equal, Like, &c.* for these in their very *Structure* express the *relative* Source, and only exist in a *joint* and *reciprocal Habitude* one to another.

THERE are also *relative Substances*, as well as *relative Attributes*; that is to say, Terms *which indicate at once both a Substance and a Relative*. Such are Master and Servant, Preceptor and Disciple: *Master* implies a *Man*; and not only that, but a *Man having Dominion*: *Servant* implies a *Man*, and not only that, but a *Man rendering Service*; and the same may be said of the other example alleged.

Now

Ch. X.

Now a distinguishing PROPERTY of these *real Relatives*, is, that they *reciprocate in their Predication* (d). Every Master is the Master of a Servant, and every Servant the Servant of a Master : every Preceptor the Preceptor of a Disciple ; and every Disciple, the Disciple of a Preceptor. The same holds in the *relative Attributes* as well as in the *Substances*, Greater being always Greater than Less, and Less being always Less than Greater. That this is a *Property*, which never fails, will better appear, if from any *relative Substance* we subtract the *relative Attribute*, and substitute in it's room the Substance *alone*. For example, from the relative Substance, Master, let us subtract the relative Attribute, Dominion, so that *Man only* shall remain, divested of that Attribute. We

(d) Πάντα δὲ τὰ πρὸς τι πρὸς ἀντιστρέφοντα λέγεται. *Arist. Præd.* p. 35.

cannot affirm of every Man, as we can Ch. X.
 of every Master, that *merely as a Man*,
 he is the Master of a Servant (e).

FROM this necessity of *reciprocal* Predication, another *Property* of Relation follows, that *we cannot understand one Relative, without understanding it's companion*; and that *in proportion as our Knowledge of one Relative is more precise, so is that likewise of the other* (f). I cannot know

(e) *Aristotle* finds an instance in the same Term, *Servant*.—οἷον ὁ δ᾽ ἐλ, εἰ μὴ δεσπότη ἀποδοθῇ δ᾽ ἐλ, ἀλλὰ ἀνθρώπου, ἢ δίποδος, ἢ ὅταν τῶν τοιούτων, ἐκ ἀντιγρέφει· ἔ γὰρ οἰκεία ἡ ἀπόδοσις εἶναι—*For example, the Term Servant, if he be not described as the Servant of a Master, but of a Man, or of a Biped, or of any other such thing, does not reciprocate, because the Description returned is not necessary and essential*—that is, we cannot say, the *Man* of a Servant, or the *Biped* of a Servant, as we say the *Master* of a Servant. *Arist. Præd.* p. 37, where much more is subjoined, worth reading.

(f) *Relata sunt simul COGNITIONE. Cognito proinde alterutro, cognoscitur alterum; (idque EODEM plane MODO*

Ch. X. know for example that A is greater than B, without knowing that B is less than A; and if with more precision I know that A is double, I necessarily know withal that B is half; and if with still farther precision I know the measure of A to be eight, I know with equal precision the measure of B to be four (g).

AND

MOD0, et MENSURA COGNITIONIS) et ignorato ignoratur. *Logic. Compend. Saunderson, p. 41. Edit. Oxon. 1672.*

I have quoted *Saunderson*, as he was an accurate Logician, but *Aristotle's* own words are, as follows—
 εἴαν τις εἰδῇ τι ὀρισμένως τῶν πρὸς τι, καὶ κεῖνο, πρὸς ὃ λέγεται, ὀρισμένως εἴσεται—*If any one know with precision any one of two Relatives, he will know also the other Relative which it refers to, with equal precision.*
Arist. Prædic. p. 39. Edit. Sylb.

(g) And here by the way it is worth observing, that as *all Relatives* are recognized in combination, while *every Object of Sense* is perceived distinct and independent; it follows that *all Relatives are properly Objects of the Intellect*, and that, if it were not for this faculty, we should know nothing concerning them. Let A for example be supposed the master of B, and let A be tall, well-proportioned, ruddy, &c. These
 last

AND this naturally leads to that fun- Ch. X.
 damental *Property* of Relation, on which
 the rest all depend, namely, *the necessary*
and universal Co-existence of Relatives (h),
 which always commence *together*, subsist
together, and cease *together*. *Ulysses*, in
 his Speech to *Thersites*, says in anger,

last characters only are visible to the Eye, nor does the Eye see *more*, while the Relation *subsists*, or *less*, when the Servant *dies*, and the Relation is *at an end*. Were there a change in the Master's person, were he to become deformed from being well-shaped, or pale from being ruddy, then would the Eye be able to recognize what had happened. But 'tis a singular property of this Genus, that a Relative may change, or lose it's Relations, without change or loss within itself. Let the corresponding Relative but vary, or cease to exist; let the Master lose his Servant, or the Preceptor his Disciple; let those, who stood on my right remove themselves to my left, or those, who stood above me, place themselves below; and 'tis easy to conceive a Subject, after having lost or varied *every one* of these Relations, still to remain itself invariably the same.

(h) Δοκεῖ δὲ τὰ πρὸς τι ἅμα τῇ φύσει εἶναι.
Arist. Præd. p. 37.

May

Ch. X. *May I lose my son Telemachus, if I do not seize, &c.* And how does he express this sentiment?

Μηδέτι Τηλεμάχοιο πατὴρ κεκλημένῳ εἶναι.

May I no longer be called THE FATHER OF TELEMACHUS (i).

He well knew he could only lose that *Relative Denomination*, by losing his Son, with whose birth and duration it was indissolubly connected. It was not that *Ulysses* might not have survived *Telemachus*, or *Telemachus*, *Ulysses*; the *Co-existence* being only attached to the *Relative Characters*, those of Father and Son.

AND hence we may collect that the *Co-existence* here mentioned is not like that of *Substance* and its *essential Pro-*

(i) *Iliad*, B. v. 260.

perties (as *Rationality* for example co- Ch. X.
exists with Man, or *Sensation* with Ani-
 mal) ; but a Co-existence less intimate by
 far than that is, because it subsists be-
 tween Beings actually *distinct* one from
 another.

AND hence it has followed, that some
 Logicians have treated it as possessing
 less of the *real*, than any one of the
 other Genera. They tell us, *Relatio est*
Ens minimæ Entitatis (k).

YET we must be careful how we un-
 dervalue it (l), in consequence of such a
 notion ;

(k) *Fell's Logic*, p. 92.

(l) Thus *Simplicius* in his Comment on this Cate-
 goric—Διὰ ταῦτα δὲ, ὡς παραφυσωμένην ταῖς ἄλλαις
 κατηγορίαις, τὴν τῆς πρὸς τι ἐπεισοδιώδη νομίζουσι·
 καὶ τοὶ προηγουμένην ἔσαν, καὶ κατὰ διαφορὰν οἰκείαν
 θεωρουμένην. Αὕτη γὰρ κοινότης ἐστὶ διὰ πάντων διήκω-
 σα, τῶν τε ἐναντίων, καὶ τῶν ὁποσῶν διαφερόντων, καὶ τῶν
 ἑλὼν γενῶν, καὶ τῶν ὑπ' αὐτὰ τεταγμένων· ἥτις εἰ μὴ
 παρῆν,

Ch. X. notion ; since with those, who well attend to it's amazing efficacy, it is more likely

παρῆν, διεσπάρσθη ἂν πάντῃ (l. πάντα) ἀπὸ πάντων
—And hence some conceive the Predicament of RELATION, by it's growing on as it were to the rest, to be something episodic and adventitious, altho' it be in fact truly PRINCIPAL, and an Object of Contemplation from it's own distinctive Character. 'Tis this indeed is that Band of COMMUNITY WHICH PASSES THRO' ALL THINGS ; thro' Contraries, thro' things in any way different, thro' whole Genera, and thro' the several Beings, arranged beneath them—that Principle, which, were we to suppose away, all things in that instant would be dissipated and torn from all things. *Simplic. in Prædic. p. 44. B. Edit. Basil. 1551.*

See also the same Author in the same Comment.

Οὔτε γὰρ τὰ γένη, ἔτε τὰ ὑπ' αὐτῶν ὄντα, κοινωνίαν ἔχει τινα πρὸς ἄλληλα, εἰ μή τις χέσεως ἢ λόγος ἐν τοῖς ἔσιν. Ἀτοπον δὲ τὴν κοινωνίαν ἀναιρεῖν τῶν διαφερόντων πρὸς ἄλληλα· ἀτοπον δὲ καὶ τὴν ἁρμονίαν ἀναιρεῖν, καὶ τὴν ἐν τοῖς φθόγγοις μόνην, καὶ τὴν ἐν τοῖς ἀριθμοῖς, ἀλλὰ καὶ τὴν ἐν ταῖς ἐσῖαις καὶ δυνάμεσι πάσαις καὶ ἐνεργείαις, ἥτις ἐγγινομένη τοῖς ἔσι, συνηγαγείναι εἰς ταυτὸν, καὶ χέειν ἔχειν πρὸς ἄλληλα ἀπειργάσασθαι· ἀναιρεθήσεται δὲ καὶ τὸ σύμμετρον καὶ ἴσον, καὶ ἐπισητόν, καὶ ἐπισήμη. Εἰ δὲ καὶ γεωμετρία καὶ μουσικὴ περὶ χέσεις ἔχουσιν, ἀνυπόστατοι δὲ αὐταί· καταγέλαστοι ἂν εἶεν ἐκεῖ-

likely to acquire a rank perhaps above Ch. X.
it's real merit.

WHAT ought we to think, should it appear the Basis of Morality?—"MORAL DUTIES (says *Epictetus*) are in general

ναι περὶ τὰ ἀνυπόστατα καὶ ἀτριβόμενα. Πῶς δὲ καὶ ἔφε-
τόν πᾶσιν ὁ θεὸς λέγεται, εἰ μηδεμίαν ἔστι πρὸς
τὸ ἔφετόν τῷ ἐφιεμένῳ.—For neither the Universal Ge-
nera, nor the things included under them, can have any
Connection one with another, if there exist not in things
the Ratio of HABITUDE or RELATION. But 'tis ab-
surd to take away the Connection of things that differ one
from another: absurd also to take away Harmony, not
that only which exists in Sounds, nor that which exists in
Numbers, but that also which exists in Substances, and
in all the variety of Capacities and Energies; that, which
having been implanted in Beings, has brought them to-
gether, and effected, that they should have the Relation
here spoken of to each other. [Farther than this, by
taking away Relation] there will be taken away the
Proportionate, the Equal, the Knowable, and Know-
lege. If Geometry and Music are employed about Rela-
tions, and these last have no Existence; then will those
Sciences be ridiculous, in being employed about Non enti-
ties. How also can GOD himself be called AN OBJECT
OF DESIRE TO ALL BEINGS, if there be no Relation
between the Thing desired, and that which desires? Sim-
plic. in *Præd.* p. 43. B.

Q

" mea-

Ch. X. *“ measured by RELATIONS. Is he a Fa-*
“ ther ?—The Relation ordains, that he
“ must be taken care of; that thou yield to
“ him in all things, bear with him, when
“ he reproaches, when he strikes, &c.—
“ But he is a bad Father—And wert thou
“ then by nature connected with a good
“ Father ?—No, but with a Father—
“ Thus therefore out of Neighbour, out of
“ Citizen, out of Magistrate wilt thou
“ TRACE THE MORAL DUTY, if thou
“ make it a Custom to CONTEMPLATE
“ THE RELATIONS (m).”

THE Stoic Emperor *Antoninus* inculcates the same doctrine. *There are (says he) three RELATIONS; one to the proximate Cause, which immediately surrounds us; one to the divine Cause, from which all things happen to all; and one to those, along with whom we live (n).* So import-

(m) *Epiet. Ench. cap. xxx.*

(n) *M. Ant. viii. 27.*


ant is the Knowlege of *Relations* (ac- Ch. X.
cording to these Philosophers) in a sub-
ject, which so much concerns us, I mean
an upright and a virtuous conduct.

'Tis to a subordinate end, that *Ho-
race* applies this Knowlege, when he
makes it an essential to *Dramatic Poets*,
and as a Philosophical Critic, teaches
them, that 'tis thro' *this* Knowlege only
they can *truly* delineate Characters. The
verses are well known ;

Qui didicit, patriæ quid debeat, &c.

'Tis thus too that *Shakespeare*, either
by Knowlege acquired, or (what is more
probable) by the dictates of an innate
superior Genius (*o*), makes *Macbeth* shud-
der

(*o*) The Author has in this place considered *Shake-
speare*, as *Aristotle* did *Homer*, and has left it uncertain,
to what Cause his transcendent merit should be a-
scribed. *Aristotle*, speaking of *Homer's* superiority,

Ch. X.  der at the thoughts of murdering *Duncan*, when he reflects on the many *Duties* he owed him, *arising from the many Relations* he stood in, all of which *Duties* he was then basely going to violate.

——— *He's here in double trust ;
First, as I am his KINSMAN, and his
SUBJECT,
Strong both against the deed: then, as his
HOST,
Who should against his Murtherer shut the
door,
Not bear the Knife myself——*

AND here I cannot help remarking upon this excellent Tragedy, that it is not only admirable as a *Poem*, but is perhaps at the same time one of the most *moral* pieces existing. It teaches

says in like manner, that it was, ἤτοι διὰ τέχνην, ἢ διὰ φύσιν, *either thro' Art, or thro' Nature. Vid. Arist. Poet. c. viii.*

us the danger of venturing, tho' but for Ch. X.
once, upon a capital offence, by shewing
 us that 'tis impossible *to be wicked by*
halves ; that we cannot stop ; that we
 are in a manner compelled to proceed ;
 and yet that, *be the success as it may*, we
 are sure in the event to become *wretched*
 and *unhappy* (p).

BUT to return to our Subject, I mean
 that of *Relation*.

IF we quit Mankind, and view it's
 more general extent, we shall find, that,
 where *Continuity* fails, there *RELATION*
supplies it's office, connecting as it were
 all things the most *remote* and *heteroge-*
neous. Were they indeed combined un-
 der an Union more intimate, were it the
 same with that *Continuity*, seen in a *liv-*
ing Body and it's Limbs, *the whole Uni-*


(p) See the Remarks on this Tragedy in that ele-
 gant Book, the *Essay on the Writings and Genius of*
Shakespeare.

Ch. X. *verse* would be no more than one immense Animal. But 'tis not so: and those, who have explained it's Nature, have rather called it *one City*, or *one Commonwealth* (q); a very different Species of Monad from one Animal, or living Being. 'Tis here then (as we have said) *Relation* intervenes, and under a thousand different ties *connects all things together*.

THE ties indeed are many, tho' the Sources are few, Every *subordinate* Being, as it is by nature *subject to wants*, (indigence and imperfection being *essential* to it's constitution) has a connection with those *Beings*, thro' whom *such wants may be supplied*. Hence then one Source of *Relation*. Again, every Being whatever, *that has power to supply such wants*, has a Connection with those *Beings*, to whom it can thus become *subservient*. Hence

(q) See Vol. First, *Treatise the third*, p. 225, 341.

then

then another Source of *Relation*. Now Ch. X.
 in the Divine Oeconomy of the whole it 
 is so admirably contrived, that every Being in different degrees possesses this *double* character, and not only *needs* assistance, but is able in it's turn to *afford* it. Nothing is so mighty, as to subsist without help ; nothing so minute, as not at times to have it's use. Thus as *Connections reciprocate*, and are every where blended, the *Concatenation of Relations* grows in fact *universal*, and the world becomes (as above described) one *City* or *Commonwealth*.

INSTANCES of this *double Relation* occur (as we have said) in every particular Being. The Ewe is related to the Grass, as to the Being which *supplies* her wants ; to her Lamb, as to the Being whose wants *she herself supplies*. The Grass again is *related* to the Earth, as to the Being, which affords it aliment ; while it is *related* to the Ewe, by be-

Ch. X. coming itself aliment to her. The Earth is *related* to Vegetables, as she is both their parent and their nurse; while she is *related* to the Sun, as to the fountain of her genial warmth. The *Relations* of the Sun are finely represented by *Epic-tetus*, who makes THE SOVEREIGN OF THE UNIVERSE thus address that noble Luminary. “*Thou* (saith he) *art* SUN: “*Thou art able by going round, to form* “*the year and the Seasons; to enlarge and* “*nourish the fruits; to raise and still the* “*Winds; to warm in due degree the bo-* “*dies of men: Arise, go round, and be-* “*ginning from the greatest, extend after* “*this manner thy influence to the most mi-* “*nute (r).”*

NOR when we mention *the Earth* ought we to forget that equitable discharge of her *Relations*, for which *Virgil* well distinguishes her by the character of *most just*;

(r) *Arrian. Epicet. l. iii. c. xxiv. p. 444. Edit. Upton.* Σὺ ἥλιος εἶ δύνασαι, κ. τ. λ.

Fundit humo facilem victum JUSTISSIMA Ch. X.
 TELLUS (s).

THE *Attic Historian* and *Philosopher* will be found the best Commentator on this elegant passage of the *Roman Poet*.
 “THE EARTH too (says *Xenophon*) being a Divinity, teacheth those that can learn it of her, JUSTICE: for such as cultivate her best, she requiteth with most goods (t)”.

WHEN we view the *Relation* of the Male to the Female, and of the Female to the Male, and add to this the *Common Relation* extending from both to their Offspring, we view the rise of *Families* thro’ the whole animal race. Among

(s) *Virg. Georg.* ii. 460.

(t) Ἐτι δὲ ἡ Γῆ, θεὸς ἔσα, τὰς δυναμένους καταμανθάνειν, καὶ ΔΙΚΑΙΟΣΥΝΗΝ διδάσκει· τὰς γὰρ ἄριστα θεραπεύουσας αὐτὴν, πλεῖστα ἀγαθὰ ἀντιποιεῖ·
Xenoph. Oeconom. p. 35. *Edit. Oxon.*

the

Ch. X.  the more social, such as Sheep and Cattle, these Families by fresh *Relations* are combined into larger multitudes, under the name of *Flocks* and *Herds*. Among those of higher order still (such as the Bee (*u*), the Ant, the Beaver, and above all the social and rational Being, Man) these herds and flocks by relations more excellent are improved into *civil Politics*, where there is a general Interest or *common Good*, a Good to which either willingly or unwillingly (*x*) every individual co-operates.

(*u*) *Virgil* speaks of the *Bee*, as he would of *Man*;
Mores et studia et populos et praelia dicam. Georg. iv.

Aristotle, distinguishing these Animals from those, which do no more than barely herd together, elegantly calls them ζῶα πολιτικὰ, *Political* or *Civil* Animals, Animals formed for a Life of *Civil association*, where the *Business* is ONE, and that COMMON to the whole Tribe; ὧν ἓν τι, κ. τ. λ. *Histor. Anim.* p. 5. Edit. Sylb.

(*x*) ————— ἦν δὲ μὴ θέλω,
 Κακὸς γενόμενος, εἰδὲν ἥττονος ἔψαμαι.
Epid. Enchirid. c. lii.

See *Vol. I. Treatise the third*, p. 235, 349.

IF

IF we descend below Animals down Ch. X.
 to Vegetables, we shall discover in the {
 Vine, the Ivy, the Woodbind, and all
 the Plants of slender Stalk, a manifest
 relation to those of a trunk more solid,
 such as the Oak, the Elm, and the se-
 veral trees of the Forest. 'Tis with a
 Power, which appears *almost a conscious*
one, that the former of these tribes, *re-*
cognizing their Relation, apply to the lat-
 ter for a support, and *spontaneously* twine
 their bodies, or at least their tendrils, a-
 round them (y).

WHEN

(y) Τὰ τέλη, ἐφ' ἃ τῶν φύσει γιγνομένων ΕΚΑΣΤΑ
 ἔεται, ἢ καὶ τὴν ἀρχὴν εὐθὺς φυομένοις πάρεσιν αὐτοῖς,
 ἀλλ' ὕδατα δὴ καὶ παραγίγνεται. Σκοπῶμεν δ' αὐτὸ
 ἐφ' ἐνὸς τῶδε· τῇ ἀμπέλῳ ἑλικὶ τέλει ἐστὶ, τὸ ἑτέραν
 φυτὲ πλορθῶ περιελιχθεῖσαν, ἐκείνῳ τὴν ἀμπελον ἀνα-
 δῆσαι τῷ φυτῷ, ταύτην ἐν τοῖς φυτοῖς τὴν φύσιν εἰλη-
 χυῖαν, ἐπαλλόκαυλον εἶναι. Οὐκ ἔν τὸ ἑτέραν φυτὲ πλορ-
 θῶ τὴν ἑλικὰ περιελιχθεῖσαν ἀναδῆσαι τὴν ἀμπελον, ἔτε
 τῇ ἀμπέλῳ φυομένη, ἔτε τῇ ἑλικὶ εὐθὺς πάρεσιν, ἀλλ'
 ὕδατόν γε παραγίγνεται· ὅθεν μέντοι ἦτιον τὲ φύ-
 εσθαι

Ch. X.

WHEN therefore we contemplate the various *Relations* already hinted, and mark in

εσθαι ὅλως ἕλικά τῇ ἀμπέλῳ αἰτίου τελικὸν ἢ ἐφ' ἐτέρῳ φυτῷ ἀνάδεσις αὐτῆς ἐστίν. Ἀμύχανον δὲ τὸ μηδέπω ὄν, μηδ' ἐν τοῖς ὄσι τεταγμένον, ὅντ' τῇ ἤδη αἰτίου γίγνεσθαι· εἶναι γὰρ δεῖ τὸ αἰτίον τῇ γιγνομένῃ, ἔχει μὴ εἶναι. Προειληφθαι ἄρα δεῖ ἐν τινι νῶ τὴν τῆς ἀμπέλου ἐφ' ἐτέρῳ φυτῷ ἀνάδεσιν, ὅς αὐτῇ ἐπισατῶν, ὥσπερ δημιουργὸς ἀνὴρ σκευασοῖς, καὶ τὴν ἕλικά αὐτῇ τῆς τοιαύτης ἕνεκα ἀναδέσεως φύσει· ἢ καὶ θαυμασίως, εἰ μὲν μηδὲν τι αὐτῇ τοιῶτον παρὰ κένεται οἷον περιελιχθῆναι, ἐπ' εὐθύ πως φαίνεται φερομένη· εἰ μὲν δὲ πλοῦθος τις παρῇ, εὐθύς περιελιχθῇ. Οὐτ' ἐν τὴν ἕλικά τῇ ἀμπέλῳ μὴ ἔστι τῆς ἕνεκα φύεσθαι, ὅπως ἐτέρῳ αὐτὴν φυτῷ ἀναδέσῃ, νῦν ἔχει μὴ ἀξίον· ἔτε τὸ μὴ νῦν τοῖς τοιούτοις ἐφιστάται ἔχει αὖ καὶ ὅτινεν λόγον.

The ENDS, to which the several vegetable Productions tend, are not instantly present to them, as soon as they begin to grow, but some way or other accrue to them subsequently. We may perceive this in a single instance. The End to the Vine's Tendril, is, by twining round the Branch of another Vegetable, to bind the Vine to that Vegetable; which Vine, among the vegetable Tribe, possesses this natural Character, that it should rest upon another for it's support. Now that the Tendril, by twining round the Branch of another Vegetable, should bind the Vine on, neither belongs to the Vine, when it first begins

in how *friendly* a manner they bring the most distant Beings together, we may be

Ch. X.

to grow, nor yet to it's Tendril; but is something which accrues subsequently: and yet nevertheless, the binding of it to another Vegetable is the FINAL CAUSE why the Tendril should grow at all, and belong to the Vine. But it is impossible that what AS YET IS NOT, and has no Arrangement in the order of things, (I mean the binding) SHOULD BE THE CAUSE OF SOMETHING WHICH NOW IS, (I mean the Tendril of the Vine, when it first appears). The Cause of any thing produced must have an actual Existence, and not be a non-entity. This Binding therefore of the Vine to some other Vegetable must have been PRECONCEIVED IN SOME MIND OR INTELLECT, who presiding over it (as any Man, being an Artist, presides over his Works) makes the Tendril grow to it for the sake of such Binding: which Tendril also wonderfully, if there be nothing adjoining of a nature for it to twine round, appears in some sort to shoot upwards; but if any Branch be near, instantly deviates and twines round it. It is therefore irrational to suppose that the Tendril did not grow to the Vine, that it might hereafter bind it to another Vegetable; nor can there be any degree of Reason for asserting, that some MIND or INTELLIGENCE did not preside over such Operations.

The force of this Argument is, as follows—
 THINGS exist before their ENDS; that is, before that the Ends of their Existence take place. The Tendril exists, before it binds the Vine; the Minute-hand exists,

Ch. X. be tempted to say with the Philosopher;
 that “all things are full of FRIENDLY
 “PRIN-

exists, before it indicates the Minutes. And yet is this Binding, and this Indicating so necessary, that the Things themselves would never have existed, but for the sake of *these only*. Where then were these *Ends*, when the *Things* themselves first appeared?—In external and visible nature?—This from the Hypothesis is *impossible*, for the Hypothesis makes them *subsequent*.—No other place then remains, but either the SOVEREIGN MIND, or a *Mind subordinate*, according as the Work itself is a Work of *Nature* or of *Art*. See before, p. 112, 113.

I have taken the preceding Extract from a Manuscript of that able Scholar and Philosopher *George Gemistus*, otherwise called *Pletho*, who flourished in the fifteenth Century, both before and after the taking of *Constantinople*. If it apply not immediately to the Subject, it has at least the merit of being something rare and ingenious. It is a morsel of that Controversy among the learned *Greeks* of this Period, whether the Preference in Philosophy was due to *Plato* or to *Aristotle*. *Scholarius*, among others, was for *Aristotle*; *Pletho* for *Plato*; from whose Work on this Subject (which was an Answer to *Scholarius*) this Extract is taken. There is another small Work of *Pletho's* upon the same Subject, intitled, *Περὶ τῶν Ἀριστοτέλης πρὸς Πλάτωνα διαφέρεται*, printed at *Paris*, 1541; and *Bessario* (a learned *Greek* of that age, who went over to the Latin Church, and became a Cardinal)

“PRINCIPLES (z)”. But we must Ch. X.
 not suffer this sentiment to carry us
 too far. Things are not only full of
 FRIENDLY PRINCIPLES, but of HOSTILE
 likewise.

Cardinal) wrote a large Tract to defend the *Platonic* Doctrine, intitled *Contra Calumniatorem Platonis*. The printed Edition is in Latin, but the whole Work is extant in *Greek* among the Manuscripts of St. Marc's Library at *Venice*, to which Library *Bessario* bequeathed his own. There is too a fine Letter remaining of the same *Bessario*, addressed to *Michael Apostolius*, who, tho' he took *Bessario's* side, and defended *Plato*, yet appears to have done it, according to *Bessario's* Letter, with a zeal and bitterness not becoming him; a zeal and bitterness too frequent in Controversy, and (unfortunately for the Cause of Letters) no where more, than among learned men, and those in particular, whom we call *Professors of Humanity*.

The Epistle above mentioned may be found in *Greek* and *Latin*, published by the learned *Boivinus*, in the second Tome of *L'Histoire de l'Academie Royale des Inscriptions*, &c. p. 455; and it is well worth perusal, for it's Temper and Elegance.

See also *Cicero de Senectute*, c. xv. *Vitis quidem*, &c.

(z) Πάντα δὲ φίλων μεσά. *Arrian Epict.* 1. iii. c. xxiv. p. 486. *Edit. Upt.*

THE

Ch. X.

THE Fangs of the Lion are as much the work of Nature, as the tendrils of the Vine, or the nurturing Teats of the Ewe. To what then have these formidable weapons *Relation*; for *Nature*, we are assured, *makes nothing in vain* (a)? If to *Offence*, then is the Lion himself a source of *hostile* relation; if to *Defence*, then is he the object of injury from some other; so that *hostility* in either

(a) This was an axiom, inculcated every where by *Aristotle*; and more especially, when he is speaking of *Final Causes*, which, tho' now they make a small part of Philosophy, were never omitted by the *Stagirite*, as often as they could be introduced. His own words deserve attention—ἡ φύσις ὅθεν ποιεῖ μάτην, ἀλλ' αἰεὶ ἐκ τῶν ἐνδεχομένων τῇ ἑστίᾳ περὶ ἑκάστου γένους ζῶν τὸ ἄριστον—NATURE MAKES NOTHING IN VAIN, but with respect to each animal Genus, out of the several ways practicable she always makes that which is best. *De Animal. Ingressu*, p. 28. Edit. Sylb.—And again, in the same Treatise—ἡ φύσις ὅθεν δημιουργεῖ μάτην, ὥσπερ εἴρηται πρότερον, ἀλλὰ πάντα πρὸς τὸ βέλτιον ἐκ τῶν ἐνδεχομένων—NATURE CREATES NOTHING IN VAIN, but (as has been said already) all things for the best, out of the several ways that are practicable. *Ibid.* p. 141. Edit. Sylb.

case


case is necessarily implied. Were it possible to doubt as to the *offensive* here, we could never doubt as to the Structure of the Spider's Web; a Structure clearly taught her by Nature for *offence alone*. These and the like Preparations, such as the Boar's Tusk, the Eagle's Talons, the Viper's Venom, &c. are all founded on such wants, as can never be satisfied *amicably*. The Wants therefore of this character naturally rouse up *similar* Instincts, and thus the World becomes filled as well with HOSTILE RELATIONS, as FRIENDLY.

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Torva læna lupum sequitur, lupus ipse capellam (b).

It appears to have been *these Relations of Hostility*, that first gave rise to the phenomena of NATURAL and MORAL EVIL. Now whether REAL EVIL exist

(b) *Virg. Ecl. ii.*

Ch. X.  at all, or whether we should confine it with the STOICS to *Evil* purely *moral*, are Questions beyond the Scope of this Treatise to examine. It will be sufficient to say, that *much Evil* is imaginary, and founded merely on *false opinion*: that of the EVILS MORE REAL, there are many, which have their END, and so may be said to partake *ultimately* the nature of GOOD. Many of the difficulties and distresses, which befall the human Species, conduce to save it from Sloth, and to rouse it up to action; to action, which is in fact the very life of the Universe.

————— *Pater ipse colendi*
Haud facilem esse viam voluit, primusque
per artem
Movit agros, curis acuens mortalia corda,
Nec torpere gravi passus sua regna veter-
*no *.*

* *Virg. Georg. I.*

IF there were no dangers, then could Ch. X.
 there be no Fortitude; if no Tempta-
 tions, then no Temperance; if no ad-
 verse Accidents, nor Loss of what we
 love, then no submissive Resignation, no
 pious Acquiescence.

Οὐκ ἂν γενοῖτο χωρὶς ἐσθλὰ καὶ κακά·
 Ἄλλ' ἔσι τις σύγκρασις, ὥς' ἔχουσιν καλῶς.

*Things GOOD and ILL can ne'er exist a-
 part ;
 But such the MIXTURE, that they WELL
 accord (c).*

AGAIN,

(c) The fine Distich here translated is from *Euri-
 pides*, quoted by *Plutarch de Isid. et Osirid.* p. 369.
Edit. Xyland.

As to the *Speculations* here offered, and the *Solu-
 tions* suggested, we may well apply to them that just
 reflection of the *Stagirite*, tho' used by him on a dif-
 ferent occasion.

Ἴσως δὲ χαλεπὸν καὶ περὶ τῶν τοιούτων σφοδρῶς ἀπο-
 φαίνεσθαι, μὴ πολλὰ καὶ ἐπισκεμμένον· τὸ μὲντοι διη-

R 2

πορηκέναι

Ch. X.

AGAIN, the Jaws of the Lion, the Poison of the Rattle Snake, the Sword of the Conqueror, and every Instrument of destruction, may be said incidentally to prepare the way for Generation ; and that not only by making room for new Comers, but by furnishing fresh Materials towards their respective Production. For tho' the Theatre of the World so far resembles other Theatres, that it is perpetually filled with Successions of new Spectators ; yet has it this in peculiar, that the Spectators, which succeed here, are made out of those that went before. Every particular *Birth*, or *natural production*, appears an act, if not of *hostility*, at least of *Separation* ; a *Seccession* from the general Mass ; a kind of

πορηκέναι περὶ ἐκάστη αὐτῶν, ἢ ἀχρηστόν ἐστι. — Perhaps 'tis difficult to prove any thing clearly upon Subjects such as these, without having often considered and examined them. And yet to have thrown out doubts concerning them, is a thing, not altogether without it's use. *Aristot. Præd. p. 40. Edit. Sylb.*

revolt

revolt from the *greater* Bulk in favour of Ch. X.
 a *smaller*; which smaller would detach
 itself, and, were it able, be independent.

IN a word as FRIENDSHIP, by *cementing* Multitude, produces UNION; so STRIFE, by *dissolving* Union, produces MULTITUDE; and 'tis by MULTITUDE *that the World becomes diversified and replenished.*

AND hence we may perceive the meaning of what *Heraclitus* says in *Plutarch*, where he calls “WAR, the Father and King and Lord of all things; and asserts, that when HOMER prayed

“ That Strife be banished both from Gods and Men,

“ he was not aware that he was cursing
 “ the Generation of all things; as in fact
 “ they deduce their rise out of Contest and
 “ Antipathy.” The same Philosopher

Ch. X. adds immediately, “ *that THE SUN could*
 “ *not pass his appointed bounds ; that other-*
 “ *wise, if he could,*

Tongues he would find to patronize the
Cause :

meaning by this *mythological* way of talking, that the Sun could not desert his Course, because so much depended on it ; or otherwise, if he could, that being himself *one of the primary Authors of Generation* upon this Earth, and well knowing how much Strife co-operated in the same work, he would surely look out for an advocate (were such any where existing) to defend the cause of STRIFE against the Calumnies of *Homer* (d).

FROM

(d) Ἡράκλειτος μὲν γὰρ ἀντικρὺς πόλεμον ὀνομάζει πατέρα καὶ βασιλέα καὶ κύριον πάντων· καὶ τὸν μὲν Ὅμηρον, εὐχόμενον,

Ἐκ τε θεῶν ἔρην, ἔκ τ' ἀνθρώπων ἀπολέσθαι,

λανθάνειν φησὶ τῇ πάντων γενέσει καταρῶμενον, ἐκ μάχης

FROM all these Speculations one thing Ch. X.
at least appears (whatever else may be
doubtful)

μάχης καὶ ἀντιπαθείας τὴν γένεσιν ἔχόντων· ἥλιον δὲ
μὴ ὑπερβῆσθαι τὰς προσήκοντας ὥρας· εἰ δὲ μὴ,

Γλώττας μιν δίκης ἐπικέρως ἐξευρήσειν.

Plutarch. de Isid. et Osir. p. 370. Edit. Xyland. Fol.

Dr. Squire, the late Bishop of St. David's, has given a fair Edition of this Tract in the original, to which he has subjoined an *English* Translation; but (according to a Practice too frequent with the best Critics) he has, in the Passage above quoted, attempted to mend, where no Emendation was wanting.

Chalcidius plainly alludes to the same Sentiment of *Heraclitus* in the following Extract from his Commentary on *Plato's Timæus*.—*Propterea que Numenius laudat Heraclium (lege Heraclitum) reprehendentem Homerum, qui optaverit interitum et vastitatem malis vitæ, quòd non intelligeret mundum sibi deleri placere: si quidem Sylva, quæ malorum fons est, exterminaretur. Chal. p. 396. Edit. Meurs. 1617.*

In the *Greek* Quotation, *Homer* is supposed to wish inadvertently against the *Generation* of all things; in the *Latin*, he wishes in the same inadvertent manner against the existence of *Sylva*, that is, of *Matter*. The difference is easily reconciled, if we suppose *Matter* to be the *Basis* of *Generation*, and to be essentially

Ch. X. doubtful) that *Relations of Hostility*, as well as *Friendship*, have their use in the Universe. Both also equally arise from *Want* on one side, and from *the Power of removing it* on the other (e). The difference is, that in *friendly Relations* the *Help* is communicated either *with pleasure*, as when the Mother suckles her Child; or at least *without pain*, as when we shew a traveller his way. In *hostile Relations*, the *Help*, without regard to the *Communicator*, is either taken by force, as when the Wolf devours the Lamb; or obtained by stratagem, as when the Spider insnares the Fly.

requisite to the existence of things *Generable* and *Perishable*, out of which this lower and visible World is wholly composed.

(e) How far the WANT OF GOOD leads to *Arts* and *Action*, may be seen in *Vol. I. Treatise the first*, p. 24; and in the Notes subjoined, p. 272, 3. 4, 5. We here perceive it to extend not only to the whole *animal* World, but even to the *Vegetable*. More will be found on this Subject in the *Treatise upon Motion*, a part of the present Work.

AND

AND thus by the reciprocal *Relations* of *Want* and *Help* (both of which under a variety of Forms exist in every *individual*) is there a kind of general Concatenation extended throughout the Universe ; while each Being communicates what Help it can afford, and obtains in it's turn, that Help which it requires. Ch. X.

To all these *Relations* must be added that chief, tho' mentioned last, *that* of the whole Universe, and every Being in it, to the *First, Supreme, and Intelligent CAUSE*, thro' which *Relation* THEY are called HIS OFFSPRING, and HE THEIR FATHER. Here indeed the *Relations* are not blended as before ; they are all purely referable to *Want* on one side, and all purely arise from *spontaneous Help* on the other ; the correspondence existing, as far as *Perfect* has respect to *Imperfect*, *Independent* to *Dependent*, the *Object desired*

Ch. X. *fired* to the Beings which *desire* (f), the
 { Maker to his Works, the Parent to his
 Children (g).

AND now to conclude with a Remark,
 which regards *Relation in general*. “ As
 “ to every Continuous Being the Genus
 “ of QUALITY gives *Distinctions*, which
 “ help to mitigate it's Sameness, and ren-
 “ der it as it were *discrete* ; so to Beings
 “ *discrete*, however remote, the Genus
 “ of Relation gives a Connection, which
 “ serves to mitigate their Diversity, and
 “ to render them as it were *continuous*.

(f) Πῶς δὲ καὶ ἐφετὸν πᾶσιν ὁ θεὸς λέγεται, εἰ μη-
 δεμία σχέσις ἐστὶ πρὸς τὸ ἐφετὸν τῷ ἐπιειμένῳ—
How is GOD called an Object desirable to all Beings, if
there be no RELATION between the Object of Desire,
and the Being which desires ? *Simplic. in Prædic. p.*
43. B. Edit. Basil. 1551. See before, Note p. 225.

(g) St. Paul has given his Sanction to that Verse of
Aratus—Τὴ γὰρ καὶ γένεσθαι ἐσμέν—*For we are his Off-*
spring. Arat. Phæn. v. 5. Aët. xvii. 28.

“ Thus

“ Thus is the World maintained as well
 “ in it's UNION, as in it's VARIETY, Ch. X.
 “ while *both Species of Quantity run thro'*
 “ *the whole, and thro' every Part.*”

AND so much for the ARRANGEMENT
 OF GENUS OF RELATION, it's nature,
 it's properties, it's utility, and extent (*h*).

(*h*) Before we quit this Arrangement, we shall
 subjoin the following Note.

The old Logicians held that *Things Intelligible*, and
Intellection were *Relatives*; so also *Things Sensible*, and
Sensation. But then they started an objection—If
Relatives co-exist, and always *reciprocate in their exist-*
ence, what would become of *Euclid's Theorems*, sup-
 posing there were no *Geometricians*? What would be-
 come of *Sensible Objects*, supposing there were no *Be-*
ings sensitive?

One Solution of this Objection is derived from the
Percipient—THE FIRST ORIGINAL AND SUPREME
 PERCIPIENT IS EVERY WHERE, AND ALWAYS IN
 THE FULL ENERGY OF UNIVERSAL PERCEPTION.

Another Solution is from the *Objects perceived*, be
 they sensible or intelligible. Every such Object has
 a *double* nature; an *absolute* nature, and a *relative* one.
 The Sound A is an Octave to the Sound B. B
 ceases, and A continues. A is no longer an *Octave*,
 but still it is a *Sound*; and even tho' we should call it

Ch. X.

no Sound, if there were to be no Hearers ; it would still be an *Undulation* of Air, capable of producing Sound, if there were an Ear capable of perceiving it, that is, an *Organ adequate to the Sensation*.

The Instance given on this occasion by the Philosophers *Porphyry* and *Simplicius*, is curious, because it is taken from that difficult System of Music, the *Enharmonic*. The following are the words of *Simplicius*—*Κἂν γὰρ διὰ ῥαθυμίαν ἀποβάλωμεν ποτὲ τὴν τῶν οὕτων γνῶσιν, ἔδὲν ἥτιον μένει τὰ οὗτα, ὅπερ ἐστὶ τὰ ἐπισητά· καὶ γὰρ ἐν τῇ μουσικῇ πρότερον μὲν κατηκόμεν διέσεως, νῦν δὲ ἀνεπαίσθητοι τέττε τῷ διαστήματι* ἔσμεν. —*For if ever thro' any Sloth or Indolence we reject Knowledge, those things, which are intelligible, remain nevertheless. 'Tis thus that in Music we used in former days to hear the QUARTER-TONE, but now we are unable to distinguish this interval. Simplic. in Præd. p. 48. B. Edit. Basil. 1551.*

Porphyry, having told us that tho' there were no Geometry, considered as a Science, there would still be Objects Geometrical, subjoins—*ἐπεὶ καὶ ἐν τῇ μουσικῇ τὸ μὲν πάλαι τῷ διεστιάῳ διάστηματι ἦκον οἱ μουσικοί, ὕστερον δὲ ἀμεληθείσης τῆς ἐναρμονίας μελωδίας, καθ' ἣν τὸ διεστιάον διάστημα ἐμελωδεῖτο, ἔκτετι τῷ τοιούτῳ αἰσθησὶς ἔσται (lege ἐστὶ) διαστήματι· καὶ δῆλον ὅτι ἐν τῇ φύσει ἐστὶ τὸ αἰσθητὸν τέτοιο διάστημα, εἰ καὶ ἡ αἰσθησις ἐκλέλοιπεν.*—*For thus too in Music, Musicians used FORMERLY to hear (and distinguish) the Interval of the QUARTER-TONE : but in latter days, THE ENHARMONIC MELODY having been neglected, by which this Interval used to be modulated, there is no longer now any Sensation of such an Interval : and yet 'tis evident that this sensible Interval has an Existence in nature, altho'*

tho' for the present the Sensation of it be lost. *Porphyr.* Ch. X.
in *Prædic.* p. 40. *Ed. Paris.* 1543.

Porphyr flourished in the third Century; *Simpli-*
cious in the sixth.

We may remark by the way from the above Quo-
tations, how fast the *Arts* of Elegance were sinking
even in the *more early* of those two Periods.

As for the state of Philosophy in the *latter* Period,
we may form a Judgment of it by what we learn
from *Simplicius* in the same Treatise, with regard to
the *Stoics*. Having in his Commentary on the Predi-
caments of *Action* and *Passion* given many Quotations
from the *Stoic* Logic, he concludes the Chapter with
the following words—Πολλὴ δὲ ἡ τῶν τοιούτων ἐξερ-
γασία παρὰ τοῖς Στωϊκοῖς· ὧν ἐφ' ἡμῶν καὶ ἡ διδασκα-
λία, καὶ τὰ πλεῖστα τῶν συγγραμμάτων ἐπιλέλοιπεν—
There is much elaborate Discussion of these matters among
the STOICS, of whom both the DOCTRINE and MOST
OF THE WRITINGS are IN OUR TIMES lost, and at
an end. *Simpl. in Præd.* p. 84. *B. Edit. Basil.*
1551.

Mahomet soon followed, whose Successor *Omar*
burnt the *Alexandrine* Library; nor did the succeed-
ing *Caliphs* emerge from Barbarity, till the Race of
the *Abbasidæ*, near two Centuries after.

The Barbarity of *Western Europe* continued much
longer, and did not begin to lessen, till the *fifteenth*
Century, that preceding the age of *Leo the tenth*.

C H A P. XI.

Concerning ACTION and PASSION—Action, it's five Species—those of Passion reciprocate—Mind Divine, Human—latter, how acted upon—Politics, Oeconomics, Ethics—Passivity in Bodies animate, and inanimate—Action, and Reaction, where they exist, where not—Self-motion, what, and where—Power, whence and what—requisite both in Action and in Passion—Power, tho' like Non-Entity, yet widely different—Double in the reasoning Faculty—Power, not first in existence, but Energy, which never has ceased, or will cease, or can cease.

Ch.XI. **I**N treating of *Relatives* we have considered principally those, which possess the *Relative* Character in a degree *above* every other. But there are things, which,

which, as they possess it blended with Ch.XI.
Characters *more* eminent, have been }
formed for that reason into *separate* AR-
RANGEMENTS. Such for example is *the*
Relation between a Being, and *the Place*,
which it occupies ; *that* between a Being,
and *the Time*, *while it exists* ; the first of
which Relations gives an answer to the
Question, WHERE ; the latter, to the
Question, WHEN.

THERE are also Relations of *Position* ;
Relations of *Habit* ; and besides these
there are Relations of ACTION and PAS-
SION, all of which are distinguished by
peculiar Attributes of their own, and
have therefore merited distinct Exami-
nations from the ancient Writers upon
Logic.

THUS, if we consider the two last, I
mean ACTION and PASSION, we shall
find them diffused thro' every part of the
Universe ; and that, either united in *one*
Subject,

Ch.XI. Subject, or else separate, and in *different* Subjects.

By *Horace* they are united :

*Qui studet optatam cursu contingere metam,
Multa TULIT, FECITQUE puer—— (a)*

So are they by *Livy*, in that manly
Speech of *Caius Mucius*—*Et FACERE et
PATI fortia, Romanum est (b).*

So are they by *Shakespeare* :

*Whether 'tis nobler in the Mind to SUFFER
The Stings and Arrows of outrageous For-
tune,
Or—by OPPOSING end them (c).*

So are they by *Milton* :

(a) *Hor. Art. Poet.* v. 412.

(b) *Liv.* ii. 11.

(c) *Hamlet.*

Fal'n Cherub, to be weak is miserable,
DOING, or SUFFERING—— (d)

Ch. XI.
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IN *Virgil* we see them separated, and  
PASSION given to *Man*, ACTION to the  
*Deity* :

O ! PASSI *graviora*, dabit DEUS *his quo-*  
*que finem* (e).

As therefore ACTION and PASSION are  
of the most extensive influence ; as they  
partake in some degree the nature of  
*Qualities* or *Attributes*, by being *intimately* and *essentially* connected with Sub-  
stance ; while the Relatives, *When*, *Where*,  
and *Position*, seem rather connected *ac-*  
*cidentally* : we shall give ACTION and  
PASSION their just Precedence, and make  
them the Subject of the present Chapter.

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(d) *Par. Lost.* i. 157.

(e) *Æn.* i. 203.

## Ch. XI.

THE SPECIES OF ACTION are as many,  
as are *the different Modes of acting* in the  
*different Species of Agents.*

THE FIRST SORT OF ACTION is that of *mere* BODY ALONE, considered either as void of Sensation *wholly*, like Fire, when it burns; or at least *as void of Sensation*, at the time when it operates. Such is that great and universal Power, the Power of *Attraction*, which all Body, animal, vegetable, and elementary, is found to possess *in proportion to it's Quantity*; that *active* Power, (if it may for the present be so called) the Effects of which modern Philosophy has scrutinized with so much penetration. Such too are those Energies peculiar to *different* Bodies, and arising out of them from their *different Natures*; as when we say the Heavens emit Light; the Trees produce Leaves; the Fields give us Corn, &c :

*Cælum*

*Cælum nitescere, arbores frondescere,  
Segetes largiri fruges, &c. (f)*

Ch. XI.

Such too are those more secret Operations of Bodies, whether *magnetic* or *electric*; to which may be added the Virtues and Efficacies of *Bodies Medicinal*. All these Energies in a comprehensive sense may be called the *Action* of Body, considered merely as *Body (g)*.

A SE-

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(f) *Cicer. Tusc. Disp. i. 28.*

(g) This is that Genus of Energies, which, as *Jamblichus* describes it, indicates no *Action* belonging to Soul, or to Animal Nature, or to Reasonings, or to Life, but which (on the contrary) exhibits the particular Energy of BODIES, CONSIDERED AS BODIES purely inanimate; and that as well with respect to all the Peculiarities which appear to surround Body, as to all those various inherent powers of Bodies, not only as they are solid and capable of resisting, but as they contain within them a multitude of Powers that are efficacious and active.

—Γένος ἐνεργειῶν, ὅπερ ψυχῆς καὶ φύσεως καὶ λόγων καὶ ζωῆς ἔχει ἐπιδείκνυσσι ποίησιν, τῶν δὲ σωμάτων, ἧ σώματα ἐσιν ἄψυχα, φανεράν καθίστησι τὴν σωματοειδῆ

S 2

ἐνεργείαν



Ch. XI. A SECOND SORT OF ACTION is that which is the result of *Sensation, Instinct,* and *natural Appetite*, and which therefore, being complicated, must necessarily be confined to Bodies of a higher Genus, to Bodies *Sensitive*, that is, to ANIMALS.

*Dente lupus, cornu taurus* PETIT, &c. (h)

No where are *these Actions* exprest with more elegance and conciseness, than by our own *Epic Poet*, in his *Paradise Lost* :

————— *Air, Water, Earth,*  
By Fowl, Fish, Beast, was FLOWN, was  
SWAM, was WALK'D (i).

ἐνέργειαν κατὰ πάσας μὲν τὰς περὶ τὸ σῶμα τὰς φαινομένης ιδιότητας, κατὰ πάσας δὲ αὐτῶν τὰς δυνάμεις, ἢ ἢ μόνον σερεά ἐστὶ καὶ ἀντίτυπα, ἀλλ' ἢ καὶ περὶ αὐτῶν ἔχει πολλὰς δραστηρίας δυνάμεις. *Simpl. in Prædic. p. 81. Edit. Basil. 1551.*

(h) *Hor. Sat. ii. 1.*

(i) *Par. Lost, vii. 502.* Καὶ δῆλον ὅσα ποτὲ ἐστὶ καὶ ὅποια εἶδη τῶν ἀλόγων ζώων, τοσαῦτα καὶ τοιαῦτα καὶ

THERE is A THIRD SPECIES OF ACTION more complicated even than the preceding, being derived not only from Sensation, Instinct, and natural Appetite, but from *Reason* also, *superadded* to these. This is a Mode of Action *peculiar to Man*, because of all the Animals we see around us, *Man* alone possesses the *Reasoning Faculty*. Ch.XI.

WIDELY diversified is the Share assumed by the *subordinate* Faculties of the *Human Soul*, in Actions of *this* Character. Sometimes they submit to *Reason*, and are (as becomes them) obedient; at other times they reject her, and proceed

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ἐν τῷ ποιεῖν διάφορά ἐστιν εἶδη κατὰ τὴν τοιαύτην ἐνέργειαν, περὶ ὧν ἐν ταῖς περὶ ζώων ἰστορίας διαριθμῆσθαι εἰώθαμεν.—'Tis evident that as are the Species of Irrational Animals in Number and in Quality, so many and such are the different Species in Acting agreeably to this [animal] mode of Energy; which several Species of Acting have been usually enumerated in the Histories of Animals. *Simpl. in Præd. p. 81, ut supra.*



Ch. XI. of themselves. And hence it is, that  
 Actions, produced from Causes so peculiarly complicated, derive to themselves the Colours of Good and Evil, and are denominated, in distinction to every other deed of Man, ACTIONS MORAL.

WHEN VIRTUE and PLEASURE addressed the young HERCULES, VIRTUE supposed him to have a Reason, that could controul his Appetites; PLEASURE supposed him to have Appetites, that would bear down his Reason. Had he obeyed the last, he had been vicious; as he obeyed the first, he was virtuous. There was a Conflict in either case between his better part, and his worse; and in that Conflict both Species of Faculties were presumed, his Rational Faculties, and his Irrational (k).

THERE

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(k) See *Xenoph. Mem.* l. ii. c. i. S. 21.

The above Species of Action is thus described by *Simplicius*—Τρίτον δὲ τῷ ποιεῖν γένος, τὸ ἐν τῷ πράσσειν



THERE IS A FOURTH SORT OF ACTION, where the INTELLECT, operating *without* Passions or Affections, stays not *within itself*, but *passes out* (as it were) to some *external* Operation. 'Tis thus that NATURE, considered as an *Efficient Cause*, may be called *the Energy of God*, seen in the various Productions that replenish and adorn the World. 'Tis thus

Ch.XI.

σειν ἀπηρίθμηται, ὅπερ τῷ λόγῳ τὰς περὶ τὰ αἰσθητὰ καὶ σύνθετα ποιήσεις ἐπιτροπεύει, προαίρεσιν καὶ βέλῃν δοῶν τε καὶ σκέψιν καὶ τὰς τοιαύτας ποιήσεις παρεχόμενον. *Simpl. ut supra.* The Genus, comprehended under the Idea of ACTING MORALLY, is the third of this Order; that Genus, which presides over the Energies of Reason with respect to the concrete Objects of Sense (that is, which presides in the affairs of common life), and which furnishes upon occasion Deliberate Choice, Volition, Opinion, Inquiry, and other Energies of the same character. *Simpl. in Præd. p. 80. B. Edit. Bas. 1551.*

We have in this place translated *πράσσειν* to *act morally*, the better to distinguish it from *ποιεῖν*, a word of meaning more extensive, signifying simply *to do*, or *to make*.

Ch. XI. that ART, considered as an *Efficient Cause*,  
 may be called the *Energy of Man*, which  
 imitates in it's Operations the plastic  
 Power of *Nature* (l).

THE LAST AND MOST EXCELLENT  
 SORT OF ACTION is seen in *Contempla-*  
*tion*; in the pure *Energy* of SIMPLE IN-  
 TELLECT, keeping *within* itself, and *mak-*  
*ing itself* it's own *Object*. This is the  
*highest Action* of which we are suscep-  
 tible; and by it we *imitate* THE SU-  
 PREME BEING, as far as is consistent  
 with our subordinate Nature. 'Tis to  
 this that our great *Poet* alludes, when  
 speaking of his Employment, during a  
 state of Blindness, he says—

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(l) Τάτα δὲ πολὺ μὲν ἐστὶ τὸ θεῖον—πολὺ δὲ καὶ  
 ἐν ταῖς τέχναις, μιμημέναις τὴν φύσιν, καὶ τὸ παρα-  
 λειπόμενον ὑπ' αὐταῖς (*lege* αὐτῆς) ἀναπληρῶσαι.  
*Simplic. ut suprâ.* Of this Species of *Acting* THE  
 DIVINITY has a large share—a large share also falls to  
 ARTS, that imitate *Nature*, and supply what she has  
 omitted.

Then



Then FEED ON THOUGHTS, which volun-  
tary move

Ch.XI.

Harmonious Numbers—— (m)

THE

(m) *Par. Lost.* iii. 37.

This highest Mode of Action (if it may be so called) is thus described by *Simplicius* in the same Comment, p. 80 :

Τὸ περὶ τῶν νοητῶν καὶ ἀμερίστων ὁρίων ἐπισκοπούμε-  
ρον ἀπλᾶις νοήσεσιν—*That which, with simple intellec-*  
*tions, inquires concerning Substances intelligible and indi-*  
*visibile—that is, Substances which, having no Parts,*  
*cannot, like Body, be infinitely divided.*

*Archytas* has enumerated these Species of Energy or Action, but in a different manner, beginning with the last of them first, and so proceeding inversely, till he come to the first that is mentioned here, and this he omits. His words are worthy of perusal—  
Τὰς δὲ Ἐνεργείας διαφοραὶ τρεῖς· τὸ μὲν γὰρ τί ἐστὶν αὐτὰς ἐν τῷ θεωρεῖν, οἷον ἀστρονομέειν· τὸ δὲ ἐν τῷ ποιεῖν, οἷον ὑγιαίνειν, τεκταίνειν· τὸ δὲ ἐν τῷ πράσσειν, οἷον στραταγὴν καὶ πολιτεύεσθαι· γίγνεται δὲ ἡ μὲν ἐνέργεια καὶ ἄνευ διανοίας, οἷον ἐν τοῖς ἀλόγοις ζώοις. Γενικώ-  
τατα δὲ αὐτά. *Archyt. apud Simplicius in Præd.* p. 80.  
There are three Distinctions of ACTION or ENERGY :  
One Sort of it consists in CONTEMPLATING, as when we study the Stars ; another in MAKING, as when we  
beal



Ch.XI. THE *Species* of PASSION may be understood by their reciprocating for the most part with those of ACTION.

THUS tho' the DIVINE MIND, by being *pure* and *intellectual Energy*, can have *nothing passive* in it's transcendent


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*heal a Disease, or exercise the Art of a Carpenter ; another [not in making but] in ACTING, as when we lead an Army, or administer a Commonwealth. There is too a fourth Energy, WHERE THERE IS NO USE OF REASONING, as in Animals irrational. These are the Forms of Action the most general and comprehensive.*

*Simplicius* tells us, that *Archytas* has omitted the other Species (that which we have mentioned first, and which respects *Bodies inanimate*) because he did not consider it as a Species *purely active*, nor as arising from any *internal* and *sensitive* Principle of Motion. And yet perhaps, in an introductory Treatise, it can hardly be considered as introduced improperly, tho' it must be allowed at the same time to want this Requisite.

We observe by the way that this distinction of Actions is called by Logicians *Actio transiens*, and *Actio immanens*, which corresponds in Grammar to Verbs *Transitive* on one side, and Verbs *Neuter* and *Middle* on the other. See *Hermes*, l. i. c. 9.

theory.

theory (n); yet THE MIND OF MAN, Ch.XI. which has *intensions* and *remissions*, is,  for that reason, *necessarily* PASSIVE in two important manners, either as *Truth*, real or apparent, demands it's *Assent*; or as *Falshood*, real or apparent, demands it's *Dissent*.

It is in consequence of *this Passivity* of the *Human Mind*, which I chuse to call *Passivity Intellectual*, that it becomes *susceptible of Discipline and Institution*, and thus finds itself adorned (according as it is cultivated) with the various tribe both of Arts and Sciences (o).

As the *Reason of Man* is acted upon by the appearances of *Truth* and *Falshood*, so are the *Appetites* of Man (and not only of Man, but of Brutes also) acted upon by the approach of *Pleasure*

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(n) See Chapter on *Qualities*, p. 161.

(o) *Vid. Arrian. Epict. l. iii. c. 3.*

Ch.XI. and *Pain* (*p*). This therefore may be called SENSUAL PASSIVITY, in opposition to the *rational* above described. 'Tis to this *Davus* alludes in *Horace*,

—— etenim fateor, me dixerit ille  
 DUCI VENTRE *levem* : NASUM NIDORE  
 SUPINOR,  
*Imbecillus, iners, &c.* (*q*)

*The moulding this Passivity of the human Mind into as much of the fair and honest, as it is capable of receiving, when it is applied to Nations, is called Politics; when to Families, Oeconomics; when to Individuals, Ethics* (*r*); and is in general

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(*p*) Δεῖ δὲ τίθεναι καὶ τὸ φαινόμενον ἀγαθὸν ἀγαθῇ χώρᾳ ἔχειν, καὶ τὸ ἡδύ· φαινόμενον γὰρ εἰναι ἀγαθόν.  
 —We ought to suppose, that both GOOD APPARENT and PLEASURE supply the place of Good (real); for Pleasure is Good apparent. *Arist. de Animal. Motu.* p. 154. *Edit. Sylb.*

(*q*) *Hor. Sat. ii. 7. 37.*

(*r*) *Nicephorus Blemmides* adopts this Division from the *Peripatetic School*—Τὸ δὲ Πρακτικὸν διαίρεται  
 εἰς



the Foundation of *Moral* Principles and Ch.XI.  
Conduct. 


THE PASSIVITY PECULIAR TO BRUTES  
may be seen in the various purposes, to  
which we direct their several Powers ;

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εἰς ἠθικόν, οἰκονομικόν, καὶ πολιτικόν· καὶ ἠθικός μὲν ἐστὶ  
φιλόσοφος, ὁ τὰ ἑαυτοῦ ἦθη καὶ ἄλλα ρυθμίζειν δυνά-  
μενος· οἰκονομικός δὲ, ὁ καὶ οἶκον ὅλον ἐκπαιδεύειν κα-  
λῶς ἐπιστάμενος· ὁ δὲ γε πᾶν ἢ καὶ πόλεις διεξάγων  
καὶ διακυβεύων ἀρίστως, πολιτικός.—*The PRACTICAL*  
*Part of Philosophy is divided into MORAL, OECONO-*  
*MICAL, and POLITICAL. It is the MORAL Philoso-*  
*pher, who is able to adjust his own manners, and those of*  
*any other individual : the OECONOMICAL, who knows*  
*how to instruct well a whole Family ; and he, who in*  
*the best manner conducts and governs a City, or Cities,*  
*this Philosopher is the POLITICAL one. Blem. Epitom.*  
*Logic. P. 37.*

As we have been speaking just before of *Passivity*,  
it is proper to remark that the same Writer, from the  
same Philosophy, takes notice of two Species of it, a  
better Species and a worse ; *Passivity Corruptive*, and  
*Passivity Completive* ; *Corruptive*, as when any Being  
is consumed by Fire ; *Completive*, as when a Being  
either learns, or is acted upon, either by it's Intellect,  
or it's Senses.—Τὸ πάρεσθαι δὲ τὸ μὲν ἐστὶ φθαρτικόν,  
ὡς τὸ καίεσθαι· τὸ δὲ τελεωτικόν, ὡς τὸ μαθηάμεναι, καὶ  
γνώσκειν, καὶ αἰσθάνεσθαι. *Nic. Blem. Ep. Log. 158.*

some

Ch.XI.  some to plow our lands, others to carry us ; a third Species to hunt for us, &c. (s)

THE PASSIVITY OF INSENSITIVE BODIES, whether vegetable or not, is equally conspicuous in the various Ends, to which we apply them. The Earth we plow ; over the Sea we sail ; out of the Forest we build our Ships, &c. This insensitive *Passivity*, tho' it submit to the *Action* of other Bodies upon it, yet always follows the *peculiar* Nature of the Being, to which it belongs ; so that the *Effects* often differ, where the *Active* Power is the same.

*Limus ut hic DURESCIT, et hæc ut cera*  
LIQUESCIT,  
UNO EODEMQUE igni—— (t)


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(s) See Vol. I. *Treatise* I. p. 40, 41. See also as to the *Passivity* of Bodies *inanimate*, p. 39, 40, of the same *Treatise*.

(t) *Virg. Ecl.* viii. 80.

LASTLY,

LASTLY, all *Bodies*, that act by AT-  
TRACTION, are themselves RECIPRO-  
CALLY ACTED UPON, as modern Philo-  
sophers have clearly demonstrated.

Ch.XI.  


As to ACTION and PASSION *in general*, it may be observed, that the great and diversified Mixture of them, which runs thro' the World, and is conspicuous in every part of it, has a necessary reference (as all other Mixtures have) *to Principles more simple*, out of which it is compounded. PURE ACTIVITY we may suppose MIND; and PURE PASSIVITY, MATTER. As *Mind* is capable of acting whatever is possible, so is *Matter* of having, whatever is possible, acted upon it. The *former* is the *Source* of all Forms, Distinctions, and Beauty; the *latter* is the *Receptacle*. In THE SUPREME MIND there is *nothing passive*; in THE LOWEST MATTER, there is *nothing active*;



Ch. XI. *tive (u)*; while all *between* is a Mixture of both, where in different parts the different Principles are *prevalent*, and from this prevalence give the Being it's proper Character.

IF we call *Man* a *Composite* of Soul and Body, as a *rational* Being, he has a Motion of *his own*; as a *sensitive* Being, he has a Motion in common with *Brutes*; as a Being merely *corporeal*, a Motion in common with *all Bodies* whatever. A Dog has only the *second* and *third* of these Motions, and a Stone only *the last*. Thus is the Stone *least* active, the Man *most* so, and the Brute *between both*.

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(u) See Chapter vi, p. 109, 110.

Thus *Archytas* in *Simplicius*—Τὰ καθαρὰ γένη τῶ ποιεῖν καὶ πάσχειν ἐν τοῖς ἀρχησιχωτάτοις—τὴ μὲν ποιεῖν ἐν τῷ Θεῷ, τὴ δὲ πάσχειν ἐν τῇ Ὑλῃ—*The pure and simple Genera of acting, and being acted upon, exist in the primary and most original of Beings; ACTING, in GOD; the being acted upon, in MATTER. Simplic. in Præd. p. 84. B. Edit. Basil. 1551.*

IN



Ch. XI. which, tho' MOVEABLE, are not *intrinsically* MOTIVE, that is, *Causes of Motion*.


ANOTHER Mode of ACTION may be found in the following instances.—A Lamb acts upon *the Senses* of a Wolf—that Sensation acts upon his *Appetite*—that Appetite acts upon his *Corporeal Organs*—by *the Action of these Organs* he runs, he seizes, and he devours the Lamb.

A CHILD is seen by its Mother likely to fall from a precipice.—The *Sensation* acts upon her *parental Affections*—these Affections act upon her *Corporeal Organs*.—By *the Action of these Organs* she runs, she seizes, and she saves her Child.

THE Instances we are going to allege, appear to be more blended with *deliberation* and *thought*. The Splendor of the *Roman Empire* acted upon the *Imagination* of *Cæsar*—that *Imagination* acted upon his *Desire of sovereign Power*—that Desire acted upon the *Faculties of his Mind and Body*.

—By



—By the *Energy of these Faculties* he passed Ch.XI.  
the *Rubicon*, conquered *Pompey*, enslaved   
*Rome*, and obtained the wished-for Empire.

AGAIN—The Domination of *Cæsar*  
acted upon the *Imagination* of *Brutus*—  
that *Imagination* acted upon his *Love for*  
*the Republic*—that *Love* for the Republic  
acted upon *his corporeal Organs*.—His hand  
in consequence plunged a Dagger into  
*Cæsar*, and, for a time, the Republic,  
which he loved, was restored.

IN all these instances the *Corporeal*  
*Organs* act, like the *Corporeal* *Masses*  
before mentioned, because they are *first*  
*acted upon*. But then they are not acted  
upon, as those are, by *other external* Bo-  
dies, but by *internal* Appetites, Affections,  
and Desires, *all* which, as well as the *Or-*  
*gans*, are PARTS of *one and the same* BEING.  
Such Being therefore is not, like Beings of  
the first Order, in a manner *passive* and  
*only moveable*; but, as it possesses *within*  
*itself* the power of *imparting* Motion, as

Ch.XI. well as of *receiving* it, the ACTION is that of a BEING, not only MOVEABLE, but *intrinsically* MOTIVE.

WE may go farther, if we please, and suggest a *third* Mode of ACTION, the *Action* of the FIRST MOVER; THAT BEING, which, tho' *Motive*, is itself perfectly IMMOVEABLE.

IN a series of Agents, where each of them *imparts* Motion, which it has *previously received*, were *such* Agents two, or were they ten, or were they a million, no Motion could ever *begin*, were there not *something* at their head *totally different* from them all; something *purely impassive*; something, which can *move*, without *being moved*; in other words, which *can impart Motion* to every thing else, and remain *itself* IMMOVEABLE.

'Tis to this character that *Boethius* alludes, in his truly sublime address to the Author of the Universe:

—Qui



————— *Qui tempus ab ævo*  
*Ire jubes, STABILISQUE MANENS DAS*  
*CUNCTA MOVERI (y).*

Ch. XI.

CONSIDERING *Action* therefore and the being acted upon with a view to Motion and the being moved, we may say that the *Peripatetic* System (for 'tis hence we derive these Speculations) contemplated all Beings in three views; either as MOVEABLE, but not MOTIVE; or as both MOVEABLE and MOTIVE; or lastly as MOTIVE alone, but NOT MOVEABLE (z).

(y) Τὸ ὀρεκτὸν καὶ τὸ νοητὸν κινεῖ, ἔ κινούμενον—  
 The DESIRABLE, and the INTELLIGIBLE MOVE,  
 WITHOUT BEING MOVED. *Arist. Metaph.* p. 202.  
*Edit. Sylb.* See below, p. 429, in the note.

The *Latin* Quotation is from the *Consolation* of *Boethius*, and is a part of those Hexameters, which for harmony of Numbers, and sublimity of Sentiment are perhaps not inferior to any in the *Latin* Language.

O! qui perpetuâ mundum &c.

(z) This Doctrine is expressed by the *Stagirite*, but in an inverted order. Τὸ μὲν Πρῶτον, ἔ κινούμενον, κινεῖ· ἡ δ' ὄρεξις καὶ τὸ ὀρεκτικὸν κινούμενον, κινεῖ· τὸ δὲ τελευταῖον τῶν κινουμένων ἐκ ἀνάγκης κινεῖν ἔδεν.  
*De Animal. Motu*, p. 154. *Edit. Sylb.*

T 3

MORE



Ch.XI.        MORE is said upon this Subject in the  
subsequent Theory concerning Motion (a).

WE shall only add, that, in the above Modes of Acting, when *Bodies* act upon *Bodies*, the Action for the greater part is *reciprocal*. While the Oar impels the Wave, the Wave resists the Oar; while the Axe hews the Timber, the Timber blunts the Axe; while the Earth attracts the Moon, the Moon attracts the Earth. And hence the Theory of ACTION and RE-ACTION, so accurately scrutinized in modern Philosophy.

If we contemplate the World, as well the vegetable as the animal, we shall

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(a) Concerning that MOTION, which *does not arise from the Collision of one Body with another Body, but where the Power which moves, and the Organs, which are moved, appear to be both of them vitally UNITED in ONE and the same Subject*, see below, p. 408 to p. 425. Concerning the necessity of *something, different from Body, to put Body in Motion*, see below, p. 437. Concerning CAUSATIVE MOTION, see below, p. 440. Concerning IMMOBILITY, see below, p. 449, 450; and *Hermes*, p. 360 in the note.

perceive

perceive ACTION and PASSION diffused thro' every part. Ch.XI.  
}

AND yet it must be observed both of *Action* and of *Passion*, (such at least as those we see around us) that they are neither of them *perpetual* in any one particular instance. Corn *only* nourishes, and Hemlock *only* poisons, when they meet a *proper* Body, on which to operate: the Musician does not *always* perform, nor is the Ear *always* affected by Sounds: the Painter does not *always* paint, nor is the Eye *always* affected by Colours.

AND hence the rise of that notable thing called POWER; that dormant Capacity, into which both *Action* and *Passion*, when they cease, retreat; and out of which, when they return, as from their *Source* they *flow*.

THERE is nothing which appears so nearly to approach Non-entity, as this singular thing called POWER; yet is there nothing in fact so truly different from it.



Ch. XI. OF Non-entity there are no Attributes, no Affections; but every POWER possesses a *specific* and a *limited* character, which not only distinguishes it from *Non-entity*, but from every *other* Power.

THUS among the ACTIVE POWERS, the Smith, *when asleep*, has *still* those Powers, which make him a Smith; the Shipwright, *when asleep*, has *still* those Powers, which make him a Shipwright. The Powers distinguish *both* from the *rest* of mankind, who purely *from not having them* are neither Smiths nor Shipwrights.

The *same* Powers help to distinguish the *same* Artists from one another: for the Powers, though invisible, are *incommutable*; nor can those of the Shipwright enable him to forge an anchor, or those of the Smith enable him to construct a Ship.

IF we pass from *active* to PASSIVE POWERS, we shall find *these* after the same manner to be *limited* in every




every Subject, and *different* in every Ch.XI. Species. Timber has the *Capacity* of becoming a Ship, but not an Axe; Iron on the contrary of becoming an Axe, but not a Ship (z). And tho' *different Agents*, by operating on the *same Patient*, may produce *different Effects* (as the Shipwright makes Timber into a Ship, while the Carpenter forms it into a House); yet still must each Effect correspond with the *passive Capacities*; or else, where these fail, there is nothing to be done.

WERE the case otherwise, were not the *Passive Powers* essentially requisite as well as the *Active*, there would be no reason, why any thing might not be made out of any thing.

FAR distant therefore from Non-entity are *Passive Powers*, however latent:

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(z) See Chapter the fourth concerning *Matter*, p. 64, 65; also p. 148, 149.

Ch. XI.  so far indeed, that where they differ essentially from one another, they often lead to Effects perfectly *contrary*, tho' the *Agent*, which operates, be individually the same :


*Limus ut hic DURESCIT, et hæc ut cera*  
LIQUESCIT,  
*Uno eodemque igni, &c (a).*

'Tis from this Theory we perceive the reason of that ancient Axiom, *Quicquid recipitur, recipitur secundum modum recipientis* ; than which nothing can be more true, when properly understood.

As to the *Active Powers*, there is an important distinction between those called *Rational*, and the *Irrational*. The Subordinate are mostly confined to the producing *One Contrary* out of *Two*. Fire can only warm, but cannot cool ; Ice can only cool, but cannot warm. But

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(a) *Virg. ut sup. p. 270.*

the *rational Powers imply both Contraries* Ch.XI.  
*at once*, and give to their possessor the   
*Alternative* of producing either. The  
 Musician has *the Power* both of Melody  
 and Dissonance ; the Physician *the Power*  
 both of healing, and making sick ; the  
 Magistrate *the Power* of deciding both  
 justly and unjustly.

THE reason of this is, that *Rational Power alone* is founded in SCIENCE, and 'tis always *one and the same Science*, which recognizes *Contraries* ; that, which teaches us Harmony, teaches us Discord ; that which informs us what is Health, informs us what is Disease ; that which discerns Truth, discerns also Falshood. Hence therefore it is, that as every *Science* may be called *double* in it's Powers of Knowledge ; so all *Action founded on Science* may be called *double* in it's Powers of Acting (b). A noble Privilege this

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(b) Καὶ τῶν δυνάμεων αἱ μὲν εἶναι ἄλογοι, αἱ δὲ  
 μετὰ λόγου—καὶ αἱ μὲν μετὰ λόγου πᾶσαι τῶν ἐναντίων  
 αἱ



Ch. XI. to Man, if well employed ; a truly unfortunate one, if abused ; since by this *He alone*, of all sublunary Beings, is properly intitled either to *Praise* or *Dispraise*.

WITH respect to POWERS in general, there is this to be observed : so important are they to the constitution of many Beings, that often, tho' *latent*, they are

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αἱ αὐταί, αἱ δὲ ἄλογοι, μία ἐνός· οἷον τὸ θερμὸν τῷ θερμαίνειν μόνον, ἡ δὲ ἰατρικὴ νόσος καὶ ὑγείας αἷτιον. Αἷτιον δὲ, ὅτι λόγος ἐστὶν ἡ ἐπιστήμη, ὁ δὲ λόγος ὁ αὐτὸς δηλοῖ τὸ πρᾶγμα, καὶ τὴν εἴρησιν—Of POWERS some will be found IRRATIONAL, others are attended with REASON—and as to those which are attended with Reason, THE SAME POWERS will EXTEND TO THINGS CONTRARY ; but as to the irrational, ONE POWER will extend ONLY TO ONE CONTRARY ; what is hot for example will only conduce to heating ; but the Art of Medicine will become the Cause both of Disease and of Health. The Cause is, that this Medicinal Science is Reason, and THE SAME REASON DISCOVERS both THE THING, and it's PRIVATION. *Arist. Metaph.* p. 143. Edit. Sylb.

See also Vol. the first of these *Treatises*, p. 173, 298 ; to these add p. 150 of the present Treatise, especially in the Note.

more

more regarded than the strongest *apparent* Attributes. Thus 'tis from their *medicinal Powers only*, that we value the several Species of Drugs ; and from their *generative Powers only* that we value the several Species of Seed, while little regard is paid to their sensible, that is their *apparent* Qualities, farther than as they help to indicate those *invisible* Powers. Ch.XI.

THE just Opposite to POWER is ENERGY, which, as it's etymology (c) shews, implies *the existing in Deed or Act*, as opposed to that existence, which only implies *Possibility*.

AND here 'tis worth observing, *that Every thing existing in Power* is necessarily roused into *Energy* by something, which itself *existed* PREVIOUSLY in

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(c) 'Εν Ἐργῳ, IN ACT, IN DEED. See a sketch of the difference between *Act* and *Power*, Vol. I. p. 13, 14.

*Energy.*



**Ch.XI.** *Energy (d).* Events and Incidents never stand still; some Agents or other are perpetually energizing, tho' all perhaps by turns have their respites and relaxations, as many of them at least as are of the *subordinate* Tribe. It happens indeed in the World, as in a Ship upon a Voyage. Every hand at a proper season has his hours of Rest, and yet the Duty never ceases, the Business of the Ship is never at a stand; those, that wake, rousing those, that sleep, and


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(d) 'Twas a Doctrine of the *Peripatetic* School, ὅτι πρότερον ἐνέργεια δυνάμει ἐστὶ—THAT ENERGY is PRIOR TO POWER. *Arist. Metaph.* p. 150. 152. —ἀεὶ γὰρ ἐκ τῆς δυνάμει οὐτὶ γίγνεται τὸ ἐνέργεια οὐκ ὑπὸ ἐνέργεια οὐτὶ οἷον ἀνθρώπου ἐξ ἀνθρώπου, μουσικὸς ὑπὸ μουσικοῦ, ἀεὶ κινῶντός τινος πρώτου τὸ δὲ κινῶν ἐνέργεια ἤδη ἐστίν. *That which exists in Energy is always formed out of that which exists in Power, by SOMETHING WHICH EXISTS (already) IN ENERGY; for example Man is formed by Man, the Musical Artist by the Musical Artist, there being always some FIRST (or prior) BEING, which gives the Motion. Now THAT, WHICH GIVES THIS MOTION, IS ITSELF ALREADY IN ENERGY. Aristot. Metaph. p. 151. Edit. Sylb.*

being



being in their turn roused again themselves. Ch.XI.



BUT another way to shew that ENERGY *is of necessity* PREVIOUS TO POWER, consists in admitting the contrary Hypothesis.

LET us suppose for example a Man placed in a part of Space, where there was, and ever had been, *eternal Silence*; or otherwise in a part, where there was, and ever had been, *eternal Darknes*: could such a one ever *actually* either have heard or seen, however exquisite his *Powers* both of hearing and seeing?—And why not?—Because to the evocation of one of these Powers, there is a necessity of *actual* Sound; to that of the other, of *actual* Light; so that had not these *Energies* existed *previously*, his *Powers* must have remained dormant thro' the period of their existence. Suppose therefore *all Energies* of  
all

Ch. XI. *all kinds to stop : how could they ever revive ? Were they all once sunk into one universal Sleep, where should we find a waking Cause, to rouse them from their Slumbers (e) ?*

AND what then are the inferences from this Speculation, that *Power necessarily arises from previous Energy ?*—One is, that all those Doctrines about Order

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(e) 'Tis hence that *Aristotle*, speaking according to the Principles of his Philosophy, says of things eternal, unalterable, and necessary, that is, things ever in Energy—*εἰ ταῦτα μὴ ἦν, ἔθ' ἐν αὐτῇ ἦν*, if THESE WERE NOT, THERE COULD BE NOTHING. *Metaph.* 153, *ut supra*. 'Tis a pertinent Question, stated by the same Author, in another part of the same Tract—*Πῶς γὰρ κινηθήσεται, εἰ μὴθ' ἔσται ἐνεργεία αἰτίου ; ἢ γὰρ ἤγε ὅλη κινήσει αὐτὴ ἑαυτήν*—*How can things ever be set in motion, if there be no CAUSE (previously) EXISTING IN ENERGY ? Mere Matter itself cannot move itself.*—*Ibid.* 201. And soon before in the same page—*ἐνδέχεται γὰρ τὸ δυνάμει ὄν μὴ εἶναι· δεῖ ἄρα εἶναι ἀρχὴν τοιαύτην, ἥς ἢ ἐστὶ ἐνέργεια*—*It may happen that the thing, which exists in POWER ONLY, may NOT EXIST AT ALL : there must therefore be (in the Universe) such a Sort of PRINCIPLE, AS THAT THE VERY ESSENCE OF IT SHOULD BE ENERGY.*

springing



springing from Disorder, Beauty from Ch. XI.  
 Confusion; of Night and Chaos being  
 the oldest of Beings; in general, of the  
 Perfect and Actual arising from the Im-  
 perfect and Potential; however they may  
 be true as to the *material* Cause of things,  
 yet are they far from being true with  
 respect to their *real and essential* Origin.  
 There is nothing in fact more certain,  
 than that the ACTUAL and PERFECT  
 are *previous to their Contraries*; else there  
 could never have been in the Universe  
*any thing Actual or Perfect.*

ANOTHER inference is, that the *most*  
*minute* and contemptible *Energy*, now *ac-*  
*tually* existing, necessarily proves the Ex-  
 istence of an *eternal Energy*, to which,  
 as to it's Cause, it is *ultimately* referable.  
 And what can such ETERNAL ENERGY  
 be, but something, *whose very* ESSENCE  
*is that* ENERGY (*f*); something, which

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(*f*) See the Note preceding—The founder of the  
 Peripatetic Sect, speaking of the *Deity*, uses the fol-  
 lowing



**Ch.XI.** knows no *remissions*, like subordinate *Energies*, no occasional retirings into *Power* and dead *Capacity*, but is EVER THE SAME IMMUTABLE AND PERFECT? Without such a *Principle* the Universe could never have begun; or when once begun, could never have been continued. And what shall we call this Principle?


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lowing Expressions—ἡ γὰρ Νῦ 'Ενέργεια, ζωή· 'Εκεῖ-  
 νος δὲ, ἡ 'Ενέργεια—*The Energy of Mind or Intellect,*  
*is Life: and HE (the Supreme Being) is that ENERGY.*  
*Metaph. p. 203.* See also *Ammon. in Lib. de Inter-*  
*pretat. p. 198, B. &c.* where the Arrangement of  
 Beings is deeply and philosophically discussed, and  
 exhibited.—Ἐξῆς δὲ τούτοις ἐπιδείξαι βυλόμενος, κ.  
 τ. λ.

'Tis agreeably to this reasoning we are told—  
 Τῷ χρόνῳ αἰὲν προλαμβάνει ἐνέργεια ἑτέρα πρὸ ἑτέρας,  
 ἕως τῆς τῆς αἰὲν κινῶντος πρῶτως—that one *Energy* in  
*point of Time* always precedes another, till we arrive at  
*the Energy of that Being, which eternally gives Motion*  
*in the first instance.* *Metaph. Θ. η. p. 152. Edit.*  
*Sylb.*

Which is as much as to affirm (in other words)  
 that there is a gradual ascent of active efficient *Princi-*  
*ples, one above another, up to that ONE ACTIVE PRIN-*  
*CIPLE, which is ORIGINAL and SUPREME.*

Shall

Shall we call it BODY or MIND?—The Ch.XI.  
best way to answer this, will be to search   
*within* ourselves, where we may discover, if we attend, a portion of *either*  
Being, together with the several Attributes appertaining to each.

AND so much for the two ARRANGEMENTS OF PREDICAMENTS OF ACTION and PASSION.

## C H A P. XII.

*Concerning WHEN and WHERE—Concerning Time and Place, and their Definitions—When and Where, how distinguished from Time and Place, how connected with them—Descriptions of When and Where—their Utility and Importance in human Life—Various Terms, denoting these two Predicaments—others denoting them not, yet made to denote them—When and Where, their extensive influence—plausible Topics—concurring Causes—Opportunity, what—Chance, what it is not, what it is—Fate, Providence—co-operating Causes—Supreme Intelligence.*

C. XII. **W**E have said already, that *Time* and *Place* agree, as they both belong to *Quantity Continuous* (a). So

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(a) See before, p. 183 to 187.



essential is this character, that could ei- C. XII.  
 ther of them be separated, as we sepa-  
 rate a piece of timber, there would then  
 be Intervals *without* Time, and Distances  
*without* place. Thus far then they agree,  
 while in this they differ, that a million of  
 different things may exist in one instant of  
 Time, but never more than one thing at  
 once can occupy one Place.

AND hence the Nature of *Place* may  
 be called *distributive*, while that of *Time*  
 may be called *accumulative*. Hence too  
 as they agree in *some* respects, and differ  
 in others, they are necessarily *not simple*,  
 but *compound* Ideas, both belonging to  
 one Genus, and each distinguished by *spe-*  
*cific* differences. Having a Genus and a  
*Difference*, they become capable of *De-*  
 *finition*, since 'tis on these two requisites  
 that all Definition is founded (b).

## TIME

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(b) *Omnis DEFINITIO constat GENERE et DIFFE-*  
*RENTIA—Fell, 218. Termini verò essentielles (Defini-*  
 U 2 tionis

C. XII. TIME therefore is *Continuity, successive in itself, and accumulative of it's proper subjects*; PLACE is *Continuity, co-existent in itself, and distributive of it's proper subjects*.

WE have said thus much about these two Beings, because WHEN and WHERE, tho' distinct from both (c), are necessarily connected with them, and cannot well be understood without reference to this *Connection*.

MEN, human affairs, and universally all sensible and corporeal Beings, as none of them are infinite either in *Duration* or *Extent*, must have something of course

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tionis scil.) GENUS et DIFFERENTIA. Sanderſon, l. i. c. 17. See alſo Walliſii Logic. l. i. c. 23.—Οἱ μὲν γὰρ ὅρισμοὶ ἐκ γένους καὶ τῶν συγκατακτιῶν εἰσι διαφορῶν, ταῖς τῶν εἰδοποιῶν. *Amm. in 5. voces*, p. 67.

(c) How they are distinct, ſee below, particularly in Note (f), alſo p. 297.

to *limit* and *circumscribe* them. Now C. XII.  
 PLACE circumscribes their *Extent*, and  
 TIME, their *Duration*; and hence the  
 necessary connection of things corpo-  
 real with these two; and not only of  
 things themselves, but of all their Mo-  
 tions, of all their Accidents, in short  
 of all they are able to *do*, and of all  
 they are able to *suffer*.

For example, certain persons are to  
 meet for a certain purpose. They must  
 be informed of the *Time* and *Place*, or  
 their *Meeting* would not be practicable.  
 First then for the *Time*—

*When shall we three meet again  
 In thunder, light'ning, and in rain (d) ?*

The answer to this question *connects* their  
*Meeting* with a certain *Time*; and in the

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(d) *Shakesf. Macbeth.*



C. XII. *Relation between these two, we behold the*  
 { rise of the Predicament, WHEN.

WHEN *the battle's lost and won,*  
 WHEN *the hurly burly's done* (e).

AGAIN—

*Where's the Place?*

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(e) Οὐ μέντοι ἔτε τῷ χρόνῳ ταυτόν τὸ Ποτέ, ἀλλ' εἴπερ ἄρα, ἐν χέσει τῇ πρὸς τὸν χρόνον. *Nor is WHEN the same with TIME; but if any thing, it consists in THE RELATION WHICH IT BEARS TO TIME. Simpl. in Præd. p. 87. B. Ed. Bas. 1551. And again* —ὅταν δέ τι πρᾶγμα, ἑτέρου οὐ τῷ χρόνῳ, καὶ ἔχῃ ὡς μέρος χρόνον λαμβανόμενον, χέσιν ἔχει πρὸς χρόνον, καὶ διὰ τῆτο ἐν χρόνῳ ἐστίν, ὥσπερ ἡ ἐν Σαλαμῖνι ναυμαχία ἐν τῷδε χρόνῳ· τότε ἄλλη κατηγορία γίγνεται, ἢ τῷ Ποτέ, ἄλλη ἔσα παρὰ τὸ Ποσόν.—*But when any particular THING, WHICH IS DIFFERENT FROM TIME, and which is not assumed as any PART OF TIME, has a RELATION TO Time, and for this reason is IN Time, as for example the Sea-fight at Salamis, which happened at such a particular Time: then there arises A DIFFERENT PREDICAMENT, that of WHEN, a PREDICAMENT DIFFERENT from that of QUANTITY. Simplic. in Præd. p. 88. Ejusd. Edit.*

The

The answer to this question *connects* their C. XII.  
*Meeting with a certain Place ; and in the*  
*Relation between these two, we see the*  
 rise of the Predicament, **WHERE.**

—— upon the Heath,  
 There we go to meet Macbeth (*f*).

LET us take another example. *Virgil*, we are informed, wrote his *Georgics* at *Naples*. By *Naples*, in this instance, is the *Place* of *Virgil* circumscribed, which might else have been at *Rome*, at

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(*f*) Ἄλλ' ὥσπερ ἐπὶ τῷ χρόνῳ ἄλλο μὲν ἦν ὁ χρό-  
 νος, ἄλλο δὲ τὸ κατὰ χρόνον, ἢ χρόνος τίς ἕτις ἄλλο  
 μὲν ὁ τόπος, ἄλλο δὲ τὸ κατὰ τόπον, ἢ τόπος τίς.—  
*For as in TIME, Time itself is one thing, and that,*  
*which is according to Time, or something belonging to it,*  
*is another thing ; so also is PLACE one thing, and that*  
*WHICH IS ACCORDING TO PLACE, or SOMETHING*  
*BELONGING TO IT, another Thing. Simpl. in Præd.*  
*ut sup.*

UBI non est Locus, sed ESSE IN LOCO. QUANDO  
 non est Tempus, sed ESSE IN TEMPORE. *Fell*, p. 104,  
 107.

U 4

Mantua,

C.XII. *Mantua, &c. The connection therefore of Virgil with this City gives us an answer to the Question, WHERE.*

AGAIN, he wrote them, we are told, while *Cæsar Augustus* was on his *Oriental Expedition*. Here the *time of this Expedition* circumscribes the *time of Writing*, which might else have been (for ought we know) during the Wars with *Brutus*, with *Antony*, &c. This *relative Connection* gives an answer to the Question, WHEN.

————— *Dum Cæsar ad altum  
Fulminat Euphraten bello, victorque vo-  
lentes  
Per populos dat jura, viamque affectat  
Olympo :  
Illo Virgilium me tempore dulcis alebat  
Parthenope, studiis florentem ignobilis otî (g).*


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(g) *Virg. Georg. iv. sub fin.*

THESE



THESE elegant lines, which we so justly admire, are in fact nothing more than the *common date of an epistle*; as if the Author, having finished his work, had subjoined *Naples, such a Month, such a Year*: so great, even in trivial matters, is the force of Numbers, and sublime Ideas.

C. XII.  


HENCE then we perceive the nature both of WHEN, and of WHERE. WHEN is not mere *Time*, nor is it *Beings and Events*; but it is *Beings and Events, as they stand related to Time*. Again, WHERE is not properly *Place*, nor is it *Beings and Events*; but it is *Beings and Events, as they stand related to Place*. If therefore *the When* only be given, and *not the Where*, then might the thing have happened either *here*, or at the *Antipodes*: and, by parity of reasoning, if the *Where* only be given, and *not the When*, then might the Event have happened, either  
*yesterday,*

C. XII. *yesterday, or before the flood.* 'Tis then  
 only comes *precision*, when we view the  
*two united (h).*

AND hence by the way the utility and praise of those two subordinate accomplishments (for Sciences I cannot call them) *Geography* and *Chronology*. By acquainting us with the relations, borne by illustrious persons and great events to the different portions both of *Time* and of *Place*, they afford us proper means to contemplate human affairs ; to view the general Order and Concatenation of Events, and our own Connection with this Order, as Members of the same universe.

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(b) Οὕτως δὲ καὶ τὸ Πᾶ καὶ τὸ Ποτὲ ἀδελφά πως ἐστὶ πρὸς ἄλληλα, κοινὴν ἐπίσης παρέχοντα τὴν συντέλειαν πρὸς ὅλην τὴν γένεσιν, καὶ τοῖς κινημένοις τὴν ἴσην χρεῖαν συμβαλλόμενα. *And thus it is that WHEN and WHERE are a sort of Brothers one to another, affording equally a common Perfection to all things that are generated, and contributing an Utility of equal Value to all things, that are in Motion.* *Simplic. in Præd. p. 87. Ed. Basil. 1551.*

IN

IN general it may be observed, that C. XII.  
 whatever is *an answer* to the Question, }  
 WHERE, belongs to the *Genus* or *Predicament* of WHERE; and whatever is *an*  
*answer* to the Question, WHEN, belongs  
 in like manner to the *Predicament* of  
 WHEN. *When* did such a thing happen?  
 —*Now*; *this instant*; *to-day*; *yesterday*;  
*a century ago*; *in such a year of our Lord*;  
*such a year of the Hegira*; *such a year of*  
*Rome*; *such an Olympiad*, &c. To these  
 may be added such terms in the *past*, as  
*Lately*, *Formerly*, *Long ago*, &c. and such  
 also in the *future*, as *Immediately*, *Soon*,  
*Hereafter* (i), &c. Again, WHERE did  
 such a thing happen?—*Here*; *There*; *in*  
*England*; *in Europe*; *in China*; *in the*  
*Moon*; *in the Sun*, &c. To these may be

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(i) See many of these Terms elegantly and accurately explained in *Aristotle's Physics*, l. iv. c. 13. The Terms alluded to are νῦν, ποτέ, ἤδη, ἄρτι, πάλαι, ἐξαιφνης, κ. τ. λ.



C. XII. added such Terms as *Near, Far off,*  
*Above, Below, &c.*

ALL these Terms, by *thus answering these Questions*, serve to indicate the *Relation* of some *Being*, or *Event*, either to *Time*, or to *Place*; and, tho' some of them do it with greater precision, and some with less, yet did they not all do it *in some degree*, they could not belong to these *two Predicaments*.

WE cannot assert the same of such terms, as *an Inch, a Foot, or a Cubit; a Day, a Month, or a Year*. The reason is, *they indicate no Relation of Time, or Place to particular things*, but only *measure out definite Portions* in these two *infinite Natures*.

WITH regard to the *human Body*, not only the *Whole* fills its proper *Place*, but so too does every *Limb*. Hence, as it's *particular Place* is a measure to each  
*Limb,*

*Limb*, so is this *Limb* in it's turn made C. XII.  
 a measure to that *Place*, in order to de-  
 fine a like portion of it, existing else-  
 where (*k*). And hence the origin of such  
 Measures, as an *Inch*, a *Foot*, a *Cubit*,  
 and the like, which are all of them de-  
 duced from certain *Limbs* in the *Human*  
*Body*.

BUT tho' the *Limbs* of *Man* were to-  
 lerably adequate to measure *Place*, yet  
 were his *Motions* by no means adequate  
 to the mensuration of *Time*, derived (as  
 they appear) from such a number of Ap-  
 petites ; from such a variety of Fancies,

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(*k*) This is indeed a common Property to all Men-  
 suration, that the *Measurer*, and the thing *measured*,  
 should *reciprocate*, so that while the Gallon measures  
 the Wine, the Wine should measure the Gallon ;  
 while the Ell measures the silk, the silk should mea-  
 sure the Ell.

See before, the Quotation given in the Note, p.  
 22. *Ἑίς* is there rendered a *Quart*, not as if this  
 last represented that *Greek* measure, but as it was a  
 measure, familiar to an *English* Reader.

and

C. XII. and contradictory Opinions. Here therefore were mankind obliged *to quit themselves*, and to recur to Motions *more orderly* than *their own*; to the *real* Motion of the Moon, to the *apparent* Motions of the Sun, in order to obtain such *orderly* Measures, as those of *Days*, and *Months*, and *Years*.


AND thus from the nature and origin of these *Terms*, we may perceive how they are distinguished from the Predicaments of WHERE and WHEN.

THERE is (if I may use the Expression) an *enlarged When*, such as *To-day*, *during this Month*, *this Year*, *this Century*; and a *precise When*, the *indivisible instant*, in which the event happened. So also is there an *enlarged Where*, as *in London*, *in England*, *in Europe*, &c. and a *precise Where*, that is to say the *exact Place*, which each individual fills (1).

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(1) See *Hermes*, p. 118, Note (g).



Now as every man exists in such a C. XII.  
*precise Where*, and during such a *precise*   
*When*, so is it with reference to these two  
 Relations of *his own*, that he recognizes  
*the When* and *the Where* of all other Be-  
 ings. *WHEN* lived Charles the Great?  
*Almost three hundred Years before the first*  
*Crusade.* Tho' this Answer tell us the  
 distance between Charles and *that Expe-*  
*dition*, yet are we still uninformed as to  
*the Time, When* he lived, unless we have  
 something given us, *to connect him with*  
*ourselves.* And *WHEN*, we demand, hap-  
 pened the first Crusade?—About seven hun-  
 dred Years ago. Here we have the *tem-*  
*poral* Relation between *ourselves*, and that  
*Event*; so that having previously learnt  
*the like* relation between that *Event* and  
*Charles the Great*, we of course recognize  
*the Time, WHEN* that Prince existed; that  
 is to say, *the temporal Relation between*  
*our own existence, and his.* The same too  
 happens in ascertaining *the Place, WHERE.*

C. XII.  AND hence it follows, that such *Measures* of Time and Place, as *a Year, a Century, a Foot, a Furlong*, tho' they belong not *of themselves* to the *present Predicaments or Arrangements*, may yet be made a Part of them, by being properly *associated*. Such they become, when we say *a Furlong hence, a Century since, a Foot below, a Year after*. The reason is, they are brought, by such *association*, to define *Relative Existence*, in doing which the very *Essence* of these *Predicaments* consists.

AND now a word, as to the force of *these two Predicaments*; their influence in the World; and more particularly in *human affairs*.

CÆSAR, when he was assassinated, fell at the feet of *Pompey's Statue*. The celebrated *Hampden* received his death's wound upon that *Field, where\** he had

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\* *Clarendon's History, Book VII.*

first executed the Ordinance for levying troops to serve the Parliament. From a royal Banqueting-house, built by himself in prosperity, was an unfortunate Prince led to an unjust Execution. In each of these instances the PLACE, WHERE, is a plausible Topic; a Topic equally suited either to raise compassion, or, if we would sophisticate more harshly \*, to insinuate Judgments, divine Vengeance, &c. But to quit topical arguments, which in fact demonstrate nothing.

'Twas by an unfortunate fall so near the conclusion of the race, that the swift footed *Salus* lost the prize to young *Euryalus* (m). 'Twas by being attacked *when* asleep, and over-powered with liquor, that the gigantic *Polypheme* fell a sacrifice to *Ulysses* (n). 'Twas by living in an age, *when* a capricious audience ruled,

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\* St. *Luke*, xiii. 4.

(m) *Æneid*. v. 286, &c.

(n) *Odyss.* ix. *sub fin.*



C. XII. that the elegant *Menander* so often yielded to *Philemon*, his inferior by the confession of all succeeding ages (o). *The Race is not to the Swift, nor the Battle to the Strong, nor yet Favour to men of Skill; but TIME and CHANCE happeneth to them all* (p).

THE same concurring Causes, which acted in these cases like adversaries, can become in others the most powerful allies. Δός μοι πῶς ἔσῳ, *Give me WHERE to stand*, was a well known saying of the famous *Archimedes*. He wanted but a *Place*, WHERE to fix his Machine, and he thought himself able to move even the World (q). *Shakespeare* tells us,


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(o) *Vid. Quintil. l. x. c. 1. — A. Gell. l. xvii. c. 4.* who says of him, *ambitu, gratiâque, et factionibus sæpenumerò vincebatur.*

(p) *Ecclesiastes, xi. 11.*

(q) See the Life of *Archimedes* in *Rivaltus's* Edition of his Works, *Paris, 1615. Fol.*

*There*

There IS A TIDE in the affairs of men, C. XII.  
 Which, taken at the flood, leads on to fortune:   
 Omitted, all the voyage of their life  
 Is bound in shallows—— (r)

When *Horace* sent a Messenger with some  
 of his Works to *Augustus*, his charge  
 was to deliver them, if *Augustus* was in  
 health; and not only so, but in good  
 humour; and not only so, but in a hu-  
 mour to call for them:

*Si validus, si lætus erit, si denique poscet* (s).

Such a Strefs did this polite author lay on  
 the propriety of THE WHEN. *Virgil*  
 mentions finely the

———— MOLLISSIMA *fandi*  
 TEMPORA (t).

(r) *Julius Cæsar*, Act iv. Sc. 5.

(s) *Hor. Epist.* l. ii. Ep. 13.

(t) *Æneid.* iv. 293.

C.XII. He makes too his *Fury* suspend her  
 Powers of Mischief, till she could catch  
 a LUCKY MOMENT to make her influence  
 more extensive :

*At sæva e speculis TEMPUS Dea NACTA  
 nocendi,  
 Tartaream intendit vocem, &c (u).*

AND hence we may collect a just idea  
 of the Term, OPPORTUNITY. It is not  
 merely *Time*, concurring with *Events*,  
 for *Time* attends them *all*, be they pro-  
 perous or adverse ; but it is TIME, CON-  
 CURRING FAVOURABLY ; 'tis TIME, CO-  
 OPERATING as an auxiliary Cause (x).


TIME

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(u) *Æneid.* vii. 511.

(x) According to the *Stagirite*, GOOD passes thro'  
 all the *Predicaments*, and, as it stops at each, assumes  
 a different Denomination. In *Substance*, it is MIND  
 and DEITY ; in *Quality*, 'tis that which is *Just* ; in  
*Quantity*, that which is *Exact*, and according to *Mea-*  
*sure* ;



TIME (it is said) *and* CHANCE *happen-* C. XII.  
*eth to all.*—And what is this CHANCE? 

—Is it the *Chance* mentioned by *Milton*, as residing at the Court of Chaos (*y*)? Or is it the same, which *some* Philosophers suppose to have framed the World, and to have maintained in it ever since no inconsiderable Sway?—If *such* *Chance* be the strict opposite to a *rational Principle*, 'tis hard to conceive, how it should have supplied it's place, and without the least ingenuity have produced a work so ingenious. 'Tis hard also to conceive, how *without* a Reason *that* should exist, which

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*sure* ; and in the Predicament WHEN, it is OPPORTUNITY, ἐν δὲ τῷ Πότε, ὁ Καίρος that is to say, GOOD or FAVOURABLE, *acceding to the Time* WHEN, and *characterising* it, gives it by *such accession* the Name of OPPORTUNITY. *Aristot. Ethic. Eudem. p. 86. Edit. Sylb. Locum autem Actionis, Opportunitatem Temporis esse dicunt ; TEMPUS autem ACTIONIS OPPORTUNUM Græcè Εὐκαιρία, Latine appellatur OCCASIO. Cic. de Offic. i. 40.*

(*y*) *Parad. Lost*, Book ii. 965.

C. XII. *it requires so much Reason (even in part only) to comprehend (z). There is however another sort of CHANCE, which, under the name of FORTUNE, we find described as follows—a Cause not manifest to human reasoning (a); not a Cause devoid of Reason, but a Cause, which human Reason wants the means to investigate.*

WE may learn from experience, that whatever opening there may be left for human Freedom, (and enough is there

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(z) *Hanc igitur in Stellis constantiam, hanc tantam tam variis cursibus in omni æternitate convenientiam temporum, NON POSSUM INTELLIGERE SINE MENTE, RATIONE, CONSILIO. Cic. de Nat. Deor. ii. 21.—Dubitant de Mundo, ex quo et oriuntur et fiunt omnia, casusne ipse sit effectus aut necessitate aliquâ, an ratione ac mente divinâ: et ARCHIMEDEM arbitrantur PLUS VALUISSE IN IMITANDIS Sphæræ conversionibus, quam NATURAM IN EFFICIENDIS. Cic. de Nat. Deor. ii. 34.*

(a) —*δοκεῖ μὲν αἰτία ἢ Τυχὴν, ἃ δὲ ἀνθρώπινῃ διανοίᾳ.*—*Arist. Phys. ii. 4. p. 33. Edit. Sylb.* Instead of *διανοία*, they used afterwards the Term *λογισμὸς*.

left

left both for *Merit* and *Demerit*) it is C. XII.  
 not so uncontrouled, as in the least to  
 affect the Universe. It is not in our  
 power to interrupt the course of Na-  
 ture; nor can we, like the Giants of  
 old, heap mountain upon mountain.  
 There is an irreversibile Order of things,  
 to which we necessarily submit; an in-  
 dissoluble Concatenation of successive  
 Causes with their Effects, by which both  
 the Being and the Well-being of this  
 Whole are maintained.

THIS divine *Order* or *Concatenation* has  
*different* denominations: referred to the  
*Supreme Being* as to it's author, we call  
 it FATE; referred to his Foresight for  
 the Good of all, we call it PROVIDENCE (b).

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(b) Three Terms are here employed, CHANCE, FATE, and PROVIDENCE; the *two first* of which have been often improperly asserted, *the last* has been often hardily denied, and all this to favour the *Atheistic System*.




C. XII. 'Tis *this* which mingles itself with all our Actions and Designs ; which *co-operates* with the Pilot, the Husbandman, and the Merchant ; nor with these alone, but with all of every degree, from the meanest Peasant, up to the mightiest Monarch. If it co-operate *favourably*, they succeed ; if otherwise, they fail. And hence the *supposed efficacy* of *Time* and *Place*, so often of such importance in *this co-operation*. 'Tis hence, *the Race is not to the swift, nor the Battle to the strong, &c.*

A PILOT fails, with intention to reach a certain port. All, that the skill of a good Navigator can suggest, is done ;

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The Author of these Notes has endeavoured to give such Meanings to the Terms CHANCE and FATE, as may render them subservient to the Cause of PROVIDENCE, and by making them *wholly dependent on* THE SUPREME INTELLIGENT PRINCIPLE, to make them weaken the System of *Atheism*, rather than contribute to it's Support.

yet

yet he fails at a *Time*, when hurricanes C. XII.  
 arise, and, instead of gaining the destined   
 port, is dashed upon the rocks. A  
 Farmer with proper industry manures and  
 sows his fields; yet the Seasons destroy  
 his harvest, and (according to his own  
 Phrase) *the Times fight against him*. A  
 Merchant travels for the sake of gain to a  
 distant country, and *there* contracts a pe-  
 stilential disease, which carries him off.

THESE Incidents, thus connected with  
*Time* and *Place*, are referred in common  
 language to *Chance*, as to their *Cause*;  
 and so indeed they may, as far as  
 CHANCE implies a CAUSE, which human  
 reasoning was not able either to foresee  
 or obviate. But if we go farther, and  
 suppose it a *Cause*, where there is in fact  
 no Reason at all; in such case we do  
 nothing less than deify CHANCE, com-  
 mitting the affairs of the World to  
 the blindest of Guides, instead of that  
 ONE, ALL-GOOD, ALL-POWERFUL, DI-  
 VINE

C. XII.  VINE INTELLIGENCE, *which in the same undivided instant both sees, and hears all things (c).*

AND so much for the two GENERA OF  
ARRANGEMENTS OF WHEN and WHERE.

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(c) See *Epicarmus*, quoted in the Note, p. 115.

C H A P.



## C H A P. XIII.

Concerning POSITION or SITUATION—  
*What it is, and how deduced—how it  
 exists in Beings inanimate—in Vegetables  
 —in Man—animal Progression—Works  
 of Art—Attitudes—illustrations of At-  
 titude—from Poets—from Actors—from  
 Orators—It's Efficacy whence—Position,  
 among the Elements of Democritus—it's  
 Influence and Importance in the natural  
 World—in the intellectual.*

THE *Arrangement or Predicament* C.XIII.  
 of POSITION or SITUATION has a  
 near affinity with that of *Place*. They  
 are both of the *relative* order, and are  
 both conversant, when taken *strictly*, a-  
 bout *corporeal* Substances only. They  
 differ however, in as much as the *simple*  
*Possession* of Space constitutes PLACE;  
 the

C.XIII. the manner (a) of possessing it, POSITION,  
or SITUATION.

Now

(a) *Differt SITUS ab UBI in hoc, quod UBI est LOCATIO TOTIUS, SITUS est ORDINATIO PARTIUM IN LOCO. UBI est simpliciter ESSE IN LOCO; SITUS, secundum PARTIUM ORDINATIONEM. Fell, p. 104.*

*Ad SITUM omnem requiritur TRIPLEX HABITUDO, quæ conjuncta constituit Situm; Habitudo Partium alicujus Totius inter se; Partium alicujus Totius ad ipsum Totum; Partium et Totius ad Locum. Sanderson, p. 49, l. i. c. 14.*

*Prædicamentum SITUS (Κεῖσθαι) respicit Positionem rei, tum respectu partium suarum inter se, tum respectu Loci, aliarumque rerum. Wallis, l. i. c. 13.*

— ἕτε ἐν τῷ κείμενον σῶμα, ἕτε τὸν τόπον, ἐν ᾧ κεῖται, τῇ διανοίᾳ περιλαμβάνοντα, δεῖ νοεῖν τὸ κεῖσθαι, μόνην δὲ τὴν ἔχασάν πως θέσιν ἐν τῷ γένει τῶ κεῖσθαι λογιζόμενον κατὰ πάντα τὰ ἔντα, ὅσα πέφυκεν ἕτερα ὑπ' ἑτέρων ἀνέχεσθαι, ἢ ἐνιδρύεσθαι τὰ ἕτερα ἐν τοῖς ἑτέροις· ἢ γὰρ τοιάδε συμπλοκὴ τῶν ἐνιδρυμένων καὶ τῶν τὴν ἑδραν παρεχόντων κυριωτάτη καὶ πρωτίτη ἐστὶ τῶ κεῖσθαι ὑπογραφὴ—*We are not to understand the Genus of LYING or POSITION, by taking into our Discussion either the Body lying, or the Place, in which it lies, but singly and solely by taking into our account the peculiar Mode of SITE in the Genus of lying, as it runs thro' all those ranks of Beings, which are formed by nature to be supported some of them by others, or to be seated some*

Now the *manner*, in which a Body C.XIII.  
possesses Space, has respect to certain *Re-*  
*lations*, which exist, some *within*, and  
some *without* it; Relations, which arise  
from it's *Parts*, it's *Whole*, it's *immediate*  
*Place*, and *the Place surrounding it*.

WE shall explain what we assert (which  
perhaps may appear obscure) by begin-  
ning from Bodies *the most simple*, and  
passing from these to others, more *com-*  
*plex* and diversified.

THE simplest and most perfectly simi-  
lar of all Bodies is the Sphere (*b*). If  
there-

---

*some of them upon others; for 'tis THIS CONNECTION  
BETWEEN THINGS, THAT ARE SEATED, and  
THINGS THAT AFFORD THE SEAT, which makes the  
primary and the strictest Description of LYING or POSI-  
TION. Simpl. in Præd. p. 85. Ed. Basil. 1551.*

(*b*) The Sphere, and other solid Figures, soon af-  
ter mentioned in this Chapter, are for the greater part  
well known. He however, who wishes for ocular in-  
spection,




C.XIII. therefore we take a Sphere, and place it upon the ground, the Part *farthest from the Earth's centre* we call it's *Top*; that *the nearest*, it's *Bottom*; and all lying between we call it's *Middle*. These Distinctions in the *Sphere* regard *external Objects only*, because the Sphere being *every where similar* contributes nothing to them *itself*. If we roll it therefore along, the Distinctions are not lost; only, while the Motion continues, they perpetually vary, and that merely with reference to *local Distinctions, existing without*.

AND hence it follows, that the Sphere, tho' it have *Place*, yet according to these reasonings has in strictness no *Position*, because it has *no peculiar Parts* deducible

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spection, may find them all (the Sphere alone excepted) among the Diagrams of the eleventh and twelfth Books of *Euclid*, to which Books we refer him, as they are easy to be had, under various Editions.

from

from it's own Figure, which Parts can be called *Top* or *Bottom*, as *contradistinguished* one to another. C.XIII. 

WHAT is true of the Sphere, may be asserted *almost* as truly of the five *Platonic* Bodies, the *equilateral Pyramid*, the *Cube*, the *Octoedron*, &c. and that, because they are not only *regular*, but because their several *Faces* are *every way similar*.

WHAT is true of *these* Bodies, is true also of their *Opposites*, the Bodies I mean, which are not only *dissimilar*, but *universally irregular*. Fragments of Rock, and Hillocks of Sand, have neither *Top* nor *Bottom*, but what is merely *casual*; and therefore, tho' of necessity they exist in *Place* by being *Bodies*, yet, as they have no *internal* local Distinctions under the meaning here adopted, it of course follows *they cannot properly have Position*.

BUT

C.XIII. BUT if we pass to those Bodies, which are neither *irregular*, like the broken Rock, because they have *Order* and *Proportion*; nor yet *every way similar*, like the Sphere, because they have *Extensions that are unequal* (such for example as the *Cylinder*, or the *Parallelipedon*); here we shall find the very Bodies, from *their own* Attributes, to concur with the World around, both in *acquiring* to themselves POSITION, as well as in *diversifying* it.

THE Cylinder for example extends *farther* one way than another, and therefore possesses *within* itself three such parts, as *two Extremes*, and *one Mean*. If we so place it therefore, that one of these Extremes (no matter which) shall be *most remote from the Earth's Centre*, and the other *most near*; in such case, by this manner of blending *external* and *internal* Relations, the *Cylinder* is said TO STAND. If we remove in part the *higher* Extreme  
from



from it's *Perpendicular*, and thus differ- CXIII.  
 ently blend Relations, the Cylinder is  
 said TO INCLINE. And if we pursue  
 this *Inclination*, till the two Extremes of  
 Top and Bottom become *horizontal*, then  
 is it said TO LIE. The *Motion*, which  
 leads from *Standing* to *Lying*, we call  
 FALLING ; that from *Lying* to *Standing*,  
 we call RISING. Every one of these Af-  
 fections may well happen to the *Cylinder*,  
 because it's peculiar *Figure*, taken with  
 it's peculiar *Place*, co-operates to the  
 production of the POSITIONS here de-  
 scribed.

'Tis not so with those Bodies already  
 mentioned, where these *internal Charac-*  
*ters* are not distinguished. The *Sphere*  
 and the *Cube* neither FALL nor RISE, be-  
 cause they neither STAND nor LIE more at  
 one time than another.

BUT suppose we go farther ; suppose  
 to one Extreme of this Cylinder we add

Y

a new

C.XIII. *a new Part, that is a Capital ; to the other*  
 { Extreme *another Part, that is a Base :*  
 the *two Extremes* of the Cylinder would  
 no longer in such case remain *indiscrimi-*  
*nate*, but the Characters of *Top* and *Bot-*  
*tom* would become distinguished and as-  
 certained, *even in the Figure itself*, with-  
 out looking to things *external*.

THE consequences of these new Cha-  
 racters are *new Modes of POSITION*. A  
*Pillar* (for such we must now suppose it)  
 is not only capable, like the *simple Cy-*  
*linder*, of *Standing* and of *Lying*, but in  
 as much as two of it's Parts, that is to  
 say it's Extremes, are *essentially* distin-  
 guished, if it rest on it's *Base*, it STANDS  
 UPRIGHT ; if on it's *Capital*, it STANDS  
 INVERTED.

• LET us carry our suppositions farther,  
 and by a Metamorphosis, like one of  
*Ovid's*, transform this *Pillar* into a *Tree*.  
 Let the *Capital* sprout into Branches, the  
 Shaft

*Shaft* become a *Trunk*, and the *Base* CXIII.  
 strike into *Roots*. Here then in a *vege-*  
*table* Subject we behold the same *Di-*  
*stinctions*; a *Top*, a *Bottom*, and a *Mid-*  
*dle* of it's own, leading as before to the  
*same Diversities of Position*.

IF we still pursue the *Metamorphosis*,  
 and transform *the Tree* into a *Man*, mak-  
 ing it's *Branches* into a *Head*, it's *Trunk*  
 into a *Body*, and it's *Roots* into *Feet*, we  
 shall discover also in an *animal* Subject  
 the same *Distinctions* as before; and the  
 Subject will in consequence be capable  
 of LYING, as well as of STANDING; of  
*Standing* UPRIGHT, as well as INVERTED.

BUT this is not all. *Man* is not only  
 an *extended* substance, like the *Column*,  
 or the *Tree*, but over and above, *as an*  
*Animal*, he is by nature *locomotive*. Now  
 the *Part* of him in progression, which  
*leads* the way, we denominate his *Fore-*  
*part* or *Front*; the *Opposite*, his *Hinder-*



C.XIII. *part* or *Rear*; and the two Parts upon each Side, *his Right* and *his Left*.

AND thus has *Man*, in consequence of his animal Frame, over and above the former Distinctions of *Top* and *Bottom* (both of them common to the *other* Subjects already described) *four additional Distinctions peculiar to him as an Animal*, the Distinctions of *Front* and *Rear*, of *Right* and *Left*, which four are *wholly unknown* both to the Column, and to the Tree.

WHILE he is under the POSITION OF STANDING, these four *Distinctions* have little force, but when he happens TO LIE, then is their Efficacy seen, and *each* of them leads to a *new*, and *different Position*. If his *Front*, while he is *lying*, be *nearest* to the Earth, then is he said to lie PRONE; if his *hinder-part* or *Rear*, then to lie SUPINE; if *neither* of these, then 'tis either on his *Right*, or on his *Left*; which


which *Positions* are unknown either to C.XIII.  
the Pillar, or the Tree.

THUS, besides the *Standing* POSITIONS of UPRIGHT and INVERTED, has MAN, in consequence of his Frame, FOUR OTHER POSITIONS, which appertain to him, *as he lies*; so that his Frame taken together, as *one perfect Whole*, is susceptible of SIX DIFFERENT AND SPECIFIC POSITIONS, which have *reference* to the SIX DIFFERENT AND SPECIFIC EXTENSIONS OF HIS BODY (c).

FABLES tell us, that the triangular Island *Sicily* was thrown upon the Giant *Typhoeus*. Under one Promontory lay

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(c) See these different *Extensions*, which *Aristotle* calls *Distances*, διαστάσεις, fully discussed in his Treatise *de Animalium ingressu*, p. 129. Edit. Sylb. In his *History of Animals*, we read—ἔχει δ' ὁ ἄνθρωπος καὶ τὸ ἄνω καὶ τὸ κάτω, καὶ τὰ ἔμπροσθεν καὶ τὰ ὀπίσθια, καὶ δεξιὰ καὶ ἀριστερά. *Hist. Animal.* p. 17. Edit. Sylb.

C.XIII.  his *Right Arm* ; under another, his *Left* ; under a third, his *Legs* ; under mount *Ætna*, his *Head* ; under the whole island, his *Body*, having his *Breast upwards*, his *Back downwards*. These *Positions* refer to the several *Extensions* above described.

*Vasta giganteis ingesta est insula membris  
Trinacris, et magnis subiectum molibus ur-  
get*

*Æthereas ausum sperare Typhoëa sedes.  
Nititur ille quidem, pugnatque resurgere  
sæpè ;*

*DEXTRA sed Ausonio manus est subiecta  
Peloro ;*

*LÆVA, Pachyne, tibi : Lilybæo CRURA  
premuntur ;*


*Degravat Ætna CAPUT : sub quâ RESU-  
PINUS arenas*

*Ejectat, flammamque fero vomit ore Ty-  
phoeus (d).*

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(d) Ovid. Metam. v. 346.



BUT not to anticipate with regard C.XIII.  
to Poets, of whom we shall say more   
hereafter.—In a *Cube* there are *six* Faces,  
capable of denoting as many *Positions*;  
and yet there is this important Dif-  
ference between the *Cube* and the *Man* :  
the Faces of the *Cube* being all of them  
*Similar*, it's *Positions*, being only *nominal*,  
can only *refer* to *things without*, and every  
Face can alike concur to the forming  
of the *same Position*. But the Parts *ana-*  
*logous* to these in *Man* being all of them  
*dissimilar*, his *Positions*, being *real*, are by  
no means thus *commutable* ; but if the  
*Head* be *uppermost*, *then*, and *then only*, is  
he, *by Position*, *Upright* ; if his *Back* be  
*uppermost*, *then*, and *then only*, is he, *by*  
*Position*, *Prone* ; nor can he possibly be  
called either *Prone* or *Upright*, were  
*any other Part* to exist in *the same Place*,  
excepting the two here mentioned.

C.XIII. FROM what has been alleged, we see the true Origin of POSITION or SITUATION. “ *It arises from the Relation, which the Distinctions of PARTS WITHIN bear to the Distinctions of PLACE WITHOUT; and it varies of course, as this Relation is found to vary.*” The fewer of these internal Distinctions any Being possesses, the less always the number of it’s possible Positions. As it possesses more, it’s Positions increase with them.

As to the *Progression of Animals*, peculiar to them as Animals, that Progression, (I mean) by which they move not as mere Bodies, but as Bodies possessed of *Instinct* and *Sensation*; it is to be observed, that this Progression is formed by the help of Joints and Muscles, and that these, during their operation, form within the Animal Body a variety of *Angles* and *Flexures*. Now hence

hence arises a *fresh multitude of characteristic Positions*. There is one *Position*, C.XIII.  
under which a Bird *flies*; another, under  
which a Horse *gallops*; a third, under  
which a Man *walks*, &c.


THESE latter *Positions* differ from those already described, because they depend not on a simple Relation of the *whole Body to things without*, but on a diversified Relation of it's different *Parts, one to another*. The Painter well knows the force of these *Positions*, since 'tis by these he superinduces *Motion* upon *immoveable Canvas*; so that from the *Position*, which we *see*, we *infer* the *Progression*, which we *see not* (e).

AND this naturally leads us to consider the POWER OF POSITION OR SITUATION in Works of ART. Among the common Utensils of life, such as Chairs,

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(e) See *Vol. I. Treatise 2. chap. ii. p. 61.*



C.XIII.  Beds, Tables, &c. there is a *Position* which is *proper*, and another which is *absurd*; a *Position*, by which they *attain their End*, and another, which *renders them useless*. Some derive their very *Essence* (if I may use the Phrase) from their *Situation*; for example, the *Lintel*, from being *over* the Door; the *Threshold*, from being *under* it (*f*). We may pass from these to Productions more elegant.

'Tis the Knowledge of these various POSITIONS peculiar to *Animal* Bodies, and to the *human* above the rest (commonly known by the name of ATTITUDES)

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(*f*) Τὰ δὲ θείσει [λέγεται,] οἷου ἄδὸς καὶ ὑπέρθυρον· ταῦτα γὰρ τῷ κείσθαι πῶς διαφέρει—Other Substances are DENOMINATED FROM THEIR POSITION, as the THRESHOLD, and the LINTEL; for these differ by the peculiar manner of their being SITUATED.—And soon after—Οὐδὸς γὰρ ἔστιν, ὅτι ἔτως κείται· καὶ τὸ εἶναι, τὸ ἔτως αὐτὸ κείσθαι σημαίνει—For it is a THRESHOLD, because it is so SITUATED; and it's EXISTENCE indicates IT'S BEING SITUATED AFTER THIS MANNER. *Metaph. H. c. 6. p. 135. Edit. Sylb.*

the


which constitutes so eminent a part in C.XIII.  
the character of a perfect *Painter*. To   
the *Statuary*, if possible, it is a more  
important Science still, because he has  
no helps, like the *Painter*, from Co-  
lour, Light, and Shade.

INSTANCES in support of this asser-  
tion (if it need supporting by instances)  
may be alleged innumerable both from  
Pictures and from Statues.

PAINTING gives us the ATTITUDES  
of St. *Paul*, and the Sorcerer *Elymas*, in  
the Cartoon of *Raphael*—of *Apollo*, and  
the dancing *Hours*, in the *Aurora* of  
*Guido*—of the sleeping *Christ*, his *Mother*,  
and St. *John*, in the *Silence* of *Caracci*—  
of many and diversified *Holy Families*, in  
the works of *Carlo Maratti*, &c.

FROM ATTITUDES in *Painting* we  
pass to those in *Sculpture*; to that of the  
*Medicean Venus*, the *Farneſian Hercules*,  
the



C.XIII.  the *Niobe*, the *Laocoon*, the *Wrestlers*, the  
dying *Gladiator*, &c.

'Tis easy, when we are describing these Beauties, to be diffuse in our expressions, and to exclaim, as we describe, *how charming, how exquisite*, &c. But the observation is just, as well as obvious—

*Segnius irritant animos demissa per aurem,  
Quàm quæ sunt oculis commissa fidelibus* (g).

HE, therefore, who would comprehend ATTITUDE in Works such as these, must either visit the Originals, or else contemplate them (as he may easily do) in Models, Drawings, and Books of Sculpture and Painting (h).


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(g) *Hor. Art. Poet.* 180.

(h) Those, who dwell in the neighbourhood where these Notes were written, may find excellent examples of ATTITUDE at *Wilton House* (*Lord Pembroke's*) among the Statues and Basso-Relievos there preserved; in particular the *Cupid bending his Bow*;  
the



WE shall find less difficulty in the C.XIII.  
works of *Poets*, because *these* address us   
in *Words*, and convey to us their Ideas not  
thro' our language but their own. 'Tis  
thus *Virgil* gives us an ATTITUDE OF  
SITTING IN DESPERATION :

— SEDET, *æternumque* SEDEBIT  
*Infelix Theseus*——— (i)

SHAKESPEARE, OF SITTING IN DE-  
SPONDENCE :

*She* SATE, *like Patience on a monument*,  
SMILING AT GRIEF——— (k)

MILTON, OF CONJUGAL AFFECTION :

---

the *Faun*, who, as he stands, *turns* his Body, and *looks*  
*backward*; the *Figures in the Marriage-Vase*; the *Ama-*  
*zon fighting*, the *Basso-Relievos of Meleager*, of  
*Niobe*, of *Ceres* and *Triptolemus*, &c.

(i) *Æn.* vi. 517.

(k) *Shakespeare's Twelfth Night*, Act. ii. Sc. 6.

MILTON,

C.XIII. ——— He, on his side

LEANING HALF RAISED, with looks of  
cordial Love

HUNG OVER HER, *enamour'd*— (m)

OVID makes *Theſcelus*, as he elevated a  
javelin, to be miraculously petrified in  
the VERY ATTITUDE OF AIMING :

—— *Utque manu jaculum fatale parabat*  
*Mittere, in hoc hæſit ſignum de mar-*  
*more GESTU* (n).

MORE formidable is a ſimilar ATTITUDE at Milton's Lazar-house :

— OVER *them triumphant* DEATH his dart  
SHOOK—but *delay'd to ſtrike*— (o).

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(m) *Par. Loſt. v. 11.*

(n) *Ovid. Metam. v. 182.*

(o) *Par. Loſt, xi. 491.*

THERE are ATTITUDES less tremendous, that mark *Reverence* and *Humiliation*. C.XIII.

THUS *Shakespeare*,

*These CROUCHINGS, and these LOWLY  
COURTESIES  
Might fire the blood of ordinary men (p).*

THE LYING, OR BEING EXTENDED ON SOME SURFACE, is an ATTITUDE in *most* instances so connected with *Death*, that DEATH is often denoted by *that Attitude alone*.

THUS *Nestor* in *Homer*, speaking of the Greek Commanders, slain before *Troy*—

— ἔνθα δ' ἔπειτα κατέκταθεν ὅσσοι ἄριστοι,  
Ἐνθα μὲν Αἴας ΚΕΙΤΑΙ ἀρήϊος, ἔνθα δ' Ἀχιλλεύς,  
Ἐνθα δὲ Πάτροκλος, Διόφιν μῆσ' ὠρ' ἀτάλαντος,  
Ἐνθα δ' ἐμὸς φίλος υἱός—— (q)

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(p) *Shakespeare's Jul. Cæsar*, Act iii. Sc. i.

(q) *Hom. Odys.* γ. 108.

*There*



C.XIII. *There fell the bravest of the Grecian Chiefs ;*  
 There LIES great Ajax ; there Achilles  
 LIES ;  
*There too Patroclus, knowing as a God ;*  
*There my own much-lov'd Son— \*.*

THUS SHAKESPEARE,

*O ! mighty Cæsar, dost thou LIE so LOW ?*  
*Are all thy triumphs, glories, conquests, spoils,*  
*Shrunk to this little measure— (r) ?*

SLEEP, whom the Poets deify, appears under a SIMILAR POSITION :

— CUBAT ipse Deus, membris languore solutis (s).

'Twas perhaps from this *Resemblance* in POSITION, joined to that other, the

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\* See also *Hom. Il. Σ. v. 20*, and Mr. Clarke's Note, where he quotes *Quintilian*.

(r) *Shakesf. Jul. Cæs. Act iii. Sc. 3.*

(s) *Ovid. Metam. xi. 612.*

*Cessation of the Sensitive Powers, that* C.XIII.  
 SLEEP and DEATH were by the Poets  
 called BROTHERS (*t*), and that the for-  
 mer (*u*) upon many occasions served to  
 represent the latter.

IF we pass from *Poets* to *Actors* (by  
*Actors*, I mean those of *Dramatic Com-*

(*t*) See *Hermes*, l. i. c. 4. p. 52.

(*u*) When *Sleep* represents Death, it is commonly  
 marked with some strong Epithet : by *Homer* it is called  
 a *brazen Sleep* ; by *Virgil*, an *iron Sleep* ; by *Horace*,  
 simply a *long Sleep* ; which Idea the Poet *Moschus*  
 heightens, by calling it not only a *long Sleep*, but a  
*Sleep, without an end ; a sleep, out of which we cannot*  
*be awak'd.*

Εὐδομεῖς εὖ μάλα μακρὸν, ἀτέρμονα, νήγρετον ὕπνον.

See *Hom. Iliad.* Α. 241. *Virg. Æn.* x. 745. *Horat.*  
*Od.* l. iii. 11. v. 36. *Mosch. Idylb.* iii. 105.

Even in Prose-writers, when we read of persons being  
*dead*, we sometimes read that *they are* FAL'N ASLEEP,  
 or that *they SLEPT with their fathers.* *Corinthians* i.  
 c. xv. v. 6. 2 *Chronicles* c. ix. v. 31.

It seems indeed to have been a custom with all na-  
 tions, in instances of this sort, to mitigate the *Harsh-*  
*ness* of the *Thing* signified, by the *Mildness* of the  
*Terms that signify it* : a well known Figure, called in  
 books of Rhetoric *Euphemismus.*

Z

positions)

C.XIII. positions) we shall find that ATTITUDES and POSITIONS make at least a moiety of their merit ; so that tho' they are *to speak* 'tis certain, as well as *to act*, yet 'tis from *acting*, not from *speaking*, that they take their *denomination*.

NOR are JUST POSITIONS without their Use to that *real Actor* upon the Stage of life, I mean the *Orator*. *Demosthenes*, in whom Rhetoric attained it's last Perfection, was at first so unsuccessful, that he was in a state of despair, 'till *Satyrus*, a celebrated Tragedian, shewed him the amazing force of *Action*, by the different *manners* of repeating certain Passages out of *Euripides* and *Sophocles* (x).

AND whence is it that POSITIONS derive this wonderful Efficacy ?—'Tis in fact because the *Body* is an *Organ* to the *Soul* ; an instrument, *whose Gestures cor-*


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(x) *Plutarch. Demosth.* p. 849. Edit. Xyland.

*respond*



*respond to every Affection*, and are diversified by *Nature herself*, as those Affections are found to vary. *Words* move only those, who understand the language; and even, where the Language is understood, acute Sentiments often escape the comprehension of unacute Hearers. But *Action*, spontaneously indicating the Motions of the *Soul*, is a Language which not only the vulgar, but even the stranger comprehends. Every one knows the external Gestures and Signs, by which, without teaching, both himself and others indicate their several *Affections*; so that seeing *the same Signs* recur, he readily knows their *Meaning*, in as much as *Nature herself* supplies the Place of an Interpreter. But to pass from these Speculations to others more general.

C.XIII.  


THE primary Elements of *Democritus* were *Atoms* and a *Void*. As for the *Variety* and the *Specific Differences*, which he found to exist in things, he deduced

Z 2

them

C.XIII. them out of his *Atoms*, first by *Figure*, as A for example differs from N; next by *Order*, as AN for example differs from NA; and lastly by *POSITION*, as Z for example differs from N, these Letters in *Figure* being in a manner the same (y).

THUS *POSITION*, according to this Philosopher, stands *among the Principles of the Universe*.

A HIGH rank this, and yet perhaps not an undeserved one, if, by attending to particulars, we contemplate it's extensive influence. For not to mention

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(y) What others called σχῆμα, *FIGURE*, Democritus called Ὑσμός; Τάξις, *ORDER*, he called Διάθεσιν; and Θέσις, *SITUATION*, or *POSITION*, he called Τροπή. See *Aristot. Metaph.* p. 11. 134. *Edit. Sylb.* See also *Lib. de Gen. et Corrupt.* 1. i. c. 2. where *Philoponus* in his Comment informs us, that these strange words were λέξεις Ἀβδερικαί, *Abderic Words*; Words used in *Abdera*, the city to which *Democritus* belonged.

the



the force of POSITION in the different C.XIII.  
 parts of every *animal*; not to mention  
 the admirable SITUATION even of *sub-*  
*ordinate* Subjects; the grateful variety of  
 Lands and Waters, of Mountains and  
 Plains; what shall we say to the POSI-  
 TION of the Heavens *above*, and of the  
 Earth *beneath*; of the Sun himself in the  
 centre, and the several Planets moving  
*round* him? If we carry our hypothesis  
 farther, and suppose (as has been well  
 conjectured) that the Solar System itself  
 has a proper *Position* respecting the *fixed*  
 Stars; and that they, presiding in other  
 Systems, maintain a certain *Position* re-  
 specting the System of the Sun; we shall  
 have reason so to esteem the importance  
 of this GENUS, that perhaps upon it's  
 Permanence depends the Permanence of  
 the World.

NOR need we be surpris'd, tho' it be  
 properly an Attribute of things *corporeal*,  
 if we discover the traces of it even in



C.XIII. Beings *incorporeal*. If the sensible World be an *Effect*, of which the *Cause* is a *sovereign Mind*, all that we discover in *Effects* we may fairly look for in their *Causes*, since *here* it's *prior* Existence (z) is in a manner *necessary*.

THUS *our own* Minds are not only the Place and *Region of our Ideas* (a), but with respect to these Ideas, such is the influence of POSITION, that upon this in a manner depends our *whole Perception of Truth*. Let us for example *invert* the Terms of a simple Proposition, and instead of saying, that *Every Man is an Animal*, say that *Every Animal is a Man*; and what becomes of the *Truth* which

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(z) See *Hermes*, p. 381, &c.

(a) — Καὶ εὖ δὴ οἱ λέγοντες τὴν ψυχὴν εἶναι τό-  
που εἰδῶν—*Well therefore do they conceive, who say that*  
*the SOUL is THE REGION OF FORMS, or IDEAS.*  
*Arist. de An.* iii. 4. p. 57. *Edit. Sylb.* See before,  
p. 98, in the Note, and p. 112, 113.

such

such Proposition contained? Let us *de-* C.XIII.  
*range* in any Theorem the Propositions  
 themselves, confounding them in their  
 order, blending them promiscuously,  
 putting the *first last*, and the *last first*;  
 and what becomes of the *Truth* which  
 such *Theorem* was to *demonstrate*? 'Tis  
 lost, till the Propositions recover their  
 natural *situation*.

— *tantum series, juncturaque pollet* \*.

DEMOCRITUS, whom we have just  
 mentioned, in order to shew the im-  
 portance of ARRANGEMENT in *natural*  
 Subjects, and the amazing *Differences*  
 that arise, where the Change is most *mi-*  
*nute*, ingeniously remarks, that *out of the*  
*same Letters are formed Tragedy and Co-*  
*medy* (b). We may affirm as confidently,

\* *Hor.*

(b) — ἐκ τῶν αὐτῶν γὰρ τραγῳδία γίνεται, καὶ κω-  
 μῳδία γραμμάτων. *De Gen. et Corrupt.* l. i. c. 2.  
 p. 4. *Edit. Sylb.*

Z 4

that

C.XIII. that out of the *same* Terms are formed  
 Truth and Falshood (c).

THE Efficacy indeed of this INTEL-  
 LECTUAL POSITION is so great, that thro'  
 it not only the wise *know*, but the un-  
 wise become *informed*. 'Tis by the  
 strength of this alone that all *Teaching* is  
 performed ; all *Learning* acquired ; that  
 the simple and uninstructed are led from  
 Truths *acknowledged* (d) to Truths *un-*  
*known,*

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(c) SIMPLE TERMS are to be found in the several  
 PREDICAMENTS or ARRANGEMENTS here treated,  
 being THE FIRST PART OF LOGIC.


From different *Arrangements* of these *Terms* arise  
 PROPOSITIONS ; and from different *Arrangements* of  
*Propositions* arise SYLLOGISMS.

PROPOSITIONS are the Object of THE SECOND  
 PART OF LOGIC ; SYLLOGISMS, of THE THIRD.

There is no going *farther*, for the most enlarged  
 Speculations are but Syllogisms repeated. Such then,  
 in a *Logical* and *Intellectual* View, is the FORCE and  
 EXTENT of the PREDICAMENT of POSITION or SI-  
 TUATION, here treated.

(d) There is an Order or Arrangement peculiar to  
 Learners ; and of course, *with respect to them, the*  
*Principle*



known, and thus ascend by due degrees to the sublimest parts of Science. C.XIII. 


What then shall we say to that STUPENDOUS POSITION, to that MARVELLOUS ARRANGEMENT, EXISTING WITHIN THE DIVINE MIND; where the *whole* of Being is *ever* present in *perfect* Order; and to which no single Truth is ever latent or unrevealed (e) ?

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*Principle or Beginning of Knowledge is different from what it is, according to the order of Nature. Hence the following observation.—*Ἡ δὲ (Ἀρχὴ) ἔθεν ἂν κάλλιστα ἕκαστον γένοιτο· οἷον καὶ μαθήσεως, ἐκ ἀπὸ τῆ πρώτης καὶ τῆς τῆ πράγματι ἀρχῆς ἐνίοτε ἀρχτέου, ἀλλ' ὅθεν ῥᾶς ἂν μάθοι.—*There is another Species of BEGINNING, and that is the Point, from which any thing may be done after the best manner; for example in the affair of Learning any thing, we are sometimes not to begin from what is first, and which is the Principle or Beginning of the Thing itself, but we are to begin from that Point, whence any one may learn the most easily. Metaph. l. iv. c. i.*

In the *Meno* of *Plato* there is a striking example of an *Arrangement* of Truths, which lead an *uninstructed* Youth to the Knowledge of a fine and important Theorem in Geometry. See the Dialogue of that name in *Plato*, and Mr. *Sydenham's* elegant and accurate Translation, enriched with Diagrams.

(e) See before, p. 110, 161, 204, 5, 6, 266, 272, 287, 8.

C.XIII.  IF we would comprehend the Dignity of POSITION in this it's ARCHETYPAL FORM, let us view it at the same instant with something, it's *perfect contrary*: let us compare it for example to the sick Man's Dream, or to that Chaos of Ideas, which fills the Mind of one delirious. As we can find few *Situations* more *unfortunate*, than these *latter*; so we can conceive no one more respectable, or *divine*, than the *former*.

AND so much for the *Genus* or *Arrangement* of POSITION, which arises from the *Genus* or *Arrangement* of WHERE, as this from the *Genus* or *Arrangement* of RELATION, both *Position* and *Where* being in their nature *Relatives*.

## C H A P. XIV.

*Concerning HABIT, or rather the BEING HABITED—It's Description—it's principal Species deduced and illustrated—it's Privation—Conclusion of the second or middle part of the Treatise.*

THE GENUS OF HABIT, or rather C.XIV.  
 OF BEING HABITED, is of so little importance, when compared to the other *Predicaments*, that perhaps it might be omitted, were it not in deference to *antient authority (a)*.

Tho' it have respect both to *Habits*, which are *worn*, and to *Persons* who *wear* them; yet is it not recognized ei-

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(a) The Authority alluded to is that of the *Pythagoreans* and *Peripatetics*.

ther



C.XIV. ther in the one or the other, but is a  
RELATION, *which arises from the two  
taken together (b).*

Now as every such *Habit*, as well as every such *Wearer*, are both of them *Substances*, the Relation must necessarily be a *Relation, existing between Substances*. It cannot therefore be the *Relation* existing between *Mind* and it's *Habits* (such as *Virtue* or *Science*) nor that between *Body* and it's *Habits* (such as *Agility* or

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(b) *Quod non ita intelligendum est, ac si res ipsæ, quæ sic habentur, sint hujus Prædicamenti (puta Vestitus ipsi, &c.) quæ ad alia Prædicamenta spectant, sed HABITIO harum, seu IPSUM HABERE, τὸ ἔχειν ταῦτα. Wallis. Logic. l. i. c. 14.*—Soon after he explains HABITIO, and informs us it means, *Vestitum esse, Tunicatum esse, Togatum esse, Coronâ cingi, Calceo indui, &c.*

Sanderfon in his *Logic* explains the *Predicament* as follows—*Corpus habens est Substantia; Res habita fere est Forma artificialis de quartâ Specie Qualitatis; APPLICATIO HUIUS AD ILLUD est HABITUS hujus Prædicamenti. Lib. i. c. 14.*

Health),

Health), for these Habits are not Sub- C.XIV.  
stances, but *inherent Attributes* (c). }


AGAIN, it cannot be the *Relation* existing between a *Man* and his *Possessions*; for, tho' these are both of them *Substances*, and tho' a Possessor may be said to *have* an Estate, he cannot be said to have it *upon* him; he does not wear it (d).

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(c) *Simplicius*, when he gives the reason, why *Habit* and the *Body-Habited* cannot co-exist, as *Substance* and it's *Attributes* co-exist, says—συμφυῖ γὰρ ταῦτά ἐστι, καὶ αὐτὸ ἐκεῖνο—*For these Attributes are con-natural* [that is, grow with the Being] *and are the BEING ITSELF.* *Simplic. in Præd. p. 93.*

(d) Διὸ οὐδὲ τὰ κτήματα, ἢ ἀνδράποδα, ἢ φίλους, ἢ πάτερας, ἢ υἱεῖς κατὰ τῆτο τὸ γένος ἔχειν λεγόμεθα, διότι οὐκ ἐν περιθίσει ταῦτά ἐστι, καίτοι κτήματα ὄντα.—*For which reason we are not said, in the sense of this Genus, TO HAVE Possessions, or Slaves, or Friends, or Fathers, or Children; for these none of them are said to exist in their being THROWN ROUND US, or SUPER-INDUCED, altho' they are all [in some sense or other] our Possessions.* *Simplic. ut supra.*

THE

C.XIV.  THE being Habited therefore is in it's *strictest* Sense something *less* than the *first* Relation, that between a Substance, and it's Attributes ; something *more*, than the *second* Relation, that (I mean) between a Possessor, and his Possessions (e).

'Tis to be hoped that these Reasonings on a subject so trite, will be pardoned for their Brevity. They are to shew, not

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(e) — καὶ εἰσὶν μέσον πῶς εἶναι τὸ ἔχειν, τῷ κεκτη-  
σθαι, καὶ τῷ καθ' ἑξιν διακεῖσθαι· ἢ μὲν γὰρ ἔχειν, ὡς  
ἡ λευκότης. χωρίζεται ἀπὸ τῶν ἑξωθεν κτημάτων, ἃ ἔ-  
περικείμεθα· ἢ δὲ σωματικόν ἐστι καὶ ἑξωθεν, χωρίζεται  
ἀπὸ τῶν ἑξῶν, αἱ συμβεβήκασιν ἡμῖν, συμφυεῖς ὄναι,  
καὶ ἔκ ἐπίκτητοι—THE HAVING ANY THING ON ap-  
pears to be a sort of Medium between POSSESSING, and  
the being HABITUALLY DISPOSED. As far as it is  
had, after the same manner as Whiteness is had, [or any  
inherent Attribute,] it is distinguished from Possessions  
WITHOUT, with which we are not said to be enveloped  
or cloathed. As far as it is corporeal, and FROM WITH-  
OUT, it is distinguished from [inherent Attributes or]  
Habits, which belong to us, as things CON-NATURAL,  
and not as things adventitious. *Simplic. ut suprà.*

what



what the Relation *is*, but what it is *not*. C.XIV.

IF it be demanded—*And what then is it?*—the Answer must be, *It is a RELATION existing after a peculiar manner; when an ARTIFICIAL SUBSTANCE is SUPERINDUCED (f) upon a NATURAL ONE, and becomes contiguous to it, tho' it be not united in vital Continuity.*

*Such was THE VERY ARMOUR HE HAD ON,  
When he th' ambitious Norway combated (g).*


THE primary End of being habited seems to have been PROTECTION; and that, either by way of defence against the inclemencies of *Nature*, as in the case of common Apparel; or by way of defence,

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(f) See the preceding Notes in this Chapter, particularly the second.

(g) *Hamlet*, Act i. Sc. i.

against

C.XIV.  against *Insults*, as in the case of Hel-  
mets, Breast-plates, Coats of Mail, &c;

FARTHER than this, as Habits were various both in their materials and shapes; and, as among the number of those who wore them, some were superior to the rest by their *Dignity and Office*: hence it was found expedient, that many of these *superior Ranks* should be marked by THE DISTINCTIONS OF PECULIAR HABITS; so that this established *another End* of being Habited, over and above *Protection*, an *End*, which gave Robes to Peers, Uniforms to Admirals, &c.

FARTHER still, some Regard, when either of the sexes *habited* themselves, was had to DECENCY; some to BEAUTY and ADVENTITIOUS ORNAMENT; of which last we may be more sensible, if we contemplate the elegant draperies of the *Grecian* Statues, or those in the capital

pital Pictures of the great *Italian* Masters, and compare these truly graceful and simple Forms to the tasteless and ever mutable ones of ourselves, and our neighbours (*h*). C.XIV.

As there are many sorts of Habit, which have respect to this last End, I

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(*h*) The same Simplicity, which contributes to the Decoration of our *Persons*, contributes also to the Decoration of *Nature*.

The following Anecdote, communicated to me by the late Lord *Lyttelton*, appears to be worth preserving. When Sir *John Vanbrugh* had finished *Blenheim-house*, the then Duchess of *Marlborough* asked him for the Plan of a Garden. Sir *John* told her, he could give no Plan himself, and he feared she might apply to others, as incapable as he was, naming certain Gardeners of the time, that are now unknown. But, continued he, *if your Grace would have a Garden truly elegant, you must apply for a PLAN to THE BEST PAINTERS OF LANDSCAPE.*

So happily did this ingenious man predict (as it were) a Taste, which, taking it's rise not many years after from *Kent*, has been since completed by *Brown*, and no where with greater beauty and magnificence, than on the very Spot, of which we are now writing, I mean *Blenheim*.

A a

mean



C.XIV. mean to *Beauty* or *adventitious Ornament*; so when a man is found to cultivate this End to an *excess*, it constitutes the character, which we call a *Fop* (i). Nay, even the *Conveniences* of Dress, when *too minutely* studied, degenerate into an effeminacy, which carries with it a reproach. 'Twas hence that *Turnus* upbraided the *Trojans* for wearing a Covering over their hands, and for tying their Caps on with Strings, that is to say in modern language, *for using Gloves and Chinstraps*.

*Et tunicæ manicas, et habent redimicula mitræ (k).*

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(i) *Horace*, in the first satire of his first book, calls the wild and extravagant *Nævius*, by the name of *VAPPA*; which *Baxter* ingeniously explains, *quod insano sumptu stolidas sequeretur delicias. Nos hujusmodi homunciones FOPPS dicimus; an et hoc a VAPPA, quærant alii.*

*VAPPA* meant originally the Juice of the Grape in a state of perfect insipidity, when 'twas neither *Wine*, nor *Vinegar*. *VAPPA propriè dicitur, quod nec vinum, nec acetum est. Vet. Scholiast. in Horat. Satir. l. i. S. 2. v. 13.*

(k) *Æn. ix. 616.*

WE have already mentioned the Use C.XIV. of *Habit* as to *Distinction*. In almost all Countries something of this hath taken place, to distinguish the *Noble* from the *Ignoble*; the *Scholar* from the *Mechanic*; to mark the *Sacerdotal*, the *Military*, the *Juridical*, &c. 'Tis to the *Fallibility*, which sometimes attends this method of distinguishing, that we owe those proverbial Sayings, THE CLOAK *makes not the Philosopher*; THE COWL *makes not the Monk* (1).

'Tis in a Sense *less strict* and precise, that we take the word HABIT, when we say of the Plains, they are *cloathed* with Grass; of the Mountains, they are *cloathed* with Wood; and more remotely still, when we apply the Notion of *Habit* to the MIND——*Having on the*

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(1) *Pallium non facit Philosophum—Cucullus non facit Monachum.*

C.XIV. BREAST-PLATE of *Righteousness*—taking  
 the SHIELD of *Faith* (m), &c.

IN the Language of Poetry there is sometimes much elegance derived from this Arrangement ; as for example, when *the Morn*, at day-break, is said to be clad with *RUSSET MANTLE* ; or when *the Moon*, in diffusing her pallid light, is said to throw o'er the dusk HER SILVER MANTLE (n) ; or when the *Psalmist* says, on a greater subject, *Thou DECKEST thyself with LIGHT, as it were with a GARMENT* (o).

THO' from all these instances we may perceive the force of this *Genus*, yet another still remains, I mean the force of it's *PRIVATION*. *Nakedness* is found to heighten *other* circumstances of *Distress* :

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(m) *Ephesians*, ch. vi. v. 14, 16.

(n) *Hamlet*, Act i. Sc. 1.—*Par. Lost*, iv. 6c8.

(o) *Psalms* civ. v. 2.



NUDUS in ignotâ, Palinure, jacebis a- C.XIV.  
renâ (o). }

THO' the Sense be *metaphorical*, yet  
*Shakespeare* avails himself of the *same*  
*Privation* in the pathetic Speech, which  
he gives to *Wolfey* :

——— O ! Cromwell, Cromwell !  
Had I but serv'd my God with half the  
zeal  
I serv'd my King, he would not in mine age  
Have left me NAKED to my enemies (p).

THE same Privation has it's effect also  
in a way more *Comic*, and contemptuous.  
'Tis thus *Aristophanes* talks about *Phi-*  
*losophers* :

Τὲς ὠχρεῖντας, τὲς ἀνυποδῆτας λέγεις (r).

(p) *Æn.* v. 871.

(q) *Shakesf.* Henry VIII. Act iii. Sc. 6.

(r) Ἀριστοφ. Νεφ. 103.

C.XIV. *You mean those pallid, those BAREFOOTED  
fellows.*

'Tis thus the Author of the *Dunciad*  
describes *Friars*——

——— *Linsey-woolsey brothers,*  
*Grave mummers, SLEEVELESS some, and*  
*SHIRTLESS others (s).*

IN some instances, *such partial Privations of Habit* become an indication of REVERENCE. Thus *Moses*, when on *holy ground*, was ordered to stand *barefooted (t)*; and among *Europeans* 'tis a mark of Respect, to appear *bareheaded*.

AND so much for THE GENUS OR PRE-  
DICAMENT OF HABIT, which we di-  
vide into Species from it's different Ends

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(s) *Dunciad*. iii. 113.

(t) *Exod*. iii. 5.

of PROTECTION, DISTINCTION, DE- C.XIV.  
CENCY, and ORNAMENT, to all of which }  
is alike opposed their Contrary, PRIVA-  
TION. So much also for the TEN UNI-  
VERSAL ARRANGEMENTS, GENERA, or  
PREDICAMENTS, with the discussion of  
which we conclude the *Second*, or *middle*  
*Part* of this Treatise.



## C H A P. XV.

*Concerning the APPENDAGES to the Universal Genera or Arrangements ; that is to say concerning OPPOSITES, PRIOR, SUBSEQUENT, TOGETHER or AT ONCE, and MOTION, usually called Post-Predicaments—the Modes or Species of all these (Motion excepted) deduced, and illustrated—Preparation for the Theory of MOTION.*

C. XV. **H**AVING now gone thro' each of the PREDICAMENTS or PHILOSOPHICAL ARRANGEMENTS, and considered it's Character, and distinguishing Attributes, there remains nothing farther to complete the Theory, but *an Explication of certain Terms*, which have occasionally occurred ; and which, from their subsequent place, and subsequent Contemplation, have been called by the

the Latin Logicians POST-PREDICAMENTS (a), and form the *third*, or *last* } C. XV. Part of this Treatise.

THUS for example, things have been sometimes mentioned in the former part of this Work, as *opposed* to one another; and hence it becomes expedient to consider the Doctrine of OPPOSITES (b).


AT other times things have been treated as being some PRIOR, some SUBSEQUENT, and others existing TOGETHER or AT ONCE (c); and hence it becomes expedient to examine these several Terms, and to investigate the *different* meanings, of which each of them is susceptible.

(a) See before, p. 35, 36.

(b) See before ch. vii. and ch. viii. p. 173. See also *Arist. Præd.*  $\omega\pi\epsilon\iota\tau\omega\upsilon$  ANTIKEIMENΩN, p. 47. *Edit. Syll.*

(c) See before, p. 181, 182, 221. See *Arist. Prædic.*  $\omega\pi\epsilon\iota\tau\tilde{\alpha}$  AMA. p. 54. *Edit. Syll.*

LASTLY,

**C. XV.**  LASTLY, MOTION in it's various Species is so widely *diffused* thro' some of the most important *Genera* already treated, that it cannot be omitted in a speculation, where the professed *End* is to *scrutinize Universals*.

IT appears therefore that there still remain, as Subjects of our Inquiry, OPPOSITES, PRIOR and SUBSEQUENT, COEXISTENT or AT ONCE, and last of all MOTION.


Now in the first place, as to OPPOSITES, the Reader must be reminded, that, having already spoken of them in a former Treatise (*d*), we omit them here, and refer to that.

THE

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(*d*) See *Hermes*, l. ii. c. 2, Note (*i*) p. 250, in which Note are enumerated RELATIVES, τὰ πρὸς τι; CONTRARIES, τὰ ἐναντία; CONTRADICTIONARIES, τὰ κατὰ ἀπόφασιν καὶ κατὰ φασιν. There is one Species omitted,



THE DOCTRINE (*e*) of PRIOR and SUB- C. XV.  
SEQUENT follows: and these perhaps   
may appear to be sufficiently discussed,  
if we enumerate, and explain the fol-  
lowing *Modes*.

THE MOST OBVIOUS MODE of PRI-  
ORITY is the TEMPORAL (*f*), accord-  
ing

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omitted, τὰ καθ' ἑξὺ καὶ σέβησις, *things opposed in the way of HABIT and PRIVATION*; such as *Sight and Blindness*.

*This Privation* differs from that mentioned already in the third Chapter of this Treatise, because the Privation there is the *road to natural Productions*; the Privation here admits no *Progress*, nor any *Return* to the original *Habit*, at least in a *natural* way. See *Ammon.* p. 146, and of this Work, p. 56, 57, &c.

(*e*) See *Arist. Præd.* Περὶ τῷ ΠΡΟΤΕΡΟΝ. p. 53.  
*Edit. Sylb.*

(*f*) This Mode *Aristotle* calls PRIOR κατὰ τὸν χρόνον, ACCORDING TO TIME; the *Priority*, depending on the *Quantity of Time* being larger with respect to the Subject, which is called *older*, or *more antient*—

τῷ

C. XV. ing to which we say, that the *Trojan*  
 Wars were *prior* to the *Punic*, and the  
 Battle of *Marathon* to that of *Blenheim*.

A SECOND MODE of PRIORITY is,  
 when a thing is *prior* to some other, be-  
 cause IT DOES NOT RECIPROCATE IN  
 THE CONSEQUENCE OF EXISTENCE (g).

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τῷ γὰρ τὸν χρόνον πλείω εἶναι, ἢ παλαιότερον ἢ  
 πρεσβύτερον λέγεται. *Præd.* p. 53. *Edit. Sylb.*

*Ammonius*, in commenting this Passage, observes  
 an elegance in the *Greek* tongue, peculiar to itself—  
*Παλαιότερον*, he tells us, is applied *indiscriminately* to  
 Beings *animal* and *inanimate*; *Πρεσβύτερον* is applied  
*only* to the *animal* Genus. *Simplicius* on the same  
 occasion makes the same Observation, in *Præd.* p.  
 106.

The last Author has also the following remark  
 concerning the different Modes of *Temporal* Priority—  
 Τὰ δὲ κατὰ χρόνον πρότερα, ἐπὶ μὲν τῶν γενομένων  
 τὰ πορρώτερον ὄντα τῷ Νῦν· ἐπὶ δὲ τῶν ἐσομένων, τὰ  
 ἐγγύτερον. *Simpl. in Præd.* p. 106. B. Things  
 PRIOR IN TIME among the PAST are those the FAR-  
 THEST from the PRESENT NOW; among the FUTURE,  
 are those the NEAREST to it. *Simpl. in Loc.*

(g) The Words in *Aristotle* are—τὸ μὴ ἀντιστρέφον  
 κατὰ τὴν τῷ εἶναι ἀκολούθησιν. *Prædic.* p. 53. *Edit.*  
*Sylb.*

A FEW examples will illustrate the C. XV.  
 apparent difficulty of this character. }  
 The number *One* according to this doctrine is *prior* to the number *Two*, because if there exist *Two*, 'tis a *necessary consequence* that there should be *One*; but if there exist *One*, it does not *reciprocate*, that there should be *Two*. Thus every *Genus* is *prior* to any one of it's various *Species*, because if there be *such a Species* as Man, or Lion, there is necessarily *such a Genus* as Animal; but if there be *such a Genus* as Animal, there is not necessarily *such a Species* as Man, or Lion.

THIS *Mode of Priority*, which we call PRIORITY ESSENTIAL, will be found of great importance in all *logical Disquisitions*, and may therefore perhaps merit some farther attention.

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He alleges the same Instance from *Numbers*, which is given here.

ACCORD-




**C. XV.** ACCORDING to this, *that thing* of any two or many things is PRIOR, which, *by being taken away, annihilates the rest ; or which, if the rest ARE, must necessarily BE* (h).

For example—If there were *no Theorems* of Science, to guide the *Operations* of Art, there could be no Art; but if there were *no Operations* of Art, there might still be *Theorems of Science*. Therefore is *Science* PRIOR to *Art*. Again, if there were *no such Things* as *Syllogized Truths*, there could be no such *Sciences* as Optics or Astronomy. But, *tho' neither of these*, there might notwithstanding—

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(h) What is here said, is explained in what immediately follows. *Simplicius* says, agreeably to the explanation here given, καλεῖν δὲ ἐνώθασιν οἱ νεώτεροι τὸ τοῦτον Πρότερον, συνεπιφερόμενον μὲν, μὴ συνεπιφέρον δὲ, καὶ συναναιρῶν μὲν, μὴ συναναιρῶμενον δὲ.—The latter Logicians are accustomed to call this *Mode of Priority*, that which is CO-INFER'D, but does NOT CO-INFER ; that which CO-ANNIHILATES, but is not CO-ANNIHILATED. *Simpl. in Præd.* p. 106.

ing

ing be such things, as *Truths Syllogized*. C. XV.  
 Therefore is *Logic* PRIOR to these, and,   
 by parity of reasoning, to every other  
*particular Science*. Again, if there were  
*no such Principles as Self-evident Truths*,  
 there could be no such things as *Truths*  
*Syllogized*. But, tho' no *Truths Syllo-*  
*gized*, there might still be *Truths self-*  
*evident*. Therefore the FIRST PHILOSO-  
 PHY, which treats of these *primary* and  
*original Truths*, being PRIOR to *Logic*, is  
 PRIOR also to the tribe of *Sciences*, as  
 are these to the tribe of *Arts*; so that of  
 course the whole structure of *Logic*, of  
*Sciences*, and of *Arts*, may be said to rest  
 upon this FIRST PHILOSOPHY, as upon  
 that only firm and solid Base, against  
 which the Powers of Ignorance and So-  
 phistry can never totally prevail.

THERE is a THIRD MODE of PRIOR-  
 ITY, seen in ORDER and ARRANGEMENT.  
 Thus in the *demonstrative Sciences*, *De-*  
*fnitions* and *Postulates* are PRIOR to Theo-  
 rems

C. XV. *rem*s and *Problems* ; in Grammar, *Syllables* are PRIOR to *Words*, and *Letters* to *Syllables*. 'Tis thus in a well composed Oration, the *Proëme* is PRIOR to the *State* and *Argument* ; and these last, to the *Peroration* (i).

A FOURTH MODE OF PRIORITY is that of HONOUR and AFFECTION, when we prefer Objects, that we revere or love, to others that less merit, or at least that we esteem less to merit our Regard and Attention (k).

Ἀθανάτους μὲν πρῶτα θεός, νόμῳ ὡς διάκεινται,  
Τίμα·—ἐπειθ' Ἥρωας ἀγαυός·

(i) Τρίτου δὲ κατὰ τινὰ τάξιν τὸ πρότερον λέγεται, καθάπερ ἐπὶ τῶν ἐπισημῶν καὶ τῶν λόγων· εἴτε γὰρ ταῖς ἀποδεικτικαῖς ἐπισήμαις, κ. τ. λ. *Arist. Præd.* p. 53. *Edit. Sylb.* This is not translated, being expressed in the Text.

(k) Ἐτι παρὰ τὰ εἰρημένα τὸ βέλτιον καὶ τιμιώτερον πρότερον τῇ φύσει δοκεῖ· εἰώθασι δὲ οἱ πολλοὶ τῆς ἐντιμοτέρας καὶ μᾶλλον ἀγαπωμένης ὑπ' αὐτῶν, προτιέρας παρ' αὐτοῖς φάσκειν εἶναι—*Arist. Præd. Ibid.*—not translated for the reason before given.

Τὲς



Τῆς τε καταχθονίης σέβει δαίμονας, ἔννομα ῥέζων C. XV.

Τῆς τε γονεῖς τίμα, τῆς τ' ἀγχίς ἐκγεγαῶτας (l),

κ. τ. λ.

*The Gods immortal, as by Law divine*

*They stand arrang'd, FIRST honour: NEXT*  
*revere*

*Th' illustrious Heroes, and terrestrial Race*

*Of Genii, paying each the legal Rites:*

*Honour thy Parents NEXT, and those of*  
*kin*

*The nearest, &c.*

HIEROCLES, in his comment on these verses, commonly called for their excellence the *Golden Verses of Pythagoras*, has largely expatiated on this divine *Precedence and Subordination*.

THUS *Horace*, with respect to that *Priority of Beings*, founded on the Religion of his Country—

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(l) *Pythag. aurea carmina.*

C. XV.

}

*Quid PRIUS dicam solitis Parentis  
Laudibus—— &c.*

*PROXIMOS illi tamen occupavit  
Pallas honores (m).*

He adopts PRIORITY, derived from *the same* principle, when he speaks of the favourite topics, which his Genius led him to cultivate :

*Quid PRIUS illustrem satiris, musâque pedestri (n) ?*

THE *Stagirite*, who records these *various Modes* of PRIORITY, observes on this *fourth* Mode (and apparently with reason) that it was in a manner the most *alien* and *foreign* of them all (o).

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(m) *Horat. Od. l. i. 12.*

(n) *Horat. Sat. l. ii. 6. v. 17.*

(o) His Words are—ἔστι δὲ δὴ καὶ ξέδον ἀλλοτριώ-  
τατ' τῶν τρόπων ἔστι—*Arist. Præd. Ibid. p. 54.*

HE

HE mentions also a FIFTH MODE, C. XV. but he introduces it with a sort of doubt. }  
*It should seem* (p), says he, besides the Modes here mentioned, there was *another Mode of PRIORITY even in things reciprocating*; altho', so far as they *reciprocate*, they may be said to *co-exist*.

THE fact is, if either of them in any sense can be called CAUSE to the *other*, it may for that reason be called PRIOR, if not in *Time*, at least in *Efficacy* and *Power*.

FOR example, the *actual Existence of a Man* reciprocates with the *Proposition*, which affirms him *actually to exist*. For if the Man *actually* exist, then is the Proposition *true*; and *reciprocally*, if the

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(p) Δόξειε δ' ἂν καὶ παρὰ τὰς εἰρημένους ἑτέρας εἶναι τὴν προτέραν τρόπον· τῶν γὰρ ἀντιστρέφόντων ΤΟ ΑΙΤΙΟΝ, κ. τ. λ. *Ibid.* p. 54.



C. XV. Proposition be *true*, then does the Man *actually exist*. And yet, tho' these things in this manner *reciprocate*, is not *the Proposition* Cause to the Man's Existence, but *the Man's Existence* to that of the Proposition ; since according as the Man *either is or is not*, in like manner we call the Proposition either *true* or *false* (q).

THIS last Mode of *Priority* we call CAUSAL PRIORITY, or the BEING PRIOR BY CAUSALITY.

WE must not however quit this Speculation, without observing that *Cause* and *Effect* do not always thus *reciprocate*, but that for the greater part *the Cause* is *naturally* PRIOR. For example : Hunger and Thirst are the *natural Causes* of Eating and Drinking ; and thus, by being their *Causes*, are *naturally prior* to

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(q) The Words of *Aristotle* are—τῷ γὰρ εἶναι τὸ πρᾶγμα ἢ μὴ, ἀληθὲς ὁ λόγος ἢ ψευδὲς λέγεται.—*Ibid.* p. 54. *Edit. Sylb.*

them

them. Crimes too are *the natural Cause*, C. XV.  
 why Punishments are inflicted ; and  
 therefore Crimes, by parity of reason, are  
*prior* to Punishments. The Sentiment,  
 tho' obvious, is well expressed by *Pætus*  
*Thrasea*. *Nam Culpa quàm Pæna TEM-*  
*PORE PRIOR EST ; emendari, quàm pec-*  
*care, posterius est (r).*

NOR are Crimes *only prior* to Punish-  
 ment, but so is *Judicial Process* ; since to  
 punish *first*, and *then* to hear, is what Sir  
*Edward Coke* chuses to call (in a language  
 somewhat strong) *the damnable and damned*  
*Proceedings of the Judge of Hell (s) :*

*Castigatque, auditque dolos—— (t).*

AND thus it appears there are FIVE  
 PRINCIPAL MODES OF PRIORITY ; that

(r) *Tacit. Annal.* xv. 20.

(s) *Coke's Institutes*, vol. ii. p. 54, 55.

(t) *Æneid.* vi. 567.

C. XV. is to say, the TEMPORAL, the ESSENTIAL, that of ORDER, that of PRECEDENCE, and that of CAUSALITY; which five being known, THE MODES OF WHAT IS SUBSEQUENT (it's natural *opposite*) are easily known also (*u*).

WE are now to examine *the Modes of Co-existence*, or *that of being AT ONCE and TOGETHER (x)*; and *these Modes* have evidently great connection with the preceding.

THE most SIMPLE MODE among these, as well as among *the Modes of Priority*, is the TEMPORAL, perceived in things or events, which exist *during the same time (y)*.

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(*u*) — δῆλον δὲ ὅτι ὅσα χῶς τὸ πρῶτον, τοσαύτα χῶς αὐτὸ ὑστερον λέγοιτο. *Simplic. ut supra*, p. 106. B.

(*x*) *Aristot. Præd.* p. 54. *Edit. Sylb.*

(*y*) — ὧν ἡ γένεσις ἐν τῷ αὐτῷ χρόνῳ — *Prædic.* p. 54. *Edit. Sylb.*

UNA



UNA *Eurusque Notusque ruunt*—— (z) C. XV.

—ΟΜΟΥ πόλεμός τε δαμάει καὶ λοιμός Ἀχαιούς (a).

*War and the Plague* AT ONCE *destroy the Greeks.*

*Persons*, in this manner co-existing, are called CONTEMPORARIES: such as *Socrates* and *Alcibiades*; *Virgil* and *Horace*; *Shakespeare* and *Johnson*.

A SECOND MODE OF CO-EXISTENCE is founded in NATURE and ESSENCE, where two things necessarily reciprocate in consequence of their existing, while neither of them at the same time is the *Cause* of existence to the other (b).

'TIS

(z) *Æn.* i. 89.

(a) *Iliad.* A. v. 61.

(b) Thus expressed by *Aristotle*—Φύσει δὲ ΑΜΑ, ὅσα ἀντιτρέφει μὲν κατὰ τὴν τᾷ εἶναι ἀκολούθησιν, μηδ' αὐτῶς δὲ αἰτίου θάτερον θάτερον τᾷ εἶναι. *Præd.* p. 54. *Edit. Sylb.*

B b 4

By

C. XV. 'Tis in this sense that *Double* and *Half* are TOGETHER or AT ONCE, for they *reciprocate*; if there be *Double*, there must be *Half*; and if *Half*, there must be *Double*. They are also *neither* of them *the Cause*, why the other exists. *Double* is no more the Cause of *Half*, than *Half* is of *Double*. This last condition is requisite, because if either of the *Two* were *essentially* and truly a Cause to the other, it would pass, by virtue of it's *Causality*, from Co-existence to *Priority* (c).


THERE IS A THIRD MODE OF CO-EXISTENCE, seen in *different* Species of the *same* Genus, when, upon dividing

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By referring to the Chapter on *Relatives*, it is easy to perceive, whence this Speculation arises; for in that Chapter the same Example is alleged as here, by way of illustration of the same Doctrine. See before, p. 221.

(c) See before, p. 371, 2.

the

the Genus, we view them *arranged together, contra-distinguished* one to another (d). C. XV. 

'Tis thus the Genus, Triangle, being divided into equilateral, equicrural, and scalene, *no one of these Species* appears to be by nature *prior*, but all of them TO EXIST AT ONCE in a state of *Contradistinction*. The same may be said of the *three animal Species*, the aerial, aquatic, and terrestrial, when we divide, after the same manner, *the Genus Animal* (e).

AND thus are the *Modes* of CO-EXISTENCE OR TOGETHER either the TEM-

(d) Thus expressed by *Aristotle*—καὶ τὰ ἐκ τῶν αὐτῶν γένους ἀντιδιηρημένα ἀλλήλοις ἅμα τῇ φύσει λέγεται—*Ibid.* 55.


(e) —ἀντιδιηρῆσθαι δὲ λέγεται ἀλλήλοις τὰ κατὰ τὴν αὐτὴν διαίρεσιν· οἷον τὸ πτηνὸν τῷ πεζῷ καὶ τῷ ἐνύδρῳ—*Ibid.* 55.

PORAL,



C. XV. PORAL, the ESSENTIAL, or the SPECIFIC.

AND here, should any one object to these Distinctions, as either too *trivial* or too *scholastic* for the purposes of a *polite* writer; we answer, that we no more wish an author to mention them, when not professedly his subject, than we would have him dissert, without a cause, upon nouns, pronouns, and the principles of Grammar. All we hope from these elementary Doctrines, is to see them in their *Effects*; to see them in the accuracy of the composition, both as to reasoning and language. 'Tis thus a grazier, when he turns his oxen into some rich and fertile pasture, never wishes to inspect what food they have devoured, but to see a fair and ample Bulk, the effect of food well digested. Besides, when *Sophists* assail us, and either exhibit *one thing for another*, or *two things for one and the same*; to what surer weapon

pon can we recur for defence, than to C. XV.  
that of *precise* and *well-established Distinc-*  
*tion (f) ?* 

THERE remains to be treated the Theo-  
ry of MOTION ; in which, without at-  
tempting to impeach or contradict any  
modern Speculations, we shall inquire,  
what was the opinion of the Ancients  
concerning it ; in what manner they at-  
tempted to catch it's *fugitive* nature ; and  
how they divided it by it's *Effects* into  
it's *subordinate Species*.

---

(*f*) *Learning* and *Science*, or rather learned and  
scientific *Terms*, when introduced *out of Season*, be-  
come what we call PEDANTRY. The *Subject* may  
have merit, the *Terms* be precise, and yet, notwith-  
standing, the *Speaker* be a PEDANT, if he talk *with-*  
*out regard either to Place, or Time*.

The following story may perhaps illustrate this Af-  
fertation. “ A learned Doctor at *Paris* was once pur-  
“ chasing a pair of stockings, but unfortunately could  
“ find none, that were either strong enough, or thick  
“ enough. Give me, says he to the Hosiery, *stockings*  
“ of Matter CONTINUOUS, not of Matter DISCRETE.”  
*Menagiana*, tome ii. p. 64.

BUT

C. XV. BUT this is a Theory demanding a *separate* Chapter, where those, who question the doctrines, may perhaps amuse their curiosity, while they peruse an attempt to exhibit the sentiments of Antiquity upon so singular a subject ; a subject, in it's *existence* so obvious, in it's *real character* so abstruse.



## C H A P. XVI.

*Concerning MOTION PHYSICAL—It's various Species deduced and illustrated—blend themselves with each other, and why—Contrariety, Opposition, Rest—Motion Physical—an Object of all the Senses—Common Objects of Sensation, how many—Motion, a thing not simple, but complicated with many other Things—it's Definition or Description taken from the Peripatetics—the Accounts given of it by Pythagoras and Plato analogous to that of Aristotle, and why.*

**A**LL MOTION is either PHYSICAL, or C. XVI.  
 NOT PHYSICAL. As by MOTION  
 PHYSICAL I mean that, which is obvious  
 to the Senses, so by MOTION NOT PHYSICAL, I mean that, which, by being  
 the object of no sense, (as for example  
 the

C.XVI. the Succession of our Thoughts and Volitions) is the Subject of *after* contemplation, and knowable *not to the Sensitive*, but to the *rational* Faculty.

THIS therefore will be the Plan of our following Inquiry.

IN the present Chapter we shall consider MOTION MERELY PHYSICAL, both in it's several *distinct* Species, and in it's *general* or *common* Character.

IN the next Chapter we shall inquire whether there be OTHER MOTION BESIDES; and if such may be found, we shall then examine, how far it is *distinguished* from the *Physical*, and how far it is *connected*.

FIRST therefore for the first (a).

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(a) In the Order of *Nature* the *Genus* precedes it's several *Species*; but in the order of *Human* Perception the several *Species* precede their *Genus*, which last is the order adopted here. See *Hermes*, p. 9.

As

As the most obvious of all *Motions* is C.XVI.  
the *Motion of Body*, so the most obvious  
*Motion of Body* is that, by which it  
*changes from Place to Place (b)*, itself  
remaining, or at least supposed to re-  
main, both in one Place and the other,  
precisely *the same*. 'Tis thus a Bowl  
moves over a Plane; a Bird thro' the Air;  
a Planet round the Sun. This Motion  
is properly MOTION LOCAL; or, if we  
chuse a single Name, we may call it  
PASSAGE or TRANSITION. It's peculiar  
character, as opposed to any other Mo-  
tion, is *to affect no Attribute of Body*, but  
merely *that of Local Site*.

*Cœruleo per summa levis volat æquora curru.*  
*Subsidunt undæ, tumidumque sub axe to-*  
*nanti*

---

(b) Called therefore in Greek ἡ κατὰ τόπον μετα-  
βολή, and sometimes by a single word, Φορά. See  
Arist. Prædic. p. 55. Edit. Sylb. and Ammon. in Loc.  
p. 171. B.



C.XVI. *Sternitur æquor aquis; fugiunt vasto  
 æthere nimbi* (c).

Here the Chariot flies, the Waves subside, the Clouds disperse, all is in LOCAL MOTION.

THERE are *other Motions*, which affect the more *inherent* Attributes. Thus when a lump of Clay is moulded from a Cube into a Sphere, there is *Motion more than local*; for there is the acquisition of *a new Figure*. The same happens, when a man from hot becomes cold, from ruddy becomes pale. MOTION OF THIS SPECIES has respect to the Genus of *Quality*, and (if I may be permitted to coin a word) may be called ALIATION (d).


*If thou be'st He! but O! how fal'n, how  
 CHANG'D  
 From Him, who in the happy realms of light,*

---

(c) *Æn.* v. 819.

(d) Ἀλλοίωσις, in barbarous Latin, *Alteratio*. *Vid. Arist. ut supra.*

*Cloath'd*

*Cloath'd with transcendent brightness, didst* C.XVI.  
*outshine* 

*Myriads, tho' bright—— (e).*

Here we behold *Qualities that are changed*,  
 a Scene of ALIATION.

ANOTHER SPECIES OF MOTION is seen  
 in *Addition* and *Detraction*; as when we  
 either add, or take away a Gnomon from  
 a Square. Here is no *Aliation*, or  
 Change of *Quality*, (for the Figure, as a  
 Square, remains the same in either case)  
 but the Effect of *such Motion* is a *Change*  
*only in the Quantity*, as the Square be-  
 comes either *smaller* or *larger*. When  
*Quantity is enlarged*, we call the *Motion*  
 AUGMENTATION; when 'tis *lessened*, we  
 call it DIMINUTION (*f*).

*Behold a wonder: They, but now who seem'd*  
*In BIGNESS to surpass Earth's Giant Sons,*

---

(e) *Par. Lost*, i. 84. See p. 174.

(f) *Augmentation*, Αύξσις — *Diminution*, Μείωσις.  
*Vid. Arist. ut sup.*

C.XVI. *Now LESS than smallest Dwarfs, in narrow room*

*Throng numberless—— (g)*

Here we behold DIMINUTION.

PARVA metu primo ; mox sese ATTOLLIT  
IN AURAS,

*Ingrediturque solo, et caput inter nubila  
condit (h).*

Here we behold AUGMENTATION.

ALL these *Motions* have this in common, that they are *Changes or Roads* from one *Attribute* to another (i), while the *Substance* remains the same, both in *Essence* and in *Name*. Thus the Planet *Jupiter*, which was a year ago in such

(g) *Par. Lost*, i. 777.

(h) *Æn.* iv. 176. See chap. ix. where the Species of *Quantity* are enumerated.

(i) Οὐ κατηγορίαι εἰσὶν, ἀλλ' ὁδὸς εἰς τὰς κατηγορίας—*They* (that is, these several Species of Motion) are not *Predicaments*, but a ROAD to the *Predicaments*. *Ammon. in Præd.* 171.



a part of the heavens, and is at present C.XVI.  
 in another, tho' his *Attributes of Place*  
 are changed, is yet both in *Essence* and  
 in *Name* still the same Planet. By pa-  
 rity of Reason, 'tis the same individual  
 Man, who, by change in *Quantity*, from  
 fleshy becomes emaciated (k).

BUT

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(k) Speaking of these Species of Motion, *Ammonius* says—κινεῖσθαι ἢ κατὰ Ποσὸν, ἢ κατὰ Ποιόν, ἢ κατὰ Τόπον, φυλάττοντα τὸ ἐξ ἀρχῆς ὑπάρχον Εἶδος—*That things are moved and changed either in QUANTITY, or in QUALITY, or in PLACE, still preserving [during these Motions] their ORIGINAL ESSENTIAL FORM.* *Ammon. in Præd. p. 172.*

Here we find the Phrase Εἶδος ὑπάρχον, commonly called *Substantial Form*, but which we chuse (as thinking it more accurate) to translate *Essential*. To explain—Let us for example call *Sphericity* (if we may employ such a word) the *Essential Form* to a Bowl. Every one will admit that the Bowl may undergo many Changes; may become White from Black, Hot from Cold; and (by a more easy Change than these) it may roll from one Place to another; and yet notwithstanding it may still continue to be a Bowl. But when it's *Sphericity*, that is to say it's Εἶδος ὑπάρχον, it's *essential Form* departs, when (supposing it's *Matter* to be Clay) it is moulded from

CXVI. BUT there are *other Motions*, which in their *Effects* go farther. Thus when the *Substance* of a Man becomes not only pallid and emaciated, but it's *living Principle* is detached from that which it enlivens, Putrefaction and Dissolution of the Body ensue, and 'tis no longer a Change *within the Substance*, but the *very Substance is lost* both in *Essence* and in *Name* (1). SUCH MOTION is called CORRUPTION, DISSOLUTION, or DYING. On the contrary, when the Seed of any Species, whether Animal or Vegetable, by Evolution, Accretion, or other latent Process of Nature, produces a certain *Being, which had no existence before*; 'tis a Change, like the former, that goes not merely to *Attributes*, but by a more efficacious Operation to the very *Substance*

---

a *Sphere* into a *Cube*, from that instant the *Bowl* is no more, it has no longer an existence either in *Essence*, or in *Name*. See before, p. 90.

(1) See the Note immediately preceding.

itself.

itself. SUCH MOTION is called GENE- C.XVI.  
RATION OF BIRTH. }

THE following difference subsists between these two latter Species and the former; the *former* are no more than *Roads to different Modes of Being*; the *latter* lead to *Being itself*, and to its opposite *Non-being* (m).

HOWEVER separate and distinct these Species of *Motion* may be found, yet *being all of the same Genus*, they naturally *blend themselves together*.

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(m) Hence GENERATION is called—'ὁδὸς ἀπὸ τῆς μὴ ὄντος εἰς τὸ ὄν, ταύτην ἀπὸ τῆς δυνάμει ὄντος εἰς τὸ ἐνεργείᾳ ὄν—THE ROAD from NON-BEING to BEING; that is, from BEING IN POWER to BEING IN ACT—CORRUPTION or DISSOLUTION, on the contrary, is called 'ὁδὸς ἀπὸ τῆς ὄντος εἰς τὸ μὴ ὄν—THE ROAD from BEING to NON-BEING. *Animon. in Præd. p. 172.*

The Particle Πῶς, prefixed in the Quotations to μὴ ὄντος, and τὸ ὄν, is to distinguish the *Non-being* and *Being* here mentioned from Being and Non-being *absolute*. Πῶς means *in a manner, as it were, after a sort*. See below, 397, 398.



C.XVI.    Thus tho' *Local Motion* may possibly exist *without the rest*, yet 'tis impossible for the *rest* to exist without *Local Motion*. *Generation* is the *Assemblage* of parts; *Corruption*, the *Separation*; so that here *Local Motion* is evident in either case. 'Tis the same in *Aliation*; the same in *Augmentation* and *Diminution*. When Fear renders a person pale, such *Change* could not be, did not his Blood retreat *locally* from the surface *to within*: and as for *Augmentation* and it's *Opposite*, they are no more than the bringing *to*, and the carrying *off*; both which in their very Idea imply *Local Motion*.


THE other Species of *Motion* are *incidentally* blended also. He that *increases* in bulk, commonly increases with *rudeness*; and he that *lessens* in bulk, commonly lessens with *Paleness*. There are both in the *Qualities* and the *Quantities* of the particles to be assembled, many  
Changes

Changes necessarily previous to *Gene-* C.XVI.  
*ration* or *Birth*; and many others, as  
 necessarily previous to *Corruption* or  
*Death* (n).

AND thus have we established SIX SPECIES OF MOTION, which we denominate PHYSICAL, because they respect *Physical Subjects*. They are to be found in four of the UNIVERSAL GENERA, or ARRANGEMENTS; one in the Genus, *Where*, TRANSITION; one in *Quality*, ALIATION; two in *Quantity*, AUGMENTATION and DIMINUTION; two in *Substance*, GENERATION and CORRUPTION.

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(n) See *Aristot. Phys.* l. viii. c. 8.—where he shews at large that *Local Motion* is necessarily the *primary Motion*, as *running thro' the rest*, and essential to them all; and where he likewise explains in what manner the *other Species of Motion* necessarily *blend themselves* with each other. The Chapter is too long to be here transcribed. In his *Tract de Anima*, l. i. c. 3. having spoken of the several Species of Motion, he adds, that MOTION infers PLACE—πᾶσαι γὰρ αἱ λεχθεῖσαι κινήσεις ἐν τόπῳ—For that ALL THE MOTIONS here enumerated are in PLACE.

C.XVI.  IN all these *Motions* there is OPPOSITION OF CONTRARIETY (o). Where two Species are coupled in one Genus, the two Species themselves are, in such case, *Contraries*; as *Generation* and *Corruption*, *Augmentation* and *Diminution*. Where the Species stands *single*, as *Local Motion*, or *Aliation*, the Contrarieties are more *numerous*, and therefore perhaps not mentioned. In *Local Motion* we behold Backward and Forward, Rectilinear and Curvilinear, Centripetal and Centrifugal, &c. In *Aliation*, or *Change of Quality*, we behold Blackening and Whitening; Straightening and Bending; Strengthening and Weakening; with many others, to which names are wanting. Lastly, all MOTION whatever is contrary to REST (p).


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(o) See the Chapter preceding, p. 361.

(p) Ἐστὶ δὲ ἀπλῶς τῇ μὲν κινήσει ἡρεμία ἐνάντιον—  
*In strictness the CONTRARY to MOTION is REST.*  
*Arist. Prædic. c. xi. p. 56. Edit. Sylb.*

AND



AND now perhaps it may not be a- C.XVI.  
 miss to inquire, WHAT PHYSICAL MO-   
 TION IS. Some Philosophers have found  
 a short method here, by telling us, 'tis a  
*simple Idea*, and therefore *cannot be de-*  
*finied*. Others, with more reason, have  
 called it *hard* to be defined (*q*), a circum-  
 stance not unusual with other Subjects  
*equally obvious*, there being nothing more  
 different both in accuracy and truth,  
 than that Apprehension, which is ade-  
 quate to the purposes of the Vulgar,  
 and that, which ought to satisfy the in-  
 vestigation of a Philosopher.

IN the first place, if we consider MO-  
 TION as an Object of *Sensation*, we shall

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The other Modes of *Contrariety* are explained in  
 the subsequent part of the Chapter here quoted,  
 which in some Editions is the fourteenth.

(*q*) — χαλεπὸν λαβεῖν αὐτὴν (*scil.* κίνησιν) τί ἐστίν·  
 'Tis hard to comprehend what it is—So says the *Stagi-*  
*rite*, and gives his Reasons, which we postpone for  
 the present, that we may not anticipate. *Phys.* l. iii.  
 c. 2. p. 45. *Edit. Sylb.*

discover

C.XVI. discover it to be the Object not of *one* Sense, but of *all*. In a ring of Bells we *hear* it; in a succession of Savours we *taste* it; of Odours, we *smell* it; and that we *feel* or *see* it, there needs no example. Thus is it distinguished from those Objects, that are *peculiar to one Sense alone*; as from Colours, which we *only see*, or from Sounds, which we *only hear*. *Simple* therefore as it is, it is not only an Object of Sensation, but stands *distinguished*, as a COMMON OBJECT, from other objects that are PECULIAR.

AND are there then (it may be demanded) no *other* Objects of the *same* Character?—'Tis answered, there are; as Bulk and Figure, *common* Objects to the Sight and Feeling; Rest and Number, *common* Objects, like Motion, to *every* Sense (*r*).

---

(*r*) Κοινὰ δὲ, κίνησις, ἡρεμία, ἀριθμὸς, σχῆμα, μέγεθος· τὰ γὰρ τοιαῦτα ὁδεμιάς ἐστὶν ἴδια (scil. αἰσθήσεως). The common Objects of Sensation are MOTION,

AND how (it is asked again) is *Motion* distinguished from these?—We reply, from Rest, by *Contrariety*; from Number, by *Continuity*; from Bulk and Figure, as the Parts of Motion are *never permanent, never co-exist*. What Speculations does this Idea, *Simple* as it is called, open, even while we consider it no farther than as an Object of *Sensation*? C.XVI.  
}

BUT we must not stop *here*, even while we consider it as *Physical*. As such we shall find it connected with a *Body*, which moves; and as such, necessarily performed *thro' Space*, and *in Time*; so that *these also*, and their *Attributes* of *Infinite* and *Continuous*, must be added

---

TION, REST, NUMBER, FIGURE, BULK; for these are peculiar to no one Sense. *Arist. de Animâ*, l. ii. c. 6. p. 34. These common Objects are well worthy of Attention in explaining the Doctrine of the Senses and Sensation.

to



C.XVI. to it's Theory, as so many necessary Speculations.

WE cannot therefore but observe, that if it be a *simple* Idea, 'tis strangely *complicated* with a multitude of others (s);

(s) See the Beginning of the third Book of *Aristotle's Physics*, ch. i. where being about to treat of *Motion*, he shews with what other Subjects it is necessarily connected, such as CONTINUOUS, INFINITE, PLACE, TIME, &c. and where accordingly, after he has given us the Opinions of his Predecessors in Philosophy concerning these Subjects, he proceeds in due order to explain what he thinks himself. —His words are, as they here follow. Δοκεῖ δ' ἡ κίνησις εἶναι τῶν Συνεχῶν· τὸ δ' Ἄπειρον ἐμφαίνεται εὐθὺς ἐν τῷ Συνεχεῖ· διὸ καὶ τοῖς ἐριζομένοις τὸ Συνεχὲς, συμβαίνει προσχρῆσθαι πολλάκις τῷ λόγῳ τῷ τῷ Ἄπειρῳ, ὡς εἰς Ἄπειρον διαιρετὸν τὸ Συνεχὲς εἶναι. Πρὸς δὲ τέτοις ἢνευ Τόπου, καὶ Κενῆ, καὶ Χρόνου ἀδύνατον κίνησιν εἶναι. MOTION appears to be in the number of things CONTINUOUS: now INFINITE immediately shews itself in that which is CONTINUOUS; for which reason, when they define CONTINUOUS, they have often occasion to employ withal the character of Infinite, in as much as CONTINUITY is that, which is DIVISIBLE TO INFINITE. Add to this, without PLACE, and VACUUM, and TIME, 'tis impossible that MOTION should have existence. *Physic.* l. iii. c. i.

such

such as *Space, Time, Infinitude, Continuity*, together with *Body*, and its *visible Attributes* both of *Quantity* and of *Quality*. But to proceed in our Speculation. CXVI.

THAT there are things existing *in act*, *in reality*, *in actuality* (call it as you please) we have the evidence both of our Senses, and of our internal Consciousness ; so that this is a matter of fact, which we take for granted. That there also are things which *actually* and *really* are *not*, is equally evident as the former, and requires no proving. A Sphinx for example *actually* is *not* ; a Centaur *actually* is *not* ; for these we may call Phantoms in the language of *Lucretius*,

*Quæ neque sunt usquam, neque possunt esse  
perfectò.*

Lastly, every *Substance* that *actually* is, by *actually* being *that* thing, *actually* is  
*not*

C.XVI. *not any other (t).* A piece of Brass for example actually *is not* an Oak ; an Acorn, *not* a Vine ; a Grape-stone, *not* a Statue.

THERE is a difference however here ; I mean a difference in the last mode of *actually not being* ; for tho' the Brass is no more a Statue, than it is an Oak, yet has it a *Capacity* to become the one, and *none* to become the other. The same may be said of the Acorn, with respect to the Oak ; of the Grape-stone, with respect to the Vine. Were it not for *this definite nature of Capacity*, which as much distinguishes the *invisible Powers*,

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(t) This LAST SPECIES of NON-ENTITY should be carefully attended to, as *the Doctrine of Motion wholly depends upon it*, and as it is so *essentially* distinguished both from the PHANTASTIC Non-entities (the Sphinx, the Centaur, &c.) immediately preceding, and from that *strongest* of all Non-entities, the Non-entity of IMPOSSIBILITY, such as that *the Diameter of the Square should be commensurable with it's Sides*, or that *the same Number should be both Even and Odd*. See before, p. 389.



as *Actuality* distinguishes the *visible At-* C.XVI.  
tributes, there would be no reason why  
an Acorn should not produce a Statue,  
as well as it produces an Oak; or why  
*any thing* (to speak more generally)  
*should not be able to produce any thing (u).*

WHAT then, if there were *no Capacity* existing in the Universe?—Could there be *Generations, Corruptions, Growths, Diminutions, Aliations, or Change of Place*?—Impossible.—But if these are all the Species of *Physical Motion*, it follows, that WITHOUT CAPACITY there can be *no such Motions*.

AND is MOTION then for this reason *pure CAPACITY*, and that *only*?—Let us examine.—A Man, being in *Salisbury*,

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(u) This Distinction of τὸ Ἐντελεχέϊα and τὸ Δυνάμει, of *that which is in ACTUALITY*, and *that which is in POWER*, is the Basis of all the *Peripatetic* Reasoning upon this Subject. See p. 277, &c. also p. 148, 149.

C.XVI. has a *Capacity* of travelling to *London*.  
 ~~~~~ Is he therefore, for merely *possessing* such *Capacity*, upon the road thither?—He is not.—*Motion* therefore, *tho'* *Capacity*, is not *Capacity alone*: there must be some degree of ACTUALITY, or else MOTION can never exist. Shall we then call it *pure ACTUALITY*?—*We cannot assert that*, when we have made *Capacity* one of it's requisites. Besides, how should *Motion* be seen in *pure Actuality*; an *Actuality*, which *never exists*, till *Motion* is *at an end*? A Man surely can no more be called *moving towards London*, who is *actually* arrived there, than he who, possessing the *Capacity* of going thither, *forbears* to exert any of his *motive powers*.

IF *Motion* therefore be neither *Capacity alone*, nor *Actuality alone*, and yet *both* (as it appears) are *essential* to it; 'tis IN BOTH we must look after it,

PULSE ; that 'tis *so* the Animal *impels* itself, because 'tis *so* that it *perceives* ; it does not *so* *perceive*, because it is *so* *impelled* (i). Chap.
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THE Impulse hitherto spoken of is of *earliest* date, commencing in a manner with the Animal itself ; and, as it merely respects the Body and bodily Pleasure, is distinguished from other Impulses by the name of APPETITE (k).

As Animals advance, the Scene of Perception enlarges, and the number of Spontaneous Impulses increase of course with it. Yet while *Pleasure corporeal* continues the *sole* Object, and there appears no Danger either in *acquiring* or *pre-*

prehension. He seems (like the rest) to have justly distinguished between INNATE INSTINCTS, and INNATE PROPOSITIONS.

(i) — ὁρεγόμεθα ὅτι δοκεῖ, μᾶλλον ἢ δοκεῖ, διότι ὁρεγόμεθα. *Arist. Metaph. A. ζ. p. 203. Edit. Sylb.*

(k) ΕΠΙΘΥΜΙΑ.

E c

as

Chap. *serving it*, the Impulse is still an *Ap-*
 XVII. *petite*, varying only in it's name, as the
 { Pleasure, to which it is referred, varies
 in the Species.

YET, besides these *Preconceptions*, the Sources of simple *Appetite*, there are also *Preconceptions* of *offering Violence*, and others of *resisting Danger*, and these naturally call forth *another* Power, I mean the Power of ANGER (1). Few Animals, when young, feel any such *Preconceptions*; but the more ferocious and savage are sure to find them at maturity; and the *irascible* Impulses soon *spontaneously* attend, prompting the Lion to employ his Fangs; the Vultur his Talons; the Boar his Tusk; and every other Animal of prey his proper and natural Preparations.

ALL these *Spontaneous Impulses*, as well of *Anger* as of *Appetite*, are equally in-

(1) ΘΥΜΟΣ.

cluded under the common name of *Irrational* (*m*), being called by this name, because they have nothing to do with *Reason*.

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BUT when REASON becomes strong enough to view it's proper Objects ; that Sight, to which no Being here but *Man alone* is equal ; when the Moral and the Intelligible rise before his *mental* Eye, and he beholds the fair Forms of *Good* and of *Truth* ; then too arise *Impulses* of a far *more noble* kind, those to Friendship, to Society, to Virtue, and to Science (*n*).

AND

(*m*) ΑΛΟΓΟΣ, as well as ΛΟΓΙΚΟΣ and ΛΟΓΟΣ, are Terms too well known, to need more than to be mentioned.

(*n*) This Progression from the lower to the superior Faculties is well described by *Cicero*.

Prima est enim conciliatio hominis ad ea, quæ sunt secundum naturam : simul autem cepit intelligentiam, vel notionem potius (quam adpellant ἔννοια illi) viditque rerum agendarum ordinem, et, ut ita dicam, concordiam ;

E e 2

multo

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AND thus is Man not only a Micro-
cosm in the Structure of his Body, but
in

*multo eam pluris aestimavit, quàm omnia illa, quæ pri-
mum dilexerat: atque ita cogitatione et ratione conlegit,
ut statueret in eo conlocatum summum illud hominis PER
SE LAUDANDUM ET EXPETENDUM BONUM. Cic.
de Fin. iii. 6.*

*Unicuique ætati sua constitutio est: alia infanti, alia
puero, alia seni: omnes enim constitutioni conciliantur, in
quâ sunt. Infans sine dentibus est: huic constitutioni sua
conciliatur. Enati sunt dentes: huic, &c. Sen. Epist.
cxxi. The whole Epistle is worth perusal, in parti-
cular what follows—Ergò infans ei constitutioni sua
conciliatur, quæ TUNC infanti est, non quæ futura ju-
veni est. Neque enim, SI ALIQUID ILLI MAJUS IN
QUO TRANSEAT, restat; non HOC quoque, in quo naj-
citur, SECUNDUM NATURAM EST.*

See also his elegant Application of this Doctrine to
the different Stages of that well-known Vegetable,
Corn, from it's first appearance above the ground, to
it's State of maturity. *Nam et illa herba, quæ in
Segetem, &c. Epist. p. 603. Edit. Varior.*

See also how elegantly Cicero applies the same Doc-
trine to the Vine, where to the vegetative Powers he
first supposes Sense superadded; and then to Sense,
Reason; each Superaddition still increasing in value,
tho' not robbing the former Powers of their due re-
gard and attention—*Et nunc quidem, quod eam tuctur,*
ut

in the System too of his Impulses, including all of them within him from the basest

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ut de Viti potissimum loquar, est id, &c. De Fin.
v. 14.

See Vol. the First, Dialogue concerning Happiness, part the second, and the Notes, p. 302, &c.

The Number and Subordination of the *animating* Powers are well distinguished in the following Extracts.

Τῶν δὲ δυνάμεων τῆς ψυχῆς αἱ λεχθεῖσαι τοῖς μὲν ἐνυπάρχουσι πᾶσαι (καθάπερ εἵπομεν) τοῖς δὲ τινὲς αὐτῶν, ἐνίοις δὲ μία μόνη· δυνάμεις δὲ εἵπομεν θρεπτικόν, αἰσθητικόν, ὀρεκτικόν, κινητικόν κατὰ τόπον, διανοητικόν· ὑπάρχει δὲ τοῖς μὲν φυτοῖς τὸ θρεπτικόν μόνον, ἑτέροις δὲ τὸ αὐτό τε καὶ τὸ αἰσθητικόν· εἰ δὲ τὸ αἰσθητικόν, καὶ τὸ ὀρεκτικόν· ὀρεξίς μὲν γὰρ ἐπιθυμία, καὶ θυμὸς καὶ βέλησις· τὰ δὲ ζῶα πάντα μίαν ἔχει τῶν αἰσθήσεων, τὴν ἀφῆν· ὥς δὲ αἴσθησις ὑπάρχει, τότε ἡδονή τε καὶ λύπη, καὶ ἡ ἐπιθυμία, τὰ γὰρ ἡδὲ ὀρεξίς ἐστὶν αὕτη—*With regard to the Powers of the Soul that have been enumerated, to some Beings they appertain ALL of them; to others, only SOME of them; and to others, only ONE of them. The Powers we have mentioned, are the Nutritive, the Sensitive, the Power of Desire, of local Motion, of Ratiocination. Now to Plants there appertains only the Nutritive Power; to other Beings both this, and the Sensitive: but if the Sensitive, then the Power of Desire; for Appetite, and Resentment, and*

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bafest to the most sublime (o). He includes them all, as being possessed of *all* Per-

Volition (the three great leading Powers) are each of them a Species of Desire, and all Animals have at least one of the Senses, I mean the Sense of Touch. Now to the Being, which possesses Sensation, to this appertain also Pleasure and Pain, and that which is Pleasurable and Painful. But if these, then Appetite; for Appetite is the Desire of that, which is Pleasurable. *Arist. de Anim.* l. ii. c. 3.

And soon after—*Ἄνευ μὲν γὰρ τῆ θρεπτικῆς τὸ αἰσθητικὸν ἔκ ἐστι· τῆ δὲ αἰσθητικῆς χωρίζεται τὸ θρεπτικὸν ἐν τοῖς φυτοῖς. Πάλιν δὲ, ἄνευ μὲν τῆ ἀπλικῆς τῶν ἄλλων αἰσθήσεων ἑδεμία ὑπάρχει, ἀφῆ δὲ ἄνευ τῶν ἄλλων ὑπάρχει· πολλὰ γὰρ τῶν ζώων ἔτε ὄψιν ἔτε ἀκοὴν ἔχουσιν, ἔτε ὁσμῆς ὅλως αἰσθησιν· καὶ τῶν αἰσθητικῶν τὰ μὲν ἔχει τὸ κατὰ τύπον κινητικόν, τὰ δ' ἔκ ἔχει· τελευταῖον δὲ καὶ τὸ ἐλάχισον, λογισμὸν καὶ διάνοιαν· οἷς μὲν γὰρ ὑπάρχει λογισμὸς τῶν φθαρτῶν, τέτοις καὶ τὰ λοιπὰ πάντα· οἷς δὲ ἐκείνων ἕκαστον, καὶ πᾶσι λογισμὸς, —ἀλλὰ τοῖς μὲν ἔδὲ φαντασία, τὰ δὲ ταύτη μόνον ζῶσι—*Without the Nutritive Power there is no Sensitive; but then the Nutritive is separated from the Sensitive in Plants. Again, without Touch there can be none of the other Sensations, but there may be Touch without any of the rest; for thus are there many Animals, which have neither Sight, nor Hearing, nor even a Sensation of Smells. Farther still, of the Sensitive Beings some possess the Loco-motive Power, and others possess it not: the last

Order

Perception ; and *Perception* we have now
found to be the Cause of all *Spontaneous*
Impulse.

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WE

Order of Beings, and those the fewest in number, are those, which possess the Powers of REASONING and DISCUSSION : and among the mortal and perishable Beings those, who possess these Powers, possess ALL the remaining Species ; but those, who possess any one of these Powers in particular, do not all of them therefore possess the Reasoning Power, but some of them want even the Power of Phantasy or Imagination ; others of them conduct themselves and live by that [inferior Power] alone. Arist. de Anim. l. ii. c. 3. p. 28. Edit. Sylb. See before, p. 106, Note (g).

It must be here observed, that PLANTS are said TO LIVE ($\zeta\eta\upsilon$) tho' not to be ANIMALS ($\zeta\omega\alpha$) ; the Character of ANIMAL being derived from the Power of SENSATION, of which Plants are supposed destitute ; while that of LIFE appertains to them, because they GROW, and PRODUCE each of them SEED after their kind.

These different Powers, as they stand united in one subject, may be better comprehended, by marking their clear and distinct character, when they exist apart, in different Subjects.

(o) The preceding Speculations have respect to the *threefold Division* of the SOUL, adopted by the *Pythagoreans* and *Platonics*, by which they made it to be *Rational, Irascible, and Concupiscible*, and called it's

E e 4

three

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WE must remember however that 'tis not Perception *simply*, which causes such *Impulse*; but 'tis Perception of Want *within*, and of adequate Good *without*; and that as this Good is sometimes an object of *Sense*, sometimes of *Intellect*, sometimes a *mistaken* Good, at other times a *real* one, (in as much as Sensation is fallible, and Reason may be deceived) so the whole amounts to this; *the Cause of Spontaneous Impulse is the Perception of absent Good, and that either sensible or intelligible, either real or apparent (p).*

AFTER this manner we perceive one of the most important Unions; the *Union*

three Faculties Λόγος, θυμός, and Ἐπιθυμία, REASON, ANGER, and CONUPISCENCE or APPETITE. See *Diog. Laert.* iii. 90. *Plato's Republic* is founded on this Division.

(p) See *Vol. the First, Treatise on Happiness*, and Notes on the same, pages 212, 246, 334, 356.

of

of those two capital Motions, the *Physical* and the *Metaphysical*. THE SOUL perceives those Goods, which it is conscious that the Animal wants. Hence an *Impulse to obtain them* by employing the Organs of the *Body*; and this, as far as *the Soul only* is concerned, we call Motion *Metaphysical*. Hence the *bodily* Organs actually are employed, and this we call Motion *Physical*. Perception leads the way; *Spontaneous Impulse follows*; and *the Body* supplies the place of an Instrument or Tool (q).

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As

(q) — ἔτις μὲν οὖν ἐπὶ τὸ κινεῖσθαι καὶ πράττειν τὰ ζῶα ὁρμῶσι, τῆς μὲν ἐσχάτης αἰτίας τὸ κινεῖσθαι ὁρμῆς ἕως ἑσῆς, ταύτης δὲ γινομένης ἢ δι' αἰσθήσεως, ἢ διὰ φαντασίας καὶ νοήσεως—And thus it is, that ANIMALS proceed to move themselves and act, a DESIRE being the last and immediate Cause of their moving, and this Desire being occasioned either by SENSATION, or else by IMAGINATION and INTELLECTION. *Arist. de Animal. Motu. c. vii. p. 155. Edit. Sylb.*

Τὰ μὲν γὰρ ὁργανικὰ μέρη παρασκευάζει ἐπιτηδείως τὰ πάθη, ἢ δὲ ὁρεξις τὰ πάθη, τὴν δὲ ὁρεξιν ἢ φαντασία.

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}

As every *animal Motion* has a view to Good, so, if it miss that Good, *the Motion ceases*, and the Animal is left discontented : if it obtain it, the Animal is happy, but then too *the Motion ceases* ; for the End is obtained, to which the Motion tended. And thus is all *animal Motion* in it's Nature *finite*, as it has a Beginning and an End ; as it begins from the *Want of Good*, and ends in it's *Acquisition*. Hence too as it ends where it begins, it bears an analogy to *Motion circular*, where we run a complete round,

Φαντασία· αὐτὴ δὲ γίγνεται ἢ διὰ νοήσεως, ἢ δι' αἰσθήσεως.—The CORPOREAL FEELINGS prepare in a proper manner the ORGANIC PARTS of the Body ; DESIRE prepares those Feelings ; that Desire is prepared by some FANCY or APPEARANCE ; and this last arises either thro' INTELLECTION or SENSATION. *Ejusd.* l. c. 8. p. 157. Edit. Sylb.

If it be asked why nothing has been said concerning *Aversion* and *Evil*, as well as concerning *Volition* and *Good* ; the Answer is, that *to fly Evil* is *to seek Good* ; and *to escape Evil* is *to obtain Good* ; so that in the present inquiry they are both included.

by

by returning to the point whence we began.

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'Tis no-unentertaining Speculation to attend to these *internal* Motions, as they arise from the different prevalence of their different *internal* Causes. Within the Soul of *Man* there are *Passions*, and a Principle of *Reason*: sometimes the *internal* Motion arises from *many Passions at once*, and the Soul is like a Sea when agitated by contrary Winds.

æstuat ingens
Imo in corde PUDOR, *mixtoque* INSANIA
LUCTU (r).

Here the Motion is tempestuous, and *Reason* during the Storm appears to be overwhelmed. At other times she interposes, but *without success*; and in such case the *Motion* is equally turbid and ir-

(r) *Æn.* x. 870.

regular.

Chap. regular. Thus *Medea*, when she is about
 XVII. to murder her children :

Καὶ μανθάνω μὲν, οἷα δρᾶν μέλλω κακά·
 Θυμὸς δὲ κρείττων τῶν ἐμῶν βελευμάτων (s).

*I know the mischiefs, that I soon shall act,
 But Passion over-rules my better thoughts.*

There are times too, when *Reason* acts with greater success, and when *the Motion* becomes of course more placid and serene. But whenever she is so far able to establish her authority, as to have *the Passions* obey her uniformly without murmuring or opposition, then follows that *orderly, that fair and equal Motion*, by which the *Stoics* represented even *HAPPINESS* itself, and elegantly called it *the Well-flowing of life* (t).

(s) *Arrian. Epict.* l. i. c. 28. p. 144. *Edit. Upton.* *Euripid. Med.* v. 1078, 9.

(t) *Ευγοία βίη.—See *Diog. Laert.* vii. 88.—*Hinc intellecta est illa beata vita, secundo defluens cursu.* *Senec. Epist.* 120. See also of this Treatise, p. 261, 262.

BESIDES,

BESIDES the well-flowing here mentioned, which is of a kind purely *moral*, there is another highly valuable, which is of a kind purely *intellectual*. It is under *this Motion*, that the Man of Speculation *passes*, thro' the road of Syllogism, from the *simplest* Truths to the *most complicated* Theorems.

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AND here it may be remarked, that as pure and original *Truth* is the Object of our *most excellent* VOLITION (it being all that we seek, considered as *Beings intelligent*), so is it as strictly and properly the Object of our *most excellent* PERCEPTION; there being no perceptive Power, but our *Intellect alone*, that can reach it. 'Tis here then we behold the meaning of an antient and important Doctrine, that THE PRIMARY OBJECTS OF PERCEPTION AND OF VOLITION ARE THE SAME (u).

(u) Τὸ ΟΡΕΚΤΟΝ καὶ τὸ ΝΟΗΤΟΝ κινεῖ, ὃ κινεῖται· ΤΕΤΩΝ ΔΕ ΤΑ ΠΡΩΤΑ, ΤΑ ΑΥΤΑ—*The DESIRABLE*

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{

'Tis hence also we may learn, that not only ALL GOOD IS TRUTH (as there can be none such *without a reason*, from which it is so denominated), but also that ALL TRUTH IS GOOD, as it is the *sole pursuit* of the contemplative, the *natural Object* of their Wants, equally as honours are to the ambitious, or as banquets to the luxurious (x).

HAVING

DESIRABLE and the INTELLIGIBLE move, *without being moved*; and of these two Genera those Objects, that are HIGHEST and FIRST, are THE SAME. *Arist. Metaph. A. ζ. p. 202. Edit. Sylb.*

When a Theorem of *Archimedes* moves within us a *Desire* to understand it; or when, being understood, it raises within us our necessary *Assent*: *we do not conceive the Theorem itself to be moved*, either by the *Desire*, or by the *Assent*, as the *Horses* are moved, that give Motion to the *Waggon*, or the *Waggon* moved, that gives motion to its *Load*.

(x) Tho' we seldom hear of *Goods* in our common intercourse with Mankind, but what have reference to the Body, or at best to the *lower Affections*; yet HAS THE HIGHEST FACULTY OF THE SOUL A PECULIAR GOOD, as much as the other faculties have,
from

HAVING said thus much concerning *Perception*, and that highest Species of *animal Impulse*, I mean *Volition*, it must not be forgot, that there are *other internal Motions* of a very different character, where both *Perception* and *Spontaneous Impulse* are in a manner *unconcerned*.

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WITHIN every Animal there is an IN-NATE and ACTIVE POWER, which ceases not it's work, when Sense and Appetite are asleep ; which, *without any conscious co-operation of the Animal itself*, carries it from an Embryo or Seed to the maturity of it's proper *Form*. Now so far this Power may be called a *Principle of Motion*. At *Maturity* it stops (for were

from the *intellectual Possession* of which Good it seeks FELICITY and PEACE.

I loved her (says the wise Man, speaking of Wisdom ; and what is *Wisdom*, but the most exalted Truth ?) *I loved her above Health and Beauty, and chose to have her instead of Light: for the Light, that cometh from her, never goeth out.* *Wisd. vii. 10.*

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the progress infinite, there could be no Maturity at all); and so far it may be called a *Principle of Cessation or Rest* (y). From this point of Rest it deserts the Being gradually, and in consequence of such desertion the Being gradually decays.

(y) Speaking of the difference between the Operation of the *Elements* and mere MATTER, and that of NATURE, and an *internal Principle*, the Stagirite observes—Τῶν δὲ φύσει συνεσώτων πέρας ἐστὶ καὶ λόγῳ μεγέθους καὶ αὐξήσεως· ταῦτα δὲ ψυχῆς, ἀλλ' ὁ πυρὸς, καὶ λόγῳ μᾶλλον ἢ ὕλης—*As to things, which derive their Constitution from NATURE, there is a BOUND and Proportion in their Magnitude and Growth; and these proceed from their SOUL, not from the Element of Fire; and are caused rather by Reason, than by Matter.* De An. ii. 4. p. 30. Edit. Sylb.—And, not long before, describing a *Physical* or *natural Substance*, he makes it to be something ἔχοντ' ἀρχὴν κινήσεως καὶ στάσεως ἐν αὐτῷ, *which possesses within itself a Principle of MOTION and of REST.* De An. ii. 1. p. 23. Edit. Sylb.

'Tis by *this Principle* that the Magnitude of the Thistle, the Oak, the Bee, the Elephant, and every other *natural Production*, whether animal or vegetable, is to a certain degree circumscribed and limited; and when that *Limit* either *fails* or *exceeds* in a conspicuous manner, the Being becomes a *Monster*. See Vol. I. p. 295, Note xviii.

—*subeunt*

ARRANGEMENTS.

401

AS DERIVING IT'S EXISTENCE FROM C.XVI.
BOTH.

SUCH in fact it will appear; something MORE *than dead Capacity*, something LESS *than perfect Actuality*: CAPACITY ROUZED, *and striving to quit it's latent Character*: not the CAPABLE Brass, nor yet the ACTUAL Statue, but the CAPACITY IN ENERGY, that is to say, the Brass in Fusion, while *it is becoming the Statue, and is not yet become*. Thus too, when a Complexion is *actually Red*, we say not that it *reddens*; much less do we assert so, while it remains *perfectly Pale*; but as every *pale* Complexion implies a *Capacity to become red*, 'tis in THE ENERGY OF THIS CAPACITY exists the *Reddening*, that is the MOTION.

IN the account of MOTION here given we see the Doctrine of the *Peripatetics*. The more ancient Sects of *Pythagoreans* and *Platonics*, tho' they give *different*

D d

Descrip-

C.XVI. Descriptions, seem to have deduced them all from *the same* Principles. Thus because, whenever any thing is *moved*, it is some way or other *diversified* either in *Quantity*, or in *Quality*, or at least in *Place*, for this reason they called MOTION, DIVERSITY. Again, because, while opposite forces are *equal*, then is *Motion suspended*, and revives not till *Inequality destroys the Equilibrium*; for this reason they called MOTION, INEQUALITY. Again, because every thing, which is *moving*, is *not* in some certain Attributes, either what it *was*, or what it *will be*; for this reason they called MOTION, NON-ENTITY (x), not *Non-entity absolute*, but with a peculiar reference.

ALL these Descriptions of MOTION naturally flow from *one* Source, and that

(x) — ἔλεγον δὲ οἱ Πυθαγόρειοι τὴν κίνησιν εἶναι ἑτερότητα, καὶ ἀνισότητα, καὶ τὸ μὴ εἶναι. *Philop. in Physic.* p. 144. For *Non-Entity*, see before p. 397, 98.

is, from it's *indefinite* (y) and *unascertainable* appearance. Now the reason why it *so* appears, is, as we have said, because we cannot place it either in *the simple CAPACITY* of things, or in *the simple ACTUALITY*. The Bow for example *moves not*, because it *may* be bent; nor because it *is* bent; but *the Motion lies between*; lies in an *imperfect* and *obscure union* of the two *together*; is THE ACTUALITY (if I may so say) EVEN OF CAPACITY ITSELF (z); *imperfect* and *obscure*,

(y) — αἴτιον δὲ τῷ εἰς ταῦτα τιθέναι αὐτὸς, ὅτι ἀόριστον τι δοκεῖ εἶναι ἡ κίνησις. *Phys.* p. 45. *Edit. Sylb.*—*The Cause of their placing MOTION among these things, is, that it appears to be something INDEFINITE.*

(z) We have just before stiled it the ENERGY OF CAPACITY; here, the ACTUALITY OF CAPACITY. These expressions are difficult, unless we attend to the manner, in which they are used. The original Greek expresses the Sentiment thus—ἡ τῷ δυνάμει ὄντι ἐντελέχεια, ἣ τοιαύτου, κίνησις ἐστίν—THE ENERGY of what exists IN POWER, considered as so existing, is MOTION. *Arist. Physic.* 43. *Edit. Sylb.*—And soon after, p. 45—τῷ δὲ δοκεῖν ἀόριστον εἶναι τὴν κίνη-

C. XVI. *obscure*, because such is CAPACITY to which it belongs.

σιν αἴτιον ὅτι ἤτε εἰς δύναμιν τῶν ὄντων, ἤτε εἰς ἐνέργειάν ἐστι θεῖναι αὐτὴν ἀπλῶς· ἤτε γὰρ τὸ δυνατόν εἶναι ποσὸν κινεῖται ἐξ ἀνάγκης, ἤτε τὸ ἐνέργεια ποσόν· ἤτε κίνησις ἐνέργεια μὲν τις εἶναι δοκεῖ, ἀτελὴς δέ· αἴτιον δ' ὅτι ἀτελὴς τὸ δυνατόν ἔστιν ἐνέργεια κίνησις· καὶ διὰ τῆτο δὴ χαλεπὸν αὐτὴν λαβεῖν τί ἐστίν· ἢ γὰρ εἰς εἴρησιν ἀναγκαῖον θεῖναι, ἢ εἰς δύναμιν, ἢ εἰς ἐνέργειαν ἀπλῶν· τῆτων δ' ἕθεν φαίνεται ἐνδεχόμενον· λείπειται τοίνυν ὁ εἰρημίου τρόπος, ἐνέργειαν μὲν τινα εἶναι, τοιαύτην δ' ἐνέργειαν, οἷαν εἴπομεν, χαλεπὴν μὲν ἰδεῖν, ἐνδεχομένην δ' εἶναι. *Arist. Phys. l. iii. c. 2.*—*The Reason why MOTION appears to be INDEFINITE, is, that there is no placing it simply either in the CAPACITY of things, or in their ENERGY: for neither is that necessarily moved, which is CAPABLE OF BECOMING a certain Quantity; nor that, which is a certain Quantity in ENERGY and ACT. Indeed the MOTION itself appears to be a certain Sort of Energy, but then 'tis an IMPERFECT one; and the reason of this is, the CAPACITY ITSELF is IMPERFECT, OF WHICH it is the ENERGY. Hence therefore it becomes hard to comprehend it's Nature: for 'tis necessary to place it either in Privation, or in Capacity, or else in simple Energy, and yet no one of these appears to be possible. The Manner therefore, which we have mentioned, is the only one remaining, which is, that it should be a peculiar Sort of Energy, and that, such a one as we have described; HARD TO DISCERN, AND YET POSSIBLE TO EXIST. P. 45, ut supra. Edit. Sylb*

AND

AND so much for MOTION PHYSI- C.XVI.
CAL, it's different Species, and it's ge-
neral Character. We are now to in-
quire concerning *Motion of another*
kind.

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Concerning MOTION NOT-PHYSICAL—


This means METAPHYSICAL, and why so called—Spontaneity—Want—Perception, Consciousness, Anticipation, Pre-conception—Appetite, Resentment, Reason—Motion Physical and Metaphysical how united—Discord and Harmony of the internal Principles—Powers vegetative, animal, rational—Immortality—REST, it's several Species—MOTION, to what perceptive Beings it appertains; to what, not—and whence the Difference.

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OUR Contemplation hitherto may be called *Physical*, because 'tis about *Physical Motions*, that the whole has been employed, and 'tis from *Physical Observations*, that the whole has been deduced. But he, who stops here, has but

but half finished his Work, if it be true that *Corporeal* Masses only *move*, because they *are moved* (a); and therefore cannot be considered as *the original Source of Motion*.

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WHEN a Boy carries about with him an Insect in a Box, we call not this Motion the *Insect's Motion* as an *Animal*, because a Nut or a Pebble would have moved in like manner. (b) When the same Boy, piercing a Wing of this In-

(a) Τὸ κινῶν φυσικῶς, κινητόν· πᾶν γὰρ τὸ τοιῶ-
του κινεῖ, κινούμενον καὶ αὐτό.—*That which GIVES Mo-*
tion PHYSICALLY, is itself MOVEABLE: for every
thing, which gives Motion in this manner, is moved also
itself.—And soon after—Τῷτο δὲ ποιεῖ διζεῖ· ὥςτε ἅμα
καὶ πάσχει.—*This, (namely the giving Motion) it does*
by CONTACT; so that at the same time (while it acts)
it is acted upon. *Aristot. Physic. l. iii. c. i. p. 44,*
45. Edit. Sylb.

(b) —εἰοίκε δὴ τὸ βίαιον εἶναι, ὃ ἔξωθεν ἢ ἀρχῇ,
μηδὲν συμβαλλομένον τῷ βιασθέντι.—*That seems to be*
FORCED or COMPELLED, of which the Principle or
Moving Cause is FROM WITHOUT, while the Being
compelled contributes nothing from itself. *Ethic. Nic.*
l. iii. c. i. p. 37. Edit. Sylb.

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fect, makes it describe a *circular Motion* round a Pin or Needle, even *this* cannot well be called the Insect's Motion ; for it's *Motion*, as an *Animal*, is not, like a Planet, round a Center. So far however the *Motion* differs from that in the Box, that by being a *mixt Motion*, the *centrifugal Part* is the *Animal's* own, the *centripetal* is *extraneous*. But if ever the Wing detach itself, and the fortunate Insect flie off ; at that instant the *Mixture of extraneous* is no more, and the *Motion* thence forward becomes properly and purely *animal*.

AND what is it, which gives the *Motion* this *proper* and *pure* character ?—It is SPONTANEITY (c), that pure and *innate* Impulse arising from the Animal it-

(c) Τὸ ἐκείνου δοξάζειν αὐτὸ εἶναι, ἢ ἡ ἀρχὴ ἐν αὐτῷ—
That should seem to be SPONTANEOUS, of which the
Principle or Moving Cause is IN THE BEING ITSELF.
Eth. Nic. l. iii. c. i. p. 38. *Edit. Syb.*

self,

self, by which *alone* it's Flight is then produced and conducted.

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AND thus, while we pass from Flying to *Innate and Spontaneous Impulse*, that is to say in other words, from Flying to its *Cause*, we pass also insensibly from *Motion Physical* to *Metaphysical*; for METAPHYSICS are properly conversant about *primary and internal Causes*. We call not such Impulse *Metaphysical*, as if it were μετὰ τὴν φυσικὴν κίνησιν, *something subsequent to natural Motion*, that is, to Flying (for this would set Effect before Cause, a preposterous order indeed!); but we call it *Metaphysical*, because tho' truly prior in itself, it is *subsequent* in *Man's Contemplation*, whose Road of Science is naturally *upward*, that is, from Effect to Cause, from Sensible to Intelligible (*d*).

(*d*) See *Hermes*, p. 9. See also the second Edition of Vol. I. p. 365, and of the present Treatise, p. 344, Note (*d*).

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SPONTANEOUS *Impulse* (*e*) is to the Insect the Cause of Flying ; so it is to the Dolphin, of Swimming ; to the Man, of Walking. But *what* is the Cause of this Impulse itself ? And why do *Animals* possess it, more than Stocks or Stones ?

To solve this question, we must first remark, that every *Animal*, however exquisite in it's frame, is nevertheless far from being perfect, being still the Part of a greater and more perfect Whole (*f*),
to

(*e*) ὁρμή. Diog. Laert. vii. 85. Una pars in APPETITU posita est. Cic. de Offic. i. 28.—APPETITIONESQUE, quas illi ὁρμᾶς vocant, obediētes efficere Rationi—De Offic. ii. 5.—Animalia, quæ habent suos IMPETUS et rerum APPETITUS—Ejusd. ii. 3.—NATURALEM enim APPETITIONEM, quam vocant ὁρμὴν, itemque, &c. De Fin. iv. 14.—Seneca uses the words, SPONTANEOUS MOTUS. Epist. cxxi.

(*f*) Ipse autem HOMO—nullo modo perfectus, sed est quædam PARTICULA PERFECTI. Cic. de Nat. Deor. ii.

to which it is *connected* by many necessary *Wants*.

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ONE of these for example is common to all Animals, that of Food or Aliment. Suppose then *this Want* were not to be gratified, what would be the consequence?—The Animal would perish.—And how has Providence obviated this danger?—It has given to every *Animal*, however base, however young, not only a *Consciousness* of *this Want*, but an *obscure Sensation* of some distinction in things *without*; and a *Preconception* or *Anticipation* in favour of that Aliment which it is to *prefer*, from an *inward feeling* of *it's proper Constitution* (g). 'Tis

ii. 14. See of this Vol. p. 230, &c. and the end of the present Chapter.

What is applied by *Cicero* in the above Passage to *Man*, may with equal propriety be applied to all other Animals, and needs no proving. 'Twas a fundamental Doctrine of the *Stoics*.

(g) — Πρῶτον οἰκεῖον εἶναι παντὶ ζῳῇ τὴν αὐτῆς εὐτασίαν, καὶ τὴν ταύτης συνείδησιν—*The thing* PRIMARILY

Chap. thus *without* either *Teaching* or *Experi-*
 XVII. *ence*, but merely from an *innate Feel-*
ing of what is conducive to their proper
Being, that Infants are able to distin-
 guish Milk from Vinegar ; and Silk-
 worms the Leaf of a Mulberry from
 that of a Laurel or an Ash (*h*). Now
 the

RILY INTIMATE to every *Animal*, is it's OWN CON-
 STITUTION, and a CONSCIOUSNESS of it. *Diog.*
Laert. vii. 85.

(*h*) — *Simul atque natum sit animal—ipsum sibi con-*
ciliari, et commendari ad se conservandum et suum Sta-
tum, et ad ea, quæ conservantia sunt ejus Statûs, dili-
genda ; alienari autem ab interitu, iisque rebus, quæ in-
teritum videantur adferre. *Cic. de Fin.* iii. 5.

Thus *Seneca*—OMNIBUS (*sc.* *Animalibus*) CON-
 STITUTIONIS SUÆ SENSUS EST, et inde *Membrorum*
tam expedita tractatio. *Epist.* cxxi.—Soon after—
Constitutionem suam [Animal] crasse intelligit, summa-
tim, et obscure—and again—*ante omnia est Mei cura :*
hoc animalibus inest cunctis : nec inseritur, sed INNAS-
CITUR.—And soon after, speaking of the terror,
 which some Animals feel in their earliest state, when
 they first behold a Hawk, or a Cat, he adds—*apparet*
illis inesse Scientiam nocituri, non EXPERIMENTO COL-
LECTAM ; nam, antequam possint experiri, cavent.

the Consequence of this *Consciousness*, of
these *Preconceptions* or *Anticipations*, is a
spon-

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Even the *ferocious* tribes of *Animals*, when their
Powers become mature, are *shewn*, how to employ
them, by an *innate*, *internal Instinct*.

*Dente lupus, cornu taurus petit, unde, nisi INTUS
Monstratum—*

As to *INNATE IDEAS*, there is certainly nothing
so true, (and it requires no great *Logic* to prove)
that, if by *INNATE IDEAS* be meant *INNATE PRO-
POSITIONS*, there never were, nor ever can be any
such things existing. But this no ways tends to sub-
vert that *innate Distinction* of things into *Eligible* and
Ineligible, according as they are suitable to every *Na-
ture*, or not suitable; a *Distinction*, which every
Being appears to recognize from it's very birth.

Hence the Author above quoted in the same *Epistle*
—*tenera quoque animalia, a materno utero, vel quoquo
modo effusa, quid sit infestum ipsis PROTINUS norunt,
et mortifera devitant.*

And 'tis upon this reasoning we may venture
to affirm, that every such *Being* in it's earliest mo-
ments *perceives itself to be an Animal*, tho' it may not be
philosophically informed, what an *Animal* really is—
QUID SIT ANIMAL, nescit; ANIMAL ESSE se sentit.
Ibid.

Whatever

Chap. *spontaneous Impulse* : for 'tis in these that
 XVII. such Impulse finds an *adequate efficient*
 Cause.

Whatever others in ancient, or even in modern days, may have thought concerning this Subject, that *Philosopher* surely can be hardly suspected of favouring *Innate Ideas*, who held THE HUMAN SOUL, or rather it's INTELLECTIVE PART, from it's comprehending all things, to be for that very reason something pure and unmixed—ἐπεὶ πάντα νοεῖ, ἀμιγῆ εἶναι—and this, because [in any compound] that which is alien, by shewing itself along with other Objects, impedes and obstructs—παρεμφαινόμενον γὰρ κωλύει τὸ ἄλλότριον, καὶ ἀντιφράττει—That therefore the HUMAN INTELLECT in it's Nature was nothing else than mere CAPACITY, or THE BEING CAPABLE—ὥςτε μὴδ' αὐτὴ εἶναι φύσιν τίνα μηδεμίαν, ἀλλ' ἢ ταύτην, ὅτι δύνατον—That in consequence it WAS NOT any single one of the whole tribe of Beings, before it comprehended and understood it—ὁ ἄρα καλέμενος τῆς ψυχῆς Νῆς—ἐδέν ἐστιν ἐνεργεία τῶν ὄντων, πρὶν νοεῖν—That 'twas not therefore probable it should be blended with the Body, for that then it would become vested with some corporeal Quality, and be either hot or cold, and have some corporeal Organ, as the sensitive faculty has; whereas now it has none—διὸ ἐδὲ μεμίχθαι εὐλοῖον αὐτὸν τῷ σώματι· ποῖος γὰρ ἂν τις γίγνοιτο, θερμὸς ἢ ψυχρὸς, καὶ ὄργανόν τι εἶη, ὥσπερ τῷ αἰσθητικῷ· νῦν δὲ ἐδέν ἐστι—He concludes at last his Reasonings with telling us—that the
 Intellect,

Cause. But if we include all these under the common name of *Perception*,
 we

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Intellect, as he had said before, was in CAPACITY, after a certain manner, the several *Objects* intelligible; but was in ACTUALITY no one of them, until it first comprehended it—and that it was the same with the Mind or HUMAN UNDERSTANDING [in it's original State] as with a RASA TABULA or WRITING TABLET, in which nothing as yet had been ACTUALLY written—
 διὸ εἶρηται πρότερον, ὅτι δυνάμει πως ἐστὶ τὰ νοητὰ ὁ Νῆς, ἀλλ' ἐντελεχεία ἔδεν, πρὶν αὖ μὴ νοῆ· δεῖ δ' ἔτι, ὥσπερ ἐν γραμματείῳ, ὃ μὴδὲν ὑπάρχει ἐντελεχεία γεγραμμένον, ὅπερ συμβαίνει ἐπὶ τῷ Νῷ.
Aristot. de Animâ, l. iii. iv.

As to the Simile of a RASA TABULA, or (to speak in a language more modern and familiar) that of A SHEET OF FAIR WRITING PAPER, tho' it be sufficiently evident of itself, it may be illustrated in the following manner.

The *Human Intellect* is pure unmixed, untainted CAPACITY, as a Sheet of fair Writing Paper is pure unmixed, untainted WHITENESS. The pure unmixed Character of this intellectual Capacity renders it fit for every *Object* of Comprehension, as the pure unmixed Character of the Paper makes it adequate to every Species of Writing. The Paper would not be adequate to this purpose, were it previously scrawled over with Syllables or Letters. As far only as it is clear, it is capable;

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{

we shall then find, that PERCEPTION is
the *proper Cause* of SPONTANEOUS IM-
PULSE ;

capable ; and if we suppose it *perfectly* clear, then is it
perfectly capable. *The same Sort of Reasoning* is appli-
cable to the HUMAN UNDERSTANDING.

Such we take to be the Sentiments of this ancient
Sage on this important Subject.

The Sentiments and Subject, being both of them
curious, will ('tis hoped) be an Apology for this Di-
gression.

By it we think it appears, that it was a received
Opinion among the Ancients, that *Instincts* both in
Man and Beast were *original*, and *founded in Nature*.
That *Aristotle* held the same, appears not only from
his History of Animals, but from the following re-
markable Passage in his *Politics*, relative to Man.
There speaking of the *Social State*, or *State of Society*,
he says—Φύσει μὲν ἔν ἡ ὁρμὴ ἐν πᾶσιν ἐπὶ τὴν τοιαύ-
την κοινωνίαν—that the TENDENCY to such a Society
was BY NATURE in all men. *Pol. p. 4. Edit. Sylb.*

We think also it farther appears, that whatever
Aristotle thought of *Instincts* residing in the *lower* fa-
culties of Man, *Instincts* respecting the purposes of
common *Life* and *Society*, yet, as to the SUPREME and
INTELLECTIVE PART, *this* he held in it's original
State to be WHOLLY PURE and UNMIXED, and only
fitted, by that *Purity*, for *general* and *universal Com-*
prehension.

— *fubeunt morbi, tristisque senectus ;*
Et labor, et duræ rapit inclementia mor-
tis (z).

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 XVII.
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As the *Local Motion* of Animals is derived from *Sense*, and *spontaneous Impulse* ; so from the *Principle*, just described, are derived their *other* Motions : from it's *ACTIVITY*, their *Generation*, their *Augmentation*, and *Change to better* ; from it's *CESSATION*, their *Change to worse*, their *Diminution*, and lastly *Death* \*. 'Tis this is that *internal Principle*, which descends from Animals even to Vegetables ; and which, as these last possess no other, is commonly called *VEGETATIVE LIFE*, tho' sometimes it is denoted by the more obvious Name of *NATURE (a)*.

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(z) *Georg.* iii. 67, 68.

\* See before, p. 384 to p. 389.

(a) See the Definition of *NATURE* in *Volume the First*, among the Notes on the first Treatise, p. 257, and more fully in the addition to Note 3, p. 282.



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WE must remember however, that while we speak of *Motion* here, we mean the *invisible* Cause, not the *visible* Effects; for these are *purely physical*, and belong to another Speculation. After the same manner are we to speak of those other

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THE VEGETATIVE LIFE here mentioned is sometimes called ψυχὴ φυτικὴ, sometimes θρεπτικὴ, and at other times τὸ θρεπτικόν, the NUTRITIVE PRINCIPLE; that Principle, which, passing thro' *Plants*, as well as *Animals*, never ceases to *nourish* and support them, thro' the period of their existence—ἀεὶ γὰρ ἐνεργεῖ ἡ φυτικὴ ψυχὴ—καὶ μᾶλλον ἐν τοῖς ὕπνοις, ἢ ἐν ταῖς λοιπαῖς τῆς ψυχῆς δυνάμεις ἡρεμῶσι· τότε γὰρ μάλιστα αἱ ἐνέργειαι—THE VEGETATIVE SOUL energizes at all times, and more during Sleep, when the OTHER POWERS ARE AT REST; and therefore 'tis then mostly are performed the Digestions. Philop. in Arist. de An. l. ii.—Τὸ ἔργον τοῦ αὐτοῦ ποιεῖ τὸ θρεπτικόν μόνον ἐν τῷ καθεύδειν μᾶλλον ἢ ἐν τῷ ἐρηπτομένῳ· τρέφεται γὰρ καὶ αὐξάνεται τότε μᾶλλον ὥς ἐδὲν προσδεόμενα πρὸς ταῦτα τῆς αἰσθήσεως.—The NUTRITIVE part of the Soul performs it's Work in SLEEPING, more than in Waking; for then, more than at any other time, are Animals nourished and enlarged in bulk, as they have NO NEED OF SENSATION FOR THESE PURPOSES. Aristot. de Somno, cap. i. sub fin. See before, p. 104.

motive




*inotive* Powers, the Powers of Magnetism and Electricity ; the *visible* Motions, which they produce, being of a Species *merely Physical*, but the *Cause* of these Motions lying itself *totally concealed*. Whether then we suppose it a Species of inferior *Life*, and say with *Thales*, that the Magnet and the Amber are *animated* (b) ; or whether we content ourselves with calling it an *internal active* Quality (*occult* we must not call it, for that is now forbidden) we may safely pronounce it a *Quality*, which, tho' we

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(b) This Opinion of *Thales* concerning the Magnet's having a Soul, because it moved Iron (ψυχὴν ἔχει, ὅτι τὸν σίδηρον κινεῖ) may be found in *Arist. de An.* l. i. c. 2. p. 7.

*Philoponus*, in his Comment on this Passage, gives us from *Thales* the following Sentiment, which, tho' not immediately to our purpose, we have transcribed for it's importance—ἔλεγε, ὡς ἡ Πρόνοια μέχρη τῶν ἐσχάτων διήκει, καὶ ἃδὲν αὐτὴν λανθάνει, ἔδδὲ τὸ ἐλάχιστον· —He used to say that PROVIDENCE extends to the lowest of all Beings, and that nothing is hid from it, no not even that which is most minute. See before, p. 130.

Chap. are sure of it's existence, is not other-  
XVII. wise comprehensible, than *by reference to*  
 *it's Effects*; as we know *Homer*, who is  
out of Sight, by his *Iliad*, which lies  
before us.

THERE is yet *another motive Principle*,  
far greater *in local extent* than all yet  
mentioned; I mean that, by which not  
only every Atom of this our Earth has  
it's proper tendency, but by which even  
Planets, Satellites, and Comets, describe  
their Orbits.

ASTRONOMERS will inform us as to  
the force of *MOTION here*, and how much  
on it's due Order depends this immense  
Universe.

THE best of ancient Philosophers,  
when they saw so many *inferior Motions*  
not to be performed *without Counsel or*  
*Design*, could not think of imputing such  
*superior* ones to the efficacy of blind  
*Chance*;

Chance ; and therefore, whatever they might conceive of the *immediate Cause* (call it *Gravitation* or *Attraction*, or by any other name) they justly supposed the *primary Cause* to be A PRINCIPLE OF INTELLECTION :

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——— *totam infusa per artus*  
MENS *agitat molem*——— (c).

THEY indeed so far considered MIND to be the Source OF ALL MOTION, that 'twas thro' its *Motive Powers*, that they distinguished it from *Body* ; which last was no more than a *passive Subject*, possessing nothing *motive within itself*, but deriving all it's Motions from *something else*.

'Twas hence too that they inferred THE IMMORTALITY OF THE SOUL.— They reasoned thus.—“ *Vital Motion may*

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(c) *Æn.* vi. 727.



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“forsake the Body, because to the Body ’tis  
“not an Essential; and in such case the  
“Body is said to die. But Vital Motion  
“cannot forsake the Soul, because to the  
“Soul ’tis an Essential, and ’tis not pos-  
“sible that any thing should be forsaken by  
“itself (d).” But this by way of di-  
gression.

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(d) — *Quod autem motum adfert alicui, quodque IP-  
SUM agitur ALICUNDE, quando finem habet motus,  
VIVENDI FINEM HABEAT necesse est. SOLUM igitur,  
QUOD SEIPSUM MOVET, quia NUNQUAM DESERITUR  
A SE, NUNQUAM ne moveri quidem desinit. Quinetiam,  
&c. Cic. Tuscul. Disp. i. 23.*

The whole Passage, which is rather too long to  
transcribe, is the Translation of an Argument, taken  
from Plato’s *Phædrus*.—Τὸ δὲ ἄλλο κινῆν, καὶ ὅπ’ ἄλλῃ  
κινεῖμενον, κ. τ. λ. *Plat. Edit. Ficini. p. 1221. B.*

See *Macrobius in Somn. Scipionis, c. 13.*

*Cicero* has used the same Argument in his *Traët de  
Seneſtute*.—*Cumque SEMPER AGITETUR ANIMUS,  
nec principium motus habeat, quia SE IPSE MOVEAT,  
NE FINEM QUIDEM habiturum esse MOTUS, quia NUN-  
QUAM SE IPSE SIT RELICTURUS—C. 21.*

*Quintilian* has brought the Argument into the Form  
of a Syllogism.—*Quicquid ex seipſo movetur, immortale  
est: Anima autem ex seipſâ movetur: immortalis igitur  
est Anima. Inst. Orat. V. 14.*

As

As to the *rise and duration* of Mo- Chap.  
TION, the founder of the *Peripatetic* XVII.  
Sect thus states the Question. “*Was*  
“*MOTION* (says he) *ever generated with-*  
“*out existing before; and is it ever again*  
“*so destroyed, that there is nothing moved;*  
“*or was it neither generated, nor is de-*  
“*stroyed, but ever was, and will be;*  
“*something appertaining to Beings, which*  
“*is immortal and unceasing; a kind of*  
“*Life, as it were, to all things that exist*  
“*by the power of Nature (e)”?*

THOSE, who meditate an answer to these Queries, will remember that MOTION is *co-eval with the Universe*, since we learn that, in its *first and earliest æra*, the *Spirit of God* MOVED upon the face of the waters\*. They will remember too that MOTION is as old as TIME, and their

(e) Πότερου δὲ γέγονέ ποτε κίνησις, ἐκ ἑσσε πρώτε-  
ρον, καὶ φθείρεται πάλιν ἄτως, ὥστε κινεῖσθαι μηδέν· ἢ  
ἔτε ἐγένετο, ἔτε φθείρεται, ἀλλ’ αἰεὶ ἦν, καὶ ἔσται, καὶ  
τῶτ’ ἀθάνατον καὶ ἀπαυσον ὑπάρχει τοῖς ἔσιν, οἷον ζωὴ  
τις ἑσσε τοῖς φύσει συνεσῶσι πᾶσιν; *Arist. Phys.* l. viii.  
c. i. p. 144. *Edit. Sylb.*

\* *Genesis* chap. i.



Chap. *Coexistence* so necessary, it is not possible to  
 XVII. suppose *the one*, without supposing *the*  
 { *other*.

AND thus, having before considered PHYSICAL MOTION, have we now considered what may be called METAPHYSICAL, or (if I may use the expression) CAUSATIVE MOTION; including under this name every ANIMATING POWER, whether *rational* or *irrational*, which, though different from *Body*, *acts upon Body*, causing it to live, to grow, and move itself and other *Bodies*. These *animating Powers* are only known from their *Effects*, as the Painter's *Art* is known from his *Pictures*. And hence, as 'tis the Effect, which leads us to recognise the Cause, hence *these animating Powers*, tho' *prior in existence* to *Physical Effects*, are *necessarily subsequent in human Contemplation*, and are *thence*, and *thence* only called METAPHYSICAL (*f*).

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(*f*) See 409, 451, 483. As to the character and subordination of the several *Animating Powers*, see before p. 421, 422. and so on to p. 438. as well in the Text, as in the Notes. See also Chapter the Sixth.



## ARRANGEMENTS.

441

AND now, having done with MOTION, we must take some notice of REST. Chap.  
XVII.

THE most obvious Species of REST is that opposed to the most obvious Species of MOTION; such for example as the *Cessation of Gales*, after they have been fresh and blowing:

*Ingrato celeres obruit OTIO*  
*Ventos——— (g).*

—the *Cessation of Billows*, after they have been loud and tempestuous—

SILENCE, ye troubled Waves, and thou  
Deep, PEACE (h).

BUT

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(g) *Horat. Od. l. i. 16.*

(b) *Par. Lost, vii. 216.*

Both these Species of *Rest* are denoted in *English* by the common name of CALM. The *Greeks*, with their usual precision, have given a different Name to each: the first, that is the *Wind-Calm*, they call *Νηγεμία*, and define it Ἡρεμία ἐν πλήθει αἰέρος,  
TRAN-

Chap.  
XVII.

BUT 'tis expedient to be more particular.—The two instances of REST, that we have alleged, are of MOTION *purely LOCAL*. So is it, when the *flight* of an Arrow is *spent*; when a Bowl, that has been *running*, *stops*. But REST is also connected with the *other* Species of Motion. The *Cessation* of Growth is *Maturity*; of the *Vital Energies*, is *Death*.

So too with respect to the *higher* faculties of the Soul, *Sense* and *Reason*.

---

TRANQUILLITY in a quantity of AIR; the second, that is the *Sea-Calm*, they call Γαλήνη, and define it Ὁμαλότης Θαλάττης, EVENESS in the SEA'S SURFACE. These definitions are of *Archytas*, and may be found in *Aristotle's Metaph.* p. 136. *Edit. Sylb.*

PLATO has brought the two terms together, in those harmonious Lines, delivered by *Agatho* in the *Banquet*—

Εἰρήνην μὲν ἐν ἀνθρώποις, πελάγει δὲ ΓΑΛΗΝΗΝ,  
ΝΗΝΕΜΙΑΝ ἀνέμων, κοίτην ὕπνου τ' ἐνὶ κήδει.

See *Platon. Symp.* p. 1190, *Edit. Fic.* See also the learned and ingenious Translation of Mr. *Sydenham*, p. 118.

The

*The Rest of the sensitive Powers, after the labours of the day, is SLEEP :*

Chap.  
XVII.

*Dulcis et alta QUIES, placidæque similima Morti (i).*

The *Rest of the Passions*, after having been agitated, is COMPOSURE and EQUANIMITY ; the *Rest of the deliberative and reasoning Powers*, after sedulous Investigation, is the *Discovery* of the thing sought, or rather the ACQUIESCENCE IN TRUTH discovered, either real or apparent, either practical or speculative.

AND hence, in the last mode of *Rest*, or *Acquiescence*, the rise of our *English* Phrase, *I am fixt* ; and of the *Latin* Phrase, *Stat* :

STAT conferre manum—— (k).

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(i) *Æn.* vi. 522.—See before, *Hermes*, p. 52, and of this Volume, p. 336, 337.

(k) *Æn.* xii. 678.

The incomparable *Sanctius* in his *Minerva* gives the following excellent explanation of this Passage. *Quam-*  
*diu*



Chap. XVII. Hence *Science* in *Greek* is called ΕΠΙ-  
 ΣΤΗΜΗ, every Theorem being as it were  
 a *Resting Place*, at which the man of  
*Science stops* (1).

LASTLY, there is a *Rest* of all the  
 most interesting to mankind, I mean  
 PEACE, that *happy Rest*, which follows  
 the Trepidations and Ravages of *War*.

AND now having done with REST,  
 let us bring the whole to a conclusion.

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*diu enim deliberatur, consilium vacillat, et sententia fluctuat; ubi certum ac statutum est, quod quis facere vult, consistit consilium, et STAT SENTENTIA. Sancti. Minerv. l. iv. c. 4. p. 637. Edit. Amst. 1733.*

In *Perizonius's* Note upon this part of *Sanctius*, it appears that SEDET is used in the *same* signification, and for *the same reasons*. See the Note following.

(1) — ἔτι δὲ καὶ ἡ νόησις ἔοικεν ἡρεμήσει τινί, καὶ ΕΠΙΣΤΑΣΕΙ μᾶλλον ἢ κινήσει—INTELLECTION appears to resemble a certain *Resting* and *STANDING STILL*, rather than a *Motion*. *De An.* l. i. c. 3. See *Hermes*, p. 368, where this Etymology is treated of more at large.

WE have said already, that the Cause of all *Animal Motion* is GOOD, either real or apparent. It is a farther Requisite, that it should be GOOD, *which is wanting*; GOOD *at a distance*: for were it *present*, the *Motion* would then be superfluous. Thus we see the meaning of the Philosophical Critic, *Scaliger*: MOTIONIS ENIM APPETENTIA CAUSA EST; APPETENTIÆ, PRIVATIO (m): *The Cause of MOTION is APPETITION; of Appetition, is PRIVATION*. 'Tis to this PRIVATION or WANT, that the Wisdom of all Ages has imputed Industry, Perseverance, and the Invention of Arts and Sciences.

Chap.  
XVII.

THIS, in *Virgil*, is the—

— *duris urgens in rebus* EGESTAS (n).

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(m) *Scalig. de Causis Ling. Lat.* c. 114.

(n) *Geor.* i. 146. See Vol. first, p. 257, p. 273, 4, 5.

To

Chap.  
XVII.  
{

To this alludes *Epicharmus*, the Poet and Philosopher :

---

τῶν πόνων  
Πωλῆσιν ἡμῖν πάντα γὰρ τ' ἀλῆθ' οἱ θεοί (o).

---

*The Gods*  
*Sell us all Goods at Labour's painful price.*

To this alludes *the Scripture*, at Man's earliest period,—*In the sweat of thy face shalt thou eat bread* (p).

BUT tho' *Want* be thus essential to set Man, and not only Man, but all animal Nature, in *Motion*, yet is WANT itself an IMPERFECTION; and *to be in want* is *to be imperfect*. And hence it follows, that true Greatness, or Superiority of Nature, consists not in having *many* Wants, even tho' we can find means to get them

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(o) *Xenoph. Mem.* l. ii. c. 1.

(p) *Gen.* iii. 19.

gratified ;



gratified ; but in having *as few as possible*, and those within the compass of *our own* abilities.

Chap.  
XVII.

'Tis to this Doctrine that *Virgil* nobly alludes, when he makes *Evander* with an heroic dignity receive *Eneas*, not at the gates of a proud Palace, but at the Door of an humble Cottage :

*Ut ventum ad sedes, hæc, inquit, limina*  
*victor*

*Alcides subiit ; hæc illum regia cepit :*

AUDE, hospes, CONTEMNERE OPES, et te

QUOQUE DIGNUM

FINGE DEO ; rebusque veni non asper  
*egenis* (q).

Conformable to the *same* way of thinking is what *Socrates* says to *Antipho* in *Xenophon* : “ You SEEM (says he) O Antipho, to be one of those, who imagine

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(q) *Æn.* viii. 362.

“ *Happi-*

Chap. XVII. *“Happiness to be Luxury and Expence.  
“But I for my part esteem THE WANT-  
“ING OF NOTHING, to be DIVINE; and  
“THE WANTING OF AS LITTLE AS  
“POSSIBLE, to come NEAREST TO THE  
“DIVINITY; and, as THE DIVINITY IS  
“MOST EXCELLENT, so the being NEAREST  
“TO THE DIVINITY is the being NEAREST  
“TO THE MOST EXCELLENT (r)”.*

ARISTOTLE seems to have followed his old Master (for such was *Socrates*), with respect to this Sentiment. *“To  
“that Being, (says he) which is IN THE  
“MOST EXCELLENT STATE, HAPPINESS  
“appears to appertain WITHOUT ACTION  
“AT ALL; to the BEING NEAREST to  
“the most perfect, thro’ a SMALL and*

---

(r) Ἐοικας, ὃ Ἀντιφῶν, τὴν εὐδαιμονίαν οἰομένην τροφὴν καὶ πολυτέλειαν εἶναι. ἐγὼ δὲ νομίζω τὸ μὲν μηδενὸς δεῖσθαι, θεῖον εἶναι, τὸ δὲ ὡς ἐλαχίστων, ἐγλυτάτω τῷ θεῷ καὶ τὸ μὲν θεῖον, κράτιστον, τὸ δὲ ἐγλυτάτω τῷ θεῷ, ἐγλυτάτω τῷ κράτιστῳ. *Xenoph. Mem.* l. i. c. 6. Sect. 10.

“ SINGLE

“ SINGLE ACTION ; *to those* THE MOST  
 “ REMOTE, *thro’* ACTIONS MANY AND  
 “ VARIOUS (s).” He soon after subjoins  
 the reason, why *the most excellent Being has*  
*no need of Action.* “ *It has* (says he)  
 “ WITHIN ITSELF THE FINAL CAUSE,”  
 that is to say, *perfect Happiness : but*  
 ACTION ALWAYS EXISTS IN TWO, *when*  
*there is both A FINAL CAUSE, and A*  
 POWER TO OBTAIN IT, each of them  
*separate, and detached from one an-*  
*other (t).*

AND

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(s) Ἐοικε γὰρ τῷ μὲν ἀριστα ἔχοντι ὑπάρχειν τὸ εὖ  
 ἄνευ πράξεως· τῷ δὲ ἐγγύτατα, διὰ ὀλίγης καὶ μιᾶς  
 τοῖς δὲ πορρωτάτω, διὰ πλείονων. *Arist. de Cælo. l. ii.*  
*c. 12. p. 54. Edit. Sylb.*

(t) Τῷ δ’ ὡς ἀριστα ἔχοντι ἄδεν δεῖ πράξεως, ἔστι  
 γὰρ ἐν αὐτῷ τὸ ἕνεκα· ἡ δὲ πράξις ἐστὶν αἰεὶ ἐν δυσὶν,  
 ἕταν καὶ ἕνεκα ἧς, καὶ τὸ τέτε ἕνεκα. *Ibid.*

The following Remark may perhaps explain this  
 Sentiment, if it should appear obscure.

When a Being finds it's Good fully and wholly within  
 itself, then, itself and it's Good being ONE, it finds no

G g

Cause



Chap.  
XVII.

AND hence perhaps we may be able to discern, why IMMOBILITY should be a peculiar Attribute to the SUPREME and DIVINE NATURE, in contradistinction to ALL OTHER Beings, endued with Powers of PERCEPTION. To Him there

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
Cause of Motion, to *seek* that, which it possesses *already*. Such Being therefore, from it's very nature, is IMMOVEABLE.

But when a *Being* and it's *Good* are separate, here, as they necessarily are Two, the *distant Good*, by being perceived, becomes a FINAL CAUSE OF MOTION, and thus awakens *within* the *Being* a certain DESIRE, of which *Desire* MOTION is the natural Consequence. SUCH BEING therefore by its nature is MOVEABLE.

*Ammonius*, in the following Quotation, appears to have had this Doctrine and these Passages of *Aristotle* in his view.

"Ὅσα γὰρ πλείονων τινῶν διέται, πλείονας κινήσεις κινεῖται· τὰ δὲ ὀλίγοι δέχονται, ὀλιγοκίνητα· ἀμέλει τὸ Θεῶν, ἀνευδεῖς ὄν, καὶ πάντῃ ἐστὶν ἀκίνητον—All such Beings, as are in want of many things, are moved in many Motions; these, who have few Wants, have few Motions; but THE DIVINITY, being WITHOUT WANTS, is therefore PERFECTLY IMMOVEABLE. *Ammon. in Praed.*  
144. B. 145.

are

are *no Wants, nothing absent which is* Chap.  
*Good*, being himself the very Effence of XVII.  
 pure Perfection and Goodness (*u*). 

AND so much for that MOTION which,  
 tho' *subsequent in contemplation to the Phy-*  
*sical* (*x*), and thence called METAPHY-  
 SICAL, is yet truly *prior* to it in the *real*  
*order* of Beings, because it appertains to  
*the First Philosophy*. So much also for  
 the Theory of MOTION.

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(*u*) See before, p. 161, 162.

(*x*) See before, p. 409.

## C H A P. XVIII.

*Conclusion — Utilities deducible from the Theory of these Arrangements—Recapitulation.*

Chap.  
XVIII.

AND thus having finished the Doctrine of *these* PHILOSOPHICAL ARRANGEMENTS, or, in other words, of CATEGORIES, PREDICAMENTS, COMPREHENSIVE or UNIVERSAL GENERA, (for we have called them indifferently by every one of these names) together with such Speculations both *previous* and *subsequent* (a), as were either requisite to explain the Subject, or else naturally arose out of it; we imagine *the Utilities* of this knowledge will be obvious to every one, who has studied it with impar-

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(a) See before, p. 35, 36, 360, 361, and below, p. 464.

tiality,



tiality, and has aimed to know, what it *really* is.

Chap.  
XVIII.

IN the first place, as we have usually begun the consideration of each ARRANGEMENT from Speculations respecting BODY, and have thence made a Transition to others respecting MIND; we may hence mark *the Connection between these* TWO GREAT PRINCIPLES, which stand related to each other, as the SUBJECT and its EFFICIENT CAUSE, and in virtue of that Relation may be said *to run thro' all things* (b).

AGAIN, our Mind, by this *orderly* and *comprehensive* Theory, becoming furnished, like a good Library, with proper Cells or Apartments, we know where to place our Ideas both of *Being* and it's *Attributes*, and where to look for them again, when we have occasion to call

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(b) See before, p. 34.

Chap.  
XVIII.

them forth. Without some ARRANGEMENT of this sort, the Mind is so far from *increasing* in Knowledge by the Acquisition of *new* Ideas, that, while it increases the *Number* of these, it does but increase it's own *Perplexity*. It is no longer a Library well regulated, but a Library crowded and confused,

———— *ubi multa supersunt,*  
*Et dominum fallunt*———— (c).

AGAIN, as these ARRANGEMENTS have a necessary Connection *with the whole of Existence*; with all BEING or SUBSTANCE on one hand, with every possible ACCIDENT or ATTRIBUTE on the other; it follows of course that *so general* a Speculation must have naturally introduced many others; Speculations, not merely *Logical*, but extending to *Physics*, to *Ethics*, and even to the *First*

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(c) *Horat. Epist. l. i. 6.*

*Philo-*

*Philosophy (d)*. The Reader from these incidental Theorems (if the Author has succeeded in his endeavours to represent them) will have a taste how *the Ancients* wrote, when they reasoned upon these Subjects, and may gratify his curiosity (if he please) by comparing them with *the Moderns*.

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XVIII.

It was not from an ostentatious wish to fill his page with Quotations, that the Author has made such frequent and copious extracts from other Authors. He flatters himself, that by this he has not only given authority to the Sentiments, but relieved also a Subject, in itself rather severe. From the Writers alleged, both ancient and modern, the Reader will perceive, how important and respectable these Authorities are. He will perceive too, that, in the wide regions of *Being*, some Sages having cultivated one part,

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(d) See before, p. 16.



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XVIII.  
        

and some another, the Labours of Ancients and Moderns have been often different, when not hostile; often various, when not contradictory; and that, among the valuable discoveries of *later* periods, there are many so far from clashing with the *ancient* doctrines here advanced, that they coincide as amicably, as a CHILLINGWORTH and an ADDISON in the same Library; a RAPHAEL and a CLAUDE in the same Gallery.

IT is not without precedents, that he has adopted this manner of *Citation*. It was adopted by *Aristotle* long ago in his *Rhetoric* and his *Poetics*. *Aristotle* was followed by those able Critics, *Demetrius*, *Quintilian*, and *Longinus*. *Chrysippus*, the Philosopher, so much approved the method, that in a single Tract he inserted nearly the whole of that celebrated Tragedy, the *Medea* of *Euripides*: so that a person, who was perusing the Tract, being asked what he was reading, replied

replied pleasantly, 'Twas the *Medea* of Chap.  
XVIII.  
*Chrysippus* (e). *Cicero* has enriched his  
 philosophic Treatises with many choice  
 morsels both from *Greek* and *Roman*  
 Writers; and this he does, not only ap-  
 proving the practice himself, but justi-  
 fying it by the practice of the Philoso-  
 phers then at *Athens*, among whom he  
 names *Dionysius* the *Stoic*, and *Philo* the  
*Academic* (f). *Seneca* and *Plutarch* both  
 pursued the same plan, the latter more  
 particularly in his *moral* Compositions.  
 To these may be added, tho' of a baser  
 age, my own learned Countryman, *John*  
 of *Salisbury* (g), who, having perused and  
 studied

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(e) *Diog. Laert.* l. vii. § 180.

(f) *Tusc. Disput.* l. ii. § 10.

(g) This extraordinary Man flourished in the  
 reign of *Henry the second*, and was therefore of *Old*  
*Salisbury*, not of *New Salisbury*, which was not founded  
 till the reign of *Henry the third*. *John* (of whom we  
 write) having had the best Education of the time,  
 and being not only a Genius, but intimate with the  
 most eminent Men, in particular with Pope *Adrian*  
 (who



Chap.  
XVIII.

studied most of the *Latin* Classics, appears to have decorated every part of his Works with splendid fragments, extracted out of them. Two later Writers of Genius have done the same in the narrative of their Travels ; *Sandys* at the beginning of the last Century, and *Addison* at the beginning of the present.

AND so much by way of Apology for the Author himself. But he has a farther Wish in this exhibition of capital Writers ; a Wish to persuade his Readers, of what he has been long persuaded himself, that every thing really *elegant*, or *sublime* in composition, is ultimately referable to the Principles of a *sound Logic* ; that those Principles, when Readers little think of them, have still a *latent*

---

(who was himself an *Englishman*) became at length a Bishop, and died in the year 1182. See *Fabricius* in his *Biblioth. Lat.* v. ii. p. 368, and in his *Biblioth. Med. et Infim. ætat.* See also *Cave's Histor. Literar.* v. ii. p. 243.

force,



force, and may be traced, if sought after, even in the politest of Writers \*.

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XVIII.

By reasoning of this kind he would establish an important *Union*; the Union he means between TASTE and TRUTH. 'Tis this is that splendid Union, which produced the *Classics* of pure *Antiquity*; which produced, in times less remote, the *Classics* of *modern* days; and which those, who *now* write, ought to cultivate with attention, if they have a wish to survive in the estimation of posterity.

TASTE is, in fact, but a Species of inferior *Truth*. 'Tis the *Truth* of *Elegance*, of *Decoration*, and of *Grace*; which, as *all Truth* is *similar* and *congenial*, coincides as it were *spontaneously* with the more *severe* and *logical*; but which, whenever *destitute* of that more solid support, resembles some fair but languid

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\* See the numerous Quotations thro' every part of this Treatise.

Body;

Chap.  
XVIII.

Body ; a Body, specious in feature, but deficient as to nerve ; a Body, where we seek in vain for that natural and just perfection, which arises from the pleasing harmony of Strength and Beauty associated.

RECOMMENDING an earnest Attention to *this Union*, we resume our Subject by observing, that 'tis in contemplating these *orderly*, these *comprehensive* ARRANGEMENTS (*h*), we may see whence the *sub-ordinate*

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(*h*) There are few Theories so great, so comprehensive, and so *various*, as the Theory of these PREDICAMENTS, or PHILOSOPHICAL ARRANGEMENTS.

The Ancients had many methods of representing Works of such a *diversified* and *miscellaneous* character.

*Fruits of various kinds, promiscuously blended*, used to be presented in a *Dish*, as an offering to *Ceres*. THIS DISH, SO FILLED, they called LANX SATURA ; and hence LANX SATURA, or rather *Satura*, or *Satira* alone (*Lanx* being understood) came to signify by metaphor a *miscellaneous* writing ; such as were the Compositions of *Lucilius*, *Horace*, *Perfius*, *Juvenal*, and others.

A Satire



ordinate Sciences and Arts all arise : *Hif-* Chap.  
*tory*, natural and civil, out of SUB- XVIII.  
 STANCE ;

A *Satire* in this sense did not mean *Sarcasm*, *Calumny*, or personal Abuse ; it meant no more than a Writing, where the *Subject* was *various* and *diversified*, such as *Juvenal* well describes it, when he speaks of his own works :

*Quicquid agunt homines, nostri est FARRAGO libelli.*

Again, we all know that GROVES and FORESTS are *diversified* with Trees ; with Trees of various Figures, Magnitudes, and Species ; and hence it was that *Statius* called his *miscellany Collections* of Poems by the name of SILVÆ.

Now it was from these ideas that Mr. *Stuart*, with his usual Taste and Classical Elegance, has designed the Frontispiece, which adorns this Volume.

We there behold a Temple of the *Tuscan* Order, dedicated to *Ceres* ; to which Goddess a *Roman* of distinction, with proper attendants about him, is making an offering of the LANX SATURA, or Dish of promiscuous Fruits. Behind we see a GROVE, which, besides the propriety of being an usual place for Temples, has a fine effect in forming the back-ground of the Piece.

The LANX SATURA and the GROVE equally contribute to denote the *Miscellaneous Character* of these PHILOSOPHICAL ARRANGEMENTS.

This Account of the *Lanx Satura* is taken from *Diomedes* the Grammarian, and may be found in the  
 Preface



Chap.  
XVIII.

STANCE; *Mathematics*, out of QUANTITY; *Optics*, out of QUALITY and QUANTITY; *Medicine*, out of *the same*; *Astronomy*, out of QUANTITY and MOTION; *Musick* and *Mechanics*, out of *the same*; *Painting*, out of QUALITY and SITE; *Ethics*, out of RELATION; *Chronology*, out of WHEN; *Geography*, out of WHERE; *Electricity*, *Magnetism*, and *Attraction*, out of ACTION and PASSION; and so in other instances.

EVERY Art and every Science being thus referred to it's *proper Principle*, we shall be enabled with sufficient accuracy to *adjust their comparative value* (*k*), by comparing the several Principles, from which they severally flow. Thus shall we be saved from absurdly *overprizing a single Art*, or *a single Science*, and from

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
Preface of *Dacier* to his Translation of *Horace's Satires*, and in the same Preface, prefixed also to the *Satires* of the *Delphin Horace*.

(*k*) See before, p. 34, 35.

treat-

treating all the rest with a sort of insolent contempt ; advantages so little to be expected from any Knowledge *less extensive*, that, on the contrary, the more deeply knowing Men may be in *a single Subject alone*, the more likely are they to fall into such narrow and illiberal Sentiments.

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XVIII.



It is indeed no wonder in such case, that mistakes should arise, since those, who reason thus, be they as accurate as may be in *their own* particular Science, will be found to reason about *one* thing, which they know, and about *many*, of which they are ignorant ; and how from Reasoners such as these, so inadequately prepared, can we expect either an exact, or an impartial Estimate ?

AND thus much at present for the Speculation concerning PREDICAMENTS, or PHILOSOPHICAL ARRANGEMENTS; in the treating of which, we have considered *in*  
*the*

Chap. *the Beginning* (l) such matters as were  
XVIII. necessarily *previous*; in the *Middle* (m)  
we have considered the ARRANGEMENTS  
*themselves*; and, in the *End* (n), various  
matters, naturally *arising out of them*, or  
which have *incidentally occurred* during  
the time of their being discussed.

AND thus *this Part of Logical Speculation* appears to be finished.

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(l) See Chapter the *first* and *second*.

(m) See from Chapter the *third* to Chapter the  
*fourteenth* inclusive.

(n) See from Chapter the *fifteenth* to the *Conclusion*.

T H E E N D.



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## ADDITIONAL NOTES.

PAGE 2.—SO EAGER WAS CATO FOR KNOW-  
LEGE, &c.] Thus *Cicero* describes him—*quippe qui,*  
*ne reprehensionem quidem vulgi inanem reformidans, in ipsâ*  
*curiâ soleret legere sæpè, dum Senatus cogeretur, nihil operæ*  
*Reipublicæ detrahens.*—*De Fin.* III. 2.—Where 'tis  
worth remarking, that CATO considered his Applica-  
tion to *Literature* as no way obstructing his Duty to the  
*Commonwealth*. The *Studious* character and the *Political*  
in Him were united.

*Ibid.*—THE PATRIOT BRUTUS FOUND TIME  
NOT ONLY TO STUDY, BUT TO COMPOSE A TREA-  
TISE UPON VIRTUE.] Thus the same *Cicero*—*Placere*  
*enim tibi (Bruto scil.) admodum sensi, et ex eo libro quem*  
*ad me accuratissimè scripsisti, et ex multis sermonibus tuis,*  
*Virtutem ad beatè vivendum se ipsâ esse contentam.* *Tuscul.*  
*Disput.* v. 1. And again,—*provocatus gratissimo mihi*  
*libro, quem de VIRTUTE scripsisti.* *De Fin.* 1. 3.

One or two short fragments of this Treatise of *Brutus*  
are preserved in *Seneca, De Consolat. ad Helv.* C. ix.

AS TO PERICLES, EPAMINONDAS, and the other  
great names mentioned in the same page with CATO  
and BRUTUS, see the note immediately following.

P. 5.—[FOR THE SPLENDOR OF THEIR ACTIVE CHARACTER] The following authorities may serve to confirm the truth of this assertion.

IN PLUTARCH'S life of PERICLES we read as follows — Ὁ δὲ πλείστα Περικλεῖ συγγενόμενος, καὶ μάλιστα περιθεὶς ὄσκειν αὐτῷ καὶ φρόνημα δημαγωγίας ἐμβριθέστερον, ὅπως τε μετεωρίσας καὶ συνεξάρας τὸ ἀξίωμα τῷ ἥθει, Ἀναξαγόρας ἦν ὁ Κλαζομένιος, ὃν οἱ τότε ἄνθρωποι ΝΟΤΝ προσηγόρευον. *But he, who was most conversant with PERICLES, and most contributed to give him a grandeur of mind, and to make his high spirit for governing the popular Assemblies more weighty and authoritative; in a word, who exalted his ideas, and raised at the same time the dignity of his behaviour: the person, who did this, was ANAXAGORAS, the Clazomenian, whom the people of that age used to call NOTN or MIND. Plut. in Vit. Periclis, p. 154. B. Edit. Xyland.*

PLUTARCH soon after gives good reasons for this appellation of ANAXAGORAS, viz. his great abilities, and his being the first who made MIND or INTELLECT (in opposition to CHANCE) a Principle in the Formation and Government of the Universe.

The Words of ANAXAGORAS on this subject, though well known, are well worth citing — Πάντα χρήματα ἦν ὁμῶς· εἴτα ΝΟΤΣ ἐλθὼν αὐτὰ διεκόσμησε. *All things were BLENDED TOGETHER: then came MIND (or an Intelligent Principle) and gave them ARRANGEMENT. Diog. Laert. II. 6.*

EPAM.



EPAMINONDAS, in his *political* capacity, was so great a man, that he raised his Country, the Commonwealth of THEBES, from a contemptible state to take the lead in Greece; a dignity which the Thebans had never known before, and which fell, upon his loss, never to rise again. The same man was a pattern in private life of every thing virtuous and amiable; so that *Justin* well remarks—*fuit autem incertum, vir melior, an dux, esset.*

CORNELIUS NEPOS, having recorded the other parts of his Education, adds—at PHILOSOPHIÆ PRÆCEPTOREM habuit LYSIM, Tarentinum, PYTHAGOREUM; cui quidem sic fuit deditus, ut adolescens tristem et severum senem omnibus æqualibus suis in familiaritate anteposuerit, neque prius eum a se dimiserit, quam doctrinis tanto antecessit condiscipulos, ut facile intelligi posset pari modo superaturum omnes in cæteris artibus. *Corn. Nep. in Vit. Epaminon. c. 2. Justin. Hist. VI. 8. Cicer. de Oratore III. 34.*

As for ALEXANDER the Great, we may form a judgment, what sort of Education his Father PHILIP wished him to have, from that curious Epistle which he wrote to ARISTOTLE, upon ALEXANDER's birth. It is in its character so simple and elegant, that we have given it intire, as preserved by *Aulus Gellius*:

Φίλιππος Ἀριστοτέλει χαίρειν.

Ἴσθι μοι γεγονότα υἱόν· πολλὴν ἔν τοῖς θεοῖς χάριν ἔχω, ἔχ' ἔτι καὶ ἐπὶ τῇ γενέσει τῆ παιδός, ὡς ἐπὶ τῷ κατὰ τὴν σὴν ἡλικίαν αὐτὸν γεγόνεναι· ἐλπίζω γὰρ αὐτὸν, ὑπὸ σὲ τραφέντα καὶ παιδευθέντα, ἄξιον εἶσθαι καὶ ἡμῶν, καὶ τῆς τῶν πραγμάτων διαδοχῆς.

H h 2

PHI-



## ADDITIONAL NOTES.

PHILIP to ARISTOTLE greeting.

*Know that I have a Son born. On this account I am greatly thankful to the Gods, not so much for the birth of the child, as for his being born DURING YOUR TIMES: for I hope that by his being brede, and educated UNDER YOU, he will become worthy of us, and WORTHY TO SUCCEED IN THE MANAGEMENT OF AFFAIRS. A. Gell. IX. 3.*

What in fact this education was, we may learn not only from ALEXANDER's History, but from an observation of *Plutarch*, in answer to an objection, how *Alexander* could venture to attack such an immense power as the PERSIAN with such contemptible forces of his own. *Plutarch* says, that no forces could be greater or fairer than the several accomplishments of ALEXANDER's Mind—and concludes, that he marched against the Persians with better supplies from his Preceptor ARISTOTLE, than from his Father PHILIP.—πλείονας παρὰ Ἀριστοτέλους τῆ καθήκοντος, ἢ παρὰ Φιλίππου τῆ πατρὸς ἀφορμὰς ἔχων, διεβαινεν ἐπὶ Πέρσας. *Plut. de Alex. Fort. p. 327. Edit. Xyland.*

As for SCIPIO, the illustrious Conqueror of *Carthage*, we have this account of him and his Companion POLYBIUS (to whom we may add also PANÆTIUS) from VELLEIUS PATERCULUS —SCIPIO *tam elegans liberalium studiorum, omnisque doctrinæ et auctor et admirator fuit, ut POLYBIUM PANÆTIUMQUE, præcellentes ingenio viros, domi militiaque secum habuerit. Neque enim quisquam hoc Scipione elegantius intervalla negotiorum otio dispunxit, semperque aut belli, aut pacis servivit artibus; semperque inter arma et studia versatus, aut CORPUS PERICULIS, aut ANIMUM DISCIPLINIS exercuit. Vell. Pat. Hist. L. I. p. 19 Edit. Lipsii.*

During

During the *campaigns* of SCIPIO, POLYBIUS attended him even in the time of Action or Engagement ; as, for example, in that bold attempt, when SCIPIO, with POLYBIUS and thirty Soldiers only, undermined one of the Gates of Carthage. See *Ammian. Marcel. L. XXIV. 2.*

During more quiet intervals *Polybius* did not forget the duties of a Friend, or the dignity of a Philosopher, but gave advice, and that suitable to the character which SCIPIO wished to support in the Commonwealth. Among other things he advised him (as PLUTARCH informs us) never to quit the *Forum*, or place of public resort, before he had made himself some Friend, who was intimately conversant in the conduct of his fellow-citizens—  
 μὴ πρότερον ἐξ ἀγορᾶς ἀπελθεῖν, ἢ φίλου τινὰ ποιήσασθαι, σύνεργος ὄντα τῶν πράξεων τῶν πολιτῶν. *Plut. Symposiac. L. III p. 659. Edit. Xyl.*

To these instances we may add the peculiar regard which CÆSAR had for the Philosopher ARISTO, and POMPEY for the Philosopher CRATIPPUS. *Ælian* well remarks on these two great Romans, that, *they did not, because their power was great, despise those who had the power of doing them the greatest Services: ἔγὰρ, ἵπεί μέγα ἐδύναντο, ὑπερεφρόνεν τῶν τὰ μέγιστα αὐτὰς ὀνῆσαι δυναμένων. Ælian. Var. Hist. VII. 21.*

In the same author, L. III. C. 17. there is an express dissertation on this subject, worthy of perusal, as being filled with examples both from the *Grecian* and *Roman* History.



To these citations I shall add only one or two more.—  
*Et certè non tulit ullos hæc Civitas aut gloriâ clariores, aut auctoritate graviores, aut humanitate politiores, P. Africano, C. Lælio, L. Furio, qui secum eruditissimos homines ex Græciâ palam semper habuerunt. Cic. de Orat. II. 37.*

In the same work, to prove the Union of the PHILOSOPHICAL character and the POLITICAL, we have the following testimony, taken from the history of those Sages, so much celebrated in antiquity, PITTACUS, BIAS, SOLON, &c. *Hi omnes, præter Milesum THALEM, CIVITATIBUS SUIS PRÆFUERUNT. De Orator. III. 34.*

See also Cicero's tract titled *Orator*, Sect. 15. p. 137. *Edit. Oxon.* and the *Phædrus* of Plato, p. 1237, *Edit. Ficini*, in both which places the intimacy above-mentioned between PERICLES and ANAXAGORAS is recorded, and the importance also of this intimacy, as to the weight it gave PERICLES in the Commonwealth of Athens.

P. 55——TO THE BETTER CO-ARRANGEMENT OF, &c.] To the Quotations here given may be added the following one from VARRO.

PYTHAGORAS *Samius ait omnium rerum initia esse Bina: ut finitum et infinitum, bonum et malum, vitam et mortem, diem et noctem; quare item duo, status et motus. Quod stat aut agitur, Corpus: ubi agitur, Locus: dum agitur, Tempus: quod est in agitu, Actio. Quadripartitio magis sic elucebit: Corpus est, ut cursor: Locus, stadium quâ currit: Tempus, hora quâ currit: Actio, cursio. Quare fit, ut omnia ferè sint quadripartita, et ea æterna; quod neque unquam Tempus, quin fuerit Motus, (ejus enim inter-*



*intervallum Tempus;*) neque *Motus*, ubi non *Locus et Corpus*;  
(*quod alterum est, quod movetur* ; *alterum, ubi* ; ) neque, ubi  
fit agitated, non *Actio* ibi. Igitur *Initiorum quadrigæ*,  
**LOCUS et CORPUS, TEMPUS et ACTIO.**

PYTHAGORAS the Samian says that the Principles of all things are two and two, or double : as for example, Finite and Infinite, Good and Evil, Life and Death, Day and Night ; and by the same rule, Rest and Motion. [In these last] that which rests or is agitated, is **BODY**, the Where it is agitated, is **PLACE** ; the Whilst it is agitated, is **TIME** ; and in the agitation itself we view the **ACTION**.

This fourfold Division will better appear as follows. Call **BODY**, the Person who runs ; call **PLACE**, the Course, over which he runs ; call **TIME**, the hour during which he runs ; and let the Race or Running, be called the **ACTION**.

Now it happens, that almost all things are in this manner fourfold, and this fourfold Division is as it were eternal. The reason is, there never was Time, but there must have been Motion, (of which Time indeed is but the Interval ; ) nor Motion, but where there must have been Place and Body ; (one of which is the thing moved ; the other, that where it is moved ; ) nor Agitation, but where there must have been Action.

And hence it follows, that **PLACE and BODY, TIME and ACTION**, form, as it were, a joint Quaternion of Principles. *Varr. de Ling. Lat. L. 4. p. 7 Edit. Amstel.*

We have given this Passage at length, not only as it explains Co-arrangement, but as it exhibits to us four of those Predicaments or Arrangements, which make Parts

of this Treatise, viz. SUBSTANCE, WHEN, WHERE, ACTION.

P. 85.— OF PURE AND ORIGINAL BODY ]—

Συνεχὲς μὲν ἔν ἐστι τὸ διαιρετὸν εἰς αἰὶ διαιρετά· σῶμα δὲ, τὸ πάντῃ διαιρετόν· μεγέθους δὲ, τὸ μὲν ἐφ' ἑν, γραμμή· τὸ δ' ἐπὶ δύο, ἐπίπεδον· τὸ δ' ἐπὶ τρία, σῶμα· καὶ παρὰ ταῦτα ἔκ ἐστιν ἄλλο μέγεθος, διὰ τὸ τὰ τρία πάντα εἶναι, καὶ τὸ τρεῖς πάντῃ.—CONTINUOUS is that, which is divisible into Parts infinitely divisible; BODY is that, which is every way divisible. Of Extensions, that which is divisible one way, is a LINE; that which is divisible two ways, is a SUPERFICIES; that which is divisible three ways is BODY; and besides these, there is no other Extension, because THREE are ALL, and THRICE [Divisible] is EVERY WAY [Divisible]. *Aristot. de Cælo, L. I. c. 1.*

In Support of this last Idea (that the Term THREE implies ALL) *Aristotle* refers to the common practice of his own Language—τὰ μὲν γὰρ δύο ΑΜΦΩ λέγομεν, καὶ τὰς δύο ΑΜΦΟΤΕΡΟΥΣ, ΠΑΝΤΑ δ' ἑ λέγομεν· ἀλλὰ κατὰ τῶν τριῶν ταύτην τὴν προσηγορίαν φημὲν πρῶτον. *We call* (says he) TWO THINGS, or TWO PERSONS, BOTH; but we do not call them ALL: it is with regard to THREE, that we first apply THIS APPELLATION (viz. the Appellation of ALL.) *Arist. in loc.*

This is true likewise in *Latin*; and is true also in *English*. Even the vulgar with us would be surprised were they to hear any one say, Give me ALL TWO, instead of Give me BOTH.

For the Grammatical Idea of BOTH see *Hermes*, p. 226.

The



The *French*, by a strange solecism, say TOUS DEUX, a fault which we should not expect in an elegant language, corrected and refined by so many able writers.

P. 90.—CAN NEVER SUBSIST WITHOUT IT.] MATTER and ATTRIBUTE are essentially *distinct*, yet like Convex and Concave, they are by nature *inseparable*.

We have already spoken as to the *Inseparability of Attributes*: we now speak as to *that of Matter*.

Ἡμεῖς δὲ φαμέν ὕλην τινὰ τῶν σωμάτων τῶν αἰσθητῶν· ἀλλὰ ταύτην ἔχωρισήν, ἀλλ' αἰὲ μετ' ἐναντιώσεως—  
*We say there is a certain MATTER belonging to all Bodies, the Objects of Sense; a Matter, NOT SEPARABLE, but ever existing with some Contrariety.*

Soon after—Ἀρχὴν μὲν καὶ πρώτην ὑποθεμένους εἶναι τὴν ὕλην, τὴν ἀχώριστον μὲν, ὑποκειμένην δὲ τοῖς ἐναντίοις —  
*First, and for a Principle, we lay down MATTER, which is INSEPARABLE from the Contraries, and is their SUBJECT or SUBSTRATUM. Arist. de Gen. et Corr. Lib. 2. P. 34, 35. Edit. Sylb.*

By *Contraries* in this place he means the several Attributes of *Matter*, such as Hot and Cold, Black and White; Moist and Dry, &c. which are all of them Contrary one to the other, from some or other of which Matter is always INSEPARABLE.

P. 116.—ANIMATING FORMS, WHICH THOUGH THEMSELVES NOT BODY, ARE YET] —ὅσων γὰρ εἰσι ἀρχῶν ἡ ἐνέργεια σωματικὴ, δῆλον ὅτι ταύτας ἄνευ σώματος ἀδύνατον ὑπάρχειν· οἷον βαδίζειν ἄνευ ποδῶν. ὥς τε καὶ



## ADDITIONAL NOTES.

καὶ θύραθεν εἰσιέναι ἀδύνατον——λείπεται δὲ τὸν ΝΟΤΩΝ  
 ΜΟΝΟΝ θύραθεν ἐπεισιέναι, καὶ ΘΕΙΟΝ εἶναι μόνον· ἔδῃ  
 γὰρ αὐτῶν τῇ ἐνεργείᾳ κοινωνεῖ σωματικὴ ἐνέργεια——  
*As many Faculties or Principles of the Soul as require bodily  
 or corporeal Energy, [that is, which require a Body or  
 an Organ to enable them to act] these, 'tis evident, cannot  
 exist without a Body; as for example, the locomotive Faculty  
 of walking cannot exist without Feet: so that for such Facul-  
 ties to pass into the Body from without [originally separate  
 and detached from it] is a thing impossible.——It remains  
 therefore that MIND or INTELLECT ALONE should pass  
 into us FROM WITHOUT [that is, be separate and wholly  
 detached] and should ALONE be something DIVINE; be-  
 cause with the Energy of this Faculty Bodily Energy has no  
 communication—that is, there is no want of corporeal Or-  
 gans for reasoning and thinking, as there is want of Eyes,  
 for Seeing, or of Ears for Hearing. Arist. de Animal.  
 Gen. L. II. c. 3. p. 208, 209, Edit. Sylb.*

In another Place, speaking of those Parts of the Soul,  
 which are inseparable from Body, because they cannot  
 energize without it, he adds——*There is however no ob-  
 jection why some Parts should not be separable; and that, be-  
 cause they are the Energies of no one Body whatever. Be-  
 sides (he goes on and says) it is not yet evident, whether the  
 Soul may be not the Life and Energy of the Body, in the same  
 manner as the Pilot is the Life and Energy of the Ship.—*  
 Οὐ μὲν ἄλλ' ἑνὶά γε ἔθεν κωλύει, διὰ τὸ μηθενὸς εἶναι  
 σώματος ἐντελεχείας. Ἐτι δὲ ἄδηλον, εἰ οὕτως ἐντελέ-  
 χεια τῷ σώματι ἢ ψυχῇ, ὥσπερ πλωτὴρ πλοῖσι.  
*Arist. de Animâ, II. c. I.*

In this last instance he gives a fine illustration of the  
 Supreme and divine Part of the Soul, that is, the MIND  
 or INTELLECT. It belongs (it seems) to the Body, as  
 a Pi-

a Pilot does to the Ship; *within* which Ship, though the Pilot exist, and which said ship though the Pilot govern, yet is the Pilot notwithstanding *no part* of the Ship: he may leave it *without change* either in the Ship or in himself; and *may still* (we know) *exist when the Ship is no more.*

P. 129. — EA CURA QUIETOS SOLLICITAT?]  
'Twas the advice of the EPICUREANS with regard to *themselves, not to marry, not to have children, not to engage in public affairs*—ἐ γὰρ γαμητέον, ἀλλ' ὅδ' παιδοποιητέον, ἀλλ' ὅδ' πολιτευτέον. *Arrian. Epiet. III. 7. p. 384. Edit. Upt.* The *political Life*, according to them, was like that of *Sisyphus*, a Life of labour which knew no end.

*Hoc est adverso nixantem tundere monte  
Saxum, quod tamen a summo jam vertice rursùm  
Volvitur, et plani raptim petit æquora campi.  
Lucret. III. 1013, &c.*

Hence, with regard to *their Gods*, they provided them a similar Felicity; a Felicity, like their own, detached from all attention. Thus HORACE, when an *Epicurean*—

—Deos didici SECURUM AGERE ÆVUM,  
Nec, si quid miri faciat natura, DEOS id  
TRISTES ex alto cæli demittere tecto.  
*Hor. Lib. I, Sat. V.*

Thus EPICURUS himself—τὸ μακάριον καὶ ἀφθαρτον ἕτε αὐτὸ πράγματα ἔχει, ἕτε ἄλλω παρέχει—  
*That which is BLESSED and IMMORTAL* (meaning the Divine Nature) *HAS NEITHER ITSELF ANY BUSINESS, nor does it find business for any other.* *Diog. Laert. x. 139.*

AUSO-



## ADDITIONAL NOTES.

AUSONIUS has translated the sentiment in two Iambics, *Ep.* cxvi :

*Quod est beatum, morte et æternum carens,  
Nec sibi parit negotium, nec alteri.*

See also LUCRETIVS I. 57. VI. 83, whom *Horace* seems to have copied in the verses above quoted.

'Tis true *this* Idea destroyed that of a *Providence* ; but to them, who derived the World from a fortuitous Concourse of Atoms, such a consequence was of small importance.

P. 131.—AND SCAPE THY NOTICE.]

To the Citations in the note p. 150, may be added the following fine sentiment of THALES—Ἡρώτησέ τις αὐτὸν, εἰ λήθοι Θεὸς ἄνθρωπος ἀδικῶν· ἀλλ' ὁ δὲ διανοόμενος, ἔφη—One asked him, if a man might escape the knowledge of the Gods, when he was COMMITTING Injustice : No, says he, not even when he is MEDITATING it. *Diog. Laert.* i, 36.

P. 138.—WHO IS IT, THAT COMPREHENDS THE WHOLE?]

This Reasoning and that in *Hermes*, p. 362, abundantly shew the SUPREMACY of THE MIND among the Faculties of the *Human Soul*. 'Tis MIND that sees the Difference not only between Black and White, Bitter and Sweet, but (which no sense is equal to) the difference between Black and Bitter, White and Sweet, and the various tribes of heterogeneous Attributes. Nor does it shew this Supremacy in these Recognitions only,  
but



but likewise, when under *one and the same view* it recognises Objects of *Sense* and of *Intellect* united, as in case of Syllogisms made of *Propositions particular and universal*, such as, (if I may be permitted to speak after so scholastic a manner) such as the Syllogisms *Darii* and *Ferio* in the First Figure.

To this may be added, that this *joint Recognition* of things multiform, contrary, and heterogeneous, and that by THE SAME FACULTY, and in THE SAME UNDIVIDED INSTANT, seems to prove in the strongest manner that such FACULTY, (by this Faculty I mean the MIND or INTELLECT) must be INCORPOREAL; for *Body*, being *infinitely divisible*, is by no means susceptible of such a *simple and perfect Unity*, as this *Recognition* must necessarily be.

P. 192.—THE MOUNTAIN, WHICH BY ITS RELATION TO THE MOLEHILL WAS GREAT, BY &c.]

This may be true with regard to Mountains, and Molehills, and the other *more indefinite* parts of Nature; but with regard to the *more definite* parts, such as Vegetables, and Animals, here the *Quantities* are not left thus vague, but are, if not ascertained *precisely*, at least ascertained *in some degree*.

Thus ARISTOTLE—Ἐστὶ γάρ τι πᾶσι τοῖς ζώοις πέρασ τῆ μεγέθους· διὸ καὶ τῆς τῶν ὀστέων αὐξήσεως. Εἰ γὰρ ταῦτ' εἶχεν αὐξήσιν αἰεὶ, καὶ τῶν ζώων ὅσα ἔχει ὀστέον ἢ τὸ ἀνάλογον, ἢ οὐκ ἄνετ' αὐτὸς ἕως ἔζη. *All Animals have a certain Bound or Limit to their Bulk; for which reason the Bones have a certain Bound or Limit to their growth.—Were the Bones indeed to grow for ever, then of course, as many Animals as have Bone, or something analogous to it, would*  
continue

*continue to grow as long as they lived. Arist. de Anim. Gener. ii. 6. p. 227. Edit. Sylb.*

What follows from Simplicius is to the same purpose; only where he mentions FORM, we must understand that *efficient animating Principle*, described in the sixth chapter of this work.

Ἐκαστον Εἶδος συνυπάγει, μετὰ τῆς οἰκείας ιδιότητος, καὶ ποσὲ τι μέτρον σύμμετρον τῇ ιδιότητι· ἔ γὰρ σχῆμα μένου ἐπιφέρει μεθ' ἑαυτῆ τὸ εἶδος, ἀλλὰ καὶ μέγεθος, ὃ μετὰ διασάσεως εἰς τὴν ὕλην παραγίγνεται. Πλάτος δὲ ἔχει καὶ τῆτο ἐνθάδε διὰ τὸ ἀόριστον πῶς τῆς ἐνύλης φύσεως. Ἐὰν δὲ πολὺ τὸν ὅρον παραλλάξῃ, ἢ πρὸς το μείζον, ἢ πρὸς τὸ ἔλαττον, τέρας νομίζεται. *Every FORM introduces, along with its own original Peculiarity, a certain measure of Quantity, bearing proportion to that Peculiarity; for it brings with itself not a FIGURE only, but a MAGNITUDE also, which passes into the Matter, by giving it extent. Now even here this Magnitude has a sort of latitude, from the indefinite nature of the material Principle [with which it is united.] But yet, notwithstanding if it change the Bound or Limit, either as to greater or to less, in a remarkable degree, the Being [by such deviation] is esteemed a Monster. Simplic. in Præd. p. 37. A. Edit. Basil.*

SIMPLICIUS gives examples of this Deviation in the case of *Giants* and of *Dwarfs*.

P. 244.—SPECTATORS—MADE OUT OF THOSE THAT WENT BEFORE.] The *Subject Matter* is the same in many succeeding Beings; as the *River* is the same; which, as it flows along, reflects many different Objects. 'Tis in this sense we are to understand the following  
After-



Affertion, and not with the least view to *equivocal* Production :

Οὐκ ἔν δια τὸ τὴν τῷδε φθορὰν ἄλλα εἶναι γένεσιν, καὶ τὴν τῷδε γένεσιν ἄλλα εἶναι φθορὰν, ἀπαυσοῦ ἀναγκαῖον εἶναι τὴν μεταβολήν. *Wherefore, from the Dissolution of one thing being the Generation of another, and the Generation of one thing being the Dissolution of another, it necessarily follows that the Change must be perpetual and never cease.* *Arist. de Gen. et Corr. L. 1. c. 3. p. 10. Edit. Syll.*

The Change here alluded to is the common course of Nature in the Production of Beings, which, were it not for the Process *above-mentioned*, would either soon be at a stand, or would require a perpetual Miracle for the supply of *new* Materials.

P. 278.—THE THEORY OF ACTION AND REACTION.]

Of this Doctrine we have the following account.—  
Αἴτιον δὲ τῶ μὲν λύεσθαι τὰς κινήσεις, ὅτι τὸ ποιεῖν καὶ πάχει ὑπὸ τῆ πάχοντος· οἷον τὸ τέμνον ἀμβλύνεται ὑπὸ τῆ τεμνομένης, καὶ τὸ θερμαῖνον ψύχεται ὑπὸ τῆ θερμαινόμενης, καὶ ὅλως τὸ κινῶν (ἔξω τῆ Πρώτης) ἀντικινεῖται τινα κίνησιν· οἷον ὡθῶν ἀντωθεῖται πῶς, καὶ ἀντιθλίβεται τὸ θλίβον. *The Cause why Motions are stopt, is, that THE ACTING POWER IS ALSO ACTED UPON BY THAT, UPON WHICH IT ACTS; for example the cutting Power is blunted by that which is cut; and the warming Power is cooled by that which is warmed; and in general the moving Principle (excepting the SUPREME and FIRST) is reciprocally moved itself under some motion or other; the impelling Power,*



*Power, for instance, is after a manner re-impelled; and the compressing Power, after a manner re-comprest. Aristot. de Animal. Gener. L. 4. p. 280. Edit. Sylb.*

P. 281. ——— DOUBLE IN ITS POWERS, &c.]  
 Ἰκανὸν γὰρ θάτερον μέρος τῆς ἐναντιώσεως, ἐαυτὸ τε κρρί-  
 νειν, καὶ τὸ ἀντικείμενον· καὶ γὰρ τῷ εὐθεῖ καὶ αὐτὸ καὶ τὸ κάμ-  
 πυλον γινώσκουμεν, κριτὴς γὰρ ἀμφοῖν ὁ κανὼν· τὸ δὲ κάμ-  
 πυλον, ἔθ' ἐαυτῷ ἔτε τῷ εὐθέος.—*One of the two Parts in the Contrariety is sufficient to judge both itself and its opposite. 'Tis thus that by the Strait we come to know both the strait and the crooked, for the strait Rule of the Artist is a judge of both. But the crooked on the other side is no judge either of itself, or of the Strait. Arist. de An. i, 5.*

P. 283. — EXISTED PREVIOUSLY IN ENERGIE.]  
 Ὅσα φύσει γίγνεται ἢ τέχνη, ὑπὸ ἐνεργείᾳ οὗτος γίγνεται ἐκ  
 τῷ δυνάμει τοιούτῃ.—*Whatever things are made either by Nature or by Art, are made OUT of something, having a capacity to become the thing produced, and that THROUGH the operation of something, which already exists in Energy. De Animal. Gener. p. 204. Edit. Sylb.*

P. 297.—AS THEY STAND RELATED TO PLACE]  
 The Force of this Arrangement or Predicament WHERE, is finely contrasted with the Predicament of QUANTITY, in that Laconic Apophthegm of AGIS. The Lacedæmonians (said he) do not ask HOW MANY the Enemies are, but WHERE they are: Οὐκ ἔφη δὲ τὰς Λακεδαιμονίους ἐρωτᾶν ΠΟΣΟΙ εἰσὶν οἱ πολέμιοι, ἀλλὰ ΠΟΥ εἰσιν. Plut. Lacon. Apophth. p. 215. D. Edit. Xyland.

P. 332.—THE DYING GLADIATOR, &c.] To these Attitudes may be added that, given by LYSIPPUS to the  
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the Statue of ALEXANDER the Great. That Prince had a certain Extension of Neck, which made him gently recline it upon his left Shoulder. When his Figure was cast in brass by *Lysippus*, the Artist ingeniously contrived to convert this *natural defect* into an Attitude of Magnificence. His Head, being reclined, was made, with a sort of insolent look, to contemplate the *Heavens*, as if things *below* were *already* at his command. And hence the meaning of that celebrated Epigram, in which this Work of Brass is supposed to address *Jupiter* in the following words ;

Αὐδάσονται δ' ἔοικεν ὁ χάλκεος, εἰς Διὰ λεύσσων,  
Γᾶν ὑπ' ἐμοὶ τίθεμαι· Ζεῦ, σὺ δ' Ὀλύμπου ἔχει.

*The Brass looks up to Jove, and seems to cry,  
This Earth is MINE ; do THOU possess the Sky.*

*Plutarch. de Vitâ et For. Alex. p. 335. Edit. Xyland. See also Brodæi Epigram. Gr. L. IV. p. 454. Edit. Franc. 1600, where the Lines here cited are introduced by two others.*

P.337.—FROM POETS TO ACTORS, &c.] See *Cic. de Orat. iii. 56, 57, 58, 59. Edit. Pearce*, where 'tis worth remarking, (c. 59.) so much stress is laid on the management of the *Countenance*, and of the *Eyes* in particular, that we are informed the old men of that age did not greatly praise even *Roscius* himself, when he appeared in his *Mask*—*quo melius nostri illi senes, qui PERSONATUM ne ROSCIUM quidem magnopere laudabant ; ANIMI est enim omnis ACTIO ; et imago animi VULTUS est, indices OCULI.*



P. 355.—MOUNTAINS CLOATHED WITH WOOD.] Thus CICERO—*Spatia frugifera atque immensa camporum, vestitusque densissimos montium, pecudum pastus, &c. DeNat. Deor. ii. 64. p. 253. Edit. Davis.*—And before, in the same treatise, he speaks of the *Earth*, as *vestita floribus, herbis, arboribus, frugibus, &c. ii. 39. p. 195.*—Yet all this we must remember is but *metaphorical*.

P. 366.—IS SCIENCE PRIOR TO ART?] *Nihil est enim, quod ad ARTEM redigi possit, nisi ille PRIUS, qui illa tenet, quorum Artem instituere vult, habeat illam SCIENTIAM, ut ex iis rebus, quarum Ars NONDUM sit, Artem efficere possit. Cic. de Orat. i. 41. Edit. Pearce, &c. p. 63. Edit. Oxon.*

This Citation well proves a part of what is here asserted, viz. the necessary Priority of some Science to every Art.

P. 389.—AND TO IT'S OPPOSITE NON-BEING.] These MOTIONS under the name of *Changes* (μεταβολαί) are well explained, as follows.

“Όταν μὲν εἴη κατὰ τὸ ποσὸν ἢ ἡ μεταβολὴ τῆς ἐναντιώσεως, αὐξήσεις καὶ φθίσεις· ὅταν δὲ κατὰ τόπον, φορά. ὅταν δὲ κατὰ πάθος, καὶ τὸ ποιεῖν, αἰλοῖσεις· ὅταν δὲ μηδὲν ὑπομένῃ, ἢ δι᾽ ἄτερον πάθος ἢ συμβεβηκὸς ὄλως, γένεσις· τὸ δὲ, φθορά.—When therefore the Change of the contrary Attribute is according to the QUANTITY, 'tis AUGMENTATION or DIMINUTION; when according to the PLACE, 'tis LOCAL MOTION; when according to any Affection, or QUALITY, 'tis ALIATION. When NOTHING REMAINS, of which the new production can be  
as



at all considered as an Affection, or an Attribute, 'tis then GENERATION; and the contrary, DISSOLUTION. *Arist. de Gen. et Corr. L. I. c. 4. p. 14. Edit. Sylb.*

P. 409.—BUT WE CALL IT METAPHYSICAL.]

*Philoponus* in a very few words well explains the term, METAPHYSICAL. Speaking of the *First* and *Supreme Cause* of all things, he adds—περὶ μὲν ἔνι ἐκείνῃ εἰπεῖν, τῆς πρώτης ἐστὶ φιλοσοφίας· θεολογία γὰρ οἰκεῖον, καὶ τῇ META TA ΦΥΣΙΚΑ πραγματεία· μᾶλλον δὲ PRO ΤΩΝ ΦΥΣΙΚΩΝ, πρὸς ἡμᾶς γὰρ ὑστερα τὰ τῇ φύσει πρότερα—*To speak concerning this Principle, is the business of the FIRST PHILOSOPHY, for it is a Subject belonging to Theology, and to that Speculation, which is METAPHYSICAL, that is to say, SUBSEQUENT TO MATTERS PHYSICAL, or rather indeed 'tis a Subject PRIOR TO MATTERS PHYSICAL, in as much as those things with regard TO US are SUBSEQUENT, which are BY NATURE PRIOR.* *Philop. in Aristot. de Gen. et Corr. p. 12. Edit. Ald. Venet. 1527.*

415.—THE COMMON NAME OF PERCEPTION.]

This word, PERCEPTION, is of the most extensive meaning, and not only includes *Intellection* but *Sensation* also, and that of the lowest degree. What is here called Perception, is by *Aristotle* called KNOWLEDGE.

—Γνώσεώς τινος πάντα (scil. ζῷα) μετέχουσι, τὰ μὲν πλείονος, τὰ δ' ἐλάττω, τὰ δὲ πάντα μικρᾶς, αἴσθησιν γὰρ ἔχουσιν· ἡ δ' αἴσθησις, γνῶσις τις. Ταύτης δὲ τὸ τίμιον καὶ ἀτιμὸν πολὺ διαφέρει σκοπεῖσι πρὸς φρόνησιν, καὶ πρὸς τὸ τῶν ἀψύχων γένος. Πρὸς μὲν γὰρ φρό-

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υησιν, ὥσπερ ἔδεν εἶναι δοκεῖ τὸ κοινωνεῖν ἀφ᾽ ἧς καὶ γεύσεως μόνου· πρὸς δὲ ἀναισθησίαν, βέλτιστον. Ἀγαπῆτὸν γὰρ ἂν δόξῃ τὸ ταύτης τυχεῖν τῆς γνώσεως, ἀλλὰ μὴ κείσθαι τεθνεώς καὶ μὴ ὄν.

*All Animals share a degree of KNOWLEDGE ; some of them, a greater ; others of them, a less ; and some of them, an exceedingly small degree ; for they have all of them SENSATION, and SENSATION IS A SORT OF KNOWLEDGE. But the Value and the No-value of Sensation is widely different, when we compare it with RATIONAL COMPREHENSION on the one side, and with the race of BEINGS INANIMATE on the other. With regard to RATIONAL COMPREHENSION, the mere partaking of TASTE and TOUCH alone, appears to be as nothing ; but with regard to pure INSENSIBILITY it is something most excellent. For [when compared to Beings Insensible] it may surely appear a blessed Event, to be possess of THIS Knowledge, and not [resembling them] to lie as dead and a Non-entity. Aristot. de Animal. Gener. Lib. I. sub. fin. p. 197. Edit. Syllb.*

P. 426.—ENDS IN IT'S ACQUISITION.]

Πάντα γὰρ τὰ ζῶα καὶ κινεῖ καὶ κινεῖται ἕνεκά τινος· ὥςτε τῷτ' ἐστὶν αὐτοῖς πάσης κινήσεως πέρας, τὸ ἕ ἕνεκα.  
*All Animals both move, and are moved for the sake of something ; so that this something, that is to say, THE FINAL CAUSE, is the BOUND or LIMIT of all their Motion. Arist. de Animal. Mot. C. 6. p. 153. Edit. Syllb.*

P. 463.—CONCERNING PREDICAMENTS OR PHILOSOPHICAL ARRANGEMENTS.] Many learned and ingenious Observations on this Subject, as well as on several other parts of ancient Philosophy (*the Peripatetic*

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*tetic* in particular) have been given to the World in a Tract lately published, styled, ON THE ORIGIN AND PROGRESS OF LANGUAGE, IN TWO VOLUMES, 8vo.

There may be found too in the second Volume many judicious and curious remarks on *Style, Composition, Language*, particularly *the English*; observations of the last consequence to those, who wish either to write or to judge with accuracy and elegance.

The Author of these Arrangements might have availed himself of many Citations from this Work, highly tending to illustrate and to confirm his Opinions, but unfortunately for him, the greater part of his own Treatise was printed off, before the second Volume of this Work appeared.





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F I N I S.

## ERRATA.

P. 21, after the Greek quotation, and before the words, *edit Sylb.* insert 12.

P. 31, l. 16, for CATEGORICS read CATEGORIES.

P. 36, in the note, for *Anti-prædicamenta* read *Ante-præd.*

P. 327, l. 7, for *Parallelipipeton*, read *Parallelepipedon*.

In the Index, under the article, *Attitudes*, for *Dependence* read *Despondence*.

— under the article, *Motion*, after the word, *Aristotle*, instead of p. 147 read 247.

— under the article, *Power*, after the words, *or capacity*, insert  
\* 277.



